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Abstract:  
 
 
 
In this study, departing from a more general concern with understanding how political 
frontiers are demarcated in Turkish politics, I aim to show how ‗Europe‘ contributed to such a 
process of constructing political frontiers during the 1999-2008 period. Rather than looking at 
the debates on ‗Europe‘ within the Turkish political landscape through a pro- vs. anti- Europe 
bifurcation, I attempt to see the discourses through the lens of ‗hegemony‘. By using Laclau- 
Mouffean discourse analysis, starting from 1999, I argue that discourses on ‗Europe‘ were 
able to hegemonise Turkish political debates and thereby demarcate the political frontiers that 
constituted that debate which started to change when discourses began to be substituted by 
different antagonisms, political frontiers and therefore modes of sustaining hegemony.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
ROADS AND STORIES 
 
 
 
The famous Turkish-German director Fatih Akın, in his movie Im Juli tells us the entertaining 
story of Daniel who follows the sun, the metaphorical representation of the girl he fell for, 
from Hamburg to Istanbul. Im Juli is a road film which plays on serendipitous encounters and 
road stories. Daniel never meets the girl he followed to Istanbul but instead, on the way to the 
‗sun‘, he falls into love with another girl and finds out that the ‗sun‘ he has been searching for 
is actually the road stories and encounters ‗on the way‘. 
 
It would not be an overstatement to claim that ‗Europe‘ within this context is both the journey 
and ‗the sun‘ for Turkey starting from the 19th century. Stretching from Selim the Third, the 
Ottoman Sultan who initiated the restructuring of the Ottoman army along European lines to 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, who clearly saw Europe as the embodiment of civilisation and 
constructed Turkish modernity on this premise, emergence of ‗Europe‘ as a journey and a 
goal to acquire has characterised the Turkish political history from the 19
th
 century onwards. 
This intense preoccupation gained particular momentum with the official acceptance of 
Turkey as a membership candidate after the Helsinki European Council in 1999. This 
heralded a new stage in Turkey‘s European journey, the most important repercussion of which 
has been the penetration of ‗Europe‘ into the Turkish domestic debates (Ulusoy, 2006).  
Especially within this new stage, the notion of ‗Europe‘ has, more often than not, been seen 
through the lens of the so-called ‗Europeanisation‘ within the academic repertoire. 
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In this study, departing from a more general concern with understanding how political 
frontiers are demarcated in Turkish politics, I will seek to show how ‗Europe‘ contributed to 
such a process of constructing political frontiers during the 1999-2008 period. As will be 
scrutinised later, political frontiers
1
 in this respect refer to the symbolic fault line between 
various political identities. This attempt is in contrast to more typical approaches to the topic, 
which focus instead on the concept of ‗Europeanisation‘. The main and general contribution 
of the thesis, therefore, is not only that it enables an understanding of this process whereby 
political frontiers are constructed through a reflexive and unfixed process, rather than seeing 
this as an automated and categorical relationship between the European and domestic level (as 
the Europeanisation literature tends towards), but also in terms of shedding light on how the 
debates and discourses on ‗Europe‘ shaped politics during that period. Therefore, ‗Europe-as-
hegemony‘, the term I will be using very often throughout the project, is the name of the 
struggle itself for the hegemonic positions of political identities rather than a given concept 
with upper case, which would be the case in case of Europeanisation literature. 
Europeanisation literature, which will be the focus of Chapter 2, poses an automatic and 
uncontroversial top-down relationship between the European level and domestic level and this 
relationship is inherently asymmetrical by definition. However, from the perspective of this 
project, we need to look at the relationship between ‗Europe‘ and Turkish domestic politics 
from the lens of ‗hegemony‘ and how the former shapes and hegemonises politics. This is an 
on-going, unfixed and contested process based on political struggle. 
 
In this way, it is possible to see the road stories ‗on the way‘ under a different light.  Why do 
we talk about ‗Europe‘ all the time? What makes these road stories so significant and resonant 
                                                            
1  Throughout the project, I will be using phrases such as ‗drawing political frontiers‘and ‗contributing to the 
political frontiers‘ interchangibly to point out the contingent and ongoing nature of political frontier demarcation.   
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within the Turkish political landscape? How are we shaped by the road itself? And finally, 
when do we stop talking about the road stories although it is still going on? For me, these 
questions bring the ‗hegemony‘ dimension to the project at hand. As will be elaborated later, 
the famous concept of ‗hegemony‘ coined by Antonio Gramsci and elaborated by Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe sets the limits of what is common sense and acceptable in social 
imaginary in cultural, political and social terms. Therefore, it is very helpful to look at the 
road stories ‗on offer‘ through the lens of ‗hegemony‘ to see how some particular stories 
materialised in a particular way so that they are more significant when compared to others. 
 
All in all, in this project I will seek the ways in which these discourses on ‗Europe‘ had an 
impact on the journey with/to ‗Europe‘ and set the limits and itinerary of the stories. Although 
there are a number of studies dealing with the Turkish discourses on ‗Europe‘, this has never 
been done through the lens of ‗hegemony‘ (e.g. Tekin, 2005; Avcı, 2004; Öniş, 2007). These 
studies usually reflect on the discourses through pro- vs. anti-Europe bifurcation and make an 
automatic and stable association between political positions and stances vis-à-vis ‗Europe‘. 
Not much effort has been directed towards the question of how ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ 
emerges through these discourses and how various political positions are formed. Moreover, 
there is often not that much difference between being anti-/pro-Europe in terms of reifying a 
particular conception of ‗Europe‘. Therefore, within this project, rather than seeing different 
representations of ‗Europe‘ as uncontested discourses of some political inclinations, I will 
scrutinise these discourses from a ‗hegemony‘ lens. 
 
No doubt, it is a very fruitful and necessary mapping exercise to trace the discourses on 
‗Europe‘ and to understand the ways in which the notion of ‗Europe‘ is constructed. It is of 
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value to know that the discourses are there, which would to a great extent help to understand 
the road stories. But, the question is, where to go from here? What do all these have to do 
with hegemony? How do we recognise ‗hegemony‘ within the political landscape when we 
see it? 
 
I think the best way to look at the impact of ‗hegemony‘ within the political terrain is to 
search for the ways in which it speaks to the political frontiers and how it shapes the political 
identities, focusing on the performative aspect of the discourses. What I mean by ‗political 
frontiers‘ here, which will be elaborated in Chapter 3, is the symbolic dividing line between 
different political identities. Therefore, as a response to these fair questions, the next attempt 
of the project will be to understand the ways in which these discourses demarcate the political 
frontiers in Turkish politics. In order to reflect on the performative aspect of the discourses on 
‗Europe‘, I will look at how they speak to the political frontiers in the Turkish political 
landscape and how politics is precipitated with regard to ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘. 
 
The thesis: a summary of the project 
 
With these premises in mind, the overall thesis presented here is that starting from 1999, 
discourses on ‗Europe‘ attempted  to hegemonise Turkish political debates and thereby to 
demarcate the political frontiers that constituted that debate; this started to change when 
discourses began to be substituted by different antagonisms, political frontiers and therefore 
modes of hegemonic struggle. The thesis is, therefore, interested in understanding the 
emergence of ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ in the aftermath of 1999 in Turkish political debates, a 
key concept I will be using throughout the project. From 2005 and 2006, however, such 
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discourses on Europe have been silenced so that they are no longer able to contribute to the 
construction of political identities. In this respect, ‗Europe‘ ceased to be a hegemonic project. 
 
The contribution of the project 
 
 
The main contribution of this project to the political science repertoire is theoretical. The 
initial claim is that political scientists focusing on the 1999-2008 period in Turkish politics 
with regard to ‗Europe‘ have typically adopted the Europeanisation literature as their starting 
point. This is inherently problematic in the sense that it sets an automatic and uncontested 
relationship between the European level and the domestic level, in this case the Turkish 
politics. Even if the asymmetry in this relationship is sometimes called ‗hegemony‘, albeit 
rarely (see for instance Dimitrova, 2002), there have not been any studies dealing with how 
the hegemony of ‗Europe‘ is sustained through discourses on ‗Europe‘ and the political 
frontiers it demarcates rather than through mechanisms of Europeanisation per se. Secondly, 
although there are a number of studies dealing with the Turkish discourses on ‗Europe‘, this is 
rarely done through the lens of ‗hegemony‘. These studies usually see discourses through a 
pro- vs. anti-Europe bifurcation and make an automatic and stable association between 
political camps and discourses on ‗Europe‘. Not much effort has been directed towards 
questioning how those political positions are constructed and how ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ is 
sustained through these discourses. Moreover, the thesis introduces the claim that there is 
often not that much difference between being anti-/pro-Europe in terms of reifying a 
particular conception of ‗Europe‘, which will be referred to as ‗bipolar hegemony‘ throughout 
the study, referring to two ends of the political spectrum. 
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Secondly, I also claim that there is a need to emphasise that the two hegemonic strategies, i.e. 
the logics of equivalence and difference, are attempts, but not pre-requisites for hegemonic 
politics. As I will scrutinise in Chapter 3 in case of the operationalisation of these logics and 
as Chapter 7 will show, which outlines the features of ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ in Turkish 
politics; these logics are very helpful in understanding antagonisms, demarcation of political 
frontiers and the hegemonic struggle. However, we also need to identify other factors (e.g. 
institutions, socio-economic factors etc.) at the political terrain to claim that hegemony is 
constructed at a political setting. In particular, the current analysisof newspapers and 
parliamentary debates to trace ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ in Turkish politics after 1999 shows 
that we need more empirical evidence to claim that these particular discourses split the social 
(logic of equivalence) or subvert this split (logic of difference) in Turkish politics as 
straightforwardly as Laclau and Mouffe would argue. The questioning of the relevance of 
Laclau-Mouffean theoretical framework to real political settings have been done before by 
different scholars (e.g. Townshend, 2004; Torfing, 1999; Critchley and Marchart, 2004). 
However, substantiating this claim with reference to the logics of equivalence and difference 
and to the distinction between notions of ‗hegemony‘ and ‗hegemonic struggle‘, which I aim 
to do in Chapter 3, is a novel attempt.   
 
Last, but not least, I put forward the notions of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ as the privileged 
signifiers of Turkish politics, which is a new claim. As Chapter 4 will elaborate, for any 
signifier to sustain hegemony in Turkish politics, it has to relate itself to the signifiers of 
‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ which have materialised in different ways in different periods, yet 
always significant and ‗privileged‘. This claim might constitute a contribution to future 
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discursive analytical strategies so that other researchers will use this method in tracing 
discourses and their performative role in sustaining hegemony. 
 
Limitations of the project 
 
However, it is very difficult to deal with and operationalise the concept of ‗hegemony‘, as has 
already been pointed out by many scholars talking about the concept in its Gramscian sense 
(Tünay, 1983; Morton, 2007) which is understood ‗as a contested, fragile and tenuous 
process, rather than simply a structure or edifice‘ (Morton, 2007: 78). The picture becomes 
even more complicated when the concept is approached from a discourse theory point of view 
as discourse theory stresses the ultimate contingency of all social identity and partial fixity of 
meaning and hegemony (Howarth et. al., 2000), thereby adding an element of contingency to 
the concept. It is important to underline here that the notion I will be using throughout the 
thesis, ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘, denotes an attempt, i.e. a hegemonic struggle, rather than the 
hegemony itself. Therefore, as I will elaborate on in Chapter 3, the question explored here is 
not how ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ is formed, but how it is maintained. As Chapter 6 and 
Chapter 7 will attempt to do in the Turkish context, what we can empirically show by using a 
Laclau-Mouffean theoretical framework is that ‗Europe‘ operates as a hegemonic struggle and 
a tendency to be a hegemonic practice, but not the hegemony per se, which is the main 
limitation of the project.  
 
Moreover, as will be elaborated in the Methodology section here, there is not a prescribed and 
free-standing set of rules and techniques that can be taken ‗off-the-shelf‘ and applied in 
discourse theory. Indeed, it has been often claimed that methodological deficit is one of the 
most important alleged deficits of the discourse theory (Howarth, 2008). The inherent 
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difficulties attached to the concepts I am dealing with and the methodological framework I am 
using are therefore evident in the modesty of the empirical findings. As will be elaborated 
upon below, I use three newspapers from different points of the political spectrum to identify 
particular discourses on ‗Europe‘ and outline the way in which discourses on ‗Europe‘ 
became hegemonic. I then move to tell the story of how the discourses on ‗Europe‘ shape 
politics and political identities in the 1999-2008 period. In order to do this, I also use 
parliamentary debates to see the ways in which ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ operated as a 
hegemonic struggle. I claim that ‗Europe‘ attempted  to draw political frontiers in the 
immediate aftermath of 1999 and hegemonise the social whereas this started to change in 
2005 and 2006. However, my reality in this respect is the newspaper statements and 
parliamentary debates. . One can always come up with a text which would challenge the 
arguments made here. Moreover, hegemony is a multi-faceted concept which would be 
reflected in various realms such as political economy and foreign policy. This project shows 
only an aspect of ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ and treats it as a struggle which is perhaps the main 
limitation of the present project. Nevertheless, the thesis traces the existing discourses on 
‗Europe‘ studied through the conceptual lens of ‗hegemony‘ and thereby enables a reflection 
and application of a novel theoretical approach to the study of Turkish politics, making a 
significant and important contribution to existing  understanding of the topic of investigation. 
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Scope of the project 
 
The time-span of the research will be the period from 1999 onwards. Although Turkey‘s 
journey with ‗Europe‘ dates back to earlier times, the Helsinki European Council in 
December 1999 when Turkey was granted candidacy status to the EU is one of the most 
significant variants in this regard. After this date, the penetration of the notion of ‗Europe‘ 
into domestic debates has been accelerated both in conceptual and political terms. The 
concept has been extensively used because the age-old depiction of ‗Europe‘ as a 
civilisational albeit rather abstract signifier acquired a much more concrete and tangible 
reference. As the European debate in Turkish politics is an ongoing process, it is hard to 
sketch its temporal end point. However, for the purposes of the present project, the end point 
selected is that when the case to close down the ruling party AKP (Justice and Development 
Party) was brought before the Constitutional Court in March 2008, as this case is of utmost 
importance for the Turkish domestic politics in general and for the political discourses in 
particular. These methodological premises of the project are elaborated in Chapter 4. 
 
The discourses referred to in the thesis are elite discourses identified through newspaper 
sources and parliamentary debates. The reason for this selection process is that elite 
discourses are primarily uttered in such media, thereby setting the limits on what could be 
said and what could not. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, in adopting a ‗hegemony‘ 
perspective, it makes more sense to look at elite discourses as hegemony is generally speaking 
a top-down process
2
. ‗The elite‘ within this context denotes the political elite composed of the 
                                                            
2 For Gramsci, who coined the term, there are two ways of sustaining hegemony: passive revolution, where the 
dominant class, though hegemony, neutralizes other classes‘ and groups‘ interests and ideological struggles, 
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Members of Parliament, high level party officials; the economic elite composed of public and 
private sectors‘ representatives at decision making levels, business community representatives 
at the local level; the administrative and bureaucratic elite composed of high level 
bureaucrats, municipalities and local opinion leaders, governors‘ office, and military elite. 
 
Analytical toolkit 
 
In order to elaborate upon the above claims, it is better to start by substantiating what I mean 
by ‗Europe‘. Throughout the project, I am generally interested in how ‗Europe‘ is constructed 
through the domestic political debates in Turkey in the aftermath of 1999. It is important to 
note at this point that due to the key developments of the period selected, ‗Europe‘ more often 
than not means the EU. In this respect, ‗Europe‘ within the framework of this project is 
treated as a signifier around which different meanings are articulated. As the research will 
show, ‗Europe‘ sometimes takes the form of a construction that would help stop terrorism in 
Turkey while sometimes it is taken as a threat to Turkishness. Therefore, I am interested in 
‗Europe‘ both as a contestation and an impact . By the same token, ‗discourse‘ in this project 
is the ways in which ‗Europe‘ emerges as a political issue. It is a practice through which 
‗Europe‘ contributes to the construction of antagonisms within the social, thereby attempting 
to sustain  hegemony. 
 
Another important concept I am interested in is that of the ‗political frontier‘, as the core aim 
of this project is to explore the extent to which ‗Europe‘ demarcates political frontiers in 
Turkish politics after 1999. By ‗political frontier‘, I mean the symbolic dividing line between 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
whereas in inclusive hegemony, the dominant group creates a national-collective will entailing the interests and 
demands of the ruled (see Gramsci, 1973; Jessop, 1983; Tünay, 1993 for more details).  
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different political identities which is contingently constructed. The question I am trying to 
explore here is: ‗how are discourses on ‗Europe‘ relevant in terms of constructing the dividing 
line between political identities?‘ What is the criterion of demarcating a political frontier 
then? What shall we take from the idea that a particular concept or a discourse draws 
politically relevant boundaries? My main criterion at this point is that a concept, a signifier or 
a discourse is able to draw political frontiers to the extent that it creates an antagonism and 
that antagonism is a part of a hegemonic struggle. . Therefore, the demarcation of political 
frontiers by discourses on ‗Europe‘ means that the political identities identify, locate, 
construct and differentiate themselves within the political field by employing different 
signifiers of these discourses (e.g. ‗free market, ‗social justice‘ or ‗multiculturalism). By this 
token, in thisexample, the antagonism is the difference between various depictions of 
‗Europe‘ (e.g. ‗free market‘ or ‗multiculturalism‘) and shows the limits of what political 
actors mean when they employ discourses on ‗Europe‘. Therefore, ‗antagonism‘ is a moment 
which temporarily and contingently fixes political and group identities and determines the 
limits of who/what is outside the political identity and who/what is not.  
 
Last, but not least, what I understand by the term hegemony is the conviction on the part of 
political identities that a particular discourse is the lingua franca of politics so that each and 
every political identity has to talk that language in order to assert its location within politics. 
As I will elaborate on in Chapter 3, lingua franca in this context denotes a signifying 
grammar in terms of which a particular social practice can be instituted and maintained, 
whereas others rejected. Moreover, this lingua franca is not an ordinary one, but one which is 
able to create antagonisms by setting the language and limits of the political with regard to 
which people take sides and politically negotiate.  
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Theoretical Framework 
 
In order to trace the discourses and different representations of ‗Europe‘, I will be using a 
Laclau-Mouffean discourse theoretical framework. With their emphasis on the extension of 
the scope of politics and on the role of discourses in constructing identities, Chantal Mouffe 
and Ernesto Laclau provide an inspiring perspective in terms of understanding social practices 
as discursive articulatory processes and the interplay of antagonisms. According to this 
conception, ‗there is only politics, when there are frontiers‘ (Laclau, 1990: 159-174). If this 
project aims to find out how political frontiers are constructed through discourses on 
‗Europe‘, a Laclau- Mouffean theoretical framework is more helpful than the Europeanisation 
literature (which does not pay attention to the political), than a social constructivist 
framework (which assumes identities to be rather stable and uncontested) and finally than a 
Foucauldian framework (where practices of power in everyday life are more significant than 
political frontiers as such).  
 
 
Methodology 
 
In order to present the discourses on ‗Europe‘ in Turkish political debates from 1999 
onwards, I will use two privileged signifiers of Turkish politics- ‗democracy‘ and ‗security‘. 
In this respect, my methodology is mainly constructed in line with the claim that for any 
discourse to be hegemonic, significant and resonant and able to construct political frontiers, it 
has to relate itself to these privileged signifiers. Therefore, by devising a list of questions in 
line with the historical relevance of the concepts of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘, I will seek 
how discourses on ‗Europe‘ are constructed in relation to these privileged signifiers. In this 
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respect, I offer a third methodological approach between Ole Wæver, who takes discourses as 
moves within pre-existing national ‗layers‘ making any discourse possible at the national 
setting and Thomas Diez, who initially singles out a set of sub-discourses as ideal types and 
moves on to trace them within any discourse, which are thoroughly scrutinised in Chapter 3. 
In the Methodology chapter, I also identify the historical discursive space within which the 
signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ have been articulated which made possible the 
emergence of these signifiers as ‗privileged‘. By this way, I aim to highlight the standard 
narratives and discourses through which the signifiers of ‗democracy‘ and ‗security‘ emerged, 
and to show that my designation of these concepts as privileged signifiers does not take place 
in a vacuum but emerges within a discursive background.  
  
 
Locating the thesis within the field: engagement with the relevant disciplinary literature 
 
Therefore, the overall thesis that discourses on ‗Europe‘ were able to hegemonise Turkish 
political debates and thereby demarcate the political frontiers after 1999  whereas ‗Europe-as-
hegemony‘ started to cease after 2005 and 2006 takes the notion of ‗Europe‘ as contested and 
negotiated. Along these lines, as this short  introduction here illustrates  and Chapter 3 will 
elaborate, I am particularly interested in political frontiers and the political.  
 
In this respect, it is possible to locate the current attempt to understand the rise and cessation  
of ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ in Turkey within relevant academic realm by using the conception 
of the political as a litmus paper. This would  facilitate a fruitful and interactive dialogue with 
the relevant disciplinary literature.  
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According to the above categorisation principle, the studies dealing with the notion of 
‗Europe‘ could be categorised into three groups: the studies which takes ‗Europe‘ as a fixed 
concept (which I designate as ‗Europe-as-fixity‘), those which subscribe to a notion of 
‗Europe‘ solely as a construct (‗Europe-as-construct‘) and finally the studies which take 
‗Europe‘ as a contestation (‗Europe-as-contestation‘), wherein this current project is 
juxtaposed with the third group of studies. The claim here is that there is both a historical and 
epistemological need to go beyond taking ‗Europe‘ for granted and solely as a construct and 
to address  the conflictual nature of the notion.    
 
1- ‘Europe-as-fixity’ studies  
 
Since the 1950s, after the launch of the EU in particular, ‗Europe‘ and the nature of the 
European polity in particular have been preoccupying the political scientists, sociologists, IR 
theorists and scholars alike. In this respect, the name ‗Europe‘ has been associated different 
conceptions within the EU context, such as ‗confederation‘ (Warleigh, 1998), ‗network 
governance‘ (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999), ‗a political system but not a state‘ (Hix, 1999), 
‗a regulatory state‘ (Majone, 1996). The general tendency in the academia in this respect 
especially in the early stages of European integration has been to take ‗Europe‘ as a non-
contested, categorical notion to be explained (I call this first group of studies as ‗Europe-as-
fixity‘). In this picture, notion of ‗interest‘ is also depicted as the major independent variable 
for explaining the development of the Euro-polity although there is a controversy between the 
carriers of those interests (states, non-state actors, etc.) (Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung, 1998: 
410). Within the literature, the association of the notion ‗Europe‘ in general and European 
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integration in particular with the EU institutions (e.g. Risse-Kappen, 1996; Jachtenfuchs and 
Kohler-Koch, 1995), enlargement (e.g. Schmimelfennig and Sedelmaier, 2002, Hughes et.al., 
2004; Pridham, 2005; Preston, 1997), interest group activity (e.g. Grossman, 2004; Lehmkuhl, 
2000) could be read along those lines. Moravscik‘s conception of European integration 
explains this tendency very well. According to Moravscik, broad lines of European 
integration since 1955 ‗reflect three factors: patterns of commercial advantage, the relative 
bargaining power of important governments and the incentives to enhance credibility of 
interstate commitments‘ (Moravscik, 1998: 3). In this picture, ‗Europe‘ ‗exemplifies a 
distinctly modern form of power politics‘ (Moravscik, 1998: 5). Politics in this respect has 
objectively specified rules and the political is consensual.  
 
2-  ‘Europe-as-construct’ studies  
 
Starting from 1990s,  European studies started incorporating the social constructivist turn (for 
examples of the social constructivist turn see Kratochwil, 1989; Wendt, 1992). Studies on 
principled issue-networks (Sikkink, 1993) and on ‗epistemic communities‘ (Haas, 1992) 
suggested that politics were determined not only by instrumentally defined self-interests, but 
also by collectively shared values and consensual knowledge. ‗The legitimacy crisis of the EU 
which became apparent during the ratification debates of the Maastricht Treaty in many 
Member States, has opened intellectual space for examining the role of ideas and collective 
identities in European politics‘ (Risse-Kappen, 1996: 59). As Chapter 3 will elaborate, a 
social constructivist approach has usually been deemed appropriate in this case, because ‗the 
EU aspires to be more than an international society: a supranational one. This means that the 
EU needs to create its own norms, values and practices to a greater extent than any 
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international society. A democratic-market oriented discourse has been identified from the 
start as the main base on which to build and sustain such a supranational political community‘ 
(Samur, 1997: 31). Moreover, when it comes to the enlargement of the EU, normative 
considerations and a value-based assessment of the process rather than objectively specified 
interests are at the forefront as the EU serves as a ‗modernisation anchor‘ for those candidates 
which are less democratic (Inotai, 1997). For instance, in the case of the Eastern enlargement, 
conceptions such as ‗reunification of the continent‘ and‗return to Europe‘ have  been used ‗to 
imply normative-emotional considerations rather than material calculations and interest-
driven expansion‘ (Samur, 1997: 31-for examples of social constructivism in the European 
studies, see Checkel, 1999; Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener, 1999; Smith, 1999; Zehfuss, 
2002). The notion of ‗Europe‘ in this picture is of a constructed nature and is inspired by ‗a 
theory of a society that stresses the open-ended process by which the social is shaped‘ 
(Rumford and Delanty, 2005: 12). As Chapter 3 will elaborate, within the framework of this 
second group of studies, politics is not an unchanged and teleological process but is open to 
reconstruction and change and the political is not completely consensual about which all 
involved actors and identities are fully informed. However, it is not totally conflictual either 
as the redefinition of the political in general and the political frontiers in particular are not the 
focus of the analysis.  
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3- ‘Europe-as-contestation’ studies 
 
Especially after the demise of the Cold War, a new need to explain the drastic transformations 
of the social structure and new social and political identities emerged which has been the main 
issue within the analytical agendas of critical theory, post-Marxism, post-structuralism, 
postmodernism and alike. European studies also shifted its focus to this new academic 
‗demand‘ and a myriad of studies aiming to reconceptualise an identity-based politics 
flourished. Especially with the signing of the treaties of Maastricht (1991) and Amsterdam 
(1997), the EU reached a degree of integration where identification with ‗Europe‘ went 
beyond hitherto known forms of intergovernmental cooperation. The newly emerging forms 
of identification with Europe now involved a new conception of ‗identity‘ and novel and 
extended practices of politics. New studies trying to understand ‗Europe‘ as an identity (e.g. 
Maier and Risse, 2003; Diez Medrano and Gutierrez, 2001; Hülsse, 1999, Jimenez et.al, 
2004), a public sphere (e.g. Barenreuter, 2005), a possibility for multicultural citizenship (e.g. 
Lavdas, 2001), a political geography (Agnew, 2001; Kuus, 2004; Moisio, 2002; Smith, 2002) 
and a metaphor (e.g. Drulak, 2006; Musolff, 2000) could be read along those lines. 
‗According to such a perspective, political practice in a democratic society does not consist in 
defending the rights of preconstituted identities, but rather in constituting those identities 
themselves in a precarious and always vulnerable field‘ (Mouffe, 2000: 148). Within those 
studies, ‗Europe‘ is taken as a performative, mobile, hybrid, partial and fluid identity and the 
political is understood as a conflictual and unfinished field always open to contestation and 
negotiation. The current attempt here to understand how ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ demarcated 
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political frontiers falls within this third category of the European studies as it also understands 
the political as an unfixed and contested realm.     
 
 
Reflexivity of the project: Dialogue with the Europeanisation literature 
 
As already mentioned above, Europeanisation literature, and  early examples of the literature 
in particular, assumes an automatic and uncontested top-down relationship between the 
European level and domestic level. Therefore, the early Europeanisation literature, according 
to the above categorisation, could be located in the first group of studies (‗Europe-as-fixity‘) 
with respect to the taken-for-grantedness of the notion of ‗Europe‘ and the assumption that 
politics is a game the rules of which are consensual and uncontested. On the other hand, 
starting from 1990s, the Europeanisation literature, through its new preoccupation with ideas, 
collective identities, language and values increasingly extended as to include the second group 
of studies as well (‗Europe-as-construct‘).     
 
However, from the perspective of this project, we need to look at the relationship between 
‗Europe‘ and domestic politics from the lens of ‗hegemony‘ and how the former shapes and 
hegemonises politics. In this respect, the current attempt offers a new analytical perspective to 
the Europeanisation literature where the political is not only given and constructed but is also 
open to contestation and negotiation. If the Europeanisation literature aims to explain change 
and the relationship between the European level and the domestic level, it should also offer 
ways to understand how hegemonic practices and articulations shape the flow of politics and 
political identities during this process. If the European integration is as political as the post-
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Maastricht period and all the on-going debates on the European constitution, referenda and 
enlargement tell us it is, the Europeanisation literature has to address the conflictual and 
contested nature of ‗Europe‘,     
 
Thesis outline 
 
In Chapter 2, I will give a general outline of the Europeanisation literature focusing on the 
ways in which the notion of ‗Europe‘ is conceptualised. The main argument in this respect 
will be that the Europeanisation literature is unable to sort out how the concept of ‗Europe‘ is 
constructed as a discourse and a contributing element to political frontiers constructed at the 
domestic level. The Europeanisation literature is particularly focused here due its prevalence 
among those seeking to understand domestic-European relations  Although the recent variants 
of the Europeanisation literature makes numerous references to the domestic level and 
domestic actors, it fails to present an overall account of how the idea of ‗Europe‘ is 
conceptualised, perceived and used at the domestic level. Moreover, even if this relationship 
is asymmetrical, ‗hegemony‘ in this picture does not originate from this asymmetry but from 
the ability of the discourses on‘ Europe‘ to draw political frontiers. For instance, the 
Europeanisation literature on Turkey more often than not explores in what ways Turkey meets 
the democratisation requirements laid down by the Copenhagen Criteria, rendering the 
relationship between the Copenhagen Criteria
3
 (and the European level in general) and 
Turkish domestic politics unproblematic and automatic. Little interest is shown in the extent 
                                                            
3 In the Presidency Conclusions of Copenhagen European Council on 21-22 June 1993, it has been stated that,  
‗[EU] membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a 
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within 
the Union‘, which has emerged in the EU parlance as ‗Copenhagen Criteria‘ after the Summit (the EU 
Presidency, 21-22 June 1993).  
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to which the discourses articulating the Copenhagen Criteria have an impact on the 
construction of domestic political frontiers and are hegemonic in this respect. 
 
The thesis will then move to Chapter 3 where I explore the possible theoretical frameworks 
that might be helpful in overcoming the shortcomings identified in the previous chapter. In 
this respect, I will first refer to social constructivism. The general claim here will be that 
although social constructivism focuses on discourses and representations, its core focus is on 
understanding social reality by assuming identities to be constant and stable. In doing so, 
social constructivist approaches are unable to show how political identities could be shaped 
by the discourses on ‗Europe‘. Similarly, the Foucauldian framework, the second theoretical 
approach I will be scrutinising, is ground-breaking in designating discourses as reflexive 
structures, yet is not entirely interested in political identities and politics as such. It is 
gainsaying at this point that although the core focus of this project is not on identities per se, 
the shaping of political identities is implicitly included as I am interested in how political 
frontiers are drawn and redrawn by discourses on ‗Europe‘. Moreover, the shaping of political 
identities is also crucial in assessing to what extent two different Laclau-Mouffean ways of 
sustaining hegemony (the so-called logics of equivalence and difference) are successful in 
hegemonising the political space. I will return to this point in Chapter 3 and denote the 
relationship between ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ and political identities after 1999 in the Turkish 
context in Chapter 7.   
In Chapter 3, I will also explore how discourse theory has been used in European studies. I 
will focus on the works of Ole Wæver (2005), Thomas Diez (1999, 2001), Henrik Larsen 
(1999), Lene Hansen (2006), and Ben Rosamond (1999), with particular reference to Wæver 
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and Diez. Finally, I will elaborate on the Laclau-Mouffean theoretical framework main 
premises of which have been mentioned above. 
 
After scrutinising Laclau-Mouffean discourse analysis and its relevance for the Turkish Euro-
discourses and political frontiers in Chapter 3 and devising my methodology in Chapter 4, in 
Chapter 5, I will give a general outline of the historical context of the Turkish political 
debates within the specified period, not only in terms of the notion of ‗Europe‘ but in terms of 
the privileged signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ as well. By doing that, I aim to sketch 
the general contours of the discursive space historically which made possible the emergence 
of these signifiers as ‗privileged‘. I do not claim any correlation or causal relationship 
between events and discourses, which would clash with the general theoretical premises of the 
project. Rather, I simply aim to provide a timeline of the events to see how discourses on 
‗Europe‘ speak to these events. For instance, rather than claiming that the discourse fixing 
‗Europe‘ as a keyword for minority rights and multiple identities emerged because of the 
Copenhagen Criteria, I aim to show how this discourse was resilient and has determined ‗the 
sides‘ of the political debates at the time when the Copenhagen Criteria was discussed in 
Turkish politics. 
 
In Chapter 6, I will scrutinise the four discourses on ‗Europe‘ resulting from the empirical 
research with newspapers, which are  Dmultiple identity which sets ‗Europe‘ as a keyword for 
minorities and multiple identities, Dterritorial integrity/anti-terrorism, presenting ‗Europe‘ as a guarantee 
of Turkish territorial integrity and the decrease in terrorism, D threat to sovereignty fixing ‗Europe‘ 
as a threat to sovereignty and D threat to Turkishness which represents ‗Europe‘ as a threat to 
Turkishness in a rather identity-based manner. After presenting the discourses, I will then 
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move to Chapter 7 which aims to temporalise them. Here, I will focus on the second general 
aim of the project, i.e. the impact of the discourses. For this aim, I will firstly diacronise the 
already-sketched discourses and present them within the flow of debates on ‗Europe‘.  This 
will make it easier to see how ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ emerged as a political struggle and 
outlined ‗the sides‘ of the debate within the Turkish politics in the 1999-2008 period. 
Secondly, after locating the discourses in a chronological perspective, I will set out the main 
features of ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘. The main argument of this chapter will be that contrary to 
the immediate aftermath of 1999 when the discourses on ‗Europe‘ attempted to hegemonise 
the Turkish political landscape, starting from 2005 and 2006 what we see is that the 
discourses on ‗Europe‘ are less and less able to draw the political frontiers. However, this 
does not mean that the discourses on ‗Europe‘ were completely absent from the political 
landscape. Starting from 2005 and 2006, political debates were precipitated with less 
reference to ‗Europe‘ and some components of the discourses on ‗Europe‘ (such as 
‗minority‘) have been articulated around other antagonisms, such as Islamism vs. liberalism 
antagonism. ‗Europe‘ does not disappear, but is no longer a hegemonic project, as the last 
chapter will show. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EUROPEANISATION LITERATURE AND THE USE OF ‘EUROPE’ AT THE 
DOMESTIC LEVEL 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Bülent Somay, in the Epilogue of an anthology of Zizek‘s works (Somay and Birkan, 2002), 
cites a joke mentioned by Zizek in his famous book The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989). A 
conscript who tries to evade military service pretends to be mad. His symptom is that he 
compulsively checks all the pieces of paper he can reach, constantly repeating: ‗that‘s not it!‘ 
He is sent to the military psychiatrist in whose office he also examines all the papers around, 
including those in the wastepaper basket, repeating all the time: ‗that‘s not it!‘. The 
psychiatrist finally convinced that he is really mad gives him a written warrant, releasing him 
from military service. The conscript casts a look at it and says cheerfully: ‗that‘s it!‘. This 
short story points to the obsessive search of the Left for a decent ideology after the 1980s. The 
‗discharge paper‘ for Turkey for a long time has been and probably still is ‗being of Europe‘, 
i.e. ‗Europeanisation‘. Starting from the 19th century, the choice for Turkey‘s European 
orientation path derived from a deep-rooted state tradition, referring to both a careful 
perception of the Turkish foreign policy options and a rather emotional attachment to the idea 
of being among the ‗European‘.  This ‗never-ending story‘ acquired a new dimension and has 
been carried to a more substantive and institutional level with the Helsinki European Council 
in December 1999 when Turkey was granted formal candidacy status in its application to join 
the EU (Müftüler-Baç, 1998). 
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This new dimension of Turkey‘s journey towards Europe overlaps with what is called in the 
literature, ‗Europeanisation‘, a relatively new trend in political analysis (for most outstanding 
examples of Europeanisation literature, see Cowles et. al., 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli, 
2003; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmaier, 2005). Like all trends, it has fans, supporters and 
admirers as well as sceptics, challengers and dissidents. The main aim of this section is to 
highlight what the term ‗Europeanisation‘ means for different scholars and academic 
tendencies and to identify the main arguments of each group through an unfolding of the most 
significant concepts and arguments with regard to ‗Europeanisation‘. 
 
Whilst the Europeanisation literature might at first glance appear only marginally or indirectly 
related to the present thesis, the rationale for the current engagement with and the critique of 
the Europeanisation literature is based on a number of reasons. Firstly, the Europeanisation 
literature would typically be the first approach any researcher focusing on the 1999-2008 
period in Turkey with a particular reference to ‗Europe‘ and domestic debates would resort to. 
In contrast, I seek here to show the shortcomings of the Europeanisation literature in terms of 
identifying the domestic discourses on ‗Europe‘ and their impact on domestic political 
frontiers. Secondly, this contributes to the novel theoretical approach developed here about 
the hegemony of ‗Europe‘ within the domestic political debates in Turkey. As the study will 
show, the hegemony of ‗Europe‘ does not originate from the automaticity of the relationship 
between the European and domestic level as stipulated by the Europeanisation literature, but 
from the power of discourses on ‗Europe‘ in terms of their ability to contribute to the 
construction of antagonisms and demarcating political frontiers in the 1999-2006 period. 
Thirdly, from a broader perspective, the current attempt here addresses the need by the 
Europeanisation literature to look at ‗Europe‘ as a political and contested realm, as pointed 
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out above. If the Europeanisation literature aims to explain the European integration and 
‗change‘, it should go beyond explaining ‗change‘ at the domestic level through ‗de-
parliamentarisation, growing bureaucratisation and increase in policy-making‘ (Goetz et.al., 
2008) and present a more political and reflexive account of ‗Europe‘ in general. This is also in 
accordance with recent critiques posed against the literature by the Europeanisation scholars 
themselves such as Radaelli, Graziano and Vink. As I will elaborate on in the forthcoming 
sections, the need on the part of the literature to redefine ‗the European impact‘ (Graziano and 
Vink, 2007) and to pay attention to broader political science questions such as power and 
legitimacy (Radaelli and Exadaktylos, 2009) shifts the literature‘s scope and shows that the 
literature and this thesis have a more interactive platform to share than the difference between 
the two in terms of scope and aim would point to. 
 
However, this attempt to outline the Europeanisation literature is not exhaustive as this 
project‘s core concern is not to find out what ‗Europeanisation‘ is. The core aim here is to 
examine how ‗Europe‘ is conceptualized in the Europeanisation literature, especially with 
regard to the domestic level. By investigating the main claims of the Europeanisation 
literature, the claim of the thesis that the Europeanisation literature is unable to adequately 
examine the concept of ‗Europe‘ as a discourse that contributes to the construction of political 
frontiers at the domestic level is presented. Thus, on a very broad level, the following section 
attempts to scrutinize only the basic assumptions of the literature on Europeanisation to use as 
leverage in this project‘s broader argument- Although the recent variants of Europeanisation 
literature makes numerous references to domestic level and domestic actors, it nevertheless 
fails to present an overall account of how the idea of ‗Europe‘ is conceptualised, perceived 
and used at the domestic level and the effect that it has upon domestic political debates, 
political identities and antagonisms . 
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Similarly, in line with the pitfalls of the Europeanisation literature I will argue throughout the 
present chapter that the Europeanisation literature on Turkey is also confined to exploring 
how Turkey has met the democratisation requirements laid down by the Copenhagen Criteria. 
Whilst it is of course important to understand how Turkey adopts the Copenhagen criteria, the 
endemic problem with the Europeanisation literature emerges here as well: the relationship 
between the Copenhagen Criteria (European level in general) and change in Turkish domestic 
politics according to this framework is depicted as one of automaticity. In this regard, I will 
use the Europeanisation literature as a departure point from which to argue that a Laclau- 
Mouffean theoretical framework is helpful in order to examine how the concept of ‗Europe‘ 
contributes to the construction of discourses and political frontiers at the domestic level. 
 
However, it is no easy task to make an analytical move from the Europeanisation literature to 
Laclau and Mouffe‘s conception of ‗discourse‘. First of all, the academic concerns of both 
approaches are starkly different. For the Europeanisation literature, Europeanisation is the 
creation/construction of distinct European institutions, policies, behaviour, discourses and 
social aggregations at the domestic level thanks to the impact of the ‗European level‘ (Cowles 
et.al, 2001; Börzel and Risse, 2003). Although this initial ‗structural‘ approach has been 
challenged by the so-called ‗bottom-up‘ approaches, the question of how the notion of 
‗Europe‘ has an impact on the creation/emergence of discourses and political frontiers at the 
domestic level remains intact (for examples of the so-called ‗bottom-up‘ approach, see 
Radaelli, 2003; Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004). The ‗bottom-up‘ approach to Europeanisation 
claims that the Europeanisation process starts from the actors, problems, resources, style and 
discourses at the domestic level (Radaelli, 2003; 2004). In this regard, the actors, discourses 
27 
 
and social processes at the domestic level matters for Europeanisation. However, the core 
concern is not to sort out whether/how ‗Europe‘ has an impact on domestic discourses and 
political frontiers. The highly ‗institutionalist‘ colouring of the Europeanisation literature -
even its more ‗social-sensitive‘ variants such as those fed by sociological institutionalism- 
does not leave enough room for meanings, representations and discourses (for examples of 
sociological institutionalism in the Europeanisation literature see March and Olson, 1989; 
Vink, 2002; Börzel, 2003). 
 
On the other hand, the conception of ‗discourse‘ by Laclau and Mouffe stipulates that if we 
are to sort out the nature or essence of reality, i.e. Europe and -in particular- to understand the 
way in which the Europeanisation process operates, we have to understand the way in which 
that reality is constructed, perpetuated and reproduced at a discursive level, i.e. the discourse 
of ‗Europe‘ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Thus, the meaning ascribed to a concept or an object 
is the result of a social process rather than something springing from the object in itself. 
 
The meaning of Europe, for example, is not then a consequence of some immanent 
quality of the landmass itself, but rather defined by what everybody, in a certain 
situation, agrees that it means. As such its meaning may well change over time (from 
‗Christendom‘ to ‗a continent‘). However the meaning of a concept or an object is 
always derived basically from its relation to other objects or concepts (Kolvraa, 2003: 
26). 
 
Secondly, the two approaches‘ evaluation of ‗change‘ is completely different. The 
Europeanisation literature presupposes that there will be a change at the domestic level due to 
the impact of Europe. This change might be in the form of an institutional, social, political, 
discursive or policy change, or an institutional resistance, convergence or divergence, unity or 
diversity. According to Harmsen and Wilson, Europeanisation is a concept beyond European 
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integration reflecting an essentially teleological view of the process (Harmsen and Wilson, 
2000).  It evokes, they argue, a much wider canvas, concerned with the myriad processes of 
change – both regarding the EU and beyond it. Even if there is resistance against the 
adaptational pressure at the domestic level, it does not harm the teleology and linearity of the 
process, as this kind of an institutional/social/discursive resistance is also a ‗change‘. Thus, 
the reality, i.e. the process of Europeanisation and European institutions in particular, initiates 
progress and may even result in the formation of a certain discourse. This highly institutional 
conception of ‗change‘ stands in contrast to the reality which results from the eternal and 
contingent articulation of discourse in its Laclau- Mouffean sense. 
 
It might be argued that, the discursive unity is the teleological unity of a project, but this 
is not so. The objective world is structured in relational sequences which do not 
necessarily have a finalistic sense and which, in most cases, do not actually require any 
meaning at all: it is sufficient that certain regularities establish differential positions for 
us to be able to speak of a discursive formation (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 109). 
 
Thus, discursive structures are never complete and discourse analysis is ‗the political analysis 
of the way contingent relations become fixed in one way, but could have been fixed in many 
others‘ (Andersen, 2003: 52). There is neither  a definite end point nor a teleological 
presupposition in terms of the unity of the project. The unstable and indeterminate nature of 
social reality is overcome by discourses determining and delimiting the range of meaningful 
behaviours and practices within particular historical contexts, albeit temporarily and 
precariously, through articulation. One of the central concepts in Laclau and Mouffe‘s theory, 
‗articulation‘, ‗designates any practice through which a certain concept or object is ascribed a 
certain (new) meaning. Articulation is then a practice, which changes or creates the thing that 
is articulated‘ (Kolvraa, 2003: 26), which is not teleological and linear. 
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Last, but not least, the Laclau- Mouffean conception of ‗discourse‘ is an overarching and 
extensive effort which has repercussions in the broader definitions of hegemony, radical 
democracy and even politics. One of the main aims of Laclau and Mouffe‘s seminal work 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics is to overcome the 
so-called ‗theoretical crisis‘  of the Left-wing and Marxism in particular, as mentioned in the 
‗Introduction‘ part of the book (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 2).  So, it offers a wide range of 
new theoretical venues and by this token it might be argued that it is prescriptive (as the title 
itself implies). However, as Radaelli argues, Europeanisation is not a new theory, nor an ad-
hoc approach, rather a way of organizing and orchestrating existing concepts; 
‗Europeanisation should be seen as a problem, not as a solution‘ (Radaelli, 2004:1). Thus, it is 
only a new way of asking questions and trying to answer them and, in this regard, is 
definitive. 
 
My concern in this regard is not to make a comparison between the conception of domestic 
meanings and discourses by the Europeanisation literature and Laclau- Mouffean conception 
of ‗discourse‘, which would be meaningless, fruitless and most important of all, analytically 
incorrect as the discourse theory used by Laclau and Mouffe is a theory whereas 
Europeanisation is rather a process, content and situation (Howell, 2004: 2).
4
 However, I 
deem it useful to start with the Europeanisation literature to examine how the concept of 
‗Europe‘ constructs/challenges discourses at the domestic level as it to some extent has also a 
claim to do so. My subsequent attempt would be then to understand how the notion of 
                                                            
4 Although for the literature Europeanisation is generally not deemed as a theory, for Howell, it might be 
evaluated as a ‗meso-level theory‘ (Howell, 2004). ‗A meso-level theory involves simultaneous study of at least 
two levels, where one level deals with individual or group processes or variables and one deals with 
organisational processes or variables, and bridging or linking prepositions are set forth to relate the two levels‘ 
(Miner, 2006: 17).       
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‗Europe‘ will have an impact on the way in which political frontiers are established in Turkish 
politics. 
 
With these initial concerns in mind, in this section, I will thoroughly explore the term 
‗Europeanisation‘. After presenting a broad definition of the term, I will highlight how Europe 
was studied in the political science literature before the devising of the concept 
‗Europeanisation‘. Thus, we can understand the main concerns and concepts that drive 
political science to shed light on the concept of ‗Europe‘. This, at the same time, helps one to 
see the evolution of the concept of ‗Europeanisation‘ in line with the institutional and 
conceptual evolution of the EC/EU itself. For this aim, I will explore the basic assumptions of 
neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. I will also refer to the relevant 
approaches such as multi-level governance, which has sown the embryonic intellectual seeds 
of what will later be called ‗Europeanisation‘. This group of studies is usually referred to as 
‗the first generation studies in Europeanisation‘ in the literature even though most of them 
(especially those in the 1970s and 1980s) did not use the term ‗Europeanisation‘ as such. For 
the first generation of European integration studies, Europeanisation was equivalent to 
European integration and the former ‗concentrated on the shift of problem-solving capability 
from the domestic to the regional level, from the individual member states to Brussels‘ 
(Caporaso, 2005: 8).
5
 Then I will move to exploring how the concept had new connotations 
                                                            
5 See Dyson and Goertz, 2003; Bache and Marshall, 2004; Quinn, 2008 for the periodisation and the main 
characteristics of ‗generations‘. Usually, these studies put the early European integration studies and early 
versions of Europeanisation literature which adopt a ‗top-down‘ approach within the very same group (first 
generation) whereas the ‗bottom-up‘ approaches constitute the ‗second generation‘ studies.  This distinction in 
the literature is made according to whether the Europeanisation induces change at formal or informal institutions 
(Bache and Marshall, 2004: 4). I will stick to this periodisation throughout the section though I do not subsume 
the early European integration studies under the rubric of ‗first generation‘ and hence not use the term 
‗generation‘ as such. As I will make it clear in the forthcoming parts, my general fault line in this section is 
whether the literature adopts a ‗top-down‘ or ‗bottom-up‘ approach.               
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within the framework of enlargements, starting from the Eastern Enlargement in the 1990s, 
which will also help me put the evolution of the literature into proper context. 
 
Second, I will deal with the concept of Europeanisation in more depth with a particular focus 
on the concepts such as ‗goodness-of-fit‘, ‗inconvenience‘ and ‗misfit‘. This group of studies 
dealing mainly with those concepts is usually called the ‗second generation studies in 
Europeanisation‘, which studies the impact of the EU on domestic change in polities, policies 
and politics. 
 
Subsequently, I will refer to some of the criticisms raised against various definitions and 
underlying assumptions of the concept of ‗Europeanisation‘. In this way, it is easier to 
understand the core claims of various scholars‘ conceptualization of the term presented 
before, as well as the strengths and weaknesses attached to them. 
 
 
 
2. THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEANISATION LITERATURE: FROM 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION STUDIES TO ENLARGEMENT 
 
It is not a prophecy to say that one of the most common concepts that those working on 
‗Europe‘ would encounter at various points in different capacities would be 
‗Europeanisation‘. With the broadest aim of understanding European integration, starting 
from the 1990s on, there has been an eruption of the literature on Europeanisation (see 
Ladrech, 1994; Wessels and Rometsch, 1996: Börzel, 1999; Harmsen, 1999 for earlier 
examples of the literature). It is, broadly speaking, a term that is employed to label or describe 
a process of transformation, but many different scholars have used Europeanisation as a tool 
for analysis of different aspects of the social reality and the term as such has been exposed to 
32 
 
an important conceptual transformation. This concept and process will be explored in detail 
below, but for now, suffice it to say that the process of Europeanisation is the 
creation/construction of distinct European institutions, policies, behaviour, discourses and 
social aggregations at the domestic level thanks to the impact of the ‗European level‘. 
 
After making clear what the concept ‗Europeanisation‘ generally means, it is useful to trace 
the intellectual predecessors of the Europeanisation literature and the embryonic attempts that 
dealt with the idea of ‗Europe‘. In this way, it is easier to uncover the theoretical 
considerations underneath the Europeanisation literature. To question the conceptual 
rupture/continuity of the Europeanisation literature with these intellectual traditions provides 
the opportunity to understand how the use of the notion of ‗Europe‘ has evolved and how it 
is/has been used. 
 
After the institutional foundation of Europe in the 1950s, a great deal of studies, which 
interpreted the newly emerging structure, depended upon the debate on the nature of this 
construction. The theories of European integration provided a more general interpretation on 
its institutional structure, generating theoretical models for the process of integration. In the 
1960s and 1970s, the focus of European integration studies had shifted to regional integration, 
which had attracted both international relations scholars and political scientists. One of the 
factors that made the cooperation between them productive was the dominant theory of the 
time, i.e. neo-functionalism. Neo-functionalism that was originally developed by Ernst Haas 
extended the existing theories in both fields by recognising interconnections between 
domestic and international politics (Smith and Ray, 1993). The idea that states were no longer 
regarded as unitary social actors went beyond the dominant state-centric approaches of 
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international relations; and the conception of the state for neo-functionalists focused on sub-
national groups, political parties, competition and bargaining on the national policy 
(Schmitter, 2004; Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989; Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991). On the other 
hand, going beyond the domestic focus of the comparative politics, neo-functionalism 
emphasised how regional and international contexts influence state policy. National policy 
was not determined merely by national level factors but transnational coalitions and regional 
influence also entered the picture (Smith and Ray, 1993). 
 
According to this theory, regional integration is an intrinsically sporadic and conflictual 
process, but one in which, under conditions of democracy and pluralistic representation, 
national governments will find themselves increasingly entangled in regional pressures and 
end up resolving their conflicts by conceding a wider scope and devolving more authority to 
the regional organisations they have created. Eventually, their citizens will begin shifting 
more and more of their expectations to the region and satisfying them will increase the 
likelihood that economic-social integration will ‗spill-over‘ into political integration 
(Schmitter, 2004: 46). 
 
According to Haas, regional integration was the process of ‗how and why states cease to be 
wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbours 
so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving 
conflict themselves‘ (Haas, 1968). Moreover, he attributed the primary role in facilitating 
regional cooperation to those more open-minded elites, supranational groups, politicians and 
lobbies in particular who have become involved in managing and directing affairs of an 
increasingly interdependent and transnational political economy. 
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Approximately at this point the new theoretical mainstream in international relations 
(regarding European integration in particular) which speaks for the new levels and actors but 
the state enters the picture and the concept of ‗Europeanisation‘ finds its earlier traces. By the 
same token, supranational governance, as theorised by Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997, 
1998, 2001), can be counted as the contemporary counterpart of Haas‘s work. Their theory of 
supranational governance is based on the assumption that the growth of supranational polity 
competence is explained by the growth of interaction amongst private economic agents (such 
as multinational corporations) (Stone Sweet and Sandsoltz, 1998). The growth of this 
transnational society is furthered through the applicability of the rule of law, transparency, 
and accountability and the institutions of the EU, mainly the Commission, are charged with 
establishing European-level competencies. Institutionalization emerges as an outcome but, at 
least partly, also as the means by which the European political space emerges and evolves 
(Stone Sweet et.al. 2001:225). 
 
Starting from 1990s, thanks to the launch of the Eastern enlargement, the Balkan enlargement 
and the EU accession with Turkey, the concept of Europeanisation and the literature attached 
to it developed a particular variant. Within this perspective, Europeanisation increasingly 
meant anchoring of a country or a region within the EU stream and the literature started 
talking about more elaborate and specified rules, mechanisms and procedures of 
Europeanisation.  Although the concept of Europeanisation was first used to explain the 
policy transformation within the EU member-states, it has been adopted to the study of non-
member states as it more adequately captures the transformation of domestic structures.  One 
of the key terms in this context is ‗EU conditionality‘, particularly the Copenhagen criteria, 
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which act as a catalyst for domestic reforms in the fields of politics, finance, law, education, 
etc., as I will elaborate with regard to the Turkish context later. Therefore, starting from the 
second half of the 1990s, the Europeanisation literature had a vast amount of references to the 
concept of the EU conditionality. ‗The concept of Europeanisation implies a different 
approach when the issue of enlargement is concerned: the incorporation of Central and 
Eastern Europe into the EU integration process by means of principles of democratisation, the 
rule of law, market economy and to human rights‘ (Kabaalioğlu et. al., 2005: 1).  As Oğuzlu 
argues, democratization along the EU accession process requires both the establishment of 
democratic regimes in candidate states and the internalization of the EU‘s identity (Oğuzlu, 
2004). Within this perspective, Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier define Europeanisation in 
Central East Europe as a process in which states adopt EU rules (Schimmelfenning and 
Sedelmeier, 2005). ‗The rules in question cover a broad range of issues and structures and are 
both formal and informal (...), [which] comprise rule for regulation and distribution in specific 
policy areas, rules of political, administrative, and judicial processes, and rules for the set up 
and competences of state and sub-state organisations‘ (Schimmelfenning and Sedelmeier, 
2005: 7). In this respect, the dominant logic underpinning the EU‘s conditionality, according 
to Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, is the bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward: the 
EU provides external stimuli for a candidate country in order to comply with its conditions 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2004: 662).  
 
In a nutshell, as Risse et. al‘s and Radaelli‘s definitions show, the earlier examples of the 
Europeanisation literature focused on the construction, diffusion, and institutionalisation of 
formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things, and 
shared beliefs and norms at the EU member states (Radaelli, 2003: 30). However, recent 
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contributions to the European integration literature have pointed out that the Europeanisation 
process could be influential even beyond the EU‘s geographic boundaries, principally with 
regard to candidate countries. In this respect, Moga makes a distinction between the 
traditional Europeanisation, which is mainly limited to the EU member states, and 
enlargement-led Europeanisation, which affects candidate countries and is conditionality-
driven (Moga, 2010). Therefore, whereas in the earlier versions of the literature, the concepts 
such as ‗goodness of fit‘ and ‗inconvenience‘ were at the forefront, the concepts of 
‗conditionality‘ and ‗Copenhagen Criteria‘ are rather significant terms for the recent exapmles 
of the literature regarding the candidate countries.  
Exploring the conceptual transformation of the Europeanisation literature as such is helpful in 
many ways. It, first of all, helps to understand and devise the literature‘s main assumptions 
and theoretical framework. Secondly, it gives an initial opportunity to answer the thesis‘ 
broader question of whether the ‗Europeanisation‘ literature contributes to the attempt to 
understand the domestic discursive construction of the notion of ‗Europe‘ and domestic 
political frontiers. I will explore further this broader question in the following section by 
presenting an overall conceptual and theoretical account of the Europeanisation literature. 
 
 
3. EUROPEANISATION: NEITHER A CAMEL NOR A BIRD
6
 
 
The main aim of this section is to explore what the term ‗Europeanisation‘ means for different 
scholars and academic strands and to identify the main arguments of each group. This initial 
concern with exploring what the term ‗Europeanisation‘ entails aims to highlight the 
significant concepts and arguments it develops. However, this attempt is not exhaustive as 
                                                            
6 Here, I basically refer to a very common Turkish literal joke. ‗Ostrich‘ in Turkish could be translated into 
English as ‗camel-bird‘. As ostrich does not have any relation either to camel or bird, yet has both of the 
components in it, this expression is usually used to point to the strange or ambiguous nature of a concept or 
structure.   
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this project‘s core concern is not to find out what ‗Europeanisation‘ is. The core aim here is to 
sort out how ‗Europe‘ is conceptualised in the Europeanisation literature, especially within the 
framework of the relationship between the European and the domestic level. By highlighting 
the main concerns of the academic debates and discussions on Europeanisation, it is possible 
to get one step nearer to the main claim of the thesis that the Europeanisation literature is 
unable to examine how ‗Europe‘ is articulated as a discourse at the domestic level and 
contributes to the formation of domestic political frontiers. 
 
One of the most extensive conceptions of the notion of ‗Europeanisation‘ is that provided by 
Olsen (Olsen, 2002). According to this framework, Europeanisation has five possible 
repercussions: changes in external boundaries, developing institutions at the European level, 
central penetration of national systems of governance, exporting forms of political 
organization and a political unification project (Olsen, 2002: 923-924). Out of these five 
conceptions of ‗change‘, Olsen focuses on two key dimensions of institutional change. ‗First 
are changes in political organization (...) [and] second are changes in structures of meaning 
and people‘s minds‘ (Olsen 2002: 926). However, this focus on codes of meaning and 
worldviews is helpful for his broader aim of redefining political ideas, ‗that give direction and 
meaning to capabilities and capacities‘ (Olsen, 2002: 926). 
 
Kohler-Koch and Eising (1999) argue that Europeanisation is a process by which 
understandings of governance in Europe are changed. They argue, for instance, that 
Europeanisation has changed shared notions of governance in the EU member states by 
establishing the principle of partnership between public and private actors and by inserting 
regions into a complex set of layers of governance. Thus, the Europeanisation process is 
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basically characterized by, first, rule transfer and, secondly, the governance mode in which 
the myriad of levels, actors and sectors at the domestic level transfer the given rules. In this 
respect, at the domestic level, Europeanisation means the dissemination of a network mode of 
governance characterized by complex interactions between different levels, sectors and actors. 
What Olsen (Olsen, 2002) calls ‗mutual adaptation among co-evolving institutions‘ within the 
framework of Europeanisation process implied by Kohler-Koch and Eising (1999) points to 
multi-level and multi-centre polities, finding their resonance best in the definition of the 
concept ‗governance‘. Therefore, Europeanisation here is a reflection of the broader 
understanding of ‗governance without government‘ (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999; Rhodes, 
1997; Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992), and ‗a generator of changing governance structures‘ 
(Sidenius, 1999: 178). 
 
Similarly, Cowles et. al. (2001) defines Europeanisation as: 
 
The emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of 
governance, that is, of political, legal, and social institutions associated with political 
problem solving that formalise interactions among the actors, and of policy networks 
specialising in the creation of authoritative European rules (Cowles et. al., 2001:3). 
 
 
Although, this conceptualization of the notion, ‗Europeanisation‘ draws resemblance to what 
had been put forward previously in terms of the change of the governance structures at the 
European level, Cowles et, al.‘s study of Europeanisation is crucial in terms of creating a new 
research agenda focusing particularly on ‗European sources of domestic politics‘ (Vink, 2002: 
3). 
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For Kabaalioğlu, the process of Europeanisation also entails the adoption of European values 
and mentality: 
It is no way confined to a mere adaptation of European institutions and acquis 
communitaire
7
 but also necessitates the adoption of values that are commonly shared by 
Europeans. Hence, the candidate countries need to determinedly alter their mentality to 
the way of doing things at the European level (Kabaalioğlu, 2005: IV). 
 
On the other hand, according to Radaelli, Europeanisation means ‗a process of construction, 
diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, 
styles, ―ways of doing things‖, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 
consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
discourses, identities, political structures and public policies‘ (Radaelli, 2003:30). Whilst 
defining Europeanisation, Radaelli departs from a core concern of finding out whether there is 
something new with the very concept to be engaged with a totally different research design 
(Radaelli, 2004). As his general conclusion is that Europeanisation is not a new theory, nor an 
ad-hoc approach, rather a way of organizing and orchestrating existing concepts; 
‗Europeanisation should be seen as a problem, not as a solution‘ (Radaelli, 2004:1). By the 
same token, Europeanisation is not the explanans (the solution, the phenomenon that explains 
the dependent variables), but the explanandum (the problem that needs to be explained) 
(Radaelli, 2004-emphasis original). It now makes more sense to start the consideration of 
Europeanisation from the actors, problems, resources, style and discourses at the domestic 
level as ‗by using time and temporal causal sequences, a bottom-up approach checks if, when 
and how the EU provides a change in any of the main components of the system of 
interaction‘ (Radaelli, 2004: 4). In this respect, Cowles et. al.‘s and Börzel and Risse‘s so-
called ‗structural‘ position is counterposed by embracing not only the correlation between 
                                                            
7 ‗Acquis communitaire is the term used to refer to all the real and potential rights and obligations of the EU 
system and its institutional framework; the accession acquis is the whole body of the EU law and practice‘ 
(Grabbe, 2003: 304-footnote 2).   
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input (EU as an independent variable) and output (domestic impact), but also whatever goes 
inside the process of Europeanisation. 
 
4. ‘EUROPEANISATION’ AS A MISFIT BETWEEN THE DOMESTIC AND 
EUROPEAN LEVELS 
 
In the previous section, I delineated a general framework that constitutes the Europeanisation 
literature in terms of the key points they emphasise. Especially, after Cowles, Caporaso and 
Risse‘s significant book, Transforming Europe: Europeanisation and Domestic Change 
(Cowles et. al, 2001), the discussion on the impact of Europe at the domestic level has been 
elaborated upon further, with numerous scholars focusing on different aspects of the notion of 
‗change‘. One of the key points noted within these discussions was the misfit or ‗goodness-of-
fit‘ between the domestic and European levels. In this section, by exploring different versions 
of the Europeanisation literature and their depiction of Europeanisation as a misfit between 
the European level and the domestic level, I will argue that although different variants of the 
literature depict ‗change‘ in different ways, these different insights do not focus per se on the 
meanings, representations, discourses and finally political frontiers at the domestic level. 
 
According to Cowles et. al, in order to produce domestic effects, EU policy must be difficult 
to absorb at the domestic level. ‗Inconvenience‘ and ‗misfit‘ between European and domestic 
policies, processes and institutions are presented as a pre-condition for the Europeanisation 
process to be realized (Cowles et. al, 2001). The so-called ‗goodness-of-fit‘ between the 
European and the domestic level determines the degree of pressure for adaptation exerted by 
Europeanisation upon the member states (Cowles et. al, 2001: 6-7). ‗The lower the 
compatibility [is] between European and domestic processes policies and institutions, the 
41 
 
higher [is] the adaptational pressure‘ (Börzel and Risse, 2003: 5). They argue that the impact 
of Europeanisation will be most pronounced in cases of moderate goodness of fit. For 
instance, Caporaso (2004) argues that if there is a good fit, there is little pressure as in the 
case of the ‗institutional fit‘ of European Central Bank (ECB) to the German economic 
system and we can just expect little response, except a straightforward policy response. 
However, Caporaso continues, if the fit is poor like the ‗misfit‘ between the EMU and ECB 
and some of the Latin countries such as Spain, Portugal, Italy, and France,  a larger response 
would be required (Caporaso, 2004). However, the ‗goodness-of-fit‘ explanation may be a 
special case rather than a general explanation, as argued by Treib (2003), Thatcher (2004a) 
and Mastenbroek and van Keulen (2004). On the basis of empirical evidence from the 
transposition of six employment rights Directives in Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland, and 
the United Kingdom, Treib (2004) shows that fit or misfit between the European level and 
existing domestic policies and structures is not always the ultimate determinant of 
Europeanisation. Instead, he underlines the significance of domestic party politics in 
determining transposition performance to the European level requirements. Concentrating on 
the telecommunications sector, Thatcher (2004a) argues that, from an actor perspective, EU 
requirements may not be a ‗pressure‘, but rather an opportunity. He seeks to find out how 
actors use European requirements and activities within their domestic arenas and claim that 
Europeanisation is unlikely to be neutral. ‗Instead, we can expect it to advantage some actors 
and disadvantage others‘ (Thatcher, 2004a: 286). Focusing on the ‗implementation‘ 
component of the European policies, Mastenbroek and van Keulen argue that member states 
‗balk at complying‘ with decisions that do not ‗fit‘ their national preferences, but smoothly 
implement much-desired negotiating outcomes (Mastenbroek and van Keulen, 2004: 3). 
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5. EUROPEANISATION LITERATURE AND ITS REFERENCES TO POLITICAL 
FRONTIERS AND DISCOURSES 
 
The general picture of Europeanisation literature I sketched above does not completely omit a 
consideration of ‗discourse‘. In particular, some examples of the second generation of 
Europeanisation studies which talk more of the domestic level and domestic actors refer to the 
concept of ‗discourse‘ extensively. However, in doing so, they link the use of ‗Europe‘ to 
discourse in order to legitimate reforms: ‗Actors use European integration as part of strategies 
of ‗communicative discourse‘ to obtain assent to reforms. Discourse is a weapon for certain 
actors; and offers public evidence for the use of European integration as a resource‘ 
(Thatcher, 2004: 287). Moreover, the emergence of a particular discourse is seen as a result of 
broader institutional contexts. ‗Discourse is always situated in broader institutional contexts, 
with institutions and culture framing the discourse, defining the repertoire of acceptable and 
expectable actions‘ (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004:193). For instance, Lazarou focuses on how 
the Europeanisation of Greek-Turkish relations led to a discourse transformation in the Greek 
press (Lazarou, 2009). She argues that post-1999 rapprochement between Greece and Turkey 
in the aftermath of Helsinki Council where Turkey has become an EU member caused a 
change in the Greek media from depiction of Turkey as an ‗enemy‘ to an ‗assistance 
discourse‘ (Lazarou, 2009). 
 
This is pretty much the same within the framework of the EU enlargement and discursive 
impacts of the accession process. In terms of the EU enlargement in the Balkans, Ralchev 
argues that the EU‘s minority discourse is an integral part of the Europeanisation discourse, 
which is a ‗political, public and decision-making motivation tool‘ (Ralchev, 2007: 3). For 
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him, national governments in South Eastern Europe had to justify their decisions in front of 
the general public which formed the backbone of the minority discourse of the Balkan 
accession (Ralchev, 2007). 
 
To reiterate, even if Europeanisation literature does not disregard the concept of ‗discourse‘ 
completely, discourses are either reduced to the actors‘ way of legitimising Europeanisation 
reforms in front of the general public or taken as a part/result of a general institutional, 
political or cultural change. Discourse is not taken to mean the relationship to hegemony or 
political frontiers, but rather treated as means of legitimising the impact of Europeanisation. 
 
There is only one study dealing with the concept of ‗Europeanisation‘ as ‗hegemony‘ 
(Dimitrova, 2002). Dimitrova argues that before 1997, the peculiar structure of Bulgaria‘s 
political sphere prevented the discourse of Europeanisation from becoming prevalent in the 
early stages of the post-communist transition (Dimitrova, 2002:70). This picture completely 
changed in the aftermath of the political crisis of 1997, when the delegitimisation of 
previously dominant political ideologies and the strong reform-minded coalition of the United 
Democratic Forces (UtDF) allowed the Europeanisation discourse to assume a hegemonic 
position (Dimitrova, 2002:70). She argues that the developments in the economic sphere 
within the context of Europeanisation had a recurrent impact on the limits of the hegemony of 
the Europeanisation discourse (Dimitrova, 2002: 80-88). Although she does not talk about the 
hegemony of Europeanisation in terms of its significance in influencing political alignments 
and frontiers, this study still remains as an outstanding example of the literature. 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
 
 
6. EUROPEANISATION LITERATURE AND TURKEY 
 
Especially in the aftermath of 1999, it is possible to claim that Turkish scholars increasingly 
got preoccupied with the Europeanisation literature and its possible application to the Turkish 
case. However, due to the novelty of the EU integration process in Turkish context at least in 
terms of legal and institutional adaptation, studies applying the key concepts of the 
Europeanisation literature such as ‗goodness-of-fit‘ or ‗misfit‘ and elaborating on particular 
aspects of Europeanisation are genuinely rare
8
. At a very general level, the Europeanisation 
literature within the Turkish context is very similar to the Eastern and Balkan enlargement. It 
is usually used synonymously with ‗democratisation‘ (e.g. Aydın and Keyman 2004; 
Müftüler-Baç, 2005; Öniş, 2010; Kubicek, 2005; Kardaş, 28 April 2008; Ulusoy, 2008) and 
‗democratic consolidation‘ (Kalaycıoğlu, 2005; Kubicek, 2005). In this respect, the tendency 
to pose a causal relationship between the European level and the domestic level within the 
framework of an inherent asymmetry is endemic and generic in the literature on Turkey. 
There are also intense references to the policy responses to the acquis and changes within the 
state machinery and legal structure (Tocci, 2005a), showing it as an ultimately one-way and 
unproblematised process. 
 
The same tendency to present the exigencies set by the European level and the developments 
‗on the ground‘ within causality also shows itself at the identification of the impact of 
Europeanisation on Turkish domestic politics. The EU demands and the responses at the 
domestic level are presented simultaneously and the Europeanisation within this context is 
                                                            
8 The articles by Centre for European Studies (CES) of Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara, 
Turkey are exceptional in this regard. CES-METU has a research team composed of post-doctoral researchers 
who are extensively focusing on different aspects of Europeanization (see CES-METU website).    
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generally presented as an ‗external trigger‘ that would lead to a re-alignment of Turkish 
politics (Öniş, 2007, 2009; Tocci, 2005a). In this respect, in line with the emergence of 
discourses as means of legitimising Europeanisation as explored in the previous section, 
different segments of Turkish society have used Europeanisation as a means of expanding 
their domain of action or the space available in domestic politics (Öniş, 2009:3). For instance, 
Öniş  focuses on how AKP pushed for Europeanisation and reform in post-2002 reform in 
order to secure the interests of religious conservatives against secular elites whereas the 
secular elites saw Europeanisation as a means of protecting and consolidating the secular, 
Western-oriented character of Turkey, hence, as a bulwark against further Islamisation of 
Turkish society (Öniş, 2009: 3). The same point is raised by Yılmaz who argues that 
Europeanisation was first a tactic and then a strategy for the AKP elites (Yılmaz, 2009). He 
argues that the AKP elite, especially after the defeat of political Islam in Turkey by the ‗post-
modern‘ military intervention of 28 February 1997, took Europeanisation as a strategy to 
accommodate public displays of Islamic identity and to prove the compatibility of Muslim 
identity and European modernity (Yılmaz, 2009: 62). Similarly, Yankaya shows how 
MÜSİAD (Müstakil İşadamları Derneği- Independent Industrialists and Businessmen 
Association) after 2003 starts favouring Turkey‘s Europeanisation, labelling this support as 
‗political opportunism‘ (Yankaya, 2009). 
 
Even if the impact of Europeanisation on particular policy areas has not been as thoroughly 
explored regarding the Turkish case as it had previously been done for other countries, there 
has been considerable focus on the impact of Europeanisation on particular policies and 
policy areas such as foreign policy (e.g. Ulusoy, 2008; Aydın and Tocci, 2009), military 
(Sarıgil, 2007), minority policy (e.g. Gregoriadis, 2008; Duyulmuş, 2008, Onar and Ozgüneş, 
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2010, Atikcan, 2008), citizenship policy (e.g. Keyman and İçduygu, 2005), asylum policy (e.g. 
İçduygu, 2007; Kirişçi, 2007), regional policy (e.g. Loewendahl- Ertugal, 2005), civil society 
(e.g. Kubicek, 2005; Rumelili, 2005; Balkır and Soyaltın, 2007; Yılmaz, 2009) and economic 
policy (e.g. Öniş and Bakır, 2007). In almost all of these studies, Europeanisation is labelled 
either as a cause of -or a response to - the European level or both of them simultaneously. 
 
Another interesting study dealing with the concept of Europeanisation is ‗Europeanisation and 
its Discontents‘ by Hakan Yılmaz (Yılmaz, 2009). Yılmaz in this study looks at 
Europeanisation from a Eurosceptic point of view and equates Europeanisation to EU support 
in the Turkish public sphere. After examining the evolution of the major Eurosceptic themes 
and movements in Turkey from the early years of the EEC–Turkey relations in the late 1950s 
until the Turkish general elections in 2007, he argues that for Europeanisation and 
democratisation attached to it to take place, pro-EU policies of the elites should be endorsed 
by the public opinion (Yılmaz, 2009). 
 
All in all, the problematic nature of the Europeanisation literature shows itself in a different 
way in the Turkish case. The relationship between the European level and the domestic level 
is still unproblematic and categorical. The taken-for-grantedness of the concepts like 
‗goodness-of-fit‘ and ‗misfit‘ is replaced by the uncontested emergence of the European level 
as a panacea for democratisation and modernisation within the framework of the examples of 
Europeanisation literature in Turkish context. Even if there are studies talking about 
discourses on Europeanisation, they usually focus on how different actors within the Turkish 
setting have used Europeanisation as a means of expanding their domain of action. There is 
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no study dealing with the concept of ‗hegemony‘, let alone with political frontiers in this 
respect. 
 
 
 
7. EARLIER CRITICISMS OF THE EUROPEANISATION LITERATURE  
 
Cowles et. al.‘s and Börzel and Risse‘s frameworks of Europeanisation have been criticised 
on many grounds. It is important to include these arguments here as the criticisms will 
facilitate the understanding of their conceptualisation, as well as its strengths and weaknesses. 
 
First of all, the earlier versions of the Europeanisation literature are criticised for limiting the 
domestic impact of Europe to changing policy practices, and thus neglecting the more indirect 
ways in which European integration affects domestic politics (Vink, 2002). 
 
At face value, such a top-down approach would imply that we need to look at, let‘s say, 
domestic policy A at time t1 and t2 (before and after European integration in a given 
policy area), see how much it has changed, and analyse whether and how ‗Europe‘ can 
be used to explain this change. Approaching Europeanisation, however, exclusively 
from a ‗top-down rather than bottom-up perspective‘ may in the end fail to recognise 
the more complex two-way causality of European integration (Vink, 2002: 7). 
 
 
This top-down approach obscures the conception of Europeanisation as a two-way process, 
rather focusing on ‗downward causation‘ from the EU level to domestic structures (Bache, 
2003: 3). In a similar vein, they put the adaptational pressure to the core of domestic change, 
which is not necessarily the case under every circumstance (Radaelli, 2004). ‗Domestic actors 
can use ―Europe‖ even in the absence of pressure. They can adapt domestic policy and 
produce change independently of pressures arising from institutional misfit‘ (Radaelli, 
2004:7). 
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Moreover, their model is said to be very structural, on the grounds that ‗there is not enough 
room for agency‘ (Radaelli, 2004). Their exclusive emphasis on domestic policy does not 
entail a clear vision of effects of domestic actors and the ways in which domestic politics and 
policies are reflected by them.  Radaelli tries to overcome this problem by making reference 
to cognitive processes and ‗frame of references‘ and to the complexity of the Europeanisation 
process with regard to time (Radaelli, 2004). In this way, ‗Europe‘ becomes the ‗grammar‘ of 
domestic political action (Radaelli, 2004: 10). 
 
By the same token and by departing from the same emphasis on ‗frames of reference‘, 
Radaelli argues that the existence of fully-fledged European policies is not a pre-condition for 
Europeanisation (Radaelli, 2004). This reference to the socialisation process not necessarily 
stemming from a policy change at home creates a very simple definition of Europeanisation, 
which has been detailed above: Europeanisation is change, either in response to EU pressure 
or as usage of Europe (Radaelli, 2004). That is, whether convergence or divergence is created 
by the process of Europeanisation is a derivative of domestic political processes. ‗So, 
although the EU may provide an ―activating stimulus‖ for convergence, the actual process is 
driven by domestic politics‘ (Radaelli, 2004:15). 
 
The recent ‗bottom-up‘ approaches give more room to the social processes at the domestic 
level to Europeanisation, trying to overcome the neglect of the domestic actors as the sole 
bearers of the European level. Radaelli‘s conception in particular is quite revolutionary both 
in terms of considering Europeanisation in terms of actors, problems, resources, style and 
discourses at the domestic level and with regard to clarifying the epistemological confusion 
49 
 
about it. However, it still lacks the adequate focus on the domestic discourses and political 
frontiers. It still provides Europeanisation with a teleological and uncontested content. The 
domestic actors can pose resistance against the European pressure according to this 
conception, but various representations and meanings attached to Europeanisation at the 
domestic level are not the core concern of the literature. 
 
 
8. RECENT CRITICISMS OF THE EUROPEANISATION LITERATURE: A 
POSSIBLE DIALOGUE WITH DISCOURSE THEORY?   
 
Although the Europeanisation literature has been one of the most popular and widely 
referenced literatures of political science since its launch in the 1990s, its content and scope 
has not remained unquestioned. Especially starting from early 2000s, the Europeanisation 
scholars showed intensive effort to clarify the conceptual scope of the ‗all-meaning concept‘ 
and to find new trajectories for the future research, which very much related to the issue of 
how to theorise the domestic adoptation to ‗Europe‘ (Vink and Graziano, 2007). A lot of 
scholars asked whether the Europeanisation research is a ‗passing fad‘ or rather a more 
permanent part of the study of European politics (e.g. Featherstone and Radaelli 2003; Vink 
and Graziano, 2007, Egan et. al., 2009).  
 
 
It could be claimed that this critical trend started with Claudio Radaelli‘s intervention 
claiming that Europeanisation as such is not a theory, but rather a phenomenon that needs to 
be explained (Radaelli, 2004). With a similar aim, volumes such as Europeanisation: New 
Research Agendas by Graziano and Vink (2007) and Research Agendas in EU Studies: 
Stalking the Elephant by Egan, Nugent and Paterson (2009) attempt to find a new research 
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agenda for the field.  According to Radaelli and Exadaktylos, the field is ready to move 
towards the exploration of ‗more ambitious questions, such as: what does the Europeanisation 
tell us about the politics of integration, power and legitimacy?‘ (Radaelli and Exadaktylos, 
2009: 208). Similarly, Mair points out that the field of European studies is mature enough to 
relate specific European-focused research to more wide-ranging patterns of mass political and 
institutional development (Mair, 2007: 165).   
 
As an example, Radaelli and Pasquier emphasise the significance of the concept of 
‗temporality‘ and the role of ‗Europe‘ in politics and claim that the narrow understanding of 
‗impact‘ on the part of the Europeanisation literature should be broadened (Radaelli and 
Pasquier, 2007: 37). Another important direction shown by Radaelli and Pasquier is the need 
on the part of the literature to draw on the classical categories of political science. In 
understanding how domestic political systems are penetrated by the logic of the EU politics 
and policy, the Europeanisation literature, in this respect, should extend its scope to concepts 
such as ‗politicisation‘ and ‗socialisation‘ and long-term dynamics  such as conflict, cleavages 
and the distribution of political resources (Radaelli and Pasquier, 2007: 43).  
 
Similarly, Mair also argues that the literature relied too much on ‗standardised quantitative 
variables that can be used directly in highly abstract cross-national research‘ (Mair, 2007: 
162).  Instead, what is needed here is a more systematic comparison of political discussion at 
the national level as revealed in parliamentary debates, or in contests surrounding 
referendums, or in the ebb and flow of the arguments used in national election campaigns. 
‗We need to know more about how Europe actually plays in national political discourse, as 
well as about the way in which it is conceived‘ (Mair, 2007: 162).   
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The need for dealing with broader questions of political science is also accompanied with 
paying attention to sociological questions. Although not posed as a direct critique, Delanty 
and Rumford‘s work could be read along these lines, where the latter is criticised on the 
grounds that it ‗is primarily concerned with conceptualising the emerging shape of the 
European polity‘ (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 1). By situating Europe and the EU within a 
broader global context, they aim to evaluate Europeanisation as a cosmopolitan process 
strictly bound up with societal transformations, new social models and normative ideals, 
which would open up ‗a field of social possibilities‘ instead of focusing on the change of the 
institutions and state (Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 4-10). They argue: 
 
Europe is being socially constructed out of disparate projects, discourses, models of 
societies, imaginaries and in conditions of contestation, resistances and diffused through 
processes of globalization. What is being claimed in this is that Europeanisation is a 
process of social construction, rather than one of state building and one in which 
globalization, in all its facets, plays a key role in creating its conditions. (Delanty and 
Rumford, 2005:6) 
 
 
Although Delanty and Rumford do not focus on how Europeanisation influences political 
frontiers at the domestic level and stress this process as ‗hegemony‘, the location of the 
concept within a broader context of globalisation in a more society-informed manner and the 
link sustained between Europeanisation and ‗discursive and socio-cognitive transformation 
within the society‘ (Rumford and Delanty, 2005: 19) set a novel and unique alternative to the 
Europeanisation literature. 
 
Another unique approach to Europeanisation with similar concerns comes from Kaliber 
(Kaliber, 2008). Kaliber argues that in order to comprehend better societal and political 
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transformations that the process of Europeanisation triggers one should associate it with the 
project of political modernity as a wider historical context, which is hardly done by the 
Europeanisation literature (Kaliber, 2008: 3). For him, by rendering Europeanisation a linear, 
natural, inevitable process, the literature ignores the historicities and specifities of distinct 
cases and hence overlooks possible deviancies, discontinuities and ruptures in absorbing 
Europeanisation, thereby getting closer to a neo-evolutionist approach (Kaliber, 2008: 7-8).  
Although his main focus is on the need to study the articulate civil society as an agent for 
democratic transformation in Turkey, Kaliber‘s work constitutes an important and astute 
critique of and intervention to the Europeanisation literature. 
 
Similarly, in a special issue of European Journal of Turkish Studies devoted to providing the 
Europeanisation literature on Turkey with a more sociologically-informed perspective to 
understand Turkey-EU relations, Visier argues that the political actors are not as intentional 
and fully-informed as the Europeanisation literature claims in terms of using and interacting 
with ‗Europe‘ and the issue of ‗Europe‘ might lead to complex and ambiguous positions. 
According to Visier, socially engaged actors occupy different positions in their original socio-
political spaces and are involved in struggles for positions, thus structuring configurations at 
the national, European, international and transnational levels. ‗Studying socio-political 
configurations and their lasting quality or possible reconstruction provides an understanding 
of the wide-ranging effects of Europe‘s emergence as a new horizon of meaning‘ (Visier, 
2009: 7).  
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Under the light of these concerns, new questions and a new agenda that would relate the 
literature to broader questions of political science and sociology also mean for the current 
study that there is more room to engage with the Europeanisation literature than the difference 
between the two in terms of scope and aim would point to. First of all, the need to redefine 
‗the European impact‘ claimed by the volume by Graziano and Vink in fact necessitates a 
redefinition of what the scholars of the literature should understand by ‗Europe‘. The earlier 
intervention by Delanty and Rumford also points to a similar need to understand ‗Europe‘ as a 
possibility for societal transformations, new social models and normative ideals (Delanty and 
Rumford, 2005: 4-10).  
 
The recent need on the part of the Europeanisation literature to pay attention to the debates 
and contests culminating around ‗Europe‘ at the domestic level clearly shows that the new 
trajectory of the literature is tilting towards seeing ‗Europe‘ as a contestation where the 
domestic actors define and redefine their positions and roles. This is the third group of studies 
I mentioned in Chapter 1, with which this study is aligned as well. In this respect, the notion 
of ‗hegemony‘, which is the focus of this study, might constitute a novel platform for the 
Europeanisation literature on which the ‗European impact‘ is redefined.  
 
Secondly, if the Europeanisation literature would pay attention to the questions of power and 
legitimacy as Radaelli and Exadaktylos point out (2009), it is necessary to take a closer look 
at the political sphere. This is even more relevant in case of the candidate states where the 
‗uncertainty and power asymmetry embedded in the notion of conditionality‘ (Sunay, 2008: 
1) go beyond the technicalities of the policy processes of the candidate states and is politicised 
by the political actors. In this respect, the notion of ‗intervening variable‘ is widely used by 
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the Europeanisation literature which point out to the specific domestic conditions that explain 
the variable domestic impact of ‗Europe‘ (e.g. Radaelli, 2004; Poguntke et.al., 2007; Grabbe, 
2003). However, a closer look at the politicisation of the notion of ‗conditionality‘ and the 
antagonisms that the conditionality articulates at the political landscape, that this thesis is 
interested in, open the door to a broader reconceptualisation of how domestic level interacts 
with discourses and thereby enrich the debate culminating around ‗conditionality‘ constituting 
a new research horizon for the literature.  
 
Thirdly, the perfomative aspect of the Europeanisation also has to be redefined. As the 
volume by Visier et.al. shows, there is a need on the part of the Europeanisation literature to 
define the political actors as undecisive and unintentional in order to to understand how 
‗Europe‘ becomes an issue within the political arena. As the current research claims, the 
articulation of subject positions on ‗Europe‘ is a gateway to understanding how these 
discourses and subject positions acquire performativity through the hegemonic struggle and 
transform the political identities of the engaged actors by demarcating political frontiers. It is 
exactly a noteworthy attempt on the part of more sociologically-informed variants of 
Europeanisation literature to take ‗Europe‘ as ‗a new horizon of meaning‘ (Visier, 2009: 7).   
 
 
 
 
All in all, although the Europeanisation literature and this thesis have different aims and foci 
as I outlined above , the current endeavour contributes to the EU studies literature in the sense 
that it makes use of concepts such as ‗discourse‘, ‗hegemony‘ and ‗antagonism‘ to identify 
how ‗Europe‘ and Turkish politics interacted in the 1999-2008 period. This reading fits well 
with the literature‘s recent endeavour to redefine ‗the European impact‘ and to engage with 
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broader questions of political science and sociology, which makes this thesis helpful and 
interesting to read by the Europeanisation scholars.    
 
 
 
9. CONCLUSION: WHY EUROPEANISATION LITERATURE? 
 
Setting the Europeanisation literature as the departure point of this project might appear 
somewhat puzzling given its marginal status for the argument of the thesis as a whole. As 
such it might lead to the question of why to begin the thesis with a review of literature the 
usefulness of which is subsequently rejected. Nevertheless, the foregoing discussion of 
Europeanisation was undertaken for a number of reasons. Firstly, I want to iterate why it is 
problematic to reduce the emergence of the notion of ‗Europe‘ in Turkish politics to a 
manifestation of Europeanisation. This is particularly important as the Europeanisation 
literature would typically be the first reference point for those seeking to research the 1999-
2008 period in Turkey with a particular reference to ‗Europe‘ and domestic debates. In this 
study, I am rather trying to show the shortcomings of the existing literature in terms that 
identify the domestic discourses on ‗Europe‘ and their impact on domestic political frontiers. 
Secondly, this contributes to the novel theoretical approach developed here regarding 
‗Europe-as-hegemony‘. As the study will show, the hegemony of ‗Europe‘ does not originate 
from the automaticity of the relationship between the European and domestic level as 
stipulated by the Europeanisation literature, but rather from the power of discourses on 
‗Europe‘ regarding the way in which they create antagonisms and demarcate political 
frontiers in the 1999-2006 period. In this respect, the current project offers a novel approach 
to the Europeanisation literature where the political is not only given and constructed but is 
also reflexive and open to contestation and negotiation.  
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Thirdly, as different in scope and content as the Europeanisation literature and the discourse 
theory are, the current attempt provides the former with a novel research agenda with respect 
to this thesis‘s interest in the notions of ‗hegemony‘ and ‗antagonisms‘, to say the least. As 
mentioned above, the Europeanisation scholars‘ recent attempt to search for new research 
trajectories and agendas and the claimed need on the part of the literature to tackle with 
broader questions of political science and sociology might mean the introduction of the 
notions of ‗hegemony‘, ‗political frontiers‘ and ‗antagonism‘ to the research agenda of the 
literature.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
DIFFERENT THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DISCOURSES ON ‘EUROPE’ 
AND POLITICAL FRONTIERS: PITFALLS AND INPUTS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous section, I highlighted the main premises of the Europeanisation literature in 
order to show its shortcomings in terms of identifying the domestic discourses on ‗Europe‘ 
and their impact on political frontiers. The Europeanisation literature, which is possibly the 
favourite literature within the academic repertoire focusing on Turkish politics during the late 
1990s and 2000s, firstly, does not focus on the discourses and meanings at the domestic level 
and secondly, does not tell us a full story of how ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ constructs political 
frontiers and identities. By sustaining a relationship of automaticity and causality between the 
European level and domestic level and rendering it an ordinate vs. super ordinate one, the 
Europeanisation literature depicts a different picture of ‗hegemony‘. Hegemony, according to 
the analytical framework of the Europeanisation literature, does not originate from the 
automaticity of this relationship between two levels, but from the significance of discourses 
on ‗Europe‘ in terms of creating antagonisms and demarcating political frontiers in the 1999-
2006 period. 
 
In this section, I will explore possible theoretical approaches to understanding how discourses 
on ‗Europe‘ hegemonise the political terrain and thereby construct political frontiers. As I 
have already mentioned in the Introduction chapter, the pitfalls I had pointed out above are 
best accommodated by the discourse theory, the theoretical framework I will be using in this 
project. However, before thoroughly exploring my theoretical framework, I will first refer to 
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the social constructivist approach for a number of reasons. First of all, this would answer the 
question of why it would not be enough to use the theoretical framework of social 
constructivism to understand the discourses on ‗Europe‘ at the domestic level and their impact 
on political frontiers. If there is not enough room in the Europeanisation literature for 
understanding ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ and how it constructs political frontiers, why not resort 
to the social constructivist perspective which is more assertive in terms of discourses, 
meanings and representations? Is it not easier to go one step further from thereon and argue 
that discourses on Europe are socially constructed? What is the significance or added value of 
using a poststructuralist discourse theory, that of Laclau and Mouffe in particular in this 
respect? In this respect, the main argument of the section on social constructivism will be that 
it does not forge the link between the construction of discourses and political frontiers 
because it is mainly preoccupied with understanding how meaning is constructed and in doing 
so assumes that identities are stable and uncontested.  More importantly, the depiction of the 
political in the social constructivist register is not sufficient at all to allow for a full grasp of 
political frontiers. 
 
Secondly, I will move on to scrutinising different strands of discourse theory. Thanks to the 
‗turn of language‘9, iterating a renewed interest in language in political theory starting from 
1960s, discourse increasingly constitutes a burning issue in the political science agenda (see 
Norval, 2000; Howarth, 2000). In this section, by making a reference to the historical venture 
of discourse theory stretching from de Saussure to Foucault, I will outline its main premises in 
order to locate Laclau- Mouffean discourse theory in its proper historical and conceptual 
                                                            
9  Norval (2000) argues that it was Richard Rorty‘s 1967 volume The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in 
Philosophical Method that popularised the use of the term. However, I will not focus on this linguistic turn and 
the literature attached to it. It suffices to say that political science was immensely penetrated by the ordinary 
language analysis by the scholars such as Wittgenstein and Austin during the 1960s.  
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context. Subsequently, I will explore the use of discourse theory in European studies. . By 
making a special reference to the works of Wæver, Larsen, Hansen, Diez and Rosamond, I 
will show how these studies focus on different constructions of discourses on ‗Europe‘, 
creating a particular reality and how the present thesis sits within a broader spectrum of 
European studies.  
 
Last, but not least, I will present the main arguments of Laclau and Mouffe by giving a 
particular importance to the concepts of ‗hegemony‘, ‗articulation‘, ‗antagonism‘ and ‗the 
social‘ and ‗the political‘, focusing particularly on how discourses are articulated vis-à-vis the 
antagonisms and the political frontiers within the ‗social‘. 
 
2. ‘IS DISCOURSE WHAT WE MAKE OF IT’?10:  SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM 
AND THE DISCOURSES ON ‘EUROPE’ 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
As already mentioned in the second chapter, the point of departure for this project is, besides 
its strengths, the Europeanisation literature is problematic in terms of identifying the domestic 
discourses on ‗Europe‘ and their impact on domestic political frontiers. The earlier examples 
of the literature sets a relationship of automaticity and causality between the European and the 
domestic level, which disregards discourses, meanings and presentations as they occur ‗on the 
ground‘. 
 
The solution that could be, and has already been, offered to this problem is social 
constructivism, the second group of studies mentioned in Chapter 1 (‗Europe-as-
                                                            
10 Here, I basically refer to Alexander Wendt‘s article ‗Anarchy is What States Make of it‘, which appeared in 
1992 and is referred as one of the milestones of the social constructivist literature 
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construct‘)(for main examples of social constructivism see Risse, 2004; Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 
1999; Checkel, 2006). With its reference to human consciousness and ideational factors, 
social constructivism ‗insists that human agents do not exist independently from their social 
environment and its collectively shared systems of meanings‘ (Risse, 2004: 160). Thus, social 
structures and agents are mutually co-determined and constituted. By the same token, we 
cannot describe the properties of social agents without reference to the social structure in 
which they are embedded. A possible follow-up to this premise is that any social phenomenon 
affects the ways in which actors see/define themselves and constitute their discursive and 
behavioral practices accordingly. This focus on social practices takes ‗words, language and 
communicative utterances seriously‘ as language is constitutive of the reality (Risse, 2004: 
164). Thus, according to the constructivist approach, international reality is not merely the 
product of physical forces and material power, whether military and economic, but is a 
phenomenon socially constructed through discursive power (the power of knowledge, ideas, 
culture, ideology, and language) (Adler 1997; Hopf 1998). 
 
Having said that, it is now more convenient to make a reference to social constructivist 
framework which takes words, language and communicative utterances seriously. It is easier, 
but is it really sufficient? This section on social constructivism will focus on that question. 
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2.2. Main premises of Social Constructivism 
 
 
In this section, I will present the main premises of social constructivism in congruence with 
the scope of the project and argue that in spite of the new and stronger position ascribed to 
meanings and representations, social constructivism is not really interested in understanding 
the political impact of discourses. I will depart from the premise that the genuine focus of 
social constructivism is less about the construction of political frontiers and more about 
understanding how meaning is constructed. 
 
 
The theoretical roots of social constructivism dates back to the late 1980s, as the first signs of 
the demise of the Cold War became visible, which culminated in the so-called ‗constructivist 
turn‘ (Checkel, 1998; Wæver, 1999) As Hacking contends, if social constructivism stipulates 
challenging the inevitability of the status-quo, then it is not surprising that the unexpected fall 
of the wall gave new legitimacy to such claims (Hacking, 1999: 6). Alexander Wendt (1987) 
introduced the agent-structure problem to IR scholarship and John Ruggie (1989) questioned 
the inability of traditional international relations theory to deal with historical transformations 
(Fierke and Jorgensen, 2001). 
 
As already mentioned, one of the main problems that social constructivism focuses on is the 
agent-structure problem. For Wendt, agents and structures mutually constitute themselves and 
interact (1987). Inspired by Anthony Gidden‘s ‗structuration theory‘, which argues that the 
relationship between agents and structures are relational and mutually constitutive, Wendt 
tries to overcome the problems associated with structuralist ontology stipulating pre-given 
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categories determining agents‘ behaviours via a dialectical synthesis‘ between structure and 
agency that overcomes the subordination of one to the other (Wendt, 1987).
11
 Thus, according 
to this conception of structure and agency, social structures are inseparable from spatial and 
temporal structures and the dialectical synthesis of structure and agent is necessary (Wendt, 
1987). Nevertheless, actors can change these social structures and thus constitute them as 
well. This is also called an ‗ontological middle way‘ (Adler, 1997; Christiansen et. al, 1999). 
 
This problematisation of structure and agency and the main tenets of constructivism in 
international relations later culminated in Alexander Wendt‘s watershed article, ‗Anarchy is 
What States Make of it‘ published in 1992 (Wendt, 1992a). In this regard, ‗states may have 
made that system competitive, self-help one in the past, but by the same token they may 
‗unmake‘ those dynamics in the future‘ (Wendt, 1992b:183), as implied in another article. In 
this respect, what concerns him is the problematic of identity, in the sense that our ideas about 
ourselves and our environment shape our interactions and are shaped by our interactions; 
thereby creating the social reality. Identity seems to be the main concept in Wendt‘s 
constructivism as it sits at the nexus between reproducing and changing a situation (Zehfuss, 
2001). In this respect, ‗what states make of anarchy is related to their conception of identity‘ 
(Zehfuss, 2001: 58). 
 
On the other hand, constructivists‘ preoccupation with language is most clearly seen in 
Nicholas Onuf‘s work. According to him, human beings construct reality through their deeds, 
                                                            
11 According to Doty, scientific realism is necessary for the ontology of structuration theory as well, which 
claims that unobservable structures are real and important, though it is not clear how this stance is set together 
with scientific realism‘s claim that structures operate according to a ‗natural necessity‘ (see Doty, 1997; Bhaskar, 
1975). For the elaboration of structure and agency relationship in structuration theory, see Giddens, 1976, 1979, 
1981, 1994, 1998: Hay, 2002: 118-122, Bryant and Jary, 1991.   
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which may be speech acts
12
. Speech acts in turn may be institutionalised into rules and 
thereby provide the context and the basis of meaning for further human action (Zehfuss, 
2001).  In this respect, meaning in human social relationships depends on the existence of 
rules, which are essentially social. According to Onuf, rules construct agents out of individual 
human beings by enabling them to act upon the world in which they find themselves (Onuf, 
1997: 8). That is, ‗rules make agents and society what they are, and they make rule a 
necessary condition for agents in society‘ (Onuf, 1997: 15). 
These acts have material and social effects; they make the world what it is materially 
and socially. Agents are never lacking in purpose, motives or intentions, even if they 
find it difficult to articulate the reasons for their actions (...) They use resources, made 
such through rules, to achieve their intentions. Whether agents articulate their reasons 
for acting by reference to the opportunities that available resources afford or observers 
do so for them, we recognise agents‘ interests in the results (Onuf, 1997: 8). 
 
This at the same time gives clues to how constructivists handle one of the most crucial 
questions preoccupying the scholars of international relations: the formation of interests. 
According to social constructivists, state interests emerge from and are endogenous to 
interaction with structures (Checkel, 1998). Interests, just like identities, are therefore 
endogenous factors and can be changed (see Rosamond, 2000:172). This endogenous view on 
interests distinguishes social constructivists from rationalists, which see interests as mainly 
exogenous to interaction with structures (Checkel, 1998). 
 
In a nutshell, Christensen, Jorgensen and Wiener (1999: 533) summarise ‗the constructivist 
turn‘ (Checkel, 1998; Wæver 1999) as consisting of three moves- an epistemological turn 
                                                            
12 Theory of ‗speech act‘ stipulates that ‗in saying something, we do something‘ (Austin, 1975: 94). Hence, in 
line with the concept of ‗illocutionary acts‘, the term used by John L. Austin in his How to do Things with 
Words, the acts can occur if the audience learns that the act has been performed. ‗Language is performative in 
that it does not only take note of, say, the founding of the European Economic Community (EEC). Instead, it is 
through language that this founding is performed‘ (Diez, 1999:600-emphasis original). This point will be 
elaborated more in the section on the use of discourse analysis in European studies.  
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towards the role of intersubjectivity, an ontological move whereby structure was redefined 
from ‗anarchy‘ as a given towards the effect of the social interaction among states, and the 
importance of shared norms in terms of institutions (quoted in Wæver, 1999:3). That is, the 
two priorities of social constructivism in IR theory, as Mendelski (2006) summarises, are the 
mutual constitution of structures and agents where social structures constitute actors by 
allowing them to act or by restricting their actions and by giving them their social identity and  
changeability of identities and interests where social norms and social interaction influence 
the behaviour of actors and define also their interests and identities (Checkel, 1998; 
Christiansen et al, 1999). 
 
In the case of Europe, social constructivists seem to be predominantly interested in how 
national interests and identities can be altered and how a European identity is created. Above 
all the interest lies in the interaction process between the European and the national level as 
well as the constitution of a new European ‗polity‘ (Christiansen, Jorgensen and Wiener, 
1999). In his article on social construction and European integration, Checkel mainly focuses 
on the processes of learning and socialisation especially within the institutions of the EU 
(Checkel, 1999). According to Smith, his constructivist accounts offer alternative ways of 
conceptualising the relationship between norms, discourse, language and material capabilities, 
which is able to capture the range of institutional dynamics at work in contemporary Europe 
fully (Smith, 1999: 685). However much these priorities are avowed by neo-functionalism, 
the differences, according to Checkel, are significant. While neo-functionalism is not a 
substantive theory that predicts constant learning or a growing sense of collective identity, but 
rather a more modest one, constructivism is a middle-range theoretical approach seeking to 
understand identity formation conditions (Checkel, 1999). 
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On the other hand, more critical/radical variants of constructivism predominantly and 
exclusively deal with language. Discourse/theoretical methods are again emphasised but with 
a greater emphasis on the power and domination inherent in language. Key sources of 
theoretical inspiration lie in linguistic approaches. Moreover, besides their preoccupation with 
language, radical constructivists add an explicitly normative dimension by probing a 
researcher‘s own implication in the reproduction of the identities and world he/she is 
studying. In this respect, nothing scholars do, be they analytic or methodological, is 
academically innocent and thus this politicised view of the academy, which is far from being 
problem-driven, characterises the critical/radical version of constructivism (Checkel, 2006). 
 
2.3. The Political in the Social Constructivist account 
 
As mentioned above, social constructivism created an inspiring and convincing perspective to 
assert the substantive role of representations and construction of meanings. This approach is 
very helpful in most ways. First of all, ‗[social constructivism] allows us to be critical towards 
or at least innovative with regard to the mainstream‘ (Guzzini, 2000: 148). This is quite 
revolutionary for a discipline which was heavily being dominated by the mainstream 
rationalist assumptions during the 1980s. Secondly, it introduces the ‗social‘ connotation to 
the ways in which we understand reality through its focus on meanings, representations, 
values and norms. By the same token, it introduces the concept of ‗discourse‘ as a significant 
phenomenon to the realm of social inquiry. Now, thanks to social constructivism, the 
question, ‗how are discourses on ―Europe‖ created?‘ is a legitimate research question for 
political science scholars and students. 
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As inspiring and helpful in understanding social reality as social constructivism is, real focus 
is different from the aim of this project in many ways, as has already been mentioned in 
Chapter 1. First of all, in its attempt to understand social reality, social constructivism 
somewhat assumes that the concepts of identity and norms are uncontested and stable. 
Writing about the German military involvement abroad, Zehfuss argues that a constructivist 
would start from a given and unquestioned norm structure. In this way, ‗the use of military 
becomes the only feasible alternative in a world limited by material conditions such as the 
possibility of death. In other words, by attempting to start from reality, the status quo is 
privileged as independent and binding conditions that limit our possibilities are asserted‘ 
(Zehfuss, 2002: 254-55). 
 
Similarly, in the case of identities, the concept of identity is stable, commonsensical and 
unproblematic. ‗In the case of moderate constructivism, identity becomes central as the result 
of a basic ontological assumption: that identity, rather than instrumental rationality, 
constitutes interests and thus determines the behaviour of agents in the international system, 
and that interest cannot therefore be taken to be stable givens‘ (Ortmann, 2007: 10). However, 
this does not necessarily point out how the political identities of agents could be shaped by the 
discourses on ‗Europe‘. Although the core focus of this project is not identities per se, the 
shaping of the political identities implicitly slides in as I am interested in how political 
frontiers are drawn and redrawn by discourses on ‗Europe‘. 
 
Secondly, although it had attached an utmost importance to meanings and representations, the 
role of language has been largely ignored in the debate between rationalists and 
constructivists. According to Fierke, ‗the avoidance of language is in part a reflection of the 
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effort to create distance from poststructuralists, who are associated with interpretative 
relativism. It is also a reflection of the middle ground‘s focus on ontology‘ (Fierke, 2007: 
175). This is the main reason why radical constructivists are radical in attributing a central 
role to language. 
 
Last but not least, the role attributed to the political is somewhat epiphenomenal in social 
constructivism. The main aim is to understand how a certain phenomenon, concept or identity 
is constructed through a socially-enriched perspective. There is little within this inquiry about 
the political as the social constructivism somewhat sacrifices the political in favour of the 
social. As Walker rightly argues, political in this perspective is understood ‗only within terms 
set by a specific rendition of what it means to be political, and of where the political is to be 
found‘ (Walker, 1995: 312). Radical constructivists, on the other hand, add an explicitly 
normative dimension to social enquiry by probing a researcher‘s own implication in the 
reproduction of the identities and world he/she is studying, therefore providing a political role 
to language and discourse (Checkel, 2006). Thus, how we are telling a story reifies a political 
perspective besides the fact that how the very act of telling that story changes the landscape of 
the political for radical constructivists, which will be explored in the forthcoming sections 
within the context of European studies. 
 
3. STRUCTURALISM, POST STRUCTURALISM AND DISCOURSE THEORY: 
WHAT PURCHASE FOR UNDERSTANDING POLITICAL FRONTIERS? 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Especially starting from the 1960s with the ‗turn of language‘, the concept of ‗discourse‘ 
started being very pervasive and significant in the realm of political theory. Generally 
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speaking, the main fault line regarding the myriad of approaches to ‗discourse‘ has been 
whether language/discourse is itself constitutive of the social reality, or whether it is a mere 
and neutral means of communication. Broadly speaking, we could distinguish between two 
main strands of theoretical approaches to discourse in this respect: the first category of 
discourse analysis is limited to conclusions about discourse or the language itself. This strand 
restricts language/discourse to texts and defines it external to the agents, drawing a sharp line 
between language and society. Structural linguistic analysis and logical positivism fall in this 
category (for examples see Barthes and Duisit, 1975; Harris, 1951; Burton, 1982).  ‗As 
everyone knows, linguistics stops at the sentence; it is the last unit that falls within its scope; 
for if the sentence-being an order and not a sequence-is not reducible to the sum of its words, 
and constitutes therefore an original unit, an enunciation, on the other hand, is nothing but the 
succession of the sentences it contains‘ (Barthes and Duisit, 1975: 239). By contrast, much 
discourse analysis in social psychology, sociology and political science has a broader focus, 
often rejecting any discursive/social distinction, on the grounds that all discourse is action and 
all action is discursive. The discourse is defined in terms of the projections and conclusions it 
establishes about social or political processes or structures. Discourse analysis in this respect 
stipulates that ‗language is not only a means of communication and a transparent medium 
through which already formed ideologies, identities and attitudes are expressed, but rather 
actively constructs socially shared representations of the world and constructs individuals as 
subjects but recreates and constructs the socially shared representations of the world‘ (Philips, 
1998: 849-emphasis original). Poststructural and critical discourse analysis fall in this 
category (for examples see Fairclough, 1992a; 1992b, Potter, 1996, Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; 
Foucault, 1972). According to Ball, this second approach is indicative of not only a renewed 
interest in the nature and functions of language but also of the realisation ‗that our language 
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does not merely mirror the world, but is instead partially constitutive of it‘ (Ball, 1985; quoted 
in Norval, 2000: 314).
13
 
 
In this section, in line with the general theoretical spirit of the project, I will focus on a 
poststructuralist reading of ‗discourse‘ in order to show how poststructuralism provides 
discourse with a significant political connotation. After giving a general register of 
structuralist theory which provides a good starting point for understanding poststructuralist 
theory in general and Laclau- Mouffean discursive framework in particular, I will outline 
main underpinnings of Foucauldian discourse analysis. I will argue that although Foucault 
presents an inspiring account of concepts such as discourse and power and focus on the 
reflexive aspects of discourse, he does not problematise how discursive formations reflect 
upon a broader account of political frontiers. 
 
The thesis will then move on to consider the use of discourse theory in European studies. As 
the notion of ‗Europe‘ presents a highly fruitful resource for students, scholars and academics 
dealing with European politics, that it is a unit of analysis in the literature on discourse is no 
surprise.  Be it in the form of a poststructuralist analysis presenting ‗Europe‘ as a concept to 
be deconstructed within the ‗European‘ discourse or in the form of the textual analysis of the 
speeches of political leaders in Europe, much has been said on the use of discourse theory 
regarding European politics. 
 
                                                            
13 At this point, it is important to note that I am following Philips‘s distinction of approaches to discourse where 
the dividing line is whether language is reflexive in the sense that ‗it constructs socially shared representations of 
the world‘ (Philips, 1998: 849). By doing this, I do not claim that critical discourse analysis and post structuralist 
discourse analysis have an identical approach to discourse. As Shepherd rightly argues, critical discourse 
analysis discourses are constrained by a material reality whereas poststructuralist discourse analysis does not 
conceive of a distinction between discursive and non-discursive (Shepherd, 2008: 17-18).      
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As the main aim of this project is to understand how ‗Europe‘ is constructed on a discursive 
basis at the domestic level, I will mainly refer to the first group of studies which entails that 
the concept of ‗Europe‘ is fixed, articulated or dislocated through a certain use of discourse, 
creating a particular reality which would have been different if the notion would have been 
articulated differently. In this respect, I will refer to the works of Ole Wæver, Henrik Larsen, 
Lene Hansen, Thomas Diez and Ben Rosamond. Such a general register of discourse theory in 
European studies is important to locate different representations and meanings of ‗Europe‘ in 
Turkish political debates, which this thesis aims to identify, into a broader scholarly context 
of European studies. It is also important to note that there are other studies using discourse 
analysis for understanding European politics, which either focus on how discourses impact 
upon particular European policies (for some examples see Hansen and Sorensen, 2005; 
Griggs, 2005; Mottier, 2005) or how discourses shape European identity from a 
psychoanalytic perspective (Stavrakakis, 2005), neither of which are included here due to 
space and their only limited relevance for the present study. 
 
Finally, I will present the main arguments of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe with a 
particular emphasis on  the concepts of ‗hegemony‘, ‗articulation‘, ‗antagonism‘ and ‗the 
social‘ and ‗the political‘, and on the question how discourses are theorised in their 
articulation vis-à-vis the antagonisms and the political frontiers within the ‗social‘ by Laclau 
and Mouffe. 
 
3.2. Structuralism 
 
Structuralist theory provides a good starting point for understanding poststructuralist theory in 
general and Laclau-Mouffean discursive framework in particular because many theoretical 
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underpinnings of the latter have been developed both as a derivative of and as a reaction to the 
structuralist conception of discourse and language. 
 
‗Structuralists emphasise that all human actions are best viewed as symbolic systems of 
practice, and researchers in the social sciences have deployed the methods and assumptions of 
structuralism to develop sophisticated conceptions of social formations, and to explain events 
such as the actions of states‘ (Howarth, 2000). Kearney argues that structuralism, being a 
method rather than a theory, aims to analyse seemingly isolated events and meanings with the 
motive to find underlying structural laws. It seeks, he argues, to contemplate the particular by 
describing its relationship with the totality of general codes, the general. It looks for the deep 
and hidden structures beneath the surface manifestations of meaning (Kearney, 1994). 
 
Keeping on the same track to find structural rules that determine the significance, meaning 
and function of the individual elements of a system, Ferdinand de Saussure distinguishes 
between the signified (concept) and the signifier (a sound image
14
) (Saussure, 1967: 66, 
quoted in Pülzl, 2001: 6). For Saussure, ‗the linguistic sign unites a concept and a sound 
image. The latter is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychological 
imprint of the sound, the impression it makes‘ (Saussure, 1967: 66). Thus, the sign dog 
consists of a signifier that sounds like d-o-g (and appears in the written form as dog) and the 
concept of a ‗dog‘, which signifier designates (Scott, 2007: 140).  
 
The signifier and the signified are connected to each other via the structural rules of the 
language. Pülzl (2001) compares this connection to a piece of paper with the signifier on one 
                                                            
14 ‗For a detailed definition of the ‗sound image‘, please see Saussure, 1967 
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side and the signified on the other. ‗If you try to tear the paper apart, you will interrupt the 
connection between them. The example of the piece of paper shows that the connection 
between the signifier and the signified is fixed, as it is difficult to tear the paper apart without 
tearing both‘ (Pülzl, 2001: 6). However, at the same time, there is no natural relationship 
between the signifier and the signified: the relationship between the word ―Europe‖ and the 
continent, civilisation, culture etc. itself is not necessarily a natural association, but only a 
function and the derivative of the language we use. In this respect, the relationship between 
both is flexible; and Saussure links this flexibility to the ‗arbitrary nature of the sign‘ 
(Saussure, 1974:68). This means that they are not necessarily linked to each other, but that the 
concept could be linked to another sound image. Thus, there is no existing property that fixes 
the signified. The signifier and the signified are fixed with regard to their relationships to 
other the signifiers and the signifieds in a particular language (Culler, 1976: 23). In the above 
example, there is no necessary reason why the sign dog is associated with the concept of a 
‗dog‘: it is simply a function and convention of the language we use (Scott, 2007: 140). The 
linguistic entity is determined not with reference to a fixed meaning, but within another kind 
of system, that Saussure compares to a chess game, in which the identity of a particular piece 
in only intelligible in terms of its function with the whole (Weber, 1976). 
 
A similar relationship could be seen between the langue, i.e. ―systemic totality of all possible 
linguistic usages‖ (Kearney, 1994: 241) and the parole. ‘The parole, in contrast, refers to any 
particular act of language; it is the actual manner in which we realise the possibilities of the 
abstract language system in our everyday utterances‘ (Kearney, 1994: 241). In distinguishing 
language and speech, he gives more emphasis to the former, rendering the empirical 
manifestation of the language, i.e. speech, epiphenomenal. 
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Saussure‘s theoretical framework is significant in terms of showing that language is not a 
transparent means of communication which is used unproblematically to disseminate our 
ideas, i.e. a nomenclature, – that it creates meaning by reference to something external to it 
such as ideas or physical objects (Ives, 2005). According to Ives, Laclau and Mouffe apply 
Saussure‘s understanding of language to political analysis in order to get ‗beyond Gramsci‘ 
and overcome the persistence of economic determinism (Ives, 2005). ‗Just as Saussure argues 
about language, subject positions are defined purely in terms of their relations with other 
subject positions‘ (Ives, 2005:460). 
 
Although structuralism provides a significant set of concepts and logics to understand the 
language and society, it is hard to argue that there is a feasible structuralist framework of 
discourse. Saussure‘s preoccupation with language, which at the same time showed his 
indifference to discursivity or extra-discursivity, precipitated a closed system of signs and 
meanings. According to Howarth (2000), poststructuralist writers such as Jacques Derrida 
seek to remedy these deficiencies by ‗deconstructing Saussure‘s sharp distinction between 
speech and writing [the langue and the parole], signifiers and signifieds‘ (Howarth, 2000: 36). 
The ‗post‘ prefix here signifies the differentiation of this school of thought from the 
structuralism of Saussure, Lacan, Althusser and Lévi-Strauss where ‗truth‘ is taken to reside 
behind or within texts and structures (e.g. linguistic, psychic or socio-economic) that are seen 
as well-fitting, rounded and stable ‗totalities‘ (Henriques et al, 1984). On the other hand, 
poststructuralism is often identified with ‗deconstruction‘-the displacement of the constructed 
naturalness of a text and the taken-for-grantedness of the truth attached to it (for further detail, 
see Derrida, 1976). Thus, knowledge and truth are not certain, stable and fixed categories, but 
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are considered to be socially and discursively constructed and are thus transient. In this 
respect, what we face is multiple ‗realities‘, contingency, and uncertainty (Wetherell, 1998). 
In a similar vein, the poststructuralist ‗turn to language‘ is characterised by its emphasis on 
the significance of language/discourse, both in terms of meaning and identity. The signified is 
downplayed and the signifier is made dominant (Henriques et al, 1984). In other words, 
language is not used to contemplate reality, but is constitutive of the reality itself. 
 
3.3. Foucault’s approach to discourse: relevance, critique and limitations  
 
Michel Foucault has always been one of the most inspiring and outstanding scholars as his 
theoretical framework was challenging in terms of many fields such as history, science, 
modernity, queer studies etc. His main preoccupation with power and its relationship to the 
discursive formations in society that make knowledge possible is the core reformulation of 
his theoretical framework.  This relationship between power, knowledge and discourse, to 
some extent, puts the concepts and conceptual fixations under scrutiny because our 
knowledge of a certain concept stems not from the concept itself but from the power 
relationship that creates its knowledge.  Foucault advocates that ‗power and knowledge 
directly imply one another and there is no power relation without correlative constitution of a 
field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same 
time power relations‘ (quoted in Turner; 1994).  Thus, everything we can see or conceive of is 
a product of power relations‘ (Shepherd, 2008: 22). The relationship sustained between 
discourse and power renders the former a practice, which is one of the most revolutionary 
aspects of Foucault. 
 
75 
 
To begin with, Foucault‘s method of ‗archaeology‘ is mainly characterised by his hostility to 
the humanist concepts of subjectivity and truth. He is interested in concepts instead. . In this 
regard, discourse refers to an ensemble of discursive practices and concepts structured and 
conditioned inside socio-historical settings. These structural relations between concepts are 
called episteme, which: 
[..] delimits in the totality of experience a field of knowledge, defines the mode of being 
of the objects that appear in that field of knowledge, defines the mode of being of the 
objects that appear in that field, provides man‘s everyday perception with theoretical 
powers, and defines the conditions in which he can sustain a discourse about the things 
that is recognised to be true (Foucault, 1986: 22). 
 
Foucault calls the product of a discourse a statement. Statements are the smallest units within 
a certain discourse. Various statements together of the same kind, made possible by the same 
‗discursive formation‘, define the discourse (Marshall, 1996: 125). In The Archaeology of 
Knowledge (1972), Foucault argues that discursive formations are historically produced, 
loosely structured combinations of concerns, concepts and themes, as well as types of 
statements that enable specific discourses. A discursive formation is not a figure that holds up 
time and freezes itself, but mobile. ‗Rules of formation‘ create particular conditions which 
allow discursive formations to occur. Similarly, statements are produced by discursive 
practices ‗that are governed by historically contingent rules of formation, which are not 
necessarily available to those practitioners enunciating them‘ (Howarth, 2000: 51). As a 
discourse is not only produced by a single statement, but by many statements, it is not only 
produced by one individual subject, but by many subjects that are embedded in different 
institutional settings. 
 
However, the pronunciation of the concept ‗subject‘ does not mean the centrality of the 
subject or the sanctity of the autonomous individual or agent in a Foucauldian sense. On the 
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contrary, ‗the subject is not a rational agent thinking and acting under its self-imposed and 
self- created commands. Rather, the subject is a product of social structures, epistemes, 
discourses or something else of the sort‘ (Bevir, 1999a: 347). Thus, Foucault, in line with the 
poststructuralist deconstructive method, which somehow challenges the constitutive 
individualism of Western modernity, tries to decentre the rational subjectivity that establishes 
the subject‘s illusion of being master of his or her own fate. What Foucault wants to 
emphasize is that the subject cannot originate the foundation that would make rationality the 
inherent telos in human history (Yoon, 2001). ‗On consequence the history of thought reveals, 
beneath continuities predicated upon the assumption of a sovereign subject, discontinuities, 
displacements, and transformations‘ (Smart 2002: 38). Thus, archaeology is presented as a 
methodology of investigation to trace back the origins of certain (social or cultural) ideas in a 
specific socio-economic context (Lawson and Garrod, 1999: 12). The archaeological 
approach of Foucault attempts to analyse the discontinuities in a specific discourse that is 
formed by a certain episteme, ‗which provides a basic view of the world that unifies 
intellectual production during a given age‘ (Torfing 1999: 90). In this regard, Foucault is also 
not interested in the truth or falsity of discourses, but rather in the conditions and the context 
under the light of which the truth or the falsity could be decided. That is, what is significant 
for Foucault is the investigation of ‗how effects of truth are produced within discourses which 
in themselves are neither true nor false‘ (Yoon, 2001: 65). 
 
In a nutshell, the archaeological approach with its suspension of subjectivity is preoccupied 
with the historical analysis of discourse through the description of the ‗archive‘, which refers 
to the system of formation and transformation of specific statements in a certain period within 
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a particular society. Discourse analysis, thus conceived, has immense potential for 
contributing to political philosophy as a normative project. 
 
In the 1970s, the concept of discourse is still central to the Foucauldian framework, ‗although 
discourses are no longer treated as autonomous systems of scientific statements but the 
product of power relations and forces that form them‘ (Howarth, 2000: 67). Moreover, the 
emphasis is now on the knowledge-power relationship: all knowledge arises out of the power 
and regimes of power define what counts as a meaningful proposition and the toolkit to be 
used. In this regard, power and knowledge always imply one another. 
 
In this regard, Foucauldian genealogy signifies a move from ‗regarding a set of concepts as 
intelligible in terms of the structural relationships within an episteme to regarding it as devoid 
of such logic and so wholly contingent‘ (Bevir, 1999a: 352). Moreover, it perpetuates his 
assault on the ‗traditional‘ history that has been started by The Archaeology of Knowledge 
previously which had substituted the totalising, positivistic theories with an alternative 
reading of history and politics based on ‗discursive formations‘ (Howarth, 2000). Now, 
genealogy entails an understanding of historicisation of discourses, institutions and practices. 
Moreover, the scope of power relations foreseen by the Foucauldian historical analysis 
challenges the Enlightenment credo, in the sense that it substitutes the analysis of ‗modern‘ 
concepts such as legitimacy and sovereignty with the ‗micro‘ power relations permeating 
every sphere of society. This approach is summed up in his vow to ‗cut off the king‘s head‘ 
by replacing the concept of sovereign power with that of ‗capillary power‘ (Burchell, Gordon 
and Miller, 1991: 136; quoted in Sutherland, 2005: 189). At the micro level, Foucault argues 
that ideas such as subjectivity, personality and the soul are just part of a discursive formation 
78 
 
produced by the operation of a specific power complex on the body. For instance, Foucault‘s 
Discipline and Punish attempts to analyse the way power works on the body through external 
control, while in History of Sexuality, he highlights the way it does so through internal 
controls (Bevir, 1999b). However, as state power is totalizing and individualizing, micro 
power relations culminate in macro level power relations. Foucault points out that the power 
operates both at the local level of continuous, productive interactions and at the larger, 
systemic level of institutions, regulations, and hegemonies (Foucault, 1990: 93). These two 
levels depend on each other: ‗[O]ne must conceive of the double conditioning of a strategy by 
the specificity of possible tactics, and of tactics by the strategic envelope that makes them 
work‘ (Foucault, 1990: 100).  Foucault maintains that it is precisely through such multiple, 
local relations of power that larger effects of domination are produced, rather than through the 
top-down imposition of disciplinary controls (Foucault, 1990: 94). 
 
Foucault presents a fascinating account of concepts such as discourse, power, knowledge and 
history and gained considerable authority in many fields of social science stretching from 
cultural studies to feminist studies. In particular, he highlights the specific ways in which the 
discursive formations are constituted in relation to the concept of ‗power‘, which is almost 
revolutionary. However, he does not problematise how the ways in which specific discursive 
formations are constructed have implications for the construction of political frontiers. The 
concept of ‗power‘ which penetrates to the smallest unit of society through prisons, police, 
church, medicine etc. does not have significance when it comes to different political demands 
for Foucault. ‗Discourses, understood narrowly as systems of statements, bring into existence 
the very objects they purport to describe and explain, including their institutional and social 
conditions of possibility‘ (Howarth, 2002: 122). In short, ‗while Foucault is surely correct to 
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stress the way in which objects of inquiry are constructed within specific discursive 
formations, he goes on to draw the illegitimate conclusion that all objects are the product of 
linguistic practices, and that their being is exhausted by a particular linguistic representation 
of them‘ (Howarth, 2002: 122). 
 
This is not a claim that Foucault‘s work is apolitical. On the contrary, it has inspired many 
left-wing theoreticians. As quoted in Wilson, ‗Antonio Hardt and Michael Negri‘s book 
Empire, one of most influential works of the anti-capitalism movement, argues that ‗the work 
of Michel Foucault has prepared the terrain for…an investigation of the material functioning 
of imperial rule‘ (Wilson, 2008).  Foucault also wrote extensively (fifteen articles three of 
which have been translated into English) on the Iranian Revolution in 1979 (Afary and 
Anderson, 2004). However, even in those articles, what he was mentioning was less about the 
political positions within society and more on the micro-practices and hazards of modernity 
such as mass martyrdom (Afary and Anderson, 2004). By this account, Foucault‘s ideas have 
no political utility nor a political claim, ‗because it was never meant that they should have‘ 
(Wilson, 2008). 
 
This links to the claim that ‗Foucault never provides a satisfactory explanation of the 
relationship between what he calls discursive and non-discursive practices in a Laclau-
Mouffean sense‘ (Howarth, 2002: 121).  The Foucauldian concern regarding the distinction 
between discursive and non-discursive practices is not to substantiate that there is somewhere 
a realm outside discourse as all practices and institutions function through discourse. ‗Rather, 
social discourses and practices are not reducible to discourses; they have their own conditions 
of possibility that are not provided for by discourse alone‘ (Purvis and Hunt, 1993: 490). This 
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brings me to the most inspiring aspect of Laclau and Mouffe‘s discourse theory, which has 
been elaborated by Norval later on: the significance of discourses in constructing political 
frontiers within a society, which I will reflect on in the next sections. 
 
3.4. Who says Europe is not where it is supposed to be
15
?: the use of discourse theory in 
European studies 
 
In this section, I will give a brief account of the use of ‗Europe‘ in European studies  mainly 
though a poststructuralist lens. For this aim, I will focus on the works of Ole Wæver, Henrik 
Larsen, Lene Hansen, Thomas Diez and Ben Rosamond. Although Hansen‘s work is not 
about the discourses on ‗Europe‘ but how two different discourses on Bosnia are constructed 
in Western political debates, it is nevertheless helpful to include her work as a good example 
of how discourse theory is used to understand particular representations in European politics. 
 
Such a general register of discourse theory in European studies is important to locate different 
representations and meanings of ‗Europe‘ in Turkish political debates, which this thesis aims 
to identify, into a broader scholarly context of European studies. As this section will show, 
‗Europe‘ emerges as a highly ‗contested concept‘. For instance, for the candidate states,   the 
EU serves as a ‗modernisation anchor‘ (Inotai, 1997) while, as Diez (1998) shows, it has been 
defined as a Liberal Economic Community in the British political debate during the accession 
                                                            
15 Here, I basically refer to R.B. J. Walker‘s article, ‗Europe is not where it is supposed to be‘ that appeared in 
Kelstrup and William‘s book, International Relations and the Politics of European Integration (Kelstrup and 
Williams, 2000) where he explores the question of why we need a new scholarly focus with regard to ‗Europe‘ 
which should now incorporate a more intense focus on the political.    
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process. Therefore, this section aims to explore how the discourse theory has been used in the 
European studies and how the present project might be located within this realm. 
 
In her analysis of the Bosnian War and endeavour to understand the relationship between 
identity and foreign policy, Hansen (Hansen, 2006) points to two different discourses in the 
Western political debate over Bosnia, the interplay of which formed the main body of the 
representation of war. The discourse of ‗the Balkans‘, which has been mainly mobilised 
during the 1990s, ‗reads the identity of the Bosnian War, its causes, participants and the role 
of the ‗West‘, through an articulation of this as a ‗Balkan War‘ driven by violence, barbarism 
and ancient intra-Balkan hatred stretching back to hundreds of years‘ (Hansen, 2006: 106). On 
the other hand, at the other end of the spectrum, there is the opposing discourse of ‗Genocide 
discourse‘, which represented the war as a genocide committed by Serbian military and 
political leaders that brought forth a long history and responsibility vis-à-vis Bosnia (Hansen, 
2006: 111). 
 
Where the Balkan discourse read temporality and ethicality through a spatial location, 
the Genocide discourse read identity through the absolute ethical responsibility invoked 
by the articulation of ‗responsibility‘ invoked by the articulation of genocide and it 
rearticulated the Balkan discourse‘s construction of a uniform ‗Balkan‘ space of ‗three 
factions‘ by separating a multicultural and democratic ‗Bosnian victim‘ from a ‗Serbian 
aggressor‘ (Hansen 2006: 96). 
 
In his analysis of French and German discourses on state, nation and Europe, Wæver 16 argues 
that these major powers project a conception of Europe as a part of their national vision of 
where they are going and who they are (Wæver, 2005). This discourse has a layered structure, 
                                                            
16 In fact,  Wæver‘s and Larsen‘s work are the parts of the same project titled, ‗Struggle for Europe: French and 
German Conceptions of State, Nation and European Union‘. However, as the book of the project has never been 
published and I have read the arguments of two authors elsewhere, I find it appropriate to treat the two authors 
individually.  
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where, in terms of ‗Europe‘, we find three such layers: the ‗state-nation‘ core concept, the 
relational position of the state vis-à-vis Europe and the layer which shows what kind of 
Europe is promoted (Diez, 2001). All these structures are socially constructed and their 
dislocation is always possible (Wæver, 2005). 
 
In line with poststructuralist decentring of the structure, the suggested hierarchy [of 
these layers] rests on the impossible closure and constant destabilisation. The tree-like 
structure corresponds to Laclau and Mouffe‘s emphasis on internal connections in 
politics. In contrast to classical Marxism, political opponents are not totally external and 
contrasted-they struggle to conquer shared nodal points, they integrate in hegemonic 
projects some integrative schemes that inevitably enter into their own conceptions, and 
thus rivals become partly divergent articulations of shared components (Wæver, 2005: 
37). 
 
In the case of Germany, the relationship between the state and nation is grounded on the fact 
that the German nation was an ethno-cultural phenomenon whereas the ‗German state was 
something to be created, not just refined and reshaped with the new ideas of nation and 
modernity‘ (Wæver, 2005: 46). In this respect, the German state is a rather abstract and 
absolute one, which is defined by power. Especially after 1990, this power meant national 
unity and economic expansion in Central Europe for Germany. According to Wæver, 
however, the current perception of Germany vis-à-vis the EU in the national politics 
culminates in an anti-power state vision, although with different justifications throughout the 
political spectrum. Social Democrats are driven by an anti-power state argument in its moral 
form, where Germany emerges as a self-conscious civilian power whereas the Christian 
Democrats stipulate the anti-power state argument on a rationalistic basis. 
 
In the French example, the general focus is on the state/nation layer and the relationship 
between the layers of state/nation and Europe is constructed in such a way that if Europe is to 
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become a political reality, it will have to take on the qualities of a nation/state. Wæver 
explains the dramatic shift of French European policy in 1983-84 with the argument that 
France pressed for a state-like EC during this period as the French concept of the ‗state‘ was 
intended to be repeated at the level of ‗Europe‘ (Wæver, 2005). As France had become too 
small and its mission must be taken over by ‗Europe‘, ‗the more Europe there will be, the 
more France‘ with Mitterrand‘s words, which signalled ‗one level up‘ (Wæver, 2005: 44). 
 
In this way, an inner link is forged between France and Europe. The Europe created 
must necessarily have a heart that beats in French. To be political, Europe must have a 
pulse that only France is capable of supplying. This ensures for France, when 
transferring its ambitions to Europe, that the European project is worthwhile; that it is 
sufficiently French. We are not talking of control by France, nor French influence as 
such, but about Europe being constituted and acting in a way that is French (Wæver 
2005: 44-emphasis original). 
 
This internal link between France and Europe points to the most crucial point regarding the 
formation of identities, i.e. we‘s, in Wæver‘s analysis: the relationship between the layers 
(nation/state and Europe) is internal. Stability and regional security in this regard depend 
crucially on the domestic articulation of a project of Europe with long-held concepts of state 
and nation on a domestic basis. 
 
This national focus is helpful in order to see how the concept of ‗Europe‘ is constructed at the 
domestic level discursively. However, it, at the same time, means that for ‗Europe‘ as an idea, 
concept and vision to be inscribed and to continue as a political process, it needs to be 
compatible with national traditions (Wæver, 2005). This priority of the national setting lowers 
the degree of openness and the contextuality of the concept and allows for a degree of 
structuralism that takes some of the layers for granted such as the state/nation. ‗In essence, 
Wæver‘s model is one of ‗change within continuity‘, affecting the branches, i.e. policies, 
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more than the trunk. The basic concepts such as ‗state‘ and ‗nation‘ will remain stable in most 
cases because of their higher ‗degree of sedimentation‘‘ (Diez, 2001: 14). This ‗Foucauldian 
structuralism‘ (Diez, 2001) which determines what will enter the terrain of the discourse and 
what will not impede the eternal dislocation of the discourses in a Laclau-Mouffean sense. An 
anti-essentialist reading of Laclau and Mouffe which puts the continuous process of 
articulating concepts that unifies the discursive space at the centre of the analysis is replaced 
by the taken-for-grantedness of some core concepts like state and nation, forming the 
discursively available horizon for visions for politics. 
 
In this respect, presenting state identities as the main source of the shaping of discourses, 
Wæver presents Europe as a concept embedded in these nation-states. ‗We have to operate in 
a perspectival mode, understanding the different ways that meaningful worlds are constructed 
which all include ‗Europe‘ but in different forms‘ (Wæver, 2005: 59). The constellation called 
‗Europe‘ is traced back to the domestic narratives and narrative struggles. 
 
Larsen, focusing on the British and Danish European policies in the 1990s on a discursive 
basis departs from a similar premise (Larsen, 1999). According to Larsen, the understanding 
of ‗Europe‘ shows important linguistic similarities on the level of dominant discourses in both 
cases as they both function on an instrumental basis. However, the real political conflict is 
realised on the level of sub-discourses of this instrumental discourse. One could distinguish 
between two sub-discourses in both countries in relation to the EC/EU and Europe. The 
interstate cooperation sub-discourse entails that Europe and EU in particular represents a 
terrain where strict interstate cooperation is essential. In this respect, ‗Europe‘ is an external 
reality and the relationship between the two levels is a zero-sum game. On the other hand, the 
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essential cooperation discourse argues that cooperation with and at the level of Europe is 
essential and it is worth paying a price for a fruitful partnership (Larsen, 1999). In terms of 
British and Danish European policies in the 1990s, the struggle between these sub-discourses 
and which domestic group adheres for what discourse determines the nature of ‗Europe‘ 
represented. The struggle between these sub-discourses is also determined to a great extent by 
the differences between the domestic political features attributed to the nation/state and the 
concept of sovereignty. Whereas the understanding of a Danish state is strongly intermingled 
with the understanding of a ‗welfare state‘ traditionally, which finds its resonance in the 
depiction of ‗Europe‘ with regard to its welfare state provisions, British non-interventionist 
state, where the priority is the individual, depicts ‗Europe‘ as a free market project. 
 
In this respect, Larsen‘s study can also be conceptualised within the framework of a 
Foucauldian structuralism, where the repertoire of the discourses is determined by the 
traditional domestic features of the state in question. The dislocation of the discourses is 
limited by the historically set tool kit of the domestic inherent features of states. 
 
In his reading of the discursive construction of ‗Europe‘, Diez employs a similar Laclau-
Mouffean inspiration, although not designating such a national and domestic essence to the 
articulation of discourses (Diez, 1999, 2001). According to Diez, in terms of European 
integration, the main struggle is not between narrowly defined economic or national interests 
but between competing discourses of European governance. In this respect, we can best 
understand European integration as a part of a discursive formation on European governance 
that is linked to a set of metanarratives on basic questions regarding ‗what the world is about‘ 
(Diez, 2001: 6). However, in understanding the discourse on Europe, we have to keep in mind 
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that ‗Europe‘ is not an entity exogenous to that discourse, existing independently and 
externally. In contrast, 
 
various attempts to capture the Union‘s nature are not mere descriptions of an 
unknown polity, but take part in the construction of the polity itself. To that extent, 
they are not politically innocent, and may themselves become the subject of analysis, 
along with articulations from other actors (Diez, 1999: 599). 
 
In this picture, agents are granted a significant position. The actor engaging in discursive 
struggle is not independent of the already established discourse but must take his point of 
departure in the established web of notions surrounding the contested concept as he/she acts 
from a subject position (Jensen, 2005). This way the discourse can be said to have a life of its 
own. The discourse, however, is dependent on reproduction through articulation. Diez 
therefore suggests that this interdependence between discursive determinism and the 
reproduction of discourse through articulation could be called linguistic structurationism.  He 
refers to Giddens (1984), who tried to move beyond structuralism and to reconceptualise the 
duality of structure and agency (Diez, 1999). 
 
Against the relative structural analysis of the Copenhagen School and Governance School in 
terms of the unlikeliness of the dislocation of discursive visions on Europe, Diez suggests the 
analytical concept of Discursive Nodal Points (DNP) for the case of European politics. 
According to this argument, the open universe of discourses is stabilised through the filling of 
discursive nodal points with meaning, which is called articulation (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; 
Diez, 2001). He refers to German sociologist Hejl‘s formulation of social theory where 
individuals are treated as nodes in a network of social systems. Their identity was produced 
by these systems which in turn were reproduced by the actions of individuals (Diez, 2001: 
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17). He links his conceptualization to Laclau and Mouffe‘s conception of nodal points as Hejl, 
like many system theorists, suffers from the risk of being too structural and hence reducing 
the agents as the sole bearers of the mandates of the system. In Diez‘s reading, Laclau and 
Mouffe, on the other hand, emphasize both the ‗selective employment of comprehensive 
discursive systems‘ and that actors are not ‗completely autonomous‘ but ‗constrained not only 
by conventional understandings and agreed-upon rules of the game but also by mutual 
positioning, existing institutionalised routines and changing contexts‘ (Diez, 2001: 17). 
Within the discursive universe where the discourses reproduce each other and are reproduced 
by them simultaneously, Diez makes an analytical distinction between the discourses 
produced and those producing, and calls the latter ‗metanarratives‘ (Diez, 1998). 
 
Usually, they have two characteristics: First, their objects and rationalities are much 
more abstract than in the case of the more policy-oriented discourses. Second, in acting 
as general frames to which discourses have to conform, they are harder to change than 
actual policy-discourses, for which there are always numerous possibilities within 
similar frameworks (Wæver, 1997: 6-9). 
 
In the case of European governance, Diez presents eight concepts produced in their respective 
policy discourses, which are the representation of Europe as Intergovernmental Cooperation 
of Nation States, Intergovernmental Cooperation of Socialist States, Free Trade Area, Federal 
State, Socialist Federal State, Liberal Economic Community, Social Democratic Economic 
Community and Network. To exemplify the different articulations of Europe in British 
politics, Diez tells us that Liberal Economic Community understanding became the dominant 
construction of European governance during the accession debates in the 1970s while 
Intergovernmental Cooperation of Socialist States was the motto of the Labour Party from the 
1960s until the 1980s. 
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In this respect, Diez‘s work is distinguished from Wæver‘s and Larsen‘s in the sense that 
metanarratives are not defined on a national/domestic basis by Diez as in the cases of the 
latter. The articulation of metanarratives into a meaningful whole is itself a political process, 
which is not pre-determined by the national/domestic rules of the political debate. 
 
In his study of the social construction of European identity vis-à-vis globalisation, Rosamond 
(1999) argues that globalisation is a ‗zone of contestation‘ (Rosamond, 1999: 653), rather 
than an external phenomenon ‗out there‘. According to Rosamond, the externalisation of 
globalisation means the treatment of interests and identities as exogenous and prior to the 
process of interaction, which is a fallacy usually adopted by the rationalistic approaches and 
other mainstream accounts. Instead, the article develops a reading of globalisation as a 
discourse by taking into account the nature of intersubjectivities generated within EU policy 
communities by the globalisation debate. The aim here is to find a way out of this ‗inside-
outside‘ dichotomy. In this respect, Rosamond (1999) seems more concerned with the 
knowledge of globalisation and its dissemination rather than with globalisation as such. That 
is, he is interested in how the use of ‗globalisation‘ as a discursive device renders the world 
manageable and constrains/determines the available strategic opportunities. 
 
The question that quickly comes to mind is mentioned by Rosamond as well: do the actors use 
the discourse of globalisation instrumentally and deliberately or are they a part of the 
construction process themselves? The answer given by him is quite convincing: globalising 
elites may engage in strategic theorising about globalisation, but this does not mean that they 
are immune from the shaping capacities of the intersubjective structures that their discursive 
practice creates via a process of communicative action, where the nature of actor interaction is 
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conceptualised rather more than ‗the exchange of preferences in an institutionalised 
environment‘ (Rosamond, 1999: 659). In this respect, as quoted in Rosamond, Risse-Kappen 
argues, 
 
This does not mean that ideas cannot be used in an instrumental way to legitimise or 
delegitimize policies motivated by purely material interests. However, the ‗power‘ of 
ideas in such instances is linked to their consensuality. Ideas become consensual when 
actors start believing in their value and become convinced of their validity (Risse-
Kappen, 1996:69-70). 
 
I think the novelty and significance of Rosamond‘s article stems from his definition of 
globalisation as a ‗zone of contestation‘, where the fixation of subject positions are defined 
within the framework of a political process. The iteration of the political is important as it 
rules out the definition of globalisation in simplistic terms as a homogenisation of practices 
and policies which induces ‗logic of no alternative‘ (Hay and Watson, 1998). Certain 
conceptions of globalisation may be ‗hegemonic‘, but this does not foreclose the possibility 
that alternative discourses may coexist and challenge the dominant strand (Rosamond, 1999: 
658). 
 
3.5. Laclau- Mouffean discourse theory 
 
Laclau and Mouffe, in their book Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, point to the need to 
rethink the Marxist project and re-evaluate the a priori privilege granted to socio-economic 
structures in historical change. According to this account, the proliferation of new types of 
struggles which are more particularist in nature urged a rethink of the ‗evident truths‘ of the 
past, thus leading to the devising of new concepts and new political projects (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985: 1). ‗Within the Marxist tradition the destabilization of traditional notions of 
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structure and structural determination, together with the crisis of its Leninist legacy, fostered a 
surge of interest in the open and undogmatic Marxism of Gramsci‘ (Torfing, 1999: 4). 
Therefore, post-structuralism‘s and post-Marxism‘s focus on political and social identities 
constituted a substantial source of inspiration for Laclau and Mouffe. 
 
In particular, Laclau and Mouffe‘s conception of discourse theory has been mainly influenced 
by the Gramscian extension of the scope of politics. Gramsci argues that ideology sustains the 
unity of a social bloc in different manifestations of social/economic life, where the subject of 
the social reality is not a class, deriving its transcendental features from the forces of 
production. This is implicitly the most important reason behind the Gramscian inspiration in 
Laclau-Mouffe and points out the most significant argument of Gramsci: his theorisation of 
the hegemonic link between the political struggle and masses (not necessarily classes), which 
at the same time meant the expansion of the scope of hegemony and thus politics. ‗[It consists 
of] institutional and social analysis of various classes and organisations in society, from 
actions of the state, to the realm of ―civil society‖  and institutions as schools, churches, 
newspapers book publishers and entertainment enterprises‘ (Ives, 2004:71). 
 
For Gramsci, political subjects are not classes, but complex ‗collective wills‘ articulated by a 
hegemonic class, which do not have a necessary class belonging. Thus, ‗collective will is a 
result of politico-ideological articulation of dispersed and fragmented historical forces‘ 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 67). However, although the collective will does not derive its 
raison d’etre from a particular class, the unifying principle articulating the diverse elements 
can only be a fundamental class. Therefore, even if the class hegemony is not ontologically 
stipulated, there is an epistemological priority attached to it. A particular class knows how to 
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form the collective will. Gramsci‘s thought, in this regard, appears to be trapped in an 
ambiguity, according to Laclau and Mouffe: 
 
On the one hand, the political centrality of the working class has a historical, contingent 
character: it requires the class come out of itself, to transform its own identity by 
articulating to it a plurality of struggles and democratic demands. On the other hand, it 
would seem that this articulatory role is assigned to it by the economic base-hence that 
the centrality has a necessary character (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 70). 
 
To summarise, Laclau and Mouffe‘s analysis with its unease with ‗the tendency to overlook 
the historical specificity of the phenomena under question‘ and the essentialist discourses 
(Laclau, 1990: 177) and veneration for the Gramscian extension of the scope of politics 
contributed to the formation of a post-Marxist theoretical trajectory. 
 
Laclau-Mouffean discourse theory, developed within the context of a neo-Gramscian 
conception of discourse, ‗grew out of debates within Marxism concerning categories such as 
‗ideology‘, ‗subjectivity‘ and questions of class identity. ‗[They] combined Marxism‘s 
preoccupation with power and conflict as integral features of society with a post-structuralist 
rejection of an a priori privilege being granted to socio-economic structures in historical 
change‘ (Martin, 2002: 23). In this respect, it could be counted as a critique and 
reinterpretation of the Marxist tradition and Gramscian approach. Laclau and Mouffe try to go 
‗beyond Gramsci‘ and overcome the persistence of economic determinism (Ives, 2005) by the 
introduction of linguistic analysis.  ‗Laclau and Mouffe do not really address the actual need 
to study language, but they use linguistics to argue against the notion of ―representation‖ and 
to elaborate their notion of ―articulation‖‘ (Ives, 2005: 462).  In this respect, their discursive 
approach to political science aims not to find accurate meaning but rather to uncover the 
production of meaning, context and power relations. Laclau and Mouffe, in their book 
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Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985), ‗build upon the anti-essentialist notion that there is 
never any absolute fixing of meaning; rather the task is to study how social practices and 
ideas come to acquire meaning‘ (McAnulla, 1998: 6). It is through discourse that people 
understand their positions in life and shape society and political activity. Thus, the notion of 
discourse entails much more than merely language, linguistics or mental representation. In 
Laclau and Mouffe‘s discourse theory, all objects and practices are seen as discursive; they 
only acquire meaning through their articulation in particular discourse. Laclau and Mouffe 
(1985) were concerned less with objective knowledge and more with the shaping and 
production of particular meanings and identities, including how people and positions are 
located by models, metaphors and discourses: ‗there is not one discourse and one system of 
categories through which the ―real‖ might speak without mediations‘ (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985: 3). It is reflected by their ontology as well, which involves the dissolution of the 
distinction between the realm of ideas and the world of real objects and practical activity 
(McAnulla, 1998: 6). 
 
As mentioned above, Laclau and Mouffe‘s departure point is the critique of Marxism in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Their main critique stems from Marxism‘s insistence on the 
ontological privilege granted to the working class by its position vis-à-vis the forces of 
production and the economic base. This provides the political struggle with a strict class 
character and fixes the identity of the political subjects which is determined by the economic 
base. However, due to the numerous historical developments such as the emergence of the 
limits of an insufficiently developed bourgeois civilisation in Russia
17
 which forced the 
                                                            
17 Laclau and Mouffe make this reference to the Russian context in terms of the use of the term ‗hegemony‘ 
within the debates at the First International between Socialists and Social Democrats by theoreticians such as 
Plekhanov, Axelrod, Trotsky, Bernstein and Luxembourg. Apparently, the time slot referred to is the pre-First 
World War period.     
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working class to come out of itself and to take the tasks that were not its own and the 
challenge to the conception of democratic rights and freedoms as ‗bourgeois‘ by nature due to 
the experience of fascism in Europe, the link between the natural class agent of a historical 
task and the concrete agent which puts it into effect was somehow challenged (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985:85-88). Therefore, according to them, the class nature of the tasks is not altered 
by the fact that they are assumed by one class or the other and the democratic tasks remain 
bourgeois even when their historical agent is the working class. In this respect, the 
relationship between the agents can only be of exteriority and it can only be constructed 
outside the relation. For instance, the capitalist relations of production are not intrinsically 
antagonistic because the capitalist extracts surplus from the worker, but very much so because 
the antagonism is established between the relations of production and something external to it 
(for instance when the worker becomes a consumer in the market) (Laclau, 1990: 8-11-
emphasis added). 
 
This focus on the ‗external‘ nature of the relationship sustained between the agents goes hand 
in hand with a rather more theoretical premise derived from Jacques Derrida and a critique of 
Enlightenment that every social structure or identity has a ‗constitutive outside‘ (Laclau, 1990: 
9). According to this conception, any structure, in order to achieve a temporary closure and to 
fix the inherently unstable identities, goes through a process of exclusion which denies the 
internal identity of the structure. According to Mouffe, by affirming that an object has been 
inscribed by something other than itself and that everything is constructed as difference, we 
also brand ‗being‘ as something that cannot be conceived as pure ‗presence‘ or ‗objectivity‘ 
(Mouffe, 2000: 147). ‗This is decisive, for if the ―constitutive outside‖ is present within the 
inside as its always real possibility, then the inside itself becomes a purely contingent and 
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reversible arrangement‘ (Mouffe, 2000: 147). Therefore, any antagonism or antagonistic 
relationship is created by the ‗constitutive outside‘ (as in the example of the worker in the 
market). Instead of Marxism‘s conviction that capitalist relations of production are 
intrinsically antagonistic, this framework states that they become antagonistic only if the 
worker resists that the extraction of surplus by the capitalist (Laclau, 1990:9). However, this 
‗outside‘ is not a regular one as we could see in nature, but a ‗radical‘ one, which blocks the 
identity of the ‗inside‘. With antagonism, denial does not originate from the ‗inside‘ of 
identity itself, but, in its most radical sense, from outside; ‗it is thus pure facticity which 
cannot be referred back to any underlying rationality‘ (Laclau, 1990: 17). Antagonism 
originates from the limits of the objectivity and the social (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 125).  
‗The outside is simultaneously that which makes the emergence of an inside possible and 
which threatens it‘ (Laclau, 1990: 168). 
 
By the same token, the conditions of existence of a given significatory system are contingent 
‗to the extent that they cannot be derived from the internal logic or rationality from the system 
itself-they are external in the sense of being radically separated from the internal logic‘ 
(Marchart, 2004: 60). ‗If any identity is necessarily contaminated by otherness and as, Lacan 
shows, becomes what it is with only reference to its otherness, it means that any discursive 
formation, in order to signify itself as such, has to refer to something which is exteriorised in 
its formation‘ (Norval, 1990: 137). In this respect, the constitutive outside is subversive as 
what is exteriorised creates the creating the possibility of constituting any identity. 
 
The keyword within the whole framework is the ‗conditions of existence‘ which are external 
to the socio-political configuration in question. According to this framework, in order to 
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understand ‗Europe‘ as a political category in Turkish domestic debates at a given time, we 
need to search for the conditions of existence of the discourse on ‗Europe‘ rather than 
searching for an internal, given and atemporal relationship between ‗Europe‘ as such and 
Turkish politics. 
 
3.5.1. Laclau- Mouffean Conceptual Framework 
 
Hegemony 
 
The focus on the ‗external‘ nature of the relationship sustained between the agents is where 
the concept of hegemony enters the picture within the Laclau-Mouffean analysis. Not 
surprisingly, they borrow this term from Gramsci. As will be detailed in the forthcoming 
sections, the main Gramscian inspiration on the part of the Laclau and Mouffean theoretical 
framework is his theorisation of the hegemonic link between the political struggle and masses, 
not necessarily classes, which at the same time meant the expansion of the scope of politics. 
According to Laclau and Mouffe, hegemony is a ‗space in which bursts a whole conception of 
the social based upon an intelligibility which reduces its distinct moment to the interiority of a 
closed paradigm‘ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 93). Instead of this burst conception of the 
social, we now have a new field where the relations between the elements are not absolutely 
fixed, but open to articulatory practices at the theoretical level and to political struggle at the 
practical level. 
 
In order to iterate the difference between the so-called ‗traditional‘ inquiry of the social reality 
and their analysis in terms of sorting out the relations between the elements, Laclau and 
Mouffe make a distinction between the categories of ‗mediation‘ and ‗articulation‘, which is 
one of the key concepts to their analysis (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 93-94). Mediation, 
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according to them, is an action which does not necessitate any action ‗on our part‘ and the 
connection between the elements refers to an underlying totality (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 
93-94). The categorical political centrality of the working class, according to this analysis, has 
nothing to do with the actions of that very class but is a priori mediated. On the other hand, 
articulation is a process by which a relationship is established between the elements in such a 
way that their identities are mutually modified.  Organisation of the elements, which forms 
the core of ‗hegemony‘, is contingent and gives the elements a new form of unity, external to 
the fragments themselves. 
 
In case of ‗mediations‘, we are dealing with a system of logical transitions in which 
relations between objects are conceived as following a relation between the concepts; in 
the second sense [in case of ‗articulations‘], we are dealing with contingent relations 
whose nature we have to determine (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 96). 
 
Thus, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) were concerned less with objective knowledge and more 
with the shaping and production of particular meanings and identities, including how people 
and positions are located by models, metaphors and discourses: ―there is not one discourse 
and one system of categories through which the ‗real‘ might speak without mediations‖ 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 3). 
 
As already mentioned, asserting the constitutive nature of antagonism entails asserting the 
contingent nature of all objectivity and this, in turn, means that any objectivity is a threatened 
objectivity. If, in spite of this, an objectivity manages to partially affirm itself, it is only by 
repressing that which threatens it. To study the conditions of existence of a given social 
identity, then, is to study the power mechanisms making it possible. According to Laclau, in 
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case of any hegemonic project, ‗social transformation means building a new power, not 
radically eliminating it‘ (Laclau, 1990: 33). 
 
Discourse 
 
This is the point where Laclau and Mouffe operationalise the concept of discourse. The 
structured totality resulting from the articulatory practice is called discourse (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985: 105). In this respect, a discourse consists of a relatively stable pattern of 
linguistic rules, social actions and material prerequisites: ‗A discursive structure is (...) an 
articulatory practice which constitutes and organises social relations‘ (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985: 96). 
 
To reiterate, it is through discourse that people understand their positions in life and shape 
society and political activity. Thus, according to the Laclau- Mouffean conception, the notion 
of discourse entails much more than merely language, linguistics or mental representation. 
Discourse, as used by Laclau and Mouffe, denotes dissolution of the distinction between the 
realm of ideas and the world of real objects and practical activity (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; 
quoted in McAnulla, 1998: 6). All objects and practices are seen as discursive; they only 
acquire meaning through their articulation in particular discourse. 
 
Another significant point on the part of Laclau- Mouffean conception of ‗discourse‘ is that 
they attribute both linguistic and material features to the field of discursivity. Therefore, for 
them, the ordering and structuring that goes on through discursive articulation takes place not 
only through language but also through social practices (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987). ‗[B]y 
discourse we do not mean a combination of speech and writing, but rather that speech and 
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writing are themselves but internal components of discursive totalities’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1987: 82-emphasis original). In this respect, the objects can only acquire meaning to the 
extent that they establish a system of relations with the other objects, where the relationship is 
socially constructed, rather than being pre-determined by the mere referentiality of the 
objects. 
Let us suppose that I am building a wall with another bricklayer. At a certain 
moment I ask my workmate to pass me a brick and then I add it to the wall. The first 
act—asking for the brick—is linguistic; the second—adding the brick to the wall—is 
extralinguistic. Do I exhaust the reality of both acts by drawing the distinction 
between them in terms of the linguistic/extralinguistic opposition? Evidently not, 
because, despite their differentiation in those terms, the two actions share something 
that allows them to be compared, namely the fact that they are both part of a total 
operation which is the building of the wall (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987: 82). 
 
However, this does not mean denying reality or existence. For them, discursive character of 
an object does not, by any means, imply putting its existence into question (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1987: 82- emphasis original). ‗A stone exists independently of any system of social 
relations, but it is, for instance, either a projectile or an object of aesthetic contemplation only 
within a specific discursive configuration‘ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987: 82). The stone exists 
before the action, but the social system it is entailed in provides it with meaning.  The stone 
being a projectile does not follow necessarily from its mere existence. It is the action and the 
relations it is involved in which makes it a projectile. By doing so, Laclau and Mouffe reflect 
upon a broader material vs. ideational debate within the political analysis where they argue 
that there is no ‗―extra-discursive‖ realm of meaningful objects and (...) this independent 
realm of objects determines the meaning of those objects‘, thereby siding with some versions 
of realism‘ according to Howarth (Howarth, 1995: 127-emphasis original). Laclau and 
Mouffe, in their answer to Norman Geras, iterate that the distinction here is not between 
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idealism and materialism but idealism and realism (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987: 106), thereby 
renouncing the criticisms of the idealist dimensions of their analysis. 
 
Therefore, according to this framework, to question how ‗Europe‘ is constructed at the 
domestic level does not interrogate whether ‗Europe‘ as such exists independently of the 
domestic social relations, nor does it mean that the construction is solely a linguistic one. It 
means that this construction entails both the linguistic elements (political party statements, 
bureaucratic policy briefings, TV programmes etc.) and the extra-linguistic elements (a 
domestic actor‘s attendance at a European Council, use of European flag within a football 
match, etc.), where their constellation would end up with a different representation of 
‗Europe‘ if had been articulated otherwise. 
 
Empty signifiers 
 
From this, it follows for Laclau and Mouffe that the motive to sustain hegemony through a 
particular discourse is characterised by the articulation of ‗empty‘ signifiers, another concept 
that is central to their analysis. Indeed, Laclau and Mouffe put the fixation of an empty 
signifier at the core of a formation of a hegemonic centre and ideology in Hegemony and 
Socialist Struggle (1985). This view has been elaborated and operationalised by Laclau in his 
later work (Laclau, 1996; Laclau, 1997).   According to Laclau, an ‗empty signifier‘, is a 
signifier without a signified (Laclau, 1997: 306). Therefore, an ‗empty signifier‘ is a signifier 
which has been articulated in a way that it has no content or meaning. 
 
In this respect, Laclau gives as an example the case of an extreme situation where social 
fabric is radically disorganised and people need ‗an order‘ (Laclau, 1996: 44). In this case, 
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according to Laclau, the actual content of the ‗order‘ becomes a secondary consideration. 
‗Order‘ as such has no content, because it exists only in the various forms in which it is 
actually realised (Norval, 2000: 330-1). However, in a situation of radical disorder ‗order‘ is 
present as that which is absent; it becomes an empty signifier, the signifier of that absence  
(Laclau, 1996: 44). 
 
Similarly, citing Walzer‘s Thick and Thin, Laclau gives the example of Prague 
demonstrations in 1989
18
 in his focus on the conception of ‗justice‘ by the Prague 
demonstrators, Laclau (1996) argues that ‗justice‘ as an empty signifier was not necessarily 
associated with any of these demands (Norval, 2000: 331). 
 
Once a demand such as ‗the end of arbitrary arrests‘ has become one of the names of 
‗justice‘, some other demands, such as ‗the prevalence of the will of the people over 
all legal restrictions‘, cannot enter the fray, except with difficulty. Thus, the filling out 
of empty signifiers by particularistic demands will limit the operation of that empty 
signifier, in this case, ‗justice‘ (Laclau, 1996: 39-emphasis original) 
 
 
By this token, hegemony, or hegemonic struggle is the competition between different political 
forces to get maximum support for the articulation of ‗empty signifiers‘, such as ‗order‘ or 
even ‗democracy‘, terms which can be invested with a variety of meanings because they have 
no inherent content and can serve to unite disparate movements (Townshend, 2004: 271). ‗To 
―hegemonise‖ content would therefore amount to fixing its meaning around a nodal point. The 
field of the social could thus be regarded as a trench war in which different political projects 
strive to articulate a great number of social signifiers around themselves‘ (Laclau, 1990: 28). 
 
                                                            
18  On 17 November 1989, more than 15000 people demonstrated in Prague on the occasion of the 50th 
anniversary of the death of student Jan Opletal, calling for the resignation of their country's communist 
government, led by Milos Jakes (BBC, 17 November 1989).  
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For the purposes of this study, it might be argued that the articulation of the concept ‗Europe‘ 
does not have a fixed referential such as ‗Christendom‘ or ‗democracy‘, but is derived 
contingently from different and dispersed elements as it is an ‗empty signifier‘. It is an ‗empty 
signifier‘ in its articulation within the democracy discourse which might mean a tool for the 
iteration of the minority identities or a guarantee for the decrease in terrorism. 
 
As a result, political forces may compete in their efforts to present their particular objectives 
as those which may carry out the task of filling the lack. Ideological struggles are, therefore, 
struggles over the filling out of such empty signifiers. This filling process operates through a 
double inscription. It is a process that simultaneously signifies the need and impossibility of 
closure; the need to constitute a unified representation of society, and the impossibility of ever 
doing so entirely (Norval, 2000: 330-1-emphasis added). 
 
We can see then how this kind of emptying reflects upon a new kind of relation between 
‗particularity‘ and ‗universality‘. According to Laclau, the ‗universal‘ does not disappear but 
has lost the transparency of a positive and closed world (Laclau, 1990: 80). In this framework, 
‗universality‘ comes into the picture when particular demands can symbolize themselves as 
‗universal‘. The ability to establish equivalence between an increasingly wide range of 
demands ‗where any particularity would be finally reabsorbed into a universal and transparent 
order‘ (Laclau, 1990: 80) is nothing but the core of the hegemony. For Laclau, this has a 
normative political dimension as well: ‗the construction of differential identities on the basis 
of total closure is not a viable or progressive political alternative‘ (Laclau, 1992: 89). 
Therefore, instead of using the excuse of pure identities and refusing to participate in national 
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or European politics, the differential identities should be permeated by the democratic process 
so that the ‗particular‘ should be articulated as the ‗universal‘ (Laclau, 1992). 
 
Therefore, this relationship between ‗universal‘ and ‗particular‘ shows the gist of the politics 
of difference and the extent to which differential identities can be articulated into a self-
proclaimed ‗universal‘ project which is the core of the hegemonic project. ‗The universal is 
no more than a particular that has become dominant‘ (Laclau, 1992: 87). According to 
Wilmsen and McAllister, there are two ways of combating a system of oppression according 
to this framework: by the operation of an inversion, in the form of denying the Western liberal 
institutions or politics in general, or by deconstructing the liberal democratic theory 
institutions because they were devised for more homogenous societies than are presently 
common (Wilmsen and Mc Allister, 1996: 11-2). ‗[This] unresolved tension between 
universalism and particularism allows a movement away from Western Eurocentrism, through 
what we would call a systemic decentring of the West‘ (Laclau, 1992: 90). 
 
Identity 
 
As mentioned above, in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985), Laclau and Mouffe claim 
that an exterior relationship exists between subjects and the tasks to be carried out in the 
social and political realm, which establishes the gist of the concept ‗hegemony‘, The crucial 
role of hegemony rests on the ‗unfixity‘of social relations which means that there are no fixed 
subject positions or privileged foundations of hegemonic domination. On the contrary, for 
them, discourses rather than materiality (such as the means of production or historical 
necessity) constitute the subject of hegemony. Thus, social practice can only be understood as 
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a discursive articulatory process, where the signifiers are located and dislocated constantly 
and the closure of the meaning is impossible. 
 
Central to this framework is the concept ‗identity‘, since it is only possible to understand any 
social identity by evaluating its internal relations within a discourse. Thus, ‗identity is not the 
immanent quality of a monadic and isolated subject, but [is] a relational and social 
phenomenon‘ (Jensen, 1997: 16-17). Within this framework, identity is constituted in a 
‗subject position‘ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:109). As there is not a homogenous subject with 
an essential and unchanged identity, the subjects have to position themselves within the given 
discourse. According to this conception, as there is a plurality of positions with which human 
beings can identify, an individual actor can have a number of different positions (Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985: 114-122). ‗If the concept of subject position accounts for the multiple forms by 
which individuals are ―produced‖ as social actors, the concept of political subjectivity 
captures the way in which social actors can act‘ (Howarth, 2000: 108).  That is, ‗the actions of 
subjects emerge because of the contingency of the discourses that confer identity on them‘ 
(Howarth, 2000:108). 
 
According to the conception that an identity is relational and contingent, ‗the subject is in a 
non-blocked position and thus is always-already engaged in producing and reproducing itself 
as subject‘ (Jensen, 1997: 17). This points to the incomplete, open and politically negotiable 
character of every identity (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 104).  
 
In accordance with this thesis‘s main attempt to highlight the extent to which discourses on 
‗Europe‘ demarcated the political boundaries and sustained hegemony in Turkish politics after 
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1999, it is theoretically necessary to underline the relationship between identities and the 
notion of ‗hegemony‘ although I do not particularly aim to focus on the transformation of 
identities. As outlined above, ‗essential for hegemonic operations is an ordering of the 
discursive space, which results in the drawing of boundaries between different subjects‘ 
(Herschinger, 2008: 5). In particular, these different subjects are grouped together under two 
diametrically opposed entities: an Other confronts a Self. This goes back to what I argued 
above: identity is relational and it is constituted against an Other; and discourses articulating 
an identity articulate a Self against a series of Others. For Herschinger, the identity of a Self is 
not only forged via the division of the discursive space and the relation to an Other but also 
through the creation of a vision of what the world would look like without being endangered 
by the respective Other (Herschinger, 2008). However, the Other can be interpreted in 
radically different ways which implies an acknowledgement of the fact that constructions of 
identities can produce varying degrees of Otherness. This in turn implies that their 
construction does not necessarily depend on the identification of a radically threatening Other 
(Rumelili, 2004: 36; Hansen, 2006: 38-41). However, as Herschinger rightly argues, in the 
context of hegemony, this conclusion is modified (Herschinger, 2008: 7). As I will outline in 
the forthcoming sections in more detail, the hegemonic strategies of the logic of equivalence 
where the discursive field is divided in two antagonistic camps, and the logic of difference 
where the differences between constituent parts are cancelled and the antagonistic frontier is 
weakened, the Other and the antagonism have to be very-well defined. Yet, while antagonism 
is the dominant mastery of the discursive space in hegemonic enterprises this does not imply 
that it is the only one. Antagonism is not a teleological aim of identity construction; rather one 
needs to lay open the discourse strategies constructing a particular antagonism (Torfing, 1999: 
131). In this respect, even if this thesis is not particularly interested in the success conditions 
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of a hegemonic struggle and discourses, I claim, along with Herschinger, that hegemony relies 
essentially on the construction of an unequivocal and radically different Other although two 
logics of hegemony (logics of difference and equivalence) articulate the Other and the 
antagonisms in different ways with different degrees (Herschinger, 2008: 7). I will return to 
this point in Chapter 7 where I will  highlight the features of ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘.  
 
The Subject and Subject Positions 
 
Within this framework, the notion of a subject is a relational concept characterised by a 
subject position within a discursive structure. ‗So the agent is both in a subject position, as an 
object for the structure, and a subject since the structure is incapable of reducing the agent to 
an object. This means that the subject is in a non-blocked position and is thus always-already 
engaged in producing and reproducing itself as a subject‘ (Jensen, 1997: 17). 
 
[…] Our position is clear. Whenever we use the category of ‗subject‘ in this text, we 
will do so in the sense of ‗subject positions‘ within a discursive structure. Subject 
cannot, therefore, be the origin of social relations – not even in the limited sense of 
being endowed with powers that render an experience possible – as all ‗experience‘ 
depends on precise discursive conditions of possibility (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 
115). 
 
 
The subject positions, which designate the agents of New Social Movements, are so different 
from the class identity presumed a priori by Marxism that, as Rosenthal puts it, it is even 
marked grammatically:  
 
We speak of the proletariat rather than the proletarians, because the category in question 
is not given by the summation or articulated totality of proleterianized subject (…) On 
the other hand, we speak of ‗women‘ or ‗blacks‘, rather than ‗the women‘ or ‗the 
blacks‘, because the categories in question are given as positions within types of 
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discourse which function precisely to determine individuals (Rosenthal, 1988: 30-
emphasis original). 
 
 
The interpretation of the subject as relational and decentred gives very important clues to 
understand how Laclau- Mouffean theoretical framework treats structure-agency debate. As 
McAnulla argues (McAnulla, 1998), in parallel with poststructuralism‘s rejection of binary 
oppositions such as mind-body, essence-appearance, presence-absence or conscious-
unconscious, Laclau and Mouffe do not establish decidable categories as such, but embrace 
notions such as undecidability or indeterminacy in terms of structure-agency debate, thus 
transcending the traditional notions of structure and agency. According to McAnnulla, 
‗structure‘ within this framework is the tendential product of relatively successful discursive 
articulation which renders meaning temporarily sedimented for a certain period whereas 
‗there is no ―agency‖ as traditionally understood as identities are based on social antagonisms 
which are decentred‘ (McAnulla, 1998:7). The subjects exist because of the dislocations 
within the structure, which provides any subject a mythical quality where the effectiveness of 
the myth is essentially hegemonic (Laclau, 1990: 60-1). This gives important clues about the 
Laclau- Mouffean relationship between identity and a hegemonic project: subjects or subject 
positions occupy a place within the political realm as the hegemonic project through the 
discourses temporarily fixes them so. 
 
This is in clear contradiction with the Subject of the Marxist tradition (with a capital S), 
which, ‗through unificatory discourses‘, unify, homogenise and render subject to ideology 
(Smith, 1988: 155). This conception of subject ‗cerns‘ the subject, i.e. abstracts the subject 
from the real conditions of its existence in perfect consonence with Western political heritage 
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(Smith, 1988: xxx). Smith offers, instead, to ‗discern‘ the subject where the human agency is 
re-introduced as a possibility of political resistance.
19
 
 
This, in a way, bears resemblance to what Laclau means by the Death of the ‗Death of the 
Subject‘. For Laclau, ‗the multiplication of new identities in the collapse of the places from 
which universal subjects once spoke‘ (Laclau, 1992: 84) ended up in the deconstruction of the 
link between social agents and classes. Different subject positions are inserted into the 
political struggle by the death of the ‗Death of the Subject‘, where subjects are reiterated and 
reintroduced within the social and political realm in a radical way- the limitation and the 
constitutive outside of the subject are the very reasons for its reinsertion: 
 
[It] showed the secret poison that inhabited it, the possibility of its second death; the 
death of the Death of the Subject, the re-emergence of the subject as a result of its own 
death; the proliferation of concrete finitudes whose limitations are the source of their 
strength; the realization that there can be subjects because the gap that the Subject was 
supposed to bridge is actually unbridgeable (Laclau, 1992: 84). 
 
However, according to Torfing, poststructuralism has not succeeded in preventing the ‗death 
of the subject‘ (Torfing, 1999: 54-77). He argues that, citing Best and Kellner, 
poststructuralism shares with structuralism the rejection of the autonomous subject. Hence, 
although poststructuralism stresses the importance of history, power and everyday life in its 
account of the subjectivation, it remains within the anti-humanist celebration of the ‗death of 
the subject‘ which applies to Laclau‘s conception of ‗subject‘ as well (Best and Kellner, 1992 
quoted in Torfing, 1999: 56). The empty space left by Marxism‘s depiction of universality 
                                                            
19 Smith, by arguing that the human agent exceeds the contemporary intellectual abstractions attached to it, 
actually dismisses the understanding of the subject ‗as it is constructed in and by much poststructuralist theory as 
well as by those discourses against which poststructuralist theory claims to pose itself‘(Smith, 1988: xxx). 
However, in terms of the link sustained between subjects and political struggle, Smith and Laclau seem to have 
similar pretensions.    
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and universal class is now filled by a number of new Social Movements (Torfing, 1999: 56). 
However, although they did not develop a distinct and more elaborate account of ‗the 
subject‘, Laclau and Mouffe‘s interpretation of the subject as relational and decentred gives 
very important clues about the significance of subject within the hegemonic struggle and 
formation of the antagonisms. 
 
Therefore, the relationship between the agents and discourses is contingent and ‗subject‘ is a 
position within the hegemonic struggle shaped by discourses, which is ‗provisional and not 
necessarily indefeasible, into which a person is called momentarily by the discourses he/she 
inhabits‘ (Smith, 1988: xxxv).  
 
It is crucial to emphasise at this point that Laclau and Mouffe did not elaborate on the 
relationship between agents on the one hand and the two different mode1s of sustaining 
hegemony differentiated by Gramsci (‗passive revolution‘ and ‗inclusive hegemony‘) on the 
other. Therefore, Laclau and Mouffe did not make a distinction between elite discourses and 
public discourses in terms of defining subject positions within the hegemonic struggle 
(Gramsci, 1973). For Gramsci, hegemony is not only the strategy of the proleteriat but also 
involves the practices of the ruling class in general (Mouffe, 1979: 179).  He makes a 
distinction between the passive revolution (‘transformism’) which is characterised with the 
gradual but continuous absorption of active elements produced by allied groups and an 
expansive hegemony, ‗which had to consist in the creation of an active, direct consensus 
resulting from the genuine adoption of the interests of the popular classes by the hegemonic 
class‘ (Mouffe, 1979: 182). This consensus is called the collective will by Gramsci (Mouffe, 
1979: 11). The ‗collective will‘ results in the dominant group (read ‗the elites‘) being 
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coordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups (read ‗the public‘) 
(Gramsci, 1973: 181). On the other hand, Laclau and Mouffe do not use the concept of 
‗collective will‘ and only pay attention to the ‗new political subjects‘ in order to differentiate 
them from workers‘ struggles (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 149-193). For Laclau, there are no 
rules that would help us identify the antagonist, i.e. the subject of the antagonism and ‗the 
collective will‘: ‗[There is a] limitation of all efforts to interpret social antagonisms in terms 
of game theory. The latter entails a system of rules which sets down the possible moves of the 
players and consequently establishes their identity. But with antagonism, rules and identities 
are violated: the antagonist is not a player, but a cheat‘ (Laclau 1990: 11).  As I will scrutinise 
in the final section of this chapter where I ask the question of ‗what to get from theory?‘, I 
return back to this problem of identifying the subject of the hegemony and show how I link 
subjects and discourses through a Laclau-Mouffean theoretical lens in this thesis.    
    
In a sense, then, Laclau and Mouffe can be claimed to have transcended traditional notions of 
structure and agency through the use of the category of ‗discourse‘. As the society is 
impossible, and it can only exist in the sense of a partial totalisation achieved through 
hegemonic discourse, ‗every social identity is constituted through a difference from which it 
can never fully distance itself‘ (McAnulla, 1998: 7). 
 
On the other hand, Jensen sees a problem with the anti-essentialist character of discourse 
theory regarding the relationship between structure and agency (Jensen, 2005). He argues that 
Laclau and Mouffe‘s use of Saussurean structural theory is a clue of the structuralist bias in 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: 
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On the one hand they again stress the anti-essentialism in that neither the totality of the 
social nor the aggregate is seen as essential. Neither structure nor agency can thus be 
accredited the power of change. However, while developing their theory, Laclau and 
Mouffe indeed use Saussurean structuralism and Althusserean post-structuralism as 
common reference points against which the discourse theory is developed. It is thus 
easy to get the impression of a structural bias in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy 
(Jensen, 2005: 6-7) 
 
Similarly, according to Wæver (2005), Laclau and Mouffe show structural characteristics with 
regard to their stance in terms of the structure and agency relationship. While he rejects that 
the ontological basis of discourse theory stipulates a bias towards structural focus, he 
associates Laclau and Mouffe‘s position to the ‗French heir‘ (structuralism) inherent in their 
theorising (Wæver, 2005: 200-1). 
 
In my reading, the assertion regarding the undecidability and contingency of subject positions 
and identities, both of which are viewed as a political struggle, can be used to inspire an 
understanding of how ‗Europe‘ is used at the domestic level in general.  All in all, the Laclau-
Mouffean conception of hegemony which challenges the traditional link forged between 
consciousness and class background and the subject positions sustained solely by this narrow 
conception extends the scope of politics. This is quite different from the previously 
scrutinised conceptualisations of ‗Europe‘. The Europeanisation literature would assert top-
down subject positions imposed by the European level whereas a social constructivist 
framework would take the identities for granted and fail to explore the link between the 
discourses and the construction of the antagonisms. Similarly, a Foucauldian framework 
would focus solely on subject positions, (which would possibly be seen as the result of the 
power relations constructed at the micro-level but not as a result of a process which is itself 
political). On the other hand, the iteration of subject positions as contingent and articulatory 
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by Laclau and Mouffe opens an excellent analytical avenue to understand ‗Europe‘ as a 
struggle for hegemony, which the present thesis is aiming at. 
 
3.5.2. Hegemony as a Political Project in Laclau and Mouffe 
 
The Laclau- Mouffean approach is very useful in that it enables us to study political processes 
with a clear focus upon the logics of language, ideas, meanings and their transformations. 
Whereas the notion of ‗Europe‘ is usually taken as a pre-given, automatic and categorical 
concept by the Europeanisation literature, discourse analysis emphasises undecidability and 
the role of contingency,  thereby emerging as  a useful tool in explaining political change. 
 
Firstly, theoretically speaking, Laclau mentions the primacy of the political over the social. 
He substantiates this claim by referring to Husserl‘s distinction between ‗sedimentation‘ and 
‗reactivation‘. Husserl, a la Laclau, argues that the practice of any scientific discipline entails 
a routinisation where the results of previous scientific investigations are taken for granted the 
original intuition which gave rise to them being forgotten (Laclau, 1990: 34). Husserl called 
the routinisation and forgetting of origins as ‗sedimentation‘, and the recovery of the 
‗constitutive‘ activity as ‗reactivation‘ (quoted in Laclau, 1990: 34). According to Laclau, the 
sedimented forms of ‗objectivity‘ make up the field of what we call the social. The moment of 
antagonism where the undecidable nature of the alternatives and their resolution through 
power relations becomes fully visible constitutes the field of the political. ‗Any political 
construction takes place against the background of a range of sedimented practices‘ (Laclau, 
1990: 35). As already mentioned, antagonism for Laclau and Mouffe shows the limits of the 
objectivity and the social (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 125). The antagonism occurs all the 
time, which points to the ontological primacy of the political (Marchart, 2007: 174). It is the 
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potential for collective identities to turn antagonistic, which grants the political an ontological 
primacy (Hansen, 2008a: 6). 
 
The theoretical primacy of the political has its implications on the practice of hegemony as 
well. According to Laclau and Mouffe‘s theoretical framework, ‗universality‘ comes into the 
picture when the particular demands can symbolise themselves as ‗universal‘, as already 
mentioned before. The core of the hegemonic struggle is the ability to establish equivalence 
between an increasingly wide range of demands and the extent to which differential identities 
can be articulated into a self-proclaimed ‗universal‘ project shows the core of the hegemonic 
project. Mobilizing a wide range of demands entails the emergence of a particular discourse 
as the key to the hegemonic struggle. ‗To ―hegemonise‖ a content would therefore amount to 
fixing its meaning around a nodal point. The field of the social could thus be regarded as a 
trench war in which different political projects strive to articulate a great number of social 
signifiers around themselves‘ (Laclau, 1990: 28). 
 
3.5.3. Signification Chains 
 
In explaining how a particular discourse is articulated around a certain signifier, the main 
concept the Laclau and Mouffean theoretical framework employs is the ‗signification 
chain‘20.  According to Philips and Jorgensen, a ‗signification chain‘ refers to the investment 
of key signifiers with meaning (Philips and Jorgensen, 2002: 50). According to this 
framework, a discourse exists as chains of differentially connected signifiers such that the 
                                                            
20 Within the Laclau-Mouffean literature, the concepts of ‗signification chain‘ (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000; 
Zizek, 1999), ‗signifying chain‘ (e.g. Hansen, 2008b; Laclau, 2005) and ‗chain of equivalence‘ (e.g. Critchley 
and Marchart, 2004; Philips and Jorgensen, 2002) are used interchangibly. To be consistent and not to conflate 
the concept with the logic of equivalence, I will be using the notion ‗signification chain‘ throughout the text.  
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meaning of one is established by reference to another. These chains establish a logical 
connection in which signifiers form combinations which make sense only by reference to the 
remainder of the ideological chain. In this conception, the discursive system exists as over-
lapping chains that may or may not cross at certain points. According to MacMillan, these 
‗crossing‘ points are similar to what Laclau and Mouffe call ‗antagonisms‘ (MacMillan, 
2010). For instance, in case of the significations chains constructed for ‗Europe‘, one chain 
may articulate ‗free market‘ whereas another chain might include the signifier of 
‗Christendom‘, which poses an antagonism between the two.    
 
 As mentioned before, for Laclau and Mouffe, signifiers do not have fixed meanings of their own 
but are open to articulation, which is at the very core of the political and the hegemonic 
struggle itself. Similarly, according to Zizek, as cited in Butler, this process of fixing a 
signifier around a certain meaning is political (Butler, 1993). ‗He argues that a pure signifier, 
empty of all meaning, postures a site of radical semantic abundance‘ (Zizek cited in Butler, 
1993: 208). Following Laclau and Mouffe, Zizek views political signifiers as free-floating and 
discontinuous within the prepoliticised field of ideology. When these political signifiers 
become politicised, they provide contingent but efficacious points of unity for the otherwise 
disparate or free-floating elements of ideological life. A political signifier gains its political 
efficacy, its power to define the political field, through creating and sustaining its 
constituency. In this respect, ‗the power of the terms ―women‖ or ―democracy‖ is not derived 
from their ability to describe adequately or comprehensively a political reality that already 
exists; on the contrary, the political signifier becomes politically efficacious by instituting and 
sustaining a set of connections as a political reality‘ (Butler, 1993: 209-210).  
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However, these signification chains do not exist in a vacuum but are identifiable within a 
signifying grammar. In line with Laclau and Mouffe‘s argument that we are always internal to 
a world of signifying practices and objects, a signification chain also exist within this world 
(Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 1-24). Laclau labels this world of signifying practices ‗a 
social logic‘ (Laclau in Butler et.al., 2000: 44-89). In his exchange with Butler and Zizek, 
Laclau characterises a social logic as ‗a rarefied system of objects, as a ―grammar‖ or cluster 
of rules which make some combinations and substitutions possible and exclude others, 
making it synonymous with his category of ―discourse‖‘ (quoted in Glynos and Howarth, 
2007: 135). I called this signifying system in Chapter 1 the lingua franca and argued that 
what I understand by the term ‗hegemony‘ is the conviction on the part of political identities 
that a particular discourse is the lingua franca of politics so that each and every political 
identity has to talk that language in order to assert its location within politics. Within the 
framework of this ‗grammar‘, in investing signifiers with meaning, the signification chains 
articulate different signifiers and draw the limits of the social in different ways which is called 
‗antagonism‘ by Laclau and Mouffe, as the next section will elaborate on.  
 
   
All in all, in the Laclau-Mouffean framework, a signification chain is a conceptual tool used 
to construct a set of connections between signifiers and is a political act in itself in 
constructing discourses and constructing hegemony, which I will thoroughly use in Chapter 6 
to construct the discourses on ‗Europe‘ in Turkish politics.  
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3. 5.4. Antagonisms, Logics of Equivalence and Difference andPolitical Frontiers 
 
As already mentioned, every hegemonic struggle aims to present a political project through 
which  particular demands can construct  themselves as ‗universal‘. The ability to establish 
equivalence between an increasingly wide range of demands ‗where any particularity would 
be finally reabsorbed into a universal and transparent order‘ (Laclau, 1990: 80) is nothing but 
the core of the hegemonic struggle. This is strictly linked to the delineation of  political 
frontiers because ‗there is only politics when there are frontiers‘ (Laclau, 1990: 159-174). 
Similarly, Mouffe argues that, ‗there is no consensus without exclusion, there is no ―we‖ 
without a ―they‖, and no politics is possible without the drawing of a frontier‘ (Mouffe, 2005: 
73). Political frontiers are crucial for the Laclau-Mouffean analysis, albeit under-explored, as 
any political identity cannot be determined through a principle of a priori societal logic and 
another way of delimiting identity should be formed (Norval, 2000). ‗[I]t is through 
consolidation or dissolution of frontiers that a historical bloc is constructed or fragmented‘ 
(Laclau, 1990: 160). As will be elaborated in the next sections, Aletta Norval takes this 
emphasis on political frontiers further and shows how the Apartheid regime in South Africa 
had  been perpetuated through the construction and deconstruction of political frontiers 
(Norval, 1990; 1994; 1996). 
 
In terms of hegemonising the social, antagonisms play a pivotal role. As mentioned before, 
antagonism originates from the limits of the objectivity and the social (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985: 125). That is, antagonisms make up the political in the sense that it shows the frontiers 
between different demands and identities within the social. Whereas it is an inherent objective 
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relation between classes for Marxism, for Laclau and Mouffe, antagonism is an experience for 
constituting the limits of the society, due to the latter‘s impossibility of fully constituting itself 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 125). In my reading, antagonism temporarily draws the boundaries 
of the political struggle and sets the rules for the language, thereby constituting the core  of 
the hegemony. Therefore, politics is a practice of creation, reproduction and transformation of 
social relations which cannot be located at a determinate level and of making sense of a field 
of the social which is criss-crossed with antagonisms (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 153). 
 
 
In doing this, i.e. sustaining the symbolic universality of particular demands and in projecting 
this as a political project, there is an infinite interplay between the so-called ‗ logic of 
equivalence‘ and ‗ logic of difference‘, two key terms central to the Laclau-Mouffean analysis 
of the formation of political identities and antagonisms. Laclau and Mouffe, following a 
Saussurean ontology of signification, define two fundamental relations in language- the 
associative (or substitutive) and the syntagmatic (or combinatory) - and transform them into 
two dynamic and politically inflected logics, namely the logics of ‗equivalence‘ and 
‗difference‘ (Glynos and Howarth, 2007: 106). With Laclau‘s words, ‗we have here the basis 
for a comparison between this duality politics/administration and the two axes of signification 
– that of combinations and that of substitutions‘ (Laclau, 2008: 18).  
 
When these different significations within language are translated to the realm of political 
practices, we have two different strategies of hegemony. The more social order is stable and 
unchallenged, the more institutional forms will prevail and will organise themselves in a 
syntagmatic system of differential positions, within the logic of difference. The more the 
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confrontations between groups define the social scene, the more society will be divided into 
two camps: at the limit, there will be a total dichotomisation of the social space around only 
two syntagmatic positions: ‗us‘ and ‗them‘ as it is the case with the logic of equivalence 
(Laclau, 2008: 18).   
 
 
In terms of the identities, logic of equivalence stipulates all subjects within the discursive 
space as universal, with regard to what Herschinger labels ‗something underlying them all‘, 
sharpening the antagonistic frontier (Herschinger, 2008: 9). On the other hand, logic of 
difference operates via the absorption of differential identities, weakening the antagonistic 
frontier (not completely eliminating it) and shifting it to the margins of politics (Herschinger, 
2008: 10). That is, on the part of the political identities, logic of equivalence renders all 
subject positions equivalent against a particular threat (‗if you do not support Europe, you will 
not be modern‘ or ‗if we join the EU, they will rule our judiciary, we have to reject the EU‘) 
whereas logic of difference particularises the subject positions and retains the differences 
(‗workers, teachers and intelligentsia alike should promote the EU ideal‘ or ‗against the EU, 
everyone from different sections of the society should unite‘).   
 
To reiterate, discourses or political identities can be articulated through the operation of logic  
of difference where the differences are marginalised between the constitutive components of 
the discourses through signifying non-adversarial and positive differences of different 
demands or camps. The political frontiers in this respect are inclusive and refer to differential 
group identities. There is an attempt to fix the relations among social agents as a set of 
differential positions (Norval, 1990: 137). Difference is the logic behind political movements 
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which seeks to heal the social space, giving room to all social demands, treating them 
‗differently‘, next to each other, without collapsing them into an equivalential chain (Laclau 
and Mouffe 1985: 129). Norval argues that during the Vorster regime in South Africa (1966-
1978), the previous racist language of the Apartheid regime was no longer heard and a new 
discourse constructing white unity was introduced (Norval, 1990: 142-143). This later 
culminated in the discourse of the National Party in the 1980s, which coopted coloured and 
Indian sections of the society into a tricameral parlimentary system (Norval, 1990; 1994). By 
using the notions of ‗free enterprise‘ and ‗economic growth‘, groups hitherto excluded from 
the political system (such as urban blacks) were included in the political realm. ‗The 
realignment of business interests and government policy around the discourse of free 
enterprise had to create the conditions under which urban blacks could be coopted, could be 
given ―a stake in the system‖, in lieu of their continued exclusion from political decision-
making processes‘ (Norval, 1996: 228). Along these lines, to exemplify the differential 
inclusion of Urban Africans, Norval quotes Anton Rupert‘s statement that: ‗we cannot survive 
without a free market economy, without a stable black middle class that enjoys full property 
rights (...) and without a feeling of hope for progress in the hearts of all our people‘, coopting 
black middle class under the rubric of ‗free market‘ and ‗stability‘ (cited in Norval, 1996: 
226-7). For Norval, another noteworthy aspect of the logic of difference is the marginalisation 
of the differences between the constitutive components of the discourses through signifying 
non-adversarial and positive differences, is to depoliticise areas of potential conflict by 
contructing differential, non-antagonistic identities (Norval, 1990: 146). An important facet in 
the National Party discourse in the late 1970s in South Africa was to concentrate power in the 
executive branch and to establish of four permanent cabinet committees which drew members 
from ranks of business leaders (Norval, 1990: 146).    
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However, group identities are not always a question of difference; there is always the 
possibility of adopting the logic of equivalence, hence depicting the Other as a ‗threat‘ 
(Norval, 1994: 115-137). What we see here is the subversion of the positive identity into a 
negative identity. ‗Antagonism becomes the impossibility of constituting purely differential 
identities‘, which is called the dichotomisation of social space through fostering a discursive 
unity against the Other made responsible for the failure of attaining a full-fledged identity of 
the Self (Norval, 1994: 121; Howarth, 2000: 107). Therefore, equivalence means that the 
singular demand ceases to be ‗what it is‘, a specific demand, and comes to represent 
something more, typically the demand of overthrowing a repressive regime (Hansen, 2008b). 
Populism is the ‗ideal type‘ of equivalental politics, and the attempt of separating the social 
space into two antagonistic camps – into two chains of equivalences – is its 'ideal type'.  
 
 
When Norval refers to the hegemonic decline of the Apartheid regime, she talks about the 
overall demarcation of political frontiers which was mainly antagonised around two camps 
(Norval, 1994: 115-137). The policies of the New Right in general and Thatcher‘s strategy of 
dividing the British society into two poles in the 1980s in particular were realised through the 
operation  of ‗logic  of equivalence‘ (Tünay, 1993). In Tünay‘s reading, Thatcherism carried 
out a two-nation hegemonic project, which entailed a process of neutralising and containing 
popular groups under massive political agenda. The New Right divided the nation into two 
parts, one of which -unions, the unemployed, the disabled, pensioners and so on- is deprived 
of the benefits of the Keynesian welfare state and subjected to wage cuts, political repression 
and so forth‘ (Tünay, 1993: 16). The signification chain, in this respect, consisted of old 
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elements such as ‗anti-statism‘, ‗productivism‘, ‗family‘ and ‗moral regeneration‘ and themes 
such as ‗future benefits will follow from present suffering‘ (Tünay, 1993: 16; Jessop et.al., 
1984: 51). In her analysis of the political movement against Eurogold
21
 by a group of activists 
in Bergama, Turkey in 1989, Özen tells a similar story in terms of depiction of a ‗threat‘ 
(Özen, 2009). According to Özen, shortly after Eurogold started its initial operations in the 
mining site in Bergama, a group of people from Bergama, including some local left-wing 
politicians, union leaders, activists from local NGOs, and a number of peasants from the 
villages constructed the mining project as an attempt by a foreign company, an imperialist 
power to exploit the resources of a developing country without regard to the natural 
environment and public health and articulated a discourse in which the operation of the 
goldmine was constructed as a direct threat to the environment (Özen, 2009: 413). In this 
respect, the signification chain included themes such as ‗environmental degradation‘ and 
‗anti-imperialism‘ and the Eurogold has been depicted as the ‗threat‘.   
 
Therefore, according to Glynos and Howarth, insofar as political practices entail the 
construction of new frontiers to challenge old social structures in the name of an ideal or 
principle (thus implying a set of inclusions and exlusions), one can say that the political logic 
of equivalence predominates. But insofar as there is a breaking down of those frontiers so as 
to maintain existing social structures (thus retaining the old distribution of inclusions and 
exlusions), we say that the political logic of difference predominates (Glynos and Howarth, 
2007: 106).  
                                                            
21 Eurogold Limited is an Australian owned gold exploration and mining company with active projects based in 
different parts of the world, including Turkey. ‗The gold-mining project concerning the gold reserves in the 
Bergama area was proposed by Eurogold in 1989. The proposed mining site was in the vicinity of the three 
villages of Bergama town, which is located near the west coast of Turkey. While tourism and trade are important 
sources of income for Bergama proper, which is the site of the ruins of the ancient city Pergammon, agriculture 
is the principal economic activity in the villages. The region in which Eurogold planned to construct a mining 
complex is known as one of the most fertile agricultural regions in Turkey‘ (Özen, 2009: 412).  
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Although the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference are two opposite logics and they 
articulate political space in quite different ways, they usually prevail together in a social 
formation and one can become more dominant than the other. However, according to Sumic, 
‗the logic of equivalence‘ has an ontological primacy over ‗the logic of difference‘:  
 
Hegemonic operation, to take place at all, thus demands a certian degee of de-
particularisation. This making indifferent of differences between particular contents, 
however, can only be achieved through the primacy of what Laclau calls the ‗logic of 
equivalence‘ over the ‗logic of difference‘ (Sumic, 2004: 190).  
 
 
 
All in all, if the logic of equivalence becomes dominant in the structuration of the political 
space, there will emerge only two differential positions which will be strictly in opposition to 
each other. This is to say, when the logic of equivalence becomes dominant, the political 
space will largely be structured around a particular antagonism and will be divided into two 
antagonistic camps. For Laclau and Mouffe, the struggles through the logic of equivalence 
where a certain section of society is mobilised against a common enemy are ‗populist 
struggles‘, e.g. colonised/coloniser, fascist/anti-fascist etc. whereas the struggles through the 
logic of difference are ‗democratic struggles‘, (e.g. feminist, gay, anti-nuclear or anti-racist) 
(Contu, 2002: 166). On the other hand, if the logic of difference becomes dominant, 
differential positions will proliferate. Within the framework of this logic, Laclau and Mouffe 
attribute a novel role to the democratic struggles, i.e. New Social Movements ‗in articulating 
the rapid diffusion of social conflictuality to more and more numerous relations which is 
characteristic today of advanced industrial societies‘ (Laclau and Mouffe: 1985: 159-160). A 
democratic struggle emerges ‗within a relatively sutured political space formed by a 
multiplicity of practices that do not exhaust the referential and empirical reality of the agents 
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forming part of them‘ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 132 Here, there is no correspondence 
between a ‗political space‘ and ‗society‘ as an empirical referent and these spaces are 
autonomous and relatively closed. In popular struggles, however, ‗the gap between political 
space and society as an empirical referent‘ is bridged by a political logic (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985: 133). Thus, the logic of equivalence simplifies the political space by dividing it into two 
camps, whereas the logic of difference creates antagonisms through multiple forms of 
democratic struggles.  ‗Whereas a project employing the logic of equivalence seeks to divide 
social space by condensing meanings around two antagonistic poles, a project employing a 
logic of difference attempts to weaken and displace a sharp antagonistic polarity, 
endeavouring to relegate that division to the margins of the society‘ (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 
2000: 11).  In Laclau and Mouffe‘s terms:  
 
We, thus, see that the logic of equivalence is a logic of the simplification of political 
space, while the logic of difference is a logic of its expansion and increasing 
complexity. Taking a comparative example from linguistics, we could say that the logic 
of difference tends to expand the syntagmatic pole of language, the number of positions 
that can enter into a relation of combination and hence of continuity with one another; 
while the logic of equivalence expands the paradigmatic pole- that is, the elements that 
can be substituted for one another- thereby reducing the number of positions which can 
possibly be combined (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 130).  
 
3.6. The recent uses of ‘logic  of equivalence’ and ‘logic  of difference’: Hegemony and 
the Essex School  
Although in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (1985), Laclau and Mouffe have given a 
comprehensive theory of hegemony and focused on the relationship between radical 
democracy and hegemonic struggle, they did not operationalise the logics of equivalence and 
difference and show how these logics work in terms of political identities in real political 
settings. This has been later done by the so-called ‗Essex School‘, a new generation of 
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scholars of political science based at the University of Essex. I deem it important to include 
some of the studies of the Essex School scholars here to see how they theorised the operation 
of logics of equivalence and difference through case studies and to understand how some of 
these case studies reflect on, interact and even counterpose the logics‘ operation in Turkish 
politics after 1999 within the context of ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ that I will outline in Chapter 
7.     
 
According to Laclau, dissatisfied with the dominant theoretical  models of social explanation 
that existed at the time in the field of the social sciences (behaviouralism, structural 
functionalism, rational choice), the School elaborated an alternative approach to the 
understanding of the structuration of socio-political spaces by articulating an alternative 
conception of discourse (Laclau in Howarth et.al, 2000: x). In Towsnhend‘s words, ‗Laclau 
and Mouffe‘s unhappiness with orthodox Marxism led them to embrace—albeit not 
uncritically—the ideas of poststructuralist Continental thinkers, especially Derrida, Foucault 
and Lacan, as well as the later Wittgenstein, who were concerned with language and 
psychoanalysis‘ (Townshend, 2003: 131).  These theoretical inspirations were also coupled 
with an immense effort to develop a fully-fledged methodology of the discourse theory.  
 
The main conceptual focus of the project at hand, i.e. political frontiers, antagonisms and 
logics  of equivalence and difference, is also central to the anti-objectivist trend of the 
School‘s research agenda. For the Essex School,  ‗in the modern era the world of politics is 
the world of contingent ―hegemonisations‖, an arena of incommensurable choices, of 
―undecidability‖ and acts of power, which are the products of the interplaying logics of 
―equivalence‖ and ―difference‖‘ (Townshend, 2003: 132).  
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The book of Discourse Theory and Political Analysis by David Howarth, Aletta J. Norval and 
Yannis Stavrakakis endeavours to show a streamlined register of the above theoretical and 
conceptual attempts (Howarth et.al, 2000). Although the book is mainly instrumental in 
showing the future research trajectories in discourse theory (Norval, 2000), it makes a very 
strong attempt to operationalise the above-mentioned concepts in different aspects of politics. 
In this section, I will mention some examples of the recent uses of the logics  of equivalence 
and  difference in different contexts and historical settings not only in this seminal book but 
also elsewhere. In this way, it is easier to see how the originally abstract notions have in the 
course of time been operationalised by different scholars, constituting a useful starting point 
from which to operationalise them within the Turkish context, the task that Chapters 6 and 7 
aim to accomplish.  
 
In her account of the Mexican revolutionary mystique Rosa Buenfil argues that ‗the Mexican 
revolution can be understood as an overdetermination of different social movements 
organised around a mystical discourse‘ (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 11). According to 
Buenfil, the movements were organised around antagonistic poles, in which various agents 
were polarised in terms of the oppressor and the oppressed (Buenfil, 2000: 93). The 
intellectual and political composition that emerged from this unity of diversity which later 
turned into the new ruling bloc was characterised by hybridity and ecclecticism, which 
mobilised the Mexican armed movement, teachers, worker and peasant leaders under the 
rubric of the oppressed against a common threat, i.e. ‗the government‘ (Buenfil, 2000).  
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Focusing on the construction of Romanian social democracy between 1989 and 1996, Kevin 
Adamson shows how revisionist socialism has incorporated signifiers associated with 
neoliberal transition discourse such as ‗market‘ and ‗privatisation‘ under the rubric of the 
discourse of ‗transition‘ (Adamson, 2000). He also acknowledges that, Romania‘s revolution, 
by dissolving differences of demands into an expanding order through logic of differences, 
and, in particular, through the discursive production of a political frontier between ‗the 
People‘ and ‗the Ceausescu‘, radically reorganised the political identities of millions of 
Romanians (Adamson, 2007).  
 
In another project, Barros and Castagnola question the political frontiers in Argentina between 
1955 and 1973, the so-called ‗interregnum‘ of the Peronist populism (Barros and Castagnola, 
2000).  By rejecting the ‗objectively‘ antagonistic interests of various economic groups in 
Argentina, they show how Peronism incorporated the hitherto excluded popular sectors and 
enlarged the scope of political identities (Barros and Castagnola, 2000: 24-29). In this picture, 
‗the political alignments had mainly to do with the attitude towards Peronism: the central 
problem was whether to be in favour or against Peronism‘ (Barros and Castagnola, 2000: 30). 
According to them, this strict split of the political realm into two fields by Peronism precluded 
the demands of these newly integrated groups to be articulated into a wider hegemonic 
operation after 1955 (Barros and Castagnola, 2000).        
 
David Howarth‘s various studies aim to explain the decline of the Black Consciousness 
Movement (BCM) and the rise of the Charterist movement and its political party, UDF, in 
South Africa between 1976 and 1986 with reference to the inherent strengths and weaknesses 
of their respective discourses. According to Howarth, the constitution of Black Consciousness 
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ideology involved the production and fixation of ‗blackness‘ as an empty signifier which  
instituted and organised a new racial political frontier in South African society (Howarth, 
1997: 54-5). ‗In this sense, the signifier ―black‖ makes possible the creation of black 
solidarity and unity, and engenders political struggle, based on a common identity actively 
denied by white domination. It thus functions as a nodal point unifying different subjectivities 
and interests against the various manifestations of white oppression‘ (Howarth, 1997: 67). 
This conception calls the African workers, Indians and Coloureds for unification against the 
common enemy of Grand Apartheid, rendering an exclusionary equivalence between those 
groups. On the other hand, the  Chartist success in the 1980s mainly stemmed from its ability 
to subsume race, class gender and youth within it (Howarth, 2000: 180–181). ‗Labelling the 
government‘s proposals as ―divisive‖, ―undemocratic‖ and ―racist‖, the UDF endeavoured to 
mobilise and organise mass popular support in favour of a united, non-racial and democratic 
South Africa‘ (Howarth, 2000: 182). Firstly, common citizenship rights and the necessity for 
an unfragmented South Africa free from racial, ethnic and sexual divisions were at the centre 
of the UDF discourse and, secondly, the political boundaries this time were drawn through the 
logic of difference and by the notion of ‗non-racialism‘.   
 
Aletta Norval‘s research on the South African politics identifying the proliferation and 
dislocation of political identities in the Apartheid era also focus on the construction of logics 
of equivalences and differences and political frontiers (Norval, 1990; 1994; 1996; 1998). 
According to Norval, the notion of ‗volkseie‘ (that which is the ‗own‘ of the ‗people‘) led to a 
recasting of the European/Native frontier by the Apartheid regime until the 1980s whereas a 
transformist project by the National Party (NP) introduced a limited and differential inclusion 
of coloured, Indian South Africans and urban South Africans around  the notion of ‗seperate 
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freedoms‘  (Norval, 1996: 174-218). Within this framework, Apartheid emerges as a failed 
hegemonic project in the 1980s  as the former discourse fostered alliances between moderates 
across the racial divide and subverted the logic of the Apartheid (Norval, 1996: 270-274).  
 
In this section, I showed how the logics of difference and equivalence have been 
operationalised by the Essex School scholars in different political settings. This attempt is 
helpful in order to understand how these logics speak to the construction of political identities 
and political frontiers. Nevertheless, I argue that however helpful the logics of difference and 
equivalence are in understanding antagonisms, demarcation of political frontiers and the 
hegemonic struggle, it is an overestimation that they are the pre-requisites for hegemonic 
politics. We also need to identify other factors (e.g. institutions, socio-economic factors etc.) 
at the political terrain to claim that the ‗hegemony‘ is successfully constructed. Therefore, 
firstly, I argue that these logics are helpful to understand the hegemonic struggle, not the 
hegemony per se, which refers back to my theorisation of ‗hegemony‘ in this section. 
Secondly, I argue that, following Herschinger, for hegemony to exist, the ‗Other‘ and 
antagonism have to be very-well defined in order to split the social or to subvert this split. 
However, as Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 will show, in case of ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ after 1999 
in Turkish politics, the four discourses on ‗Europe‘ had different ‗Others‘ and did not split the 
social in the way Laclau and Mouffe intend.          
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4. CONCLUSION: WHAT TO GET FROM THEORY? 
 
 
 
The most inspiring aspect of the Laclau-Mouffean theoretical framework is their emphasis on 
how the notion of hegemony entails the extension of the scope of politics and how the 
political frontiers are drawn via the construction of antagonisms and a hegemonic struggle. 
The approach is equally ground breaking in that it enables one to see how the social is 
symbolically criss-crossed by antagonisms and absorbed by the political. However, Laclau 
and Mouffe‘s work is highly abstract and theoretical, as noted by many scholars (e.g. Contu, 
2002; Carpentier and Spinoy, 2007). Similarly, they do not tell us in what ways antagonisms 
and political frontiers are relevant to the hegemonic struggles of today. The question remains, 
therefore, where does one adopting a Laclau- Mouffean approach go from here? 
 
The present study will be using the concepts of ‗hegemony‘, ‗logic  of equivalence‘, ‗logic  of 
difference‘, ‗antagonisms‘ and ‗political frontiers‘ throughout the project.  However, instead 
of the notion of ‗hegemony‘, I will be using the term ‗bipolar hegemony‘, borrowing from 
Emilia Palonen as I argue that we need both poles of a discourse regardless of whether that 
pole of the discourse supports or rejects a particular political practice in order to identify the 
hegemonic struggle (Palonen, 2009). Palonen uses the term ‗bipolar hegemony‘ in order to 
understand the cleavages within the Hungarian society, which aims to ‗gather differences 
along a single frontier that functions as the source of common identification‘ (Palonen, 2009: 
319). Within this context, I will investigate how ‗Europe‘ emerges as a bipolar hegemonic 
discourse in the specified period and irreducible openness of the social is stabilised in 
articulations around ‗Europe‘. Studies on the notion of ‗Europe‘ in Turkish political landscape 
usually tend to outline two main inclinations about ‗Europe‘, namely a pro-Europe vs. anti-
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Europe approach. The second step in this regard is to make an automatic association between 
some particular camps and these two main positions. As the main of aim of this thesis is to 
understand how the hegemony of ‗Europe‘ is sustained, I am rather interested in seeing how 
‗Europe‘ hegemonises the social cross-cutting both inclinations. Therefore, I confine myself 
to calling both poles of this discourse as ‗dominant discourse‘ or parts of the same hegemonic 
discourse instead of referring to them as two mutually exclusive and opposing discourses. 
This is due to the view that, as Wæver argues: 
 
the ‗dominant‘ political line and the opposition usually share a lot (except the question 
on the agenda). This follows from the fact that political opponents relate to each other, 
and therefore almost always deal with some of the same issues and use related concepts 
and images while struggling to reformulate and conquer other key terms (Wæver, 2005: 
36).  
 
 
My understanding of Ole Wæver here is that the question is a part of the agreement between 
opponents. It is rather the answers that differ. However, the limits of objectivity and the terms 
in which it is asked are the same so that particular constructions of the world are reified rather 
than contested. ‗Both sides of the antagonistic relation are necessary in order to create a single 
space of representation‘ (Laclau, 318).  Therefore, I will be using the notion of ‗hegemony‘ 
with a focus on its bipolarity and on the argument that chains of equivalences and chains of 
differences are part and parcel of the same hegemonic strategy. These logics form the poles of 
the bipolar hegemony, not the pro-/anti- stance against ‗Europe‘. For this reason, I do not 
agree with Laclau and Mouffe‘s association between types of struggles and logics articulated 
mentioned above. A new social movement can be populist and employ logic of equivalence in 
the sense of dichotomising the social space against capitalism. Logics of equivalence and 
difference are two sides of the same coin, so-called ‗hegemony‘. Norval, in this respect, gives 
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the example of Apartheid which did not operate either through logics of exclusion (‗logic of 
equivalence‘), nor simply through differential forms of inclusion (‗logic of difference‘), but 
through the simultaneous retention of those logics (Norval, 1996: 10). According to her, 
‗attempts to reduce Apartheid to either of those dimensions will, thus, fail to grasp what 
constituted one of the strongest mechanisms of its hegemonisation‘ (Norval, 1996: 10).   
 
Similarly, I find the notions ‗antagonism‘ and ‗political frontiers‘ very helpful in terms of 
seeing the operationalisation of the discourses.  What really matters here for the very aims of 
this study is that antagonisms set the rules of politics and frontiers between opposing groups. 
How do discourses do that in Turkish politics? How are the political frontiers drawn within 
the social and turned into the political by discourses on ‗Europe‘? These are the questions that 
will be explored in the forthcoming sections. 
 
Last, but not least, throughout the thesis, in order to overcome the ambiguity of the Laclau-
Mouffean theoretical framework in terms of the subjects and the so-called ‗antagonists‘ of a 
particular discourse, I will argue that an actor assumes a subject position within a discourse by 
articulating the elements of a signification chain. As I will substantiate in Chapter 6, I will 
claim that political actors are the subjects of the discourses and therefore the hegemonic 
struggle as long as they appear in the political terrain as a part of those discourses and as long 
as they aim to render the discourses of the opponents‘ subject position meaningless.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
A POSSIBLE METHODOLOGY FOR UNDERSTANDING DISCOURSES ON 
‘EUROPE’ AND POLITICAL FRONTIERS IN TURKISH POLITICS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous section, I argued that with its particular focus on the significance of discourses 
in delienating political frontiers, Laclau-Mouffean discourse analysis is helpful for 
understanding the domestic discourses and representations of ‗Europe‘. Generally speaking, 
by exploring the main insights of the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe in Chapter 3, I 
argued that it is important to understand the meanings, representations and discourses and 
how these speak to the construction of political frontiers within the social. 
 
In this section, I will outline the methodology for my endeavour to map out possible readings 
and representations of the notion of ‗Europe‘ in Turkish political debates in the aftermath of 
1999.  In this respect, firstly, I will briefly outline possible methodological options that could 
be used to understand the discourses on ‗Europe‘ in Turkish political debates. Surely, this list 
is not exhaustive as my main aim is not to map out the possible examples of poststructuralist 
methodology. I will present some possible methodological choices that exist within the 
literature that might be applied to this project. Secondly, I will move on to devising my own 
methodology. As discourse theory is a version of ‗a problem-driven‘ rather than a ‗method-‘ 
or ‗theory-driven‘ research (Howarth, 2005), the methodology outlined here is particularly 
designed to address the problem at hand: to identify discourses regarding the concept of 
‗Europe‘ as they exist within Turkish political debates and their impact on political frontiers 
as hegemony. However, it also has the broader aim of reflecting upon possible discursive 
analytical strategies in the future so that other researchers might operationalise this method in 
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tracing discourses and their performative role in sustaining hegemony and demarcating 
political frontiers. Finally, I will address  the problems that emerged within the project from 
the use of the methodology outlined here. This exercise is helpful to see the concrete and 
immediate ramifications of the problems associated with the post-structuralist methodology 
on the current project and to offer alternative future methodological research trajectories, 
which will also be mentioned in Chapter 8.    
 
The departure point of my methodology will be the claim that for any discourse to be 
hegemonic in the Turkish political setting, it has to relate itself to the privileged signifiers of 
Turkish politics, namely the signifiers of ‗democracy‘ and ‗security‘. 
 
2. DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND METHODOLOGY: CHALLENGES AND FACTS 
 
When it comes to devising the methodology for a project which has a close affinity with the 
post-structuralist reading of the discourses on ‗Europe‘ in Turkish political debates, the main 
methodological premise and perhaps the strength of the discourse theory might turn into a 
weakness: there is not a prescribed and free-standing set of rules and techniques that could be 
taken ‗off-the-shelf‘ and applied. It has been often claimed that methodological deficit is one 
of the most important deficits for discourse theory (Howarth, 2008). The best a discourse 
analyst can do, in this respect, is to acknowledge the spectrum of methodological options 
available to him/her and then to reflect upon and theorise the ways he/she conducts research 
and asks questions. These questions ‗are always understood within a wider set of ontological 
and epistemological postulates and particular problems‘ (Howarth, 2005: 317). 
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A second difficulty arises due to the ‗constructed nature of the data‘ in discourse analysis 
(Hansen and Sorensen, 2005: 98). Contrary to traditional methods of social scientific inquiry 
which stipulate that scientific findings should not be affected by the researcher, discourse 
theorists posit the constructed nature of the scientific data and argue that, ‗the steps taken are 
not neutral vis-à-vis the theoretical point of departure; but always include an element of 
construction‘ (Hansen and Sorensen, 2005: 98). This epistemological stance, which claims 
that ‗there are no extra-discursive facts, rules and method or criteria for establishing that can 
guarantee the production of true knowledge‘, in a way, leaves the whole methodological 
burden of proof solely to the researcher conducting the research (Torfing, 2005: 27). 
Moreover, dealing with one‘s own country‘s political debates is even harder as the researcher 
is then a part of those identified (or not-identified) discourses himself/herself. This might 
affect the researcher‘s selectivity in terms of the resources or the way he/she operationalises 
them. Indeed, this is a very well-known problematique of social sciences in general since 
Durkheim (1982 [1894]), where he tried to solve the problem of the social scientist bringing 
his/her social baggage to the social field, or to the field of discourses for this matter.  There is 
not an omnipotent solution to this problem, nor is it a problem as such, especially for 
discourse analysis which does not have the slightest claim for ‗scientific objectivity‘. What 
the discourse analyst offers to this problematique as a solution is to do a second-order 
observation- he/ she observes the observers. It is an observation ‗of the observing system 
itself-not in any way but precisely as an observer‘ (Andersen, 2003: 66). According to 
Luhmann, ‗to observe is to indicate something within the boundaries of a distinction‘ (quoted 
in Spencer-Brown, 1969: 1). In this respect, as long as you stick with the boundaries of your 
distinction and the straightjacket of your methodology, your observation is your reality, the 
discursive universe of the political debates that you are coming from in this case. ‗The sense 
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that we make becomes ―real‖, and, (...) these systems of meaning-production are intimately 
related to practices of power – the power to define and defend ―reality‖‘ (Shepherd, 2006: 20). 
 
3. HOW TO MAP OUT THE EURO-DISCOURSES IN TURKISH POLITICAL 
DEBATES: SOME OPTIONS 
 
In this section, I will present some of the methodological choices that are available for the 
project at hand. As mentioned above, the list of the methodologies mentioned here is not 
exhaustive, and one can always identify alternative methodologies within the literature on 
‗Europe‘. However, in line with the aims of this project, I singled out these methodologies as 
possible options and as a proper departure point for devising my own methodology. 
 
Ole Wæver‘s methodological approach, consisting of the presentation of discourses as 
composed of layers is significant in this regard. As summarised in the previous section, he 
understands the discourse as a layered structure, where different layers of the discourse is 
formed by the different forms that ‗we‘ takes (Wæver, 2005). He, then, explains the change 
and continuity in terms of discourse on European integration by the move along the layers 
(Wæver, 2005) (see Chapter 3 for a detailed review of the model). This methodology is very 
helpful in enabling an understanding of the national context and conducting a comparative 
research as the aforementioned model stipulates both a synchronic (fitting material from 
different contexts, actors and years into a structure) and a diachronic component (moving 
through time and focusing on how the structure shapes action through time) (Wæver, 1998: 
115; 2005: 40). Indeed, a synchronic analysis ‗freezes the object of analysis in time, thereby 
focusing on attention on the structure of social and political relations at a specific instant 
(Hay, 2002: 144) while the diachronic analysis ‗emphasises change over time‘ (Hay, 2002: 
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148). Therefore, Wæver‘s analysis includes both approaches as he tries to construct a 
structure and see how this structure is shaped by the actors over time.  This methodology is 
groundbreaking in that it enables an understanding of the evolution of European integration 
discourse in three settings and explains change via the move along layers through a relatively 
structuralist reading. According to Wæver, the internal link between identities attached to 
Europe and the nation-state depend crucially on the domestic articulation of a project of 
Europe with long-held concepts of state and nation on a domestic basis (Wæver, 1997; 2005). 
Therefore, if we translate this framework to the project at hand, the correlation between 
‗Europe‘ and domestic discourses depends on pre-existing concepts at the Turkish domestic 
level. Although this project requires a more thorough diachronic analysis than this model can 
offer as the period on focus is 1999-2008 and it is not interested in how actors would shape 
the structure as it would be an overly actor-based approach to ‗discourse‘, the emergence of 
some certain concepts as components of a pre-existing framework is inspiring in terms of 
contemplating about the discourses on ‗Europe‘ in Turkish political debates. 
 
On the other hand, departing from the idea that discursive spaces are governed by the 
rationalities that make the appearance of a particular action/ object possible (Diez, 1997:5) 
(see Chapter 3 for a detailed analysis), Diez presents another method for understanding the 
conditions of legitimacy of European governance. As mentioned before, by breaking down 
the concept of legitimacy into three terms (participation, output and identity), Diez mentions 
four images of the European governance in Western European politics: ‗Federal State‘, 
‗Intergovernmental Cooperation‘, ‗Economic Community‘ and ‗Network‘ (Diez, 1997; 1998). 
He presents these as ideal types and from the level of abstraction this poses; he reflects his 
own position as an ‗observer‘ (Diez, 1997; 1998). This is a very helpful method to map out 
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the possible discourses on Europe, or on European governance in that case, and sustains a link 
between the discourses and the limitations of those discourses within the discursive space in a 
succinct way, which the existing project aims at. In this respect, the project at hand can pre-
define, let‘s say, 4 possible discourses that establish the boundaries of the discursive space 
available in Turkish political debate on ‗Europe‘, such as D1 (development), D2 
(modernisation), D3 (Westernisation), D4 (stability) and test the legitimacy of these 
discourses within the Turkish political debates. 
 
This exercise is very fruitful in that it enables one to map out the particular discourses 
attached to Europe and as such it might be analytically easier to find out why these discourses 
are successful as legitimacy of the discourses would implicitly point to their success. 
Moreover, it is more than fair to present these ideal-types as the most common discourses 
attached to the notion of ‗Europe‘ in Turkish political context after a careful investigation of 
the existing literature.  However, this method of using ideal-types has the risk of tailoring the 
empirical findings retrospectively in accordance with the pre-defined ideal-types. When 
coupled with the previously mentioned concern of dealing with one‘s own political baggage 
(with Turkish case in this respect), this exacerbates the risk of observing what your ideal types 
allows you to observe. It is very hard to evade this, and whatever one stresses depends on 
one‘s own approach towards the object anyway (Diez, 1997: 8). A researcher needs to hold 
certain concepts constant in order to evade tautology. However, presenting certain main 
signifiers that would help contouring the axes of the discourses instead of ideal types might be 
a better solution. I will come to this point later. 
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In another project, focusing on the role of normative orders in sustaining the legitimacy of a 
polity (the EU in this respect), Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung this time offer the aforementioned 
ideal types to understand development of polity-ideas in France, Germany and the UK 
(Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung, 1998). By the use of the existing literature and an analytical 
scheme consisting of a hierarchy of four levels, they present a list of 180 categories/ entries on 
a legitimate political order inferred from the investigation of the existing literature. The crux 
of the project is ‗to look for these elements of legitimacy in the documents included in the 
analysis‘ (Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung, 1998: 418). Therefore, another methodological choice 
would be to use a vaster list of categories to understand the general contours of the Euro-
discourse in Turkish political debates. Through the use of an extensive list of categories, 
questions or possible concepts that might be in use with regard to ‗Europe‘, the main aim of 
the project at hand would be to find to what extent the existing discourse on ‗Europe‘ fits the 
pre-defined group of questions or categories. This has similar strengths and weaknesses that 
the previous project undertaken by Diez has as the range of possible entries has the potential 
to limit the findings that can be made, although to a less extent. Moreover, the increased 
number of the concepts now extends beyond the discursive area covered and as such it gives a 
clear idea of a particular discourse (rights, democracy, values, history etc.) (see the table at 
Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung, 1998: 417). The idea of having a list of categories/entries to 
trace the conditions of legitimacy made by Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung (1998) is inspiring in 
the sense that a researcher now has a legitimate framework to limit the discursive space. The 
use of list of questions derived from the existing literature by Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung 
(1998) is inspiring for the research design of the present thesis although the focus here is not 
on normative ideas, as is the case in the mentioned study. 
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4. THEN HOW?: SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON METHOD 
 
As mentioned above, in the empirical chapters of the thesis, I will argue that, rather than 
solely identifying the historical evolution of how the concept of ‗Europe‘ has been used in 
Turkish political scene, we should try to understand, first of all, how the various discourses on 
and representations of ‗Europe‘ emerge and, secondly, how these discourses attempted to 
hegemonise the social and speak to the construction of political frontiers in Turkish politics. 
 
As I have already outlined in the preceding section, the methodologies I have explored offer 
two broad alternative ways through which to do this: one can either single out certain pre-
determined discourses as ideal types in Turkish politics through the use of the existing 
literature or alternatively trace some already-existing concepts within the discourses that make 
any discourse on ‗Europe‘ possible in the Turkish domestic setting. 
 
Bearing these options in mind, through the use of existing literature, rather than pre-defining 
ideal types and discourse, I present two privileged concepts that I deem substantive for not 
only Turkish conceptions of ‗Europe‘, but also for Turkish politics: security and democracy. 
This analytical move is also in accordance with the aim of tracing ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ and 
political frontiers in the sense that it is these ‗privileged‘ concepts that define whether a 
discourse attempts to be hegemonic or not. Therefore, my main claim in this chapter is that 
for any discourse to articulate a hegemonic struggle  in the Turkish political setting, it has to 
relate itself to these signifiers. One should note that I do not present these concepts as 
discourses; rather these two are the ‗privileged signifiers‘ in one way or the other in the 
Turkish political debates that have been pivotal throughout the Turkish political history, as the 
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forthcoming section will show. As already mentioned in Chapter 3, inspired by Lacanian 
‗points de capiton‘, Howarth and Stavrakakis speak of the ‗nodal points‘ as privileged 
signifiers in a discourse that bind together a particular meaning or ―chain of signification‖‘ 
(Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000:8-emphasis added). As the next section will argue, use of the 
already existing literature on Turkish politics shows that meaning or representation requires 
the intervention of those two signifiers to create a signification chain within the Turkish 
political terrain. 
 
Secondly, as the next section will show, these two signifiers within Turkish politics iterate a 
mutual antagonism although they are not necessarily inherently antithetical. Therefore, even if 
this project does not claim that these two concepts are mutually exclusive, it departs from the 
claim that in Turkish politics, the signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ are articulated in 
such a way that they have always emerged as two ends of a spectrum. This point is very 
crucial for my empirical findings as in Chapter 6 where I will outline the four main discourses 
on ‗Europe‘ in Turkish politics I will not, for instance, focus on discourses which depict 
‗Europe‘ as a positive direction for Turkish security. This does not mean that there are not any 
discourses in Turkish political setting that subscribe to this representation. Rather, this line of 
discourse is out of scope of this project as this is not the way ‗security‘ is represented as a 
privileged signifier in Turkish politics, as the next section will show. 
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5.  LOCATING ‘DEMOCRACY’ AND ‘SECURITY’ IN TURKISH POLITICS AND 
ASSESSING THE LEGACIES : AN OVERVIEW 
 
5. 1. Introduction 
 
‘I am dedicating this award to my lonely and beautiful country’ 
 
Nuri Bilge Ceylan, who received the Best Director Award in the 61st
 
Cannes Film Festival 
with his film ‘Three Monkeys’ (25 May 2008) 
 
When this sentence was heard by ordinary Turkish citizens during the Cannes Film Festival, 
the reaction by that time was to shiver and to be touched, probably not by the word 
‗beautiful‘, but by the word ‗lonely‘. Yes, the Turks feel themselves lonely and resented most 
of the time. This might be the loneliness of the country, of a particular identity, of a belief or 
of a certain political tendency. More interestingly, a sociologically/politically informed eye in 
Turkish politics can read this as a security tendency to assert the geopolitical specificity of the 
country so that ‗nobody likes us‘, or as a statement showing the fragility and state-
centeredness of the Turkish politics so that ‗the Establishment does not like us‘. 
 
In Turkish politics, as mentioned above, it is usually easy to oscillate between the concepts, 
hence concepts are more ‗essentially contested‘ (Connolly, 1993). In this section, the general 
argument will be that the concepts of ‗democracy‘ and ‗security‘ are/ have been championed 
within Turkish politics. This is predominantly because Turkish politics is predominantly 
characterised by an oscillation between a ‗democracy‘ representation culminating around the 
concepts of human rights, rule of law and multiculturalism and a ‗security‘ representation 
more vigilant and attentive to outside interference to domestic matters. However many 
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different forms this oscillation may take, be it in the realm of economics, culture or education, 
these two signifiers have always been privileged within the flow of Turkish politics. As 
already mentioned in Chapter 3, inspired by Lacanian ‗points de capiton‘, Howarth and 
Stavrakakis speak of the ‗nodal points‘ as ‗privileged signifiers in a discourse that bind 
together a particular meaning or ―chain of signification‖‘ (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000:8-
emphasis added). In this respect, I will call the concepts of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ the 
privileged signifiers of Turkish politics. This is mainly because, as the research in this section 
will show, use of the already existing literature on Turkish politics that will be exemplified 
below iterates that any meaning or representation requires the intervention of those two 
signifiers to create a signification chain within the Turkish political terrain. 
 
By this way, it is easier to make sense of these signifiers‘ salience today and to see how such 
standard narratives became woven into the discourses on ‗Europe‘. Therefore, instead of 
offering an ‗objective‘ history of these concepts or claiming that the Turkish political history 
is characterised by the ‗given‘ meanings of these signifiers, I suggest that the discursive 
moves outlined here have made these signifiers privileged and have identified the discursive 
space within which ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ is constructed. In doing this, I will first sketch the 
discursive terrain on which the signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ are represented in the 
Turkish history with regard to cultural and political aspects. After identifying the general 
traits of this discursive space, I will show how this space has been challenged and changed in 
the 1990s.  
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In this section, I will outline the historical features of the discursive space within which the 
signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ have been articulated in Turkish politics 22 . This 
attempt is not exhaustive as my core aim is not to identify how these concepts evolved 
historically. Rather, I aim to highlight the standard narratives and discourses through which 
the signifiers of ‗democracy‘ and ‗security‘ emerged, and thus show that my designation of 
these concepts as privileged signifiers does not take place in a vacuum but take place within a 
discursive space.  By investigating the main features of the discursive space of Turkish 
politics with regard to these key signifiers, I aim to make a general introduction to Chapter 6 
where I will map out the discourses on ‗Europe‘ in Turkish political debates from 1999 
onwards. According to Sonnichen, discourses within a hegemonic struggle do not exist in a 
vacuum but are parasitical on a bunch of previous discourses and a discursive space 
(Sonnichen, 2008). By this token, it is important to identify the pre-existing discursive space 
with regard to the signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ in order to understand the 
discourses on ‗Europe‘ and how the privileged signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ 
intervened within the signification chain of these discourses.   
 
5. 2. The democracy-security nexus in Turkish politics 
 
Democracy and security are two concepts not only instigating endless discussions around the 
globe, but also two sine-qua-non notions of political science. Sometimes, a functioning 
democracy is seen as the prerequisite of security, as argued by well-known Democratic Peace 
Theory. Democratic peace theorists argue that democratic domestic institutions are conducive 
                                                            
22 It is important to note at this point that throughout the thesis, I will be using ‗Turkish politics‘, ‗Turkish 
political terrain‘ and ‗Turkish political debates‘ interchangibly referring both to the political debates and the 
discursive space that those debates take place within.  
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to producing and sustaining peace at the international level, which goes back to Immanuel 
Kant who explicated the foundations of liberal thinking (Panke and Risse, 2007: 89-108). 
‗There is a virtual absence of war among dyads of democratic polities‘, which would render 
the world a more secure place (Starr, 1997: 153). According to International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance: 
 
Democracy is in crisis worldwide at the very time when there needs to be a renewed 
emphasis on democratic practice as the key to the attainment of 21st century human 
security aims. Democracy matters for human security because well-designed and 
inclusive political institutions and processes are the key to both preventing violence and 
managing conflict constructively, and because respect for human rights and public 
participation are essential for meeting human development objectives (International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2006:5). 
 
 
Similarly, security and democracy are two sides of the same coin when it is democracy 
promotion and democratisation in question. When Gow talks about the European integration 
in Central Europe, he argues that, ‗the EU has played a role and will continue to play a role in 
the development of secuirty and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe‘, defining the last 
two as simultaneous impacts of the EU (Gow, 1999: 23-emphasis added). 
 
Alternatively, democracy and security might sometimes be two mutually exclusive, if not 
incompatible concepts. Schmitter warns us against the danger of national ‗insecurity‘ that a 
newly established democratic regime might bring in his article where he points to a potential 
tension between democracy and security: 
 
The advent of democracy does not guarantee national security. Depending on a 
country's size, resources, strategic location, and neighbours, it may even make the 
problem worse. Fledgling democracies can present an attractive ‗target of opportunity‘ 
to aggressors--as the case of Bosnia tragically testifies. They may also, however, be 
able to count upon greater regional and global solidarity-consider Macedonia, where 
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1,100 foreign troops are now stationed to guard its territorial integrity (Schmitter, 
1994: 70). 
 
Along those lines, notions of security and democracy invoke an inherently problematic 
relationship also at a very abstract level. Avner Yaniv, elaborating on the historical uneasy co-
existence of these two concepts in the Israeli context, argues that ‗democracy puts the 
individual human being at the centre of everything‘, signalling human dignity, privacy and 
pluralism whereas ‗security, by contrast, is a state-centred concept‘ (Yaniv, 1993: 1). 
Similarly, especially in the aftermath of 9/11, as Huysmans argues, ‗security risks liberal 
democracy through the very means by which it intends to save it‘ (Huysmans, 2004: 321). 
 
The interplay between two ‗essentially contested concepts‘ (Connolly, 1993; Diez, 1997; 
1998) becomes even more complicated in the case of Turkish politics which has numerous 
eccentricities and particular tendencies, one of which has already been exemplified in the 
introduction to this section. First of all, Turkey is a ‗second-wave‘ democracy which 
underwent a transition to democracy in the late 1940s. Thus, it has a long history of 
democracy. ‗Yet, Turkish democracy has been interrupted three times by military 
interventions; it has experienced three breakdowns and three restorations of democracy‘ 
(Özbudun, 2000: 1). Secondly, although the republic of Turkey was established in 1923 after 
the War of Independence and proclaimed a radical rupture with its predecessor, the Ottoman 
Empire, as a fully-fledged republic, it has experienced much continuity with the Empire in 
many realms
23
. Turkey also poses a striking test bed as one of the few democracies with a 
                                                            
23 Whether the Republic of Turkey poses a rupture or continuity with the Ottoman Empire has been one of the 
most controversial debates of Turkish politics. The scholars of ‗rupture‘ argue that the Turkish republic as a 
newly established state was a complete and radical rupture from the Ottoman legacy (see Ahmad, 1993; Lewis, 
1961; Tuncay, 1981) while the scholars of ‗continuity‘ argue that most of the features of the current Turkish state 
system, such as the prevalence of strong state tradition or lack of a civil society, stem from the Ottoman legacy 
(see; Zurcher, 1993; Heper, 2000; Mardin, 1973).  
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strictly laicist regime, which led to many repercussions and debates especially after the 
coming to power of Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, a party which has/had 
ideological and institutional ties with the previously banned Islamic political parties in terms 
of whether the assertion of particular tendencies, or for that matter an Islamic identity, is 
compatible with democracy. 
 
5.3. The privileged signifiers of ‘security’ and ‘democracy’ in Turkish historical 
narrative: mapping the discursive space 
 
As mentioned before, the main claim of Chapter 4 is that for a discourse to be hegemonic in 
Turkish political terrain, the privileged signifiers of Turkish politics, ‗security‘ and 
‗democracy‘, have to intervene with the signification chain they  create. However, first, it is 
necessary to identify historically the discursive space which made possible the emergence of 
these signifiers as ‗privileged‘. As Laclau and Mouffe claim,  
if a relation of hegemonic representation is to be possible, its ontological status has to 
be defined. This is the point at which, for our analysis, a notion of the social conceived 
as a discursive space – that is, making possible relations of representation strictly 
unthinkable within a physicalist or naturalistic paradigm – becomes of paramount 
importance (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: x).  
 
Therefore, it is necessary to sketch the general contours of the discursive space within which 
the signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ have been articulated in Turkish politics, which I 
will outline in the following section. It is important to note here that this attempt is not 
exhaustive as my core aim is mainly to highlight the standard narratives and discourses 
through which the signifiers of ‗democracy‘ and ‗security‘ emerged, and thus show that my 
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designation of these concepts as privileged signifiers does not take place in a vacuum but stem 
from a historically constituted discursive background. This will help us to have a better sense 
of these signifiers‘ salience today, and see how such standard narratives became woven into 
‗Europe-as-hegemony‘. Therefore, instead of offering an ‗objective‘ history of these concepts 
or claiming that the Turkish political history is characterised by the ‗given‘ meanings of these 
signifiers, I suggest that discursive moves I outline here made these signifiers privileged and 
identified the discursive space within which ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ operates. In doing this, I 
will first sketch the discursive terrain on which the signifiers of ‗democracy‘ and ‗security‘ 
are represented in the history of at cultural and political levels. Having identified the general 
traits of this discursive space, I will show how this space has been challenged and changed in 
the 1990s.  
 
5.3.1. The Cultural Level: the Militaristic Discourse in Turkish Society 
 
In this section, I will examine the militaristic discourse in Turkish society with reference to 
societal representations of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ in Turkish politics, particularly during 
the nation-building process of the 1920s. The main axis of the discursive space in this respect 
is characterised by the so-called ‗Sèvres syndrome‘24. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire  
following the First World War signalled the end of Turkish imperial history. Being a member 
of the Axis, the Ottoman Empire was forced to sign the Treaty of Sèvres, which had been 
drawn up to divide Western Anatolia and Thrace among the victors (Zürcher, 1993). ‗To that 
effect, the Treaty proposed to allocate large chunks of Ottoman territory to various European 
powers, create independent Armenian and Kurdish states, and put Istanbul and the Turkish 
                                                            
24 Although it has been first coined in Jung (2001) in its academic sense, the term ‗Sevres syndrome‘ is often 
used in Turkish domestic debates on Europe.   
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Straits under international control. The remaining territory for the Turks would be reduced to 
a small area around Ankara in central Anatolia‘ (Drorian, 2005: 257) 
 
This treaty was overruled by the Republic of Turkey after the War of Independence (1919-
1922) under the  leadership of Atatürk. However, the ‗resurrection‘ of this treaty has always 
remained a danger, a source of fear, in the subconscious  of Turkish society and constituted a 
defining element of national politics, which has a tendency to rise at a slightest incidence of 
perceived external threat, predominantly from ‗Europe‘. This, coupled with ‗the ensuing rise 
of nationalism among Christian peoples and later Muslim Arabs (..) left a negative imprint on 
the psyche of many in Turkey‘ (Bilgin, 2005: 183). Thus, the basic assumption underlying the 
Sèvres syndrome‘ is that the Europeans perceive the Turks as the illegitimate invaders and 
occupiers of the European-Christian lands and as the oppressors of the European-Christian 
peoples. Therefore, the logic of this fear suggests that ‗the Europeans have always tried to 
sweep the Turks away from the ancestral European- Christian territories and to restore those 
lands back to their rightful owners, the Armenians and the Greeks in the past and now the 
Kurds‘ (Yılmaz, 2006: 38). The syndrome plays on Turks‘ fear of losing their territorial 
integrity and reactivates what they call in Turkey the Sèvres Treaty syndrome, still valid and 
powerful after 80 years. The Europe that ‗carved up‘ the Ottoman Empire remains a malicious 
power that, in the name of the West, will continue to pursue its (undeclared) historic plan to 
weaken Turkey, once again (İnsel, 2003). Flashbacks of the dramatic collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire in the nineteenth century and the aborted Sèvres Treaty (1920) allowing the Allies to 
invade the Ottoman territories became dominant images of the national political debates and 
agenda  (Ulusoy, 2004). According to Cizre, bad memories of what the Ottoman Empire had 
gone through and the resulting vigilance to potential attempts to disintegrate the Turkish 
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Republic delineated the contours of the fear of abandonment and loss of territory within 
Turkish politics (Cizre, 2006: 9).  
 
According to Kazaz, the ‗Sèvres syndrome‘ can be explained as a form of cultural trauma 
(Kazaz, 2008: 41). Alexander suggests that, ‗cultural trauma occurs when members of a 
collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks 
upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future 
identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways‘ (Alexander, 2004:1). The main manifestation 
of this trauma has been the articulation of the notion of ‗minority‘ almost as an allergy in 
Turkish cultural terrain. During the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish intelligentsia 
came to see the concept ‗minority‘ as a weapon employed by the enemies to interfere with the 
already-weakened Empire‘s internal affairs, to ultimately disintegrate it. The roots of this 
perception goes as far back to   the Küçük Kaynarca Agreement, signed in 1774, when Russia  
became the official guarantor of the Orthodox population living in the Ottoman Empire 
(Belge, 6 November 2004).  
 
But this sense of caution and the associated rise of Turkish nationalism, gained the 
characteristic of a a state-led nationalism, especially following the independence in 1923. The 
state aimed to suppress all differences within its territory and tried to assimilate these 
differences under the rubric of ‗Turkishness‘,fitting into Charles Tilly‘s categorisations of 
state-led and state-seeking nationalisms (Tilly, 1992). Therefore, official Turkish nationalism 
of the Republic emerged as a territorial identity and the Turkish people were those who lived 
within that territory (Karal, 1981). ‗This was, in principle, different from both the Islamist and 
the ethnic/racial models of nationalism, and was much closer to the original Ottoman 
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nationalism‘ (Gülalp, 2002: 27). Within this context, the Turkish state has tended to refer to 
all of its citizens as ‗Turkish‘, which rendered the notion of a ‗minority‘ controversial 
throughout the Republican history.  
 
Against this background, the notion of ‗security‘, not surprisingly, had almost a naturalised 
connotation in the Turkish cultural terrain, which is not antithetical to ‗democracy‘. 
According to Roland Barthes, ‗in passing from history to nature, a myth acts economically; it 
abolishes the complexity of human acts, it gives them the simplicity of essences (…), it 
establishes a blissful clarity: things appear to mean something by themselves‘ (Barthes, 1972: 
143). Allison and Altınay suggest that this naturalisation in Barthes refers to the 
conceptualisation of something as cultural in order to make it seem as natural (Allison, 1994: 
81; Altınay, 2004: 25-emphasis original). Within this context, the notion of ‗security‘, and the 
military as its carrier, always had a naturalised location in the eyes of the Turkish society. As 
Demirel claims, Turkish Armed Forces is perceived as the most reliable and the most 
effective institution of Turkish politics (Demirel, 2002). Another interesting claim about the 
cultural representation of the military is that trust in civilians and support for democracy do 
not necessarily reduce military‘s popularity (Sarıgil, 2009).  Altınay claims that  the only 
widely used term that connotes a negative display of military power and antithetical to 
‗democracy‘ is darbe (‗coup d‘etat‘). This negative connotation was prevalent especially 
during the post-coup periods, especially after 27 May 1960, 12 March 1971 and 12 September 
1980 (Altınay, 2004: 2).  
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5.3.2. The Political Level: Strong State Discourse in a Historical Perspective 
 
 
In order to understand how the notions of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ have been articulated at 
the political level in Turkish politics, it is necessary to identify main manifestations of the 
strong state discourse, and the general conceptualisation of the ‗state‘ in retrospect. 
Mahçupyan indicates that peculiarity of the Turkish state comes from the mitigation of an 
imperial social heritage with Western political and administrative mechanisms (Mahçupyan, 
1996: 133). This social heritage consists of patriarchal and religious themes which are shared 
by the state and the society (Mahçupyan, 1996: 29). However, the state is always seen at the 
top of all hierarchies, out of reach for the society, almost remiscient of the Platonic ideal of 
the state (for a discussion on the resemblance between the Ottoman state structure and the 
Platonic state see Mardin, 1985; Köker, 1992). Plato claims that real knowledge lies in the 
world of ideas and only the chosen ones, possessing natural skills and wisdom, can achieve 
such knowledge. Therefore, Plato‘s projection of the ideal state proposes a social stratification 
based on meritocracy: Philosopher King and Guardians, Military/Auxiliary Class and 
Producer/Worker Class. This categorisation applies to the Ottoman case, the Sultan 
corresponding to the philosopher king, who relies on a strong military class. The Sultan, his 
entourage, and the military class were always segregated from the rest of the society 
(Saybaşılı, 1992: 122).  
 
This focus on the segregation of the state from the rest of the society has been designated as 
the ‗centre-periphery cleavage‘ by Şerif Mardin as the main antagonism shaping the state-
society relations starting from the Ottoman times, which is mainly defined along cultural lines 
(Mardin, 1973)  ‗Those who belonged to the ruling institutions - a collective term denoting 
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the Palace, the civilian bureaucracy and the military - differed from the rest of the population 
in their cultural orientation‘ (Heper, 2000: 66).  The centre-periphery antagonism has retained 
its significance during the Republican era. According to Keyder, ‗the state [in the Republican 
era] is a concept with an unequivocal referent in the Turkish context. In its eyes, the nation is 
an organic totality whose true interest can be known and fostered only by the Kemalist elite‘ 
(Keyder, 2004: 65). Similarly, according to Çarkoğlu, the centre, which is organised around 
secular principles of Kemalism, adopting a centralist, nationalist and state protectionist 
attitude, was confronted by a heterogeneous, sometimes hostile periphery, composed mainly 
of the peasantry, small farmers and artisans with parochial orientations (Çarkoğlu, 1998: 555). 
However, ‗the centre‘ is not a monolithic entity in this picture. There is a crude distinction 
between the state elite and the political elite in Turkish politics, where, ‗the state elite still 
does not trust the political elite‘ and therefore the latter should be kept under surveillance by 
the army
25
 (Heper, 2000: 77). Similarly, for Yıldız, the state power in Turkey renders the 
military bureaucracy the genuine protector of the Republic, bygiving it an autonomous and 
unaccountable place within state and thereby rendering the army ‗an auditing and executive 
body‘ (Yıldız, 2006: 12). 
 
Therefore, the strong state discourse materialised in the Turkish context refers to a state which 
has assumed the capacity of acting almost completely independent from civil society. In that 
regard  the state, rather than the government, has constituted ‗the primary context of politics‘ 
(Keyman and Koyuncu, 2005; Heper, 1985; Kramer, 2000).   
 
                                                            
25 State elite in this respect is the appointed high-rank civil servants and bureaucrats whereas political elite are 
the elected representatives of the political parties. For Heper, added to it was also the ‗clash between ―state 
logic‖ and ―political logic‖ that is the confrontation between those who emphasized Republican values and those 
who stressed ―national will‖‘ (Heper, 2000: 71).  
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5.4. Recent changes and challenges of ‘security’ and ‘democracy’ in Turkey: re-ordering 
of the discursive space 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, starting from the 1990s, Turkish politics faced 
numerous challenges, not least in terms of the re-articulation of the signifiers of ‗security‘ and 
‗democracy‘. The processes of globalisation, EU integration and relative normalisation of the 
Turkish democracy in the aftermath of the coup of 1980 created a pressure for the relocation 
of those signifiers in the Turkish politics. The confinement of democratisation to the 
economic realm, especially in the 1980s, has increasingly been replaced with the emergence 
of democratisation attempts within the political sphere in the 1990s. The proliferation of 
multiple identities, the empowerment of extra-state actors and the burgeoning of a civil 
society in the late 1980s and 1990s has been the earliest, and most noticeable, implications of 
this re-articulation.Rumford explains this transformation with reference to the broader context 
of cosmopolitan democratisation which brings the anchoring of citizenship, rights and 
freedoms beyond the nation-state, and makes it easy for individuals and groups to move onto 
an international terrain and to connect with rights, freedoms and institutional remedies which 
are denied them at home (Rumford, 2003: 388).  
 
All in all, these transformatory processes mentioned above meant the re-ordering of the 
discursive space in Turkish politics. One important variant of this re-ordering has been the so-
called ‗politics of resentment‘ in the political realm, which is characterised by the tension 
between secularism and Islamism (Atasoy, 2007). According to Arat-Koç, the articulation of a 
‗cosmopolitan‘ discourse by the Islamists on the compatibility of Islam and neoliberal 
capitalism, especially from the 1990s onwards, has been effective in providing the material, 
social and ideological basis for a cross-class alliance between the newly emerging Muslim 
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bourgeoisie and the urban poor (Arat-Koç, 2009: 209). The emergence of an Islamist RP 
(Refah Partisi-Welfare Party) in the 1995 parliamentary elections as a coalition partner with 
DYP (Doğruyol Partisi-True Path Party) coincided with this ‗new alliance‘. Unexpectedly, 
this new alliance and the normalisation on the part of the Islamists created tension at the state 
level. National Security Council meeting on 28 February 1997, which forced RP to withdraw 
from power due to its anti-secular activities - also known as a ‗postmodern coup‘ in Turkish 
public opinion - and the closure of the FP (Fazilet Partisi- Virtue Party) - the ideological 
successor of the RP - by the Constitutional Court in 2001 on the same grounds could be read 
as a result of this tension (Aydın and Çakır, 2007; Gülalp, 2003).  
 
The landmark electoral victory of the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- Justice and 
Development Party), recruiting its ruling cadre mainly from the previous Islamist parties, in 
the 3 November 2002 elections has been interpreted by many commentators as the Islamists‘ 
move to reconcile with ‗the regime‘ (Aydın and Çakır, 2007; Somer, 2004; Güneş-Ayata, 
2003). This accommodation was translated into the AKP‘s mainstream and pro-Western 
discourse, which made it a ‗conservative democratic‘ political party in the party leader, 
Tayyip Erdoğan‘s words (Akdoğan, 2004). The second electoral victory of the AKP in the 22 
July 2007 elections, with 47% of the votes, pointed to the pinnacle of the aforementioned 
challenges to historical structure of the Turkish state and society, which had started in the 
1990s (Sarıbay, 30 July 2007). 
 
This also meant re-definition of, and turning point in, the famous ‗centre-periphery cleavage‘ 
in Turkish politics as the AKP emerged as the representative of ‗periphery‘. Urban and 
secular elites, a product of a Republican Westernisation understanding, have increasingly 
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been replaced by more conservative elite with a less strict conception of ‗secularism‘. In this 
respect, new concepts and subject positions have been included within the security and 
democracy agendas. Starting from 2002, the so-called, ‗cultural war between secularism and 
Islam‘, which started in the 1990s, has become even more visible and substantial due to the 
new owners of power (Aydın, 2007). 
 
The proliferation of also introduced the so-called ‗the Kurdish issue‘ to the political agenda as 
one of the key components of the debates around the notions of security and democracy, 
especially from the 1980s onwards. The notion of the ‗Kurdish issue‘, which is extensively 
used in Turkish politics, has a set of connotations most of which are about the identity 
demands of the Kurdish citizens.  The representation of Kurdishness as a particular identity, 
and the disputes on whether or not its assertion would further democracy in Turkey, and the 
fears that it would be detrimental in that it would encourage and aggravate PKK terrorism, 
thereby rendering Turkey more susceptible to disintegration, have delineated the contours of 
the relevant debates. We will take up those issues in detail in the forthcoming chapters. Yet, 
here, I will elaborate a little further on this point, to provide a background to our further 
discussion on the recent debates on democracy and security.   
 
Although the pro-Kurdish activists managed to have official access to the parliament in the 
past, mainly as the MPs from different parties, it was not until 1990 when the first political 
party with a pro-Kurdish agenda, the HEP (Halkin Emek Partisi-People‘s Labour Party), was 
established. In the 1991 elections, the HEP joined forces with SHP and was able to secure a 
few parliamentary seats. Yet, the HEP was soon banned from politics on grounds of 
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‘separatism‘, ie, threatening the unity of the nation-state. This resulted inthe establishment of 
yet another political party with a pro-Kurdish agenda on 19 October 1992, the ÖZDEP 
(Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi-Freedom and Democracy Party) (Koğacıoğlu, 2003: 259). 
Within 3 months, the public prosecutor began procedures to close this new party, the pretext 
being ‗it called for a federalist solution to the Kurdish problem and it was formally banned 
from politics on 14 July 1993 by the Constitutional Court‘ (Yavuz, 2003: 76). As with their 
predecessors, the subsequent pro-Kurdish political parties, the DEP (Demokrasi Partisi-
Democracy Party) and the HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi-People's Democracy Party) 
sought a political solution to the Kurdish issue. The HADEP was followed by the DEHAP 
(Demokratik Halk Partisi-Democratic People‘s Party) established in 1997, and the DTP 
(Demokratik Toplum Partisi- Democratic Society Party) established in November 2005, all 
closed down by the Constitutional Court on the grounds of their alleged separatist activities.  
 
Another important variant of the Kurdish issue in general and its representation within the 
political scene has been the PKK. As will be scrutinised thoroughly in the forthcoming 
chapters, the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan-Kurdistan Labour Party) was involved in 
terrorist activities in the Southeastern Turkey, from August 1984 until 2001, when intense 
armed struggle lost its momentum, at least for a while. These activities led to the death of 
30,000 people. The PKK has always been at the centre of the debates on the Kurdish issue, as 
all political parties and figures with a pro-Kurdish agenda, by default, were charged with 
sympathising the PKK (which was sometimes the case). As a result, the general expectation 
from pro-Kurdish parties was to openly declare that they did not support or approve the 
activities of the PKK. 
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All in all, as Houston argues, in the recent period, which has been mainly characterised by the 
proliferation of new identities, we can identify at least three competing narratives which 
would point to the re-ordering of the discursive space within which ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ 
would be articulated: ‗Turkish Republican, Kurdish and Islamist‘ (Houston, 1999: 88). 
Debates about these three narratives have been the most significant political issues regarding 
the privileged signifiers of ‗democracy‘ and ‗security‘ starting from the 1990s. Nevertheless, 
the question for the present thesis is how these new conceptions and signifiers relate 
themselves to the notion of ‗Europe‘. The next section will seek answers to these questions. 
 
6. OPERATIONALISING ‘DEMOCRACY’, ‘SECURITY’ AND ‘EUROPE’: HOW DO 
THE PRIVILEGED SIGNIFIERS TRANSLATE INTO REAL DISCOURSES? 
 
Having made clear that I will use the two privileged concepts of Turkish politics to trace the 
discourses on ‗Europe‘ within Turkish politics, in this section, I will elaborate my 
methodology on the operationalisation of the two ends of the above mentioned spectrum. 
How can we trace the process whereby the discourses on ‗Europe‘ get constellated around the 
security vs. democracy spectrum? In order to do this, through the use of existing literature, I 
will devise a set of questions to understand how different representations of ‗Europe‘ speak to 
these two privileged signifiers and how they come to be salient and resonant within the 
Turkish political terrain. In this section, my general argument is that Turkish politics is highly 
characterised by an infinite articulation and interplay of these signifiers. If we want to 
understand how a hegemonic struggle operates  and political frontiers are drawn by particular 
discourses, we need to see how these discourses are constructed in relation to those signifiers. 
That is, for any discourse to be hegemonic and able to draw the political frontiers, it has to 
relate itself to the privileged signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘, one way or other.  In 
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this section, in order to trace the discourses on ‗Europe‘, I will devise a list of questions 
referring to the significance and historical discursive space  of the signifiers of ‗security‘ and 
‗democracy‘. . 
 
With regard to the historical significance of the concept of ‗security‘ in Turkish political 
setting, the following questions are of primary importance: 
 
 Is ‗Europe‘ itself put forward as a threat to the state and its role in domestic security? 
 Are there any constitutional and legal arrangements considered to be controversial to 
the security of the state during the EU accession process? 
 Is ‗Europe‘ considered controversial to the red lines of the Turkish foreign policy? 
 Is ‗Europe‘ put forward as a ‗threat‘ to the Turkish society? 
 
On the other hand, with regard to the historical background of the concept of ‗democracy‘ in 
the Turkish political setting, the following questions are of importance: 
 
 Does ‗Europe‘ create any changes in terms of the Turkish state‘s role in 
democratisation? 
 Are there any constitutional and legal arrangements considered to contribute to the 
democratisation of the state during the EU accession process? 
 Does ‗Europe‘ create any changes in terms of the Turkish state‘s role in democracy? 
 Is ‗Europe‘ deemed to be fostering certain particular identities? 
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By using the questions listed above, I will trace the discourses on ‗Europe‘ at the newspapers 
of Radikal, Zaman and Cumhuriyet in the 1999-2008 period. As I mentioned in Chapter 3, in 
order to overcome the unclarity of Laclau-Mouffean theoretical framework in terms of 
relating subjects to discourses, I will argue that an actor assumes a subject position within a 
discourse by articulating the elements of a signification chain. Therefore, I will identify 
discourses by constructing the signification chains they articulate. The questions listed in the 
above section will help me do that. But, what makes those newspapers and dates so 
significant that they contour the content of this project? The following sections will answer to 
these questions. But, before that, in the following section, I will show my methodology to 
locate these discourses within ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘.  
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7. HOW TO IDENTIFY ‘EUROPE-AS-HEGEMONY’? OPERATIONALISING THE 
LOGICS OF EQUIVALENCE AND DIFFERENCE 
 
In the above section, I showed how I will trace the discourses on ‗Europe‘ by using the list of 
questions. However, it is equally important to locate these discourses within ‗Europe-as-
hegemony‘ and to identify how these discourses became a part of the hegemonic struggle. As 
Chapter 7 will show, I claim that ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ operated through the logics of 
equivalence and difference and attempted to hegemonise the social in different ways from 
1999 to 2005. But, how is it possible to show these attempts within the sources? For this aim, 
I will use the keywords associated with the logics in Chapter 3. As I argued in Chapter 3, the 
Laclau-Mouffean theoretical framework entails that there are two different strategies of 
hegemony, namely the logics of equivalence and difference (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; 
Norval, 1990; 1994; 1996; Howarth, 2000). In logic of difference, the differences are 
marginalised between the constitutive components of the discourses through signifying non-
adversarial and positive differences of different demands or camps. Difference is the logic 
behind political movements which seeks to heal the social space, giving room to all social 
demands, treating them ‗differently‘, next to each other, without collapsing them into an 
equivalential chain (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 129). This logic also depoliticises areas of 
potential conflict by contructing differential, non-antagonistic identities an there are cases 
where this depoliticisation is realised through technocratism (e.g. the strategy of NP in the late 
1970s). Therefore, key to understanding a logic of difference is the particularisation of the 
subjects, emphasis on the concept of ‗identity‘ and the weakening of the antagonistic frontier 
between identities (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 11). In this respect, the key concepts for 
understanding a logic of difference are ‗identity‘, ‗harmony‘ and ‗commonness‘. On the other 
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hand,  the logic of equivalence is characterised by the depiction of the Other as a ‗threat‘ and 
the dichotomisation of social space (Norval, 1994: 121; Howarth, 2000: 107). What we see 
here is the universalisation of subjects (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 11). In this respect, 
the key concepts for logic of equivalence are ‗unity‘, ‗solidarity‘ and ‗threat‘. 
 
In the below table, I bring together the theoretical definitions of the notions I will 
operationalise in Chapters 6 and 7 and the methods I will use to trace them within the 
newspapers and parliamentary debates:  
 
 
          Concept  Definition Identification Criteria 
          
 
 
 
 
     Signifying chain 
A group of signifiers linked in 
some culturally determined 
manner, where the meaning of 
one signifier is established by 
reference to another. These 
chains establish a logical 
connection in which signifiers 
form combinations which make 
sense only by reference to the 
remainder of the ideological 
chain. 
Identification through regular 
and recurrent themes that 
appeared in  the newspaper 
staments. All articles have 
been read and on a year-to-
year basis, main keywords 
(limited to 3 for each 
discourse) repeatedly and 
recurrently attached to 
‗Europe‘ have been chosen 
as the elements of the chain 
 
 
 
Privileged signifier 
 
 
A particular signifier that has 
primacy in the organisation of a 
signification chain 
Identification through the use 
of the already existing 
literature on Turkish politics, 
which showed that for any 
signifier to be hegemonic 
within the Turkish political 
terrain, requires the 
intervention of the signifiers 
of ‗democracy‘ and 
‗security‘.  
 
 
   Logic of equivalence 
 
A hegemonic strategy which is 
characterised by the depiction of 
the Other as a ‗threat‘ and the 
dichotomisation of social space.   
Universalisation of identities is 
essential.  
 Selecting statements both 
from newspapers and 
parliamentary debates, which 
treat ‗Europe‘ as an umbrella 
concept and which would 
cancel the differences against 
a ‗threat‘ or an ‗enemy‘. The 
keywords to be sought are 
‘unity’, ‘solidarity’ and 
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‘threat’. 
 
 
  Logic of difference 
 
A hegemonic strategy in which 
the differences are marginalised 
between the constitutive 
components of the discourses 
through signifying non-
adversarial and positive 
differences of different demands 
or camps. Particularisation of 
identities is essential.  
Selecting statements both 
from newspapers and 
parliamentary debates, which 
would expand the limits of 
politics and render the 
differences between 
identities intact.   The 
keywords to be sought are 
‗identity‘, ‘harmony’ and 
‗commonness’ (not with 
reference to an ‗enemy‘)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: The analytical framework for identifying discourses on ‗Europe‘ and ‗Europe-as-
hegemony‘ in Turkish politics after 1999 
 
 
8. THE EXTENT OF THE STUDY 
 
The time-span of the research is the period from 1999 onwards. Although Turkey has a very 
long history interwoven with the concept of ‗Europe‘, the Helsinki European Council in 
December 1999 signifies the official acceptance of Turkey as a membership candidate and is 
therefore outstanding in this regard. After this date, the penetration of the notion of ‗Europe‘ 
into domestic debates accelerated both in conceptual and political terms. The concept became 
extensively used as the age-old depiction of ‗Europe‘ as a civilizational (albeit rather abstract) 
signifier acquired a much more concrete and tangible reference. Secondly, the fact that the EU 
candidacy required distinct political arrangements and relatively concrete political 
adjustments, such as the obligation to resolve the border problems with its neighbouring 
countries in accordance with the United Nations Charter, or to bring the disputes to the 
International Court of Justice (Uğur, 2003: 166) had a substantial impact on the Turkish 
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political fabric and how and with what references the debates are conducted. As the Euro-
debate in Turkish politics is an ongoing process, however, it is hard to sketch the end point 
within the time continuum. Nevertheless, at this point, I will end the project‘s time continuum 
with the case to close down the ruling party AKP (Justice and Development Party) brought 
before Constitutional Court in March 2008, as this case of outmost significance for security-
democracy debates and domestic discourses. 
9. SELECTION OF RESOURCES 
 
Like any kind of analysis, discourse analysis needs to start from somewhere and also like any 
kind of academic endeavour; one has to be selective in terms of this starting point. 
‗―Covering‖ a national discursive space is in principle impossible: one cannot read everything 
which has been written -or stated- within a debate as broad as the national debates on Europe‘ 
(Hansen and Wæver, 2002: 42). In this project, therefore, in order to investigate the political 
space of Turkey regarding the domestic debates which occurred (and are occurring) and to 
trace the debates on ‗Europe‘ and to see how these sustain hegemony, I will mainly be 
looking at daily newspapers. I will focus predominantly on daily newspapers through the 
method of ‗extensive reading‘ (Hansen and Sorensen, 2005). I will also refer to some 
particular parliamentary debates to support the research on ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘. 
Newspaper articles are very helpful in identifying discourses on ‗Europe‘ and in 
understanding the hegemonic strategies of logics of equivalence and difference within 
‗Europe-as-hegemony‘. They also ‗represent many of the discourses found in other media 
such as radio and television‘ (van Bommel and Spicer, 2008: 11). However, as it is 
empirically very hard to show ‗hegemony‘, I deem it important to support with further 
research the identification of these logics. For this aim, I will pick up exemplary 
parliamentary debates within the 1999-2008 timeline in order to understand the 
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operationalisation of these logics. As Chapter 5 will elaborate on, the debates on the notion of 
‗reform‘ were one of the most significant variants of the discourses culminating around 
‗Europe‘. Therefore, I will refer to the parliamentary debates on ‗reform‘ between 1999 and 
2008, which are available at the ‗Library, Documentation and Translation Directorate of the 
Grand National Assembly of Turkey‘, a centre within the Turkish Parliament, which 
‗provides the MPs with information they require whilst performing their legislation duty and 
collects and documents the debates taking place within the Parliament‘ (the Grand National 
Assembly of Turkey Website, 2010). However, it is important to note that the current research 
primarily rests on the newspapers.  
 
Although the post-structuralist approach makes a substantial association between discourse 
and texts, which not only refer to a written utterance of discourse but also to other discursive 
practices such as movies, videos, maps and architecture (Wæver, 1996, Neumann, 1998), I 
limit my research mainly to newspapers as I deem them to be an important source determining 
the pace of the debates within the political realm. In this respect, I will prioritise texts, 
utterances and articles about/by well-known public figures, such as prominent academics and 
journalists, as well as high-level state officials such as members of the Parliament (MP) and 
government ministers rather than pursuing ‗what ordinary people think about Europe‘ 
(Hansen and Wæver, 2002). This does not necessarily mean that I will not refer to public 
opinion whatsoever. However, the main focus of the research will be on ‗dominant elite 
representational practices that establish the rules from which policies are derived‘ (Kuus, 
2002: 400). In this respect, I suppose a hierarchical relationship to exist within the political 
debates, whereby elites and top political figures determine the ‗rules of the game‘ that are 
received by the public. This is also in accord with my substantive interest in how the 
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discourses sustain ‗hegemony‘ and demarcate political frontiers. As Chapter 3 has shown, the 
success of a hegemonic project depends on the ability of a discourse or particular project to 
present itself as universal and to assert antagonisms within the political, which points to the 
power dimension of hegemony. Along these lines, it would not be unfair to claim when a 
particular discourse is hegemonic; its direction is from top to down, from elites to ‗the 
people‘. 
 
What if an utterance is made which has been mentioned in a T.V. programme or in a 
newspaper beyond the scope of my research? What if it is significant enough to challenge my 
previous findings or the patterns I had devised? In this case, I can happily take shelter in the 
political theory‘s ‗innocent unless proven‘ principle and share the same provision with 
Hansen and Wæver (2002) which they refer to as ‗the opposite burden of evidence‘ which 
goes as follows: ‗I claim that on the basis of my reading of the debate in country X, the 
discursive structure looks like this. If you show me a text I have not included, it should be 
possible for me to read this text through the structure I have constructed. If not, my reading of 
the debate needs to be revised‘ (Hansen and Wæver, 2002: 42). 
 
In line with the general attempt to reflect upon the political debates on ‗Europe‘ within the 
Turkish political scene, I will trace the discourses on ‗Europe‘ at three Turkish daily 
newspapers: Radikal, Cumhuriyet and Zaman. These particular newspapers are chosen in an 
attempt to select various examples from different extents of the political spectrum. Radikal 
(‗Radical‘) is generally considered as a left-wing (social democratic and libertarian) 
newspaper. However, when compared to Cumhuriyet (‗Republic‘), which is one of the oldest 
Turkish daily newspapers and usually known for its left-leaning patriotic tendency, Radikal is 
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considered by many to be much moderate, open-minded, and tolerant. Cumhuriyet in this 
regard is less mainstream and less circulated, but noteworthy enough to reflect an implicit 
Euro-sceptic and stable tone within the political debates. Zaman (‗time‘ or ‗era‘) is a major 
Turkish daily newspaper which used to be known for its conservative stance and religious 
affiliation. Having been established under the auspices of Fetullah Gülen26 in 1986, Zaman 
has experienced a huge editorial change in the early 2000s and became a liberal tabloid where 
many prominent Turkish intellectuals and academicians currently write contributions. 
 
 
 
10. POST-RESEARCH REMARKS: LIMITATIONS OF THE METHODOLOGY  
 
In this research, by using the research design I outlined above, I collected 218 newspaper 
statements (see Annex 1 for the whole list of statements) and 54 documents entailing 
parliamentary debates on ‗reform‘ (see Annex 2 for the whole list of debates). It is an 
important finding that while the newspaper articles were very helpful in terms of identifying 
discourses on ‗Europe‘ and ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘, the parliamentary debates drew on the 
technical aspects of the EU reforms and hence did not display any hint of the hegemonic 
logics I outlined in Chapter 3. I also encountered problems due to the use of the post-
structuralist methodology, which I will outline below. This attempt is helpful to see the 
immediate effects of the problems associated with the post-structuralist methodology on the 
current project and to reflect on possible future research venues that would aim to resolve 
these problems. Chapter 8 will also focus on these possible future research trajectories.     
 
 
                                                            
26 The leader of a particular religious sect, who is charged by Turkish secularist circles to aim to destroy the 
integrity of secular Turkish Republic and to bring the Sheria rule to Turkey.    
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10.1. Discourse-agency problem  
 
As I have already elaborated in Chapter 3, the post-structuralist theoretical framework I am 
employing here is highly inspired by the work of Laclau and Mouffe, which rejects the 
intentionality of the political actors and the agency of the discourses. That is, theoretically 
speaking, there is not a causal, deterministic and one-way relationship between discourses and 
actors and thus actors do not intentionally and strategically employ discourses. On the 
contrary, ‗discursive practices themselves construct the subjects and relations among them‘ 
(Seng, 2001: 10).   
 
However, the discourses also have a performative aspect, which this thesis is primarily 
interested in, and, apart from producing a terrain where political actors locate themselves, 
they produce and lead to practices (such as hegemony and political frontiers that this project 
attempts to address). Although Laclau and Mouffe‘s work is theoretically seminal in going 
beyond traditional notions of structure and agency, the latter has been pointed out as one of 
the most significant methodological shortcomings of their framework, as Chapter 8 will claim 
in detail (see Jensen, 2005; Howarth, 2000; Wæver, 2005 for a critique of Laclau- Mouffean 
structure-agency conception). Indeed, when it comes to devising a methodology, a researcher 
eventually has to deal with tangible, real actors in order to do this. ‗The discourses do not 
present themselves as such; what we observe are people and their productions‘  (Sang, 2001: 
11).  That is, however much you as a researcher refrain from sustaining a deterministic 
relationship between agents and discourses, when it comes to analysing discourses, you 
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cannot escape from identifying the actors who are in part perpetuating those discourses. But 
this is not the same as attributing intentionality to their actions. In order to overcome the 
ambiguity of the Laclau-Mouffean theoretical framework in linking actors to discourses, I 
argued in Chapter 3 that an actor assumes a subject position within a discourse by articulating 
the elements of a signification chain and that the political actors are the subjects of the 
discourses and therefore of the hegemonic struggle as long as they appear in the political 
terrain as a part of those discourses and as long as they aim to render the discourses of the 
opponents‘ subject position meaningless. However, the Laclau-Mouffean theoretical 
framework‘s tendency to avoid real actors and the problem of identifying the link between 
subjects and discourses without providing the former with intentionality are the most 
significant methodological deficits of the discourse theory, which I also had to venture within 
the project.         
 
10.2.The impact of the sources used 
 
As mentioned above, the current attempt aims to trace the elite discourses in three daily 
newpapers. No doubt, the elite discourses sourced from elsewhere (e.g. party programmes, 
election manifestos etc.) would give a different depiction of the discourses and ‗Europe-as-
hegemony‘. However, the methodological framework suggested here does not take into 
account whether the elite discourses or ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ would be different if extracted 
from somewhere else. Because, this is the reality I am dealing with. As mentioned before, the 
post-structuralist methodology does not question whether the actors (the elites for this matter) 
are deliberately and strategically manipulating the discourses which would pose a causal and 
one-way relationship between the agents and discourses. On the contrary, as the post-
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structuralist methodological framework suggests, which the current attempt also resorts to, the 
elites as actors do not have a substantive role on constructing the discourses but vice versa: 
the discourses construct the subject positions of the actors. 
 
This stands in stark contrast with the methodological insights of Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA). As mentioned above, CDA subscribes to the idea that the media are a biased tool 
which construct/reconstruct and legitimise the discourses of the elites. That is, according to 
this framework, the elite strategically use media to further their privileges, providing a direct 
link between the sources of the discourses and their construction. According to Van Dijk:  
 
The news media do not passively describe or record news events in the world, but 
actively (re-)construct them, mostly on the basis of many types of source discourses. 
Corporate interests, news values, institutional routines, professional ideologies and 
news schema formats play an important role in this transformation (...) These 
properties of news processing tend to lead to a reproduction and legitimation of the 
ideology of the political, socio-economic and cultural elites (Hall et al. 1980; Mueller 
1973)  (van Dijk, 1989: 203).   
 
In this respect, for CDA, the sources within which the elite discourses are represented are 
substantial for the identification of the discourses. . On the other hand, this does not have a 
substantial role for designing the methodology of this project.  
 
10.3. Analytical limits of the discourses  
 
As mentioned before, this project aims to trace ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ by tracing the 
discourses on the notion of ‗Europe‘ in the 1999-2008 period as, the claim goes, the 
discourses have a performative role in demarcating the political frontiers. Discourses draw the 
limits of the politics. But, what about the limits of the discourses themselves? How are we 
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going to limit the discourses? The methodology scrutinised above gives a clear picture or 
what to include within the boundaries of the discourses, but where to stop? Do I need to 
include each and every statement that fits to the above methodological chart?   
 
In this respect, I designated the end point of the research when discourses started repeating 
themselves. As Chapter 6 will show, I focused on the signification chains that the four 
discourses tended to construct and I included only some of the elements articulated within the 
discourses. The frequency, repetition and resonance of the elements articulated within the 
chains of equivalences has been the  litmus paper to set the limits of the current research.    
  
10.4. Lost in translation? Working with two languages   
 
As I traced the discourse in three Turkish daily newspapers, all of the source material I used 
was not surprisingly in Turkish, which brings the language and bilinguality issues to the 
forefront. I analysed the discourses in Turkish and later translated the statements I picked up 
to include here into English. But, does this pose a problem for the research?  
 
For Derrida, translation involves a degree of transformation a regulated transformation of one 
language by another, of one text by another. ‗We will never have, and in fact have never had, 
to do with some ―transport‖ of pure signifieds from one language to another, or within one 
and the same language, that the signifying instrument would leave virgin and untouched‘ 
(Derrida, 1981: 4, quoted and translated by Bolanos Cuellar, 2008: 331).  Therefore, 
according to this perspective, the translation is not a scientifically-approached, holistic and 
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comprehensive subject matter, but involves the slipperiness and contingency of the meaning 
in different languages.  
 
However, translation from Turkish to English did not have a direct impact on my analysis (as 
I already did my analysis in  Turkish) and was only an inter-lingual issue. However, the 
problem of bilinguality is clearly a crucial point to keep in mind for  discourse theory 
researchers who work with discourses.      
 
10.5. Background information problem  
 
The current thesis interested in how the discourses on ‗Europe‘ hegemonise the political in 
Turkish politics in the 1999-2008 period obviously has the Turkish discourses on ‗Europe‘ in 
the specified period as a case study. As Hansen argues, working with a case study that 
stretches over a longer period of time walks hand-in-hand with identifying a timeline of the 
events (Hansen, 2006: 115-6). Moreover, it is compulsory to familiarise the readers to the 
Turkish political context to put the analysis into its proper context, which is the main aim 
behind the design of the background section in Chapter 5. However, then, the analysis here 
which claims to map out a clear rejection of the so-called conventional approaches and of a 
causality between events and discourses is potentially undermined by the need to give the 
clear picture of ‗the ground‘ as it is. As Norval rightly argues, even such a radical and 
unconventional construction of political frontiers takes place within a context and an already 
instituted horizon of meaning from which it must distance itself or in relation to which it must 
situate itself (Norval, 1996: 54).  
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11. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter, departing from the general claim that in order to sustain hegemony in the 
Turkish landscape, any discourse has to relate itself to the privileged signifiers of ‗democracy‘ 
and ‗security‘, I devised a methodology for my endeavour to trace the discourses on ‗Europe‘ 
and to understand how they hegemonise the social and demarcate political frontiers. 
 
For this aim, I firstly explored possible methodological options that could be used to 
understand the discourses on ‗Europe‘. By doing this, I aimed to see how the so-called 
‗methodological deficit‘ of poststructuralist discourse theory has been overcome by various 
studies on ‗Europe‘ (Howarth, 2008). I particularly focused on the methodologies used by 
Wæver, Diez and finally Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung (Wæver, 1997, 2005; Diez, 1997, 1998; 
Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung, 1998). I was mainly inspired by the designation of the discourse 
a layered structure by Wæver, where different layers of the discourse are formed by different 
identity forms and the discourse on European integration by the move along the layers 
(Wæver, 2005). On the other hand, by coining four images of the European governance in 
Western European politics as ideal types, Diez sustains a link between the discourses and their 
limitations by using these ideal types, which was helpful for my research design (Diez, 1997; 
1998). This has later been elaborated by another study by Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung who 
present a list of 180 categories/ entries on a legitimate political order inferred from the 
investigation of the existing literature by using the above ideal types (Jachtenfuchs, Diez and 
Jung, 1998). Although Wæver‘s main aim of constructing a structure and seeing how this 
structure is shaped by the actors over time is too actor-centred for the very aims of this project 
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and Jachtenfuchs, Diez and Jung‘s ideal types would limit the findings, both endeavours were 
very helpful in designing my analytical framework. 
 
Subsequently, I sketched the general features of the discursive space within which the 
signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ have been articulated in Turkish politics. By doing 
this, I aimed to identify the standard narratives and discourses through which the signifiers of 
‗democracy‘ and ‗security‘ emerged, and thus to show that my designation of these concepts 
as privileged signifiers does not take place in a vacuum. This is also helpful to see within 
what discursive space the discourses on ‗Europe‘ and ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ in Turkish 
politics emerge.    
 
I then presented my own research design. By focusing on the 1999-2008 period, I devised a 
list of questions mainly framed by the existing literature and I used this list to trace the 
discourses on ‗Europe‘ and ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ within  the newspapers of Radikal, Zaman 
and Cumhuriyet and particular parliamentary debates on the EU reforms. and I claimed that 
the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 which signifies the official acceptance of 
Turkey as an EU candidate is utterly outstanding for the further penetration of ‗Europe‘ into 
domestic debates. Although it was hard to sketch the end point within the time continuum as 
this penetration is still an ongoing, I ended the project‘s time continuum by the case to close 
down the ruling party AKP (Justice and Development Party) brought before Constitutional 
Court in March 2008.  
 
Finally, I presented some concluding remarks on the methodology of the research. In this 
respect, I addressed some of the problems faced during the project that stemmed from the 
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application of the post-structuralist methodology. This attempt is helpful not only to see the 
immediate effects of the problems associated with the post-structuralist methodology on the 
current project, but also to reflect on possible future research venues that would aim to 
address these problems, which will also be mentioned by Chapter 8.      
 
In the following chapter, I will give a general account of the historical context of the focus 
period, not only in terms of the notion of ‗Europe‘ but in terms of the privileged signifiers of 
‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘. This exercise, rather than pushing a correlation between events 
and discourses, aims to provide the historical background regarding the discourses, secondly, 
to highlight how the discourses on ‗Europe‘ speak to this background and finally to sustain a 
smooth passage to the empirical chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND OF THE 
DISCOURSES ON ‘EUROPE’: POSITIONS AND MILESTONES 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter, I outlined the methodology employed in the present project, 
highlighting the two privileged signifiers of Turkish politics: security and democracy. I 
departed from the claim that any discourse in Turkish politics has to relate itself to these 
signifiers in order to be significant and salient and able to contribute to the construction of 
political frontiers. These have materialised in different ways in different periods of Turkish 
politics, yet have always remained significant and ‗privileged‘. I also demonstrated the 
discursive space within which  the privileged signifiers of ‗democracy‘ and ‗security‘ have 
emerged as two ends of the spectrum  in contrast to the Western experience where a 
functioning democracy has predominantly been seen as the prerequisite of the security 
(International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2006:5). Subsequently, I 
attempted to operationalise two ends of the spectrum with relation to ‗Europe‘ through a set of 
questions I devised with regard to the discursive space  within which these signifiers emerged 
historically in order to link them to particular and concrete discourses in domestic political 
debates in Turkey. I also underlined the key concepts to identify ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ 
within the newspapers and parliamentary debates.   
 
In this chapter, before illustrating discourses on ‗Europe‘ in Turkish political debates from 
1999 onwards using the list of questions and keywords devised in the methodology chapter, I 
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will give a general account of the historical context of the focus period, not only in terms of 
the notion of ‗Europe‘ but also in terms of the privileged signifiers of ‗security‘ and 
‗democracy‘. As Hansen argues, ‗working with a case study that stretches over a longer 
period of time, a timeline identifies periods of heightened activity, where the density of events 
is greater‘ (Hansen, 2006: 115-6). Therefore, rather than aiming at positing a causal 
relationship between political developments and discourses, this exercise aims; firstly, to 
provide the historical context regarding the discourses; secondly, to illustrate how the 
discourses on ‗Europe‘ speak to this background and thirdly, to set the discursive space within 
which discourses on ‗Europe‘ emerged after 1999. This will also sustain a smooth passage to 
the empirical chapters. However, this attempt leads to a methodological problem already 
pointed out in Chapter 4. That is, in order to familiarise the readers to the Turkish political 
setting, the current analysis also has to contain some conventional and ‗analysis-free‘ 
background information which does not contribute to the analysis and which, in a way, harms 
the ‗unconventionality‘ of the project. Then, it is crucial to state here that the background 
information presented in this chapter aims to give the historical context of the discourses on 
‗Europe‘ in the 1999-2008 period and is not directly a part of the current research.  
 
In a nutshell, this chapter will elaborate upon the argument that in order to understand and 
make sense of discourses on ‗Europe‘ in Turkish politics and of how these discourses 
attempted  to be hegemonic, one has to focus on how and at what instances the privileged 
signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ were articulated within the signification chains of the 
concept. In order to do this, I will first elaborate how the signifiers of ‗security‘ and 
‗democracy‘ have materialised and highlight the key events around which the general debates 
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have culminated in the 1999-2008 period. Later, I will move on to elaborate the context of the 
debates on the notion of ‗Europe‘. This will mainly mean giving a brief account of the key 
events regarding the EU Accession, as ‗Europe‘ mainly meant ‗the EU‘ after Helsinki 
European Council, as has already been claimed in the Introduction chapter. This exercise, 
besides giving a detailed account of the Turkey-EU relations, aims to highlight the debates 
attached to the key events of the period, to put them in their proper context and to elaborate 
how the discourses on ‗Europe‘ that will be scrutinised in the following chapter speak to this 
context and make those events significant and highlighted. 
 
 
 
 
2. MATERIALISATION OF ‘SECURITY’ AND ‘DEMOCRACY’ IN THE 1999-2008 
PERIOD: ‘PKK’, ‘THE KURDISH ISSUE’ AND ‘TURKISHNESS’ 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
To reiterate, generally speaking, this project aims at arguing that ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ was 
able to draw the political frontiers in Turkish politics in the aftermath of 1999. One of the sub-
arguments in this respect has been that for any signifier to be hegemonic in the Turkish 
political landscape it has to relate itself to the signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ which 
have materialised in different ways in different periods of Turkish politics, albeit always 
remaining resonant and ‗privileged‘. In this section, I will give a brief background to the 
signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ in the specified period. This will outline the security-
democracy debates of the period and will help locate the discourses on ‗Europe‘ in their 
proper context and the discursive spaceIn this way, it would be easier to elaborate in the 
following chapters on the question of through which landmark events those privileged 
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signifiers have been articulated within the signification chains of ‗Europe‘ during the period 
and will help answer question such as, ‗why was the PKK so significant in terms of 
constructions of ‗Europe‘ during the period?‘. In this respect, the argument in this section will 
be that the debates on PKK terrorism, the Kurdish question and Turkishness were the 
landmark incidents defining the discursive space within which discourses on ‗Europe‘ 
emerged with regard to the signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘.  
 
 
 
2.2. Security’ and ‘democracy’ in the 1999-2008 period: debates and events 
 
It is not an overstatement to say that the most significant instance regarding both signifiers of 
security and democracy within the period has been the relaunch of PKK terrorism in June 
2004 which had previously stopped in 1999. As mentioned above, in Turkish politics, 
terrorism has usually been associated with PKK. Especially during this period, PKK incidents 
overlapped with the question of whether cultural and collective rights of the Kurds granted by 
the Copenhagen Criteria would damage the integrity of the Turkish state and legitimise PKK 
terrorism, which more often than not played on ethnic Kurdish identity. 
 
All in all, the lifting of the State of Emergency in South-Eastern Turkey where PKK terrorism 
was predominantly active, after the capture of Abdullah Ocalan (the PKK leader) in Kenya 
and the minority rights stipulated by the Copenhagen Criteria in the 1999-2004 period pointed 
to a state of normalization. It has been pointed out by many commentators that ‗Europe‘ was a 
substantial part of this normalisation (e.g. Dahlman, 2004; Kalaycioglu, 2003; Tocci, 2005b). 
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Another manifestation of this normalization has been the penetration of the Copenhagen 
Criteria into the domestic politics and recognition of the Kurdish issue by the state. In this 
respect, Erdoğan‘s first visit to Diyarbakır right after his inauguration on 12 August 2005 was 
crucial as he mentioned the existence of a ‗Kurdish issue‘ for the first time since the ‗Kurdish 
reality‘ was first mentioned by the then prime minister Suleyman Demirel in 1991.27 Erdoğan 
confessed that ‗the State has made some mistakes in the past‘ (Radikal, 13 August 2005). This 
was coupled with Retired General Aytaç Yalman‘s statement that during the 1970s, the state 
officials of that time wrongly evaluated the DDKO
28
 (Dogu Devrimci Kultur Ocaklari-East 
Revolutionary Cultural Hearths) as a simple Marxist-Leninist organisation (Yalman, 16 
August 2005). All in all, these two incidents were groundbreaking as the Turkish official 
stance had always been to explain the PKK problem as the ‗South-Eastern issue‘, linking it 
with the region‘s underdevelopment, or a ‗terrorism problem‘. 
 
Within this context, the re-launch of the terrorist activities of PKK in 2005
29
 led many 
commentators to raise eyebrows, leading to comments such as: ‗PKK has returned to its old 
independence struggle and its demands and the democratisation attempts stipulated by the EU 
are completely delinked‘ (Aktan, 16 August 2005). Starting from January 2006, PKK has 
launched repeated attacks on Turkish territory from sanctuaries in the Kandil Mountains, 
                                                            
27 In January 2007, 15 months after this statement, Erdoğan answered a question on Kurdish problem that it was 
actually a ‗terrorism problem‘ (quoted in Erdem, 8 January 2007).   
28 The organizational and ideological precedent of PKK in the 1970s 
29 As highlighted by many commentators, the re-launch of PKK terrorism overlapped with a divide in the ruling 
cadres of PKK along an ‗EU-American‘ axis. A group deemed the civic liberties granted through the EU 
accession in Turkey enough to stop armed struggle whereas the majority wanted to continue armed struggle, 
which led to the aforementioned terror wave (Berkan, 16 November 2007, Aytac and Uslu, 20 July 2007). It has 
also frequently been noted that ‗PKK got panicked as there happened to exist different civil society options in 
the region other than itself during the EU process‘ (Aytac and Uslu, 20 July 2007).  The so-called ‗different civil 
society options‘ in this statement by Aytaç and Uslu refer to the burgeoning and strengthening of numerous civil 
society initiatives funded by the EU during the EU integration process by various associations, SMEs and local 
governments in the region.  
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northern Iraq, killing several hundred Turkish security forces (Larrabee, 2007: 105). This was 
especially the case with the Newroz celebrations in March 2006 which later turned into street 
riots in Diyarbakır organised by the PKK, and which resulted in 15 casualties. This, coupled 
with the PKK assault in Şırnak that caused the death of 13 soldiers on 7-8 October 2007, 
caused deep sorrow and rage within the society. 
 
 
In line with the re-launch of terrorist activities by the PKK, starting from 2005, Turkey has 
been experiencing a significant rise in violence committed in the name of ‗nationalism‘. The 
name of Trabzon, a city in the north of Turkey, has been pronounced a lot within those 
debates. On 6 April 2005, 5 members of TAYAD (Tutuklu Aileleleriyle Dayanisma Vakfi- 
Association for Solidarity with Prisoners‘ Families) were set upon in Trabzon when they 
distributed a leaflet about the isolation and hunger strikes in prisons based on the rumours that 
the group had burned the Turkish flag and was carrying the picture of Öcalan (Cumhuriyet, 7 
April 2005). A subsequent attack occurred on 11 April 2005 when TAYAD members from 
different cities tried to make a press statement in the town centre protesting the previous 
incident. It has been claimed that Trabzon has been tainted by this whole development as it is 
historically associated with multiculturalism and multiethnicism and it is easy to disseminate 
the fear of the rejuvenation of the Pontiac Greek State and thereby raise the extent of ultra-
nationalism expressed within Turkish society (Mert, 9 February 2006; Laçiner, 29 January 
2007).  On 30 August 2006, on the Turkish Victory Day, four university students in Istanbul, 
who protested the Turkish involvement in the Israeli-Lebanese conflict, holding banners 
proclaiming, ‗Israil askeri olmayacağız‘ (‗we will not be Israeli soldiers‘), were almost 
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lynched by a mob of 300 ultra-nationalists (Radikal, 1 September 2006). These lynch attempts 
were repeated many times in different parts of Turkey. 
30
 All of these incidents came about as 
a result of the rumours that the victims were ‗burning flags‘ or ‗chanting pro-PKK slogans‘. 
 
The ‗nationalist‘ reaction was also articulated along the religious lines. On 6 February 2006, 
the priest of the Santa Maria Catholic Church in Trabzon, Andrea Sentore was gunned down 
by a sixteen-year-old (Cumhuriyet, 6 February 2006). On 18 April 2007, in Malatya, 3 
Christians working at a publishing house publishing books on Christianity were tied, tortured 
and killed by five young men in response to their alleged missionary activities (Radikal, 19 
April 2007). 
 
Within this period, signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ also revolved around the question 
of whether DTP is the political wing of PKK or just a political party with a pro-Kurdish 
agenda, trying to promote an ethnic-sensitive approach to the Kurdish issue. In this respect, 
DTP was claimed to be reluctant in distancing itself from PKK in the eyes of the public, a 
claim any Turkish political party with a Kurdish agenda has faced, as mentioned in the 
preceding section. One of the main incidents in this respect was experienced in March 2007, 
when DTP leader, Ahmet Turk was sentenced to 6 months by a court in Diyarbakır on the 
                                                            
30 On 25 February 2006, a man almost been lynched by a group of 1000 ultra-nationalists on the grounds that he 
allegedly kicked the flag. On 30 March 2006, In Sakarya, two students who tried to hang a poster of dead left-
wing terrorist Mahir Cayan, one of the founding fathers of THKP-C, were set upon by 2,000 people and the 
party building of the DTP was destroyed. On 12 May 2006, members of TAYAD distributing flyers in Mersin 
were attacked by the crowd leaving a mosque after Friday prayers. On 29 August 2006, a group of Kurdish 
workers have almost been lynched by approximately 1000 people in Konya.  On 20 July 2006, police arrested 61 
people from the Basic Rights group and Freedom Support Organization who had refused to hand over two 
members at a makeshift camp they had set up in Kirklareli. When they were being transported to Vize, rumours 
spread that they were PKK terrorists who had been caught and a local crowd tried to lynch them. In Akyazi, 
Sakarya, 4 Kurdish workers were almost lynched on the ground that they were ‗pro-PKK‘ (for further details see 
Radikal, 1 September 2006, Radikal, 9 September 2006).  
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grounds that he addressed to Abdullah Ocalan, leader of PKK, as ‗Sayin‘ (dear, esteemed) in 
a speech he made in January 2006 (BBC News Online, 6 March 2007) according to Article 
215 of Turkish Penal Code, which penalises those ‗who praise either an offence or an 
offender‘. 31 The hesitance to exclude the PKK from the party organisation has also been 
echoed by the DTP ruling cadre. In the first Kurdish conference in Diyarbakır named ‗Kurds 
in Turkey: the main requirements for peace‘, DTP co-Chair Selahattin Demirtas stated, ‗we 
cannot call terror what you call it. If we do, we become what you are‘ (Radikal, 1 October 
2007). At another conference on 4 December 2007 organised by the European Parliament 
titled, ‗The EU, Turkey and the Kurds‘, Nurettin Demirtas, DTP Chair, said: ‗we believe that 
the insistence to name PKK as a terrorist organisation must be given up. Unfortunately, after 
9/11, the approach of ―you are either with us or against us‖ has been imposed by the US, 
which has also been endorsed by the EU. It should be the political party itself to decide what 
to say and what not to say‘ (Radikal, 5 December 2007). 
 
Another important variant of the security-democracy debates within this period was the cross-
border operation to Northern Iraq. In Turkish domestic debates, reference to PKK terrorism 
has been almost synonymous with the region of Northern Iraq. ‗The power vacuum left in 
northern Iraq by the first Gulf War has enabled the PKK to use this territory as a staging 
ground for raids into Turkey and a sanctuary where it could enjoy relative freedom from 
Turkish counterattacks‘ (Görener, 2008: 1).  Especially after the legalisation of the confederal 
structure in Iraq in the aftermath of 15 December 2005 elections and the emergence of 
                                                            
31 Meanwhile, Erdoğan also faced a judicial allegation on the grounds that he addressed in the very same way to 
Ocalan in a speech he made in August 2000 at a radio programme in Austria, which did not result in a conviction 
due to the prescription  of the act (Radikal, 27 March 2007).     
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Kurdistan region as one of the constitionally defined regions, the foreign policy dimension of 
the Kurdish issue has started to play a role in the debates as ever. 
 
Against this backdrop, and especially in the aftermath of Şırnak assault, one of the most hotly 
debated issues has subsequently been the motion that gave mandate to the government to 
organise a cross-border operation to Northern Iraq, which was ratified by a vote of 507-19 
(Zaman, 18 October 2007). Before the motion, Erdoğan‘s statement that, ‗the price of the 
motion will be paid whatever it takes. We do not have to ask for permission from anyone‘ 
showed the changing tone of the debates (Radikal, 13 October 2007). 
 
During the same period, the PKK organised another attack on 21 October 2007 to Dağlıca 
Infantry Batallion, Hakkari, killing 12 soldiers and kidnapping 8. This was immediately 
followed by the news that a wedding convoy had tripped a landmine in the very same region, 
an event which was strongly believed to have been the work of PKK terrorists. The kidnapped 
soldiers have been released after the direct initiatives of the DTP. After their release, the 
Minister of Justice Mehmet Ali Şahin‘s stated that, ‗no member of Turkish Armed Forces 
should have been in this situation. I could not be utterly happy of their release‘32 which led to 
the whole incidence being perceived as more than an ordinary kidnapping (Zaman, 6 
November 2007). After the Dağlıca ambush, 13 civil society associations with the greatest 
number of members
33
 issued a declaration constituting a ‗common stance against terror‘ and 
                                                            
32 The soldiers have been released after a protocol among the US, Northern Iraq Administration and DTP MPs in 
front of Ocalan‘s poster created a deep disappointment within the society and politicians. Yet, the statement of 
Sahin has been condemned by many. The soldiers were arrested upon their return and charged with disobedience 
to the command and illegally leaving the country.  
33 Among those civil society associations were TOBB, TISK, TZOB, TESK, TURK-IS, HAK-IS, KAMU-SEN, 
MEMUR-SEN, TUSIAD, MUSIAD, ASKON, TUSKON and TBB.   
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stating that whatever needed to be done to stop terror and its supporters should be done 
immediately (Radikal, 23 October 2007).  
 
The debates on security and democracy have been all the more intense following the furore 
caused by articles 312 and 301 of the Turkish Penal Code in Turkish political landscape. 
Article 312 charged those who ‗provoke people to hatred and hostility by inciting religious 
and ethnical differences‘, among whom were Tayyip Erdoğan in 1997 and Akin Birdal, the 
then Chairman of Human Rights Association, in 2000. On 6 February 2002, a ‗mini-
democracy package‘ was voted in by the Parliament, altering the wording of Article 312. 
Under the revised text, incitement can only be punished if it presents ‗a possible threat to 
public order‘ (Radikal, 5 February 2002). Article 301 was another highly debated article at 
both the national and international levels, which came into force on 1 June 2005 as a part of 
the new Penal Code. It stipulated that a person ‗who explicitly insults Turkishness, the 
Republic or Turkish Grand National Assembly, shall be given a penalty of imprisonment for a 
term of six months to three years‘ (Turkish Penal Code, 2005). Indeed, the New Penal Code 
was designed in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria and ‗created positive expectations 
both in domestic public opinion and EU circles‘, albeit creating an environment within which 
many authors and artists are imprisoned due to the authoritarian perception and application of 
article 301 (Hekimoğlu, 11 February 2006). Not surprisingly, the issue of ‗Europe‘ largely 
dovetailed with the debates on ‗Turkishness‘ within this context. 
 
The article caused much ado both in Turkey and in Europe after the prosecutions of well-
known novelists and journalists such as Orhan Pamuk, Hrant Dink, Perihan Mağden, Elif 
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Şafak, and even Joost Lagendijk, chairman of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. 
The fact that the article has been using ambiguous words such as ‗insult‘ and ‗Turkishness‘ 
was identified by many commentators (see Belge, 24 March 2007; Belge, 21 October 2007; 
Hekimoglu, 11 February 2006 for a detailed analysis). 
 
One of the most high profile cases regarding the infringement of the Article 301 was the case 
of Orhan Pamuk. Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk stated in an interview to a Swiss newspaper 
in February 2005 that: ‗30000 Kurds and one million Armenians have been killed in these 
lands and nobody but me dares to talk about it‘. This caused a big disappointment and uproar 
within Turkish public opinion, with ‗leading commentators denouncing him as a traitor‘ 
(Freely, 31 August 2005). There followed a case brought by a group of lawyers led by Kemal 
Kerinçsiz, a Turkish lawyer from Büyük Hukukçular Birliği (Great Union of Jurists), that 
Pamuk be convicted as an infringement of Article 301. The Orhan Pamuk case which started 
on 16 December 2005 and attracted the widespread attention of both domestic and 
international public opinion rendered the case ‗a litmus paper for Turkey's commitment to the 
EU's membership criteria‘, in Olli Rehn‘s words (Radikal, 16 December 2005).  The 
European Parliament commissioned a delegation led by Camiel Eurlings to observe the case 
(EPP Group, 30 November 2005). The first hearing of the trial was suspended due to the 
furore and turmoil inside and outside of the courtroom, where ‗domestic and European 
supporters of Pamuk has been subject to violence by the protesters‘ (Radikal, 17 December 
2005). According to Denis MacShane, Labour MP and British minister for Europe from 2002 
to 2005 who ‗was punched in the face by a nationalist lawyer‘, ‗in the court room where 
Pamuk's case was heard, the hate word was ―European‖' (MacShane, 18 December 
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2005).That the act had been committed before the launch of the new Penal Code on 1 June 
2005 caused confusion in terms of the technicalities of the case and from the beginning it was 
not clear within what jurisdiction the case fell. On the defence of the judiciary, Cicek said, 
‗the Turkish judiciary got confused due to the EU‘s contradictory decisions about Turkey (...) 
Hotly-debated 301 has at the first instance been approved by the EU (...) Orhan Pamuk caused 
this whole 301 trouble‘ (Radikal, 25 September 2005).  Finally, Pamuk case was dropped due 
to the Ministry of Justice‘s statement that the case is not within the Ministry‘s jurisdiction and 
the court‘s subsequent ruling that there is not an adequate ground for the realization of the 
case (Zaman, 23 January 2006). 
 
Hrant Dink, the editor of bilingual (Turkish-Armenian) newspaper Agos (‘Furrow’) was also 
brought to court for ‗denigrating Turkishness‘ on 7 October 2005 and received a six month 
suspended sentence (Radikal, 10 October 2005). The charge imposed on him due to a 
commentary where he mentioned ‗genocide against the Armenians‘ and that the Armenians, 
instead of tackling with Turkey all the time should turn to Armenia itself, thus ‗replacing of 
the dirty blood associated with the ―Turk‖ with clean blood‘34 (Dink, 13 February 2004). He 
was charged once again due to a speech he made to the Reuters News Agency where he stated 
‗of course, I‘m saying it‘s a genocide because its consequences show it to be true and  labels 
itself as such. We see that the people who had lived on these lands for 4 thousand years 
perished after those events‘ (Radikal, 26 September 2006). While the case was still pending, 
Dink was assassinated on 19 January 2007 by a 17-year-old, Ogun Samast. 
                                                            
34 Within the aforementioned trial, the Expertise Committee appointed by the Court stated in their report that the 
article in question does not constitute an offense as ‗the author points out to the need on the part of Armenians to 
get rid of the attempt and determination to articulate what had been experienced in 1915 as a vital part of the 
Armenian identity‘ (Radikal, 10 October 2005). Depending on the Report, Chief Public Prosecutor asked for the 
acquittal of Dink, which was overruled by the Supreme Court of Appeals on 6 June 2006.  
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The highly securitised Armenian issue also brought the author Elif Şafak  to court in July 
2006, who was accused of the violation of the article 301 by Kemal Kerinçsiz on the grounds 
that she insulted ‗Turkishness‘ in her book, ‗Bastards of Istanbul‘ (Radikal, 29 July 2006). In 
this book, Şafak she told the story of Turkish-Muslim Kazanci family and American-
Armenian Çakmakçıyan family, where the fictitious character, Armanoush Çakmakçıyan 
comes to Turkey to meet with her Turkish relatives. When Armanoush tells her Turkish 
relatives about the fate of her family, what she says is as much about ‗genocide‘ as about 
‗Turkish butchers‘ (Şafak, 2006). Though not as intensified as the Orhan Pamuk case, the Elif 
Şafak case was subject to protests and demonstrations. A group including Pakize Akbaba, 
Chair of Şehit Aileleri Derneği (Martyrs‘ Families Association) and Sevgi Erenerol, the 
spokesperson of Turkish Orthodox Patriarchy, protested against Şafak in front of the court 
building with the EU flags, altered to include swastikas at the centre (Radikal, 22 September 
2006).  The protests were mainly directed to the European members of the audience such as 
Joost Lagendijk, representatives of PEN and Amnesty International. Şafak was acquitted in 
this first hearing of the case on 21 September 2006. 
 
In November 2005, Baskın Oran and Ibrahim Kaboğlu, who drafted a report on behalf of the 
Minority Rights and Cultural Rights Working Group under the Prime Ministry Human Rights 
Advisory Council on 22 October 2004, were also charged under Article 301/II (‗humiliation 
of the court‘s authority‘) and Article 216/I (‗inciting hatred and enmity‘) of the Turkish Penal 
Code‗. In the ‗Minority Rights and Cultural Rights Report‘, the Council decided that ‗sub-
identities should not be denied. The right of people from different identities and cultures to 
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protect and develop their identities should be guaranteed‘, which clearly meant the re-
evaluation of Lausanne (Zaman, 16 October 2004). 
35
. According to Lausanne Treaty, the 
main international document regarding the definition of ‗minority‘, only Greeks, Armenians, 
Jewish and Bulgarians are deemed to be minorities (‗non-Muslims‘ by the 143rd Article of 
Lausanne) (Oran, 25 October 2004).  
 
After the publication of the Report, the government on different occasions criticised the 
Report. For instance, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül said that ‗they have 
never asked for such a report‘ (Radikal, 23 October 2004).  According to Oran, the 
government tried to stay out of the issue because of the frenzy caused by rightwing protesters 
and also because it did not want trouble before 17 December 2004, the launch of accession 
negotiations with the EU (Oran, 2007: 6). The then Minister of Justice, Cemil Çiçek, qualified 
the Report as an ‗intel mischief-maker‘ 36  (Radikal, 19 November 2004). In the trial 
indictment, Oran and Kaboğlu were charged with suggesting provisions remiscient of the 
Sevres Treaty within the Report (Radikal, 16 November 2005). Therefore, from the 
beginning, the Report and the charges against Oran and Kaboğlu were highly securitized. On 
the first hearing on 15 February 2006, the court cancelled the Article 301 charge while the 
other was left standing. Oran and Kaboğlu‘s case was dropped after the Chief Prosecutor at 
the Supreme Court of Appeals called for the acquittal of the academics as the ideas in the 
                                                            
35 The Board has been established in 12 April 2001, when DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition was in power and it 
consisted of 78 members from the state cadres and civil society organizations, including TESK, Human Rights 
Organization, the Sovereignty of Law Organization, Social Thought Organization etc. (Oran, 25 October 2004). 
The duty of the Council is to ‗comment, suggest and report on the development and protection of human rights‘ 
(Ünal, 22 October 2004).  
36 Intel‘ is the pejorative form of the ‗intellectual‘ in Turkish 
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Report did not constitute a crime according to the new Penal Code (Radikal, 3 November 
2007). 
 
All in all, Article 301 trials figured prominently from 2005 on until the article‘s amendment in 
April 2008. Besides the harsh criticisms it received in European public opinion, the EU 
official documents during this period also made intense references to the trials and demanded 
amendments be made to the article, as the next section will show. Thus, the Turkey 2006 
Progress Report stated that, ‗Article 301 needs to be brought into line with the relevant 
European standards‘. It went on to state that this also ‗applies to other provisions of the Penal 
code which have been used to prosecute the non-violent expression of opinions and may limit 
freedom of expression‘ (the European Commission, 8 November 2006). On 30 April 2008, 
the Turkish Parliament adopted the AKP bill with 250 votes for and 65 against, which 
entailed the replacement of the offense of ‗insulting Turkishness‘ with that of ‗insulting the 
Turkish nation‘, brought leniency to first time offenders and granted the right to give 
permission for Article 301 trials to the Ministry of Justice (Radikal, 1 May 2008). Within this 
framework, ‗Turkishness‘ was the keyword around which the security-democracy debates 
were articulated. 
 
Another substantial component of the security-democracy debates were the Republican rallies 
during this period. The end of the tenure of Turkey‘s 11th President Ahmet Necdet Sezer in 
May 2007 also meant the emergence of the presidency debate as an issue of antagonism in 
Turkish politics. The main axis of the debate was the fact that the party in power, Justice and 
Development Party had a parliamentarian majority to vote for a candidate in accordance with 
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its ‗own goals‘, thereby posing a threat to the secular regime and Republican values. In this 
debate, the presidency of Tayyip Erdoğan was particularly to the forefront as his daughter and 
wife wore headscarves, he had an imam-preacher certificate and he appointed Islamist hard-
liners to key bureaucratic positions.  The tension was further exacerbated when Abdullah Gul 
as the AKP nominee for presidency was not declared to the public until the very last minute.
37
 
The high possibility of having a president from AKP and the aforementioned growing tension 
led to a number of demonstrations and marches just before the start of the presidential election 
process. The first protest was organised in Ankara by Atatürkcu Dusunce Dernegi (Atatürkist 
Thought Association-ADD) and supported by almost 300 civil society organisations. At the 
rally titled, ‗Claim your Republic‘, around five hundred thousand demonstrators rallied to 
chant slogans such as, ‗we do not want imams at Çankaya38‘, ‗neither US nor EU, ultimately 
independent Turkey‘, ‗Çankaya is secular and secular it will remain‘ and ‗this is Tandogan, 
have you seen it, Erdoğan?‘ (Radikal, 15 April 2007). The main emphasis of the rally was the 
masses who felt that the laicist Republic and Republican values were under threat by the 
election of an AKP-nominated president. The wide spectrum of demonstrators ranged from 
hard-liner nationalists to socialists, from Republicans to liberals. 
 
The second rally has been organised in Istanbul on 29 April 2007, a quite significant anti-
government tone has been added to the demonstrations (Radikal, 30 April 2007). Another 
added phenomenon was the anti- coup d‘état tone due to the declaration issued by the Chief 
General of Staff on the 23
rd
 of April: one of the most frequently used slogans was ‗neither 
                                                            
37 His name was declared 30 hours before the deadline.  
38 Çankaya is the name of a district in Ankara where the President and the Presidency reside. References to 
Çankaya were particularly significant during the republican rallies as the dissidents were interested in whether 
the next occupant of Çankaya would be accordant with Republican values.   
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coup d‘état not sheria‘ and the people claimed that that was a civilian coup d‘etat 
(Cumhuriyet, 30 April 2007; Belge, 1 May 2007). The third, fourth, fifth and sixth rallies took 
place consecutively in Manisa, Çanakkale on 5 May, in İzmir on 13 May with more than 1 
million demonstrators and in Samsun with 100000 people respectively (Radikal, 14 May 
2007; Radikal, 21 May 2007). 
 
2.3. Conclusion 
 
In this section, departing from the argument that any discourse in Turkish politics has to relate 
itself to the privileged signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ in order to be significant and 
salient and able to construct political frontiers, I gave a brief account of security-democracy 
debates. This helps to illustrate see how these signifiers materialised in the specified period 
and to show in the next chapter how they came to be articulated around the notion of 
‗Europe‘. To reiterate, the Kurdish question, PKK terrorism and Turkishness debates each set 
the benchmark of the period with regard to the signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ and set 
the discursive space  within which discourses on ‗Europe‘ emerged. The adoption of the 
Copenhagen Criteria by Turkey and its manifestations on the political landscape and the re-
launch of PKK terrorism in June 2004 (which had until then ceased since 1999) were all 
intertwined within these debates and led to a discussion of whether the cultural and collective 
rights of the Kurds would damage the integrity of the Turkish state and legitimise PKK 
terrorism (which more often than not played on ethnic Kurdish identity). Similarly, the 
debates on Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code loomed large both at the domestic and the 
European level from 2005 until the article‘s amendment in April 2008. Whether the harsh 
criticisms the article received in the European public opinion and the EU are an ‗intervention‘ 
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to Turkey‘s internal problems or facilitated the promotion of rights and liberties in Turkey has 
formed the backbone of the debates. The signifiers ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ materialised 
within this period which had the effect of introducing PKK terrorism, the Kurdish question 
and Turkishness as the landmark debates in relation to ‗Europe‘. 
 
The question, however remains, how did these debates set the ground for the emerging 
discourses on ‗Europe‘ and how were the signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ related to 
‗Europe‘? The next chapter will seek an answer to this question. But, before that, I will give a 
brief background of debates on ‗Europe‘ in Turkish politics in the focused period to further 
elaborate the context of the discourses on ‗Europe‘ that I will scrutinise in the next chapter 
and will constitute a passage to the empirical chapter. 
 
3. THE EVOLUTION AND MILESTONES OF THE TURKISH DEBATE ON 
‘EUROPE’ AFTER 1999: ‘REFORM’ AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
 
In the Turkish political system, the notion of ‗Europe‘ has always been at the forefront. 
Moreover, there has been almost no political tendency that has not possessed an idea of 
‗Europe‘ in its discourses or party programme. This preoccupation gained particular 
momentum especially following the official acceptance of Turkey as a membership candidate 
after the Helsinki European Council in 1999. According to Ulusoy, this decision is important 
for the penetration of the notion of ‗Europe‘ into the domestic debates as with this decision 
the EU agreed to share the burden of convergence through an accession partnership, and 
Turkey was enabled to participate in certain EU programs (Ulusoy, 2006). The Helsinki 
decision calls on Turkey to resolve the border problems with its neighbouring countries in 
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accordance with the United Nations Charter, or to bring the disputes to the International Court 
of Justice (Uğur, 2003: 166). Most important of all, EU conditionality, particularly the 
Copenhagen political criteria, has acted as a catalyst for domestic reforms in the fields of 
politics, law and education, as mentioned above. Helsinki European Council and penetration 
of the EU to the domestic debates has also meant a sheer equivalence sustained between 
‗Europe‘ and ‗the EU‘ in public parlance from now on. 
 
Therefore, the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 stands as a milestone regarding 
‗Europe‘ within the specified period. The Council at this meeting made a number of decisions 
marking a new stage in relations. While the Luxembourg European Council of December 
1997 excluded Turkey from the accession process, the Helsinki Council granted Turkey 
candidacy status ‗on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States‘ (the 
European Council, 1999). Apart from the fact that the decision constituted a turning point for 
Turkey‘s long-standing desire for EU membership, the main impact of Helsinki has been the 
constitution of a pre-accession strategy for Turkey. Within the framework of the Copenhagen 
criteria, Turkey‘s membership was conditional on the fulfilment of the pre-accession strategy. 
The Council stated that ‗compliance with the political criteria laid down at the Copenhagen 
European Council is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations‘ (the EU 
Presidency, 10-11 December 1999). Turkey was required to undertake a substantial degree of 
democratization and human rights reforms. Therefore, starting from Helsinki European 
Council, the concept of ‗Europe‘ was synonymous with the concept of ‗reform‘, pointing to 
the new arrangements on the part of Turkey to be made in many realms such as human rights, 
democratization, education, judiciary and politics. 
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In line with the Copenhagen Criteria and the Accession Partnership of 2001, the Turkish 
Parliament has been engaged in the most pervasive constitutional change in the Republican 
era and 51 Articles of the 12
 
September 1980 Constitution
39
 were to be amended (Radikal, 11 
September 2001). The amendments (usually known as Harmonisation Packages) stretched 
from basic rights and liberties, the limitation of sovereignty and the secrecy of the private life 
to individual immunity and capital punishment, which were realised both by the DSP-ANAP-
MHP coalition government and by the AKP government after coming to power in November 
2002. These reforms culminated in a New Penal Code, which came into force on 1 June 2005. 
 
These amendments, which testified to a broad-based political will for EU membership 
in Turkey, introduced new provisions in line with the priorities of the 2001 National 
Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA), such as the freedom of thought and 
expression, the prevention of torture, strengthening of democracy and civilian authority, 
the freedom and security of the individual, the right to privacy, the inviolability of the 
domicile, the freedom of communication, the freedom of residence and movement, the 
freedom of association and gender equality (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007: 
4). 
 
Volkan Vural, the then chair of ABGS (Avrupa Birliği Genel Sekreterliği-General Secretariat 
of the European Union), the board responsible for the management and regulation of all the 
issues about the EU, depicted EU integration as a period for the ‗renewal of Turkey through 
reforms‘, by giving the example of Bulgarian and Romanian accessions: 
 
                                                            
39 ‗The current Constitution of Turkey was drawn up by a constituent assembly appointed and supervised by the 
leaders of the 12 September 1980 military intervention and adopted by a nation-wide referendum held under 
extra-ordinary conditions of the military regime at the time‘ (Gönenç, 2004: 90). Although it has been amended 
many times after returning to multi-party politics in 1983, especially during the EU accession process, it is still 
called the 1982 Constitution (the year it has been ratified), generally to point out the non-democratic elements 
still entailed.     
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The time is ticking for the EU. The democratisation package should be ratified 
immediately. The Turkish Republic has always been a Western project. The aim is to 
renew Turkey through reforms. Turkey is proof of European multiculturalism (...) The 
EU does not want to disintegrate us. We should pay attention to the examples of 
Bulgarian and Romanian democracies. The day we start the negotiations, I will go to a 
primary school and tell the children what kind of a future is waiting for them (Vural, 3
 
September 2001). 
 
 
The keyword of ‗reform‘ has also created its adversaries within the political landscape 
especially by the actors who securitised
40
 the concept. The main variant of the anti-reform 
discussion has unexpectedly been Cyprus. The Accession Partnership of 8 November 2000 
and the debates which culminated around it were predominantly read through the lens of 
Cyprus. Accession Partnership suggested that ‗the accession partnership is the centrepiece of 
the pre-accession strategy‘, and ‗it contains short term and medium term priorities and 
intermediate objectives identified for Turkey‘ (the European Commission, 8 November 2000). 
Among the short-term priorities of the Accession Partnership, the need for political dialogue 
with the UN to find a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem was mentioned, 
which, by that time, created a great shock and resentment in the Turkish debates on ‗Europe‘. 
 
The Cyprus conflict continued to be the main point of reference in EU documents in 2002, 
2003 and 2004. Although it has been stated in the Copenhagen European Council Presidency 
Conclusions in December 2002 that, ‗if the December 2004 European Council [in Brussels] 
decides that Turkey has fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, the negotiations will be 
                                                            
40 The concept of ‗securitisation‘ is widely used in the political science and IR theory and points to this tendency, 
where an issue becomes a security issue-‗not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because it is 
presented as such by the political actors (Buzan et.al, 1998: 24-6). Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan, the core 
scholars of the so-called Copenhagen School, define securitization as a successful speech act ‗through which an 
intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential 
threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat‘ 
(Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 491).  
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opened without delay‘, the resolution of the Cyprus conflict was implicitly put forward as a 
condition for launching the accession negotiations (European Council, 13 December 2002). 
This tendency is ‗evident in the 2003 regular report of the Commission on Turkey as well as 
the Strategy Paper, stating ―the absence of a settlement could become a serious obstacle to 
Turkey‘s EU aspirations‖‘ (Ulusoy, 2008: 316). 
 
Another anti-reform penchant emanated from the arrangements on abolition of capital 
punishment in line with the Copenhagen Criteria. The death penalty, not de facto carried out 
in Turkey since 1984, ‗was abolished with the amendments to the relevant national legislation 
enacted by the third [harmonisation] package in line with Protocol 6 to the ECHR
41
 and the 
former constitutional amendments‘ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007: 8). This created anti-
reform repercussions mainly due to the fact that it would have a direct impact on Abdullah 
Ocalan, the PKK leader. The so-called ‗baby killer‘, as frequently referred to in Turkish 
public opinion, was held responsible for the death of 30000 people over the course of a 
decade of armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish Armed Forces and had been 
sentenced to death by an Ankara State Security Court after having been captured in Kenya on 
15 February 1999 by the Turkish intelligence service. After the third harmonization package 
entered into force on 9 August 2002, therefore his death sentence was converted to life 
imprisonment and he was put into a prison in a small town called Imralı. 
 
                                                            
41 In the 1990s, Turkey did not become a party to Protocol 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
which prohibits the capital punishment except at times of war although it did not enact the penalty. Protocol 6 
was ratified in 2003. 
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Another important issue during this period was the restructuring of National Security 
Council
42
 (MGK). Starting with the 2001 Progress Report which outlined short-term and 
medium-term objectives to fulfil Copenhagen Criteria, the EU pointed to the need to sustain 
and monitor de facto civilian control over the military, which meant the restructuring of MGK 
(the European Commission, 13 November 2001). Incremental constitutional amendments 
were made after 2001 regarding the increase of civilian members within the MGK. However, 
the real restructuring of the Council came about with the Seventh Harmonisation Package, 
which entered into force in August 2003. Within this framework, ‗the Law on the National 
Security Council‘ was amended to revise the duties and authority of the Council in order to 
prevent the misinterpretation of its role‘ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2007: 17). In this 
respect, the new duties and authority of the Council have been revised and its role was 
reduced to a level of advisory organ to the Cabinet. Further, a civilian was appointed as MGK 
secretary-general for the first time. 
 
At the EU Summit in Brussels on 16-17 December 2004, the European Council decided that 
Turkey ‗sufficiently‘ fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria to open accession negotiations 
on 3 October 2005 (the EU Presidency, 16-17 December 2004). The negotiations between 
Turkey and the EU started on 3 October 2005. The Negotiating Framework which was 
unanimously accepted by the EU Council of Ministers stated that, ‗the shared objective of 
negotiations is accession‘ (the European Council, 3 October 2005). 
 
                                                            
42 The National Security Council, established in 1961, was touted as an essential institution which strengthened 
the role of military in politics. This institution, used by the military as the main tool for shaping domestic and 
foreign policies, is a constitutional tool through which the military expresses its own views in the public arena. 
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Unsurprisingly, the Negotiating Framework included specific references to the Cyprus 
problem. According to this document, Turkey‘s progress in terms of negotiations will be 
measured against ‗Turkey's continued support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive 
settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and in line with the principles on 
which the Union is founded, including steps to contribute to a favourable climate for a 
comprehensive settlement, and progress in the normalisation of bilateral relations between 
Turkey and all EU Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus‘ (the European Council, 
3 October 2005). 
 
Cyprus was also a burning issue in the 2006 Progress Report where according to the 
negotiating framework and the Accession Partnership, Turkey was expected to ensure 
continued support for efforts to find a comprehensive settlement to Cyprus problem, and 
implement fully the Protocol
43
 adapting the Ankara Agreement to the accession of the 10 new 
EU Member States including Cyprus (the European Commission, 8 November 2006). This 
meant the need on the part of Turkey to remove all obstacles to the free movement of goods, 
including restrictions on means of transport, which has been frequently been referred as, ‗to 
open up the harbours‘ in the public opinion (e.g. Zaman, 8 November 2006; Radikal, 5 
September 2006; Bila, 29 September 2006). There was also a particular emphasis within the 
Progress Report on the infamous Article 301 in terms of the need on the part of Turkey to 
remove all legal barriers against freedom of expression (the European Commission, 8 
November 2006). In the European Council meeting in Brussels on 14–15 December 2006, the 
                                                            
43 The so-called ‗EU-Turkey Customs Union Adaptation Protocol‘ was signed on 29 July 2005 by Turkey which 
meant the extension of the Customs Union to the new ten members. However, Turkey made a declaration on 29 
July 2005 that the extension of customs union as to include Cyprus does not amount to any form of recognition 
of the Republic of Cyprus (Hoffmeister, 2006: 225).    
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EU decided to suspend eight chapters
44
 from the accession negotiations with Turkey on the 
grounds that she did not ratify the Additional Protocol to the Customs Union between EU and 
Turkey, including the Republic of Cyprus within the Customs Union. However, the chapters 
on the Customs Union were not the only ones blocked by the EU. After Nicolas Sarkozy‘s 
election as French President in spring 2007, France started blocking the opening of 5 
negotiation chapters
45
 that would have ‗direct bearing on membership‘ (Arısan Eralp, 2009). 
This decision was  first  applied on 25 June 2007, when the EU agreed to extend membership 
talks with Turkey to two new policy areas but stopped short of opening discussions on the key 
area of economic and monetary policy (again due to French opposition)
46
 (Radikal, 26 June 
2007). 
 
Against this background, and especially starting from 2006, what we see is a decrease in the 
intensity of the reform waves; what has been referred to as a ‗reform fatigue‘ by some 
commentators (Patton, 2007; Güven, 14 April 2006). It has even been claimed that the AKP 
has deliberately halted the reforms and intends to push its hidden Islamic agenda by the 
Western media (Wall Street Journal, 22 May 2006; the Economist, 4 May 2006). It was after 
the Turkish-EU Joint Parliamentary Commission meeting of 3-4 May 2006 that the EU 
authorities started using  terms like ‗slowing down‘ ‗delay‘ and ‗halt‘ (Kaygusuz, 2009: 416). 
The European Parliament report by Camille Eurlings of September 2006 expressed a wide 
range of views (mainly critical) of the slowdown of the reform process in Turkey, referring to 
                                                            
44 The chapters suspended were the Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to Provide 
Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union 
and External Relations, which were considered to be related to the Customs Union.     
45 Agriculture and Rural Development, Economic and Monetary Policy, Regional Policy and Coordination of 
Structural Instruments, Financial and Budgetary Provisions and Institutions.  
46 The chapter on Economic and Monetary Policy has been opened on 19 December 2008 
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the court cases on Article 301 which had been introduced by the new Turkish Penal Code and 
the need on the part of Turkey to normalize its relationships with Cyprus, and to come to 
terms with its past regarding the ‗Armenian genocide‘ (although recognition of the ‗genocide‘ 
is not a condition for EU accession) (the European Parliament, 27 September 2006).   Even if 
the Ninth Reform Package has been announced on 12 April 2006 by the government which 
entailed amendments on Law on Foundations, Law on Settlement, Law on Private Education 
Institutions and Law on Ombudsman, the then Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul said that they 
do not contemplate any changes regarding the Article 301 (Kaygusuz, 2009: 422). 
 
These changes within Turkish legislation also entailed amendments regarding the Law on the 
Fight against Terrorism (anti-Terror Law from now on). This law was devised in 1991 when 
the struggle with the PKK was at its pinnacle. Even if numerous changes were made during 
the previous Harmonisation Packages, the real amendments regarding the law came about 
with a government draft in April 2006 which was accepted in June 2006 as a reaction to the 
rising tension in the South-East (Aytar, 2008: 4-5). The new law, which extended the 
definition of ‗terror‘ and punishments attached to ‗terrorist propaganda‘47, has been widely 
criticised by public opinion, especially in terms of the article which grants extended rights to 
state authorities in their struggle against terrorism (Zaman, 29 June 2006). 
 
 
 
                                                            
47 The new law pressed aggrevated sentence in case ‗terrorist propoganda‘ was made by the means of Press and 
the media. This article has been vetoed by Sezer and sent back to the Parliament for reconsideration while it has 
also been criticised by the EU‘s 2006 Progress Report on the grounds that, ‗freedom of the press and media 
could be undermined by provisions allowing the suspension of periodicals and introducing the liability of chief 
editors and of press and media owners for publishing terrorist propaganda or praise in press or media organs‘ 
(the European Commission, 8 November 2006: 6).  
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
So far, in line with the general interest of the project in understanding the emergence of 
‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ in the aftermath of 1999 in Turkish political debates, I set forth the 
theoretical framework, methodology and background information for focusing on what 
discourses on ‗Europe‘ were constructed within the period and how these discourses delineate 
political frontiers in the empirical chapter. By using a Laclau-Mouffean theoretical 
framework, I firstly argued in Chapter 3 that for any discourse to be hegemonic within the 
political it has to delineate the political frontiers between different political identities. In this 
respect, within the hegemonic struggle of a political project on ‗Europe‘, the antagonisms 
between different political identities could be constructed either via co-opting different 
sections of society under the rubric of ‗Europe‘ or through a common stance against ‗Europe‘ 
(‗logic  of difference‘) or by polarising ‗Europe‘, either through the demonising of other 
options than ‗Europe‘ or othering ‗Europe‘ itself (‗logic  of equivalence‘). Secondly, in order 
to highlight the discourses on ‗Europe‘ which would do the aforementioned demarcation, I 
devised a methodology in Chapter 4. Departing from the claim that for any discourse to be 
hegemonic in the Turkish political setting it has to relate itself to the signifiers of ‗security‘ 
and ‗democracy‘, I compiled a list of questions to trace the discourses on ‗Europe‘ and 
‗Europe-as-hegemony‘. In this chapter, before investigating discourses on ‗Europe‘ in Turkish 
political debates from 1999 onwards, I provided a general register of the historical context of 
the focus period, not only in terms of the notion of ‗Europe‘ but also in terms of the privileged 
signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘. I argued that within this period, the signifiers of 
‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ in relation to ‗Europe‘ materialised to highlight the landmark 
201 
 
issues of PKK terrorism, the Kurdish question and debates on ‗Turkishness‘ whereas the issue 
of ‗reform‘ was the landmark concept highlighted regarding the signifier of ‗Europe‘. I do not 
claim that there is a causal relationship between those events and the discourses I will outline 
in the next chapter. Rather, this exercise aims to situate the discourses that will be outlined in 
the forthcoming section within a dynamic and political context and to introduce the discursive 
space of the period within which these discourses emerged  to the readers who are not familiar 
with the Turkish political landscape. 
 
No doubt, it is vital to know which events marked ‗the ground‘ within the focused period in 
order to make sense of the discourses and political frontiers, a task which this chapter has 
sought to achieve. However, it is more important to see how, and in what ways, these key 
events are articulated within the chains of equivalences and speak to the discourses. For 
instance, how is the abolition of the death penalty articulated with respect to ‗Europe‘? How 
are the privileged of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ signifiers included within the chains of 
equivalence of the discourses on ‗Europe‘? All in all, how are the discourses on ‗Europe‘ 
constructed? The following chapter will answer this question. In chapter 6, by referring to the 
questions list compiled in Chapter 4 and by using the newspapers Cumhuriyet, Zaman and 
Radikal, I will highlight the discourses on ‗Europe‘ in the Turkish political debates in the 
1999 and 2008 period to be able to understand how ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ emerged and how 
political frontiers were demarcated by these discourses in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
DISCOURSES ON ‘EUROPE’ WITHIN TURKISH DOMESTIC POLITICAL 
DEBATES IN THE AFTERMATH OF HELSINKI COUNCIL 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter, I laid the background for the empirical discussion of the project by 
providing a general register of the historical context, not only in terms of ‗Europe‘ but also in 
terms of the privileged signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ in order to introduce the 
reader to the general climate of the period. However, it is equally crucial to see how, and in 
what ways these key events are articulated within the signification chains though discourses 
on ‗Europe‘, as this chapter will investigate. 
 
In this section, by referring to the question list compiled in the Methodology chapter and by 
using the newspapers Cumhuriyet, Zaman and Radikal, I will illustrate the discourses on 
‗Europe‘ in the Turkish political debates during the 1999 to 2008 period. By singling out the 
main contours of the debates, I will show how and with what references ‗Europe‘ has been 
used in the political debates and how the signification chains have been articulated by these 
discourses. It is important to say at this point that the statements included in this chapter are 
not the exhaustive result of my newspaper research. The myriad statements (218 statements) 
have been narrowed down to 30 statements (see Annex 1 for the whole list of statements). In 
order to exemplify the statements I used, I included 2 statements for each signifier articulated 
within the signification chain of ‗Europe‘ for each discourse, which I deem to be 
representative, repetitive and resonant within the research. The discourses outlined here will 
help me to see how the bipolar hegemony of the notion of ‗Europe‘ has been sustained, so that 
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it created a common language both for the opponents and proponents of the European project, 
and how it demarcated the political frontiers, which will be explored in Chapter 7. 
 
2. DISCOURSES ON ‘EUROPE’ IN RELATION TO THE PRIVILEGED 
SIGNIFIERS OF ‘DEMOCRACY’ AND ‘SECURITY’ 
 
 
2.1. Discourse 1: ‘Europe’ as a keyword for minority rights and multiple identities 
(Dmultiple identity) 
 
One of the most important aspects of the Copenhagen political criteria was related to the 
amelioration of the rights and conditions of particular groups and identities, especially during 
this period. As such, ‗Europe‘ was directly associated with the assertion of cultural rights to 
the Kurds and whether the Kurds are legally and politically deemed as a ‗minority‘. In 
particular, the designation of the Kurds and the Alevis
48
 in the 2004 Progress Report as 
‗minorities‘ emerged as an important landmark in this respect, as has already been mentioned 
(Radikal, 7 October 2004). All in all, therefore, the notion of ‗minority‘ has increasingly been 
articulated with respect to ‗Europe‘, especially in the first half of the 2000s. This articulation 
of ‗Europe‘ had two distinct yet related dimensions. First of all, ‗Europe‘ has been rendered 
equivalent to the notion of ‗minority‘ on a rights-based manner. Regarding the rights granted 
by the state within the EU process, various demands stretching from the granting of cultural 
(collective rights) to the transformation of Turkey from a unitary state to a federation have 
                                                            
48 Although it is still a widely-debated historical, political and even religious issue, Alevilik (‗Alevism‘) is 
generally depicted as a heterodox sect within Islam, Christianity and Shamanism‘ (Poyraz, 2006: 8). Although 
Alevis ‗has never seen themselves as a minority throughout the Republican history‘, homogenizing and unifying 
tendency of the Turkish nation-state dovetailed with the under-representation of Alevis as a religious community 
in Turkey (Genç, 10 October 2005). The most significant manifestation of this under-representation is the 
emergence of Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (Directorate of Religious Affairs) on as a Sunni-led institution and the 
compulsory courses at the primary and secondary school level on religion which predominantly teach the Sunni 
doctrine. 
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been aired. Within this context, the debates have been carried out with respect to a two-fold 
reference to the notions of ‗sub-identity‘ and ‗upper identity‘ where ‗a sub-identity is the 
identity that a person has by birth, such as the identity of one who is born from a Kurdish 
mother and father while an upper identity is an identity affiliated by the state; it coincides 
with the citizenship‘49 (Oran, 28 May 2004). 
 
Secondly, the iteration of ‗Europe‘ in this respect referred to a broader identitarian context, 
whereby the proliferation of multiple identities has been rendered equivalent to ‗Europe‘. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, in Turkish political debates, the concept of identity in general and the 
multiplication of identities in particular have gained momentum in the 1990s and 2000s due to 
the processes of globalisation and the EU accession. The singular ‗citizenship‘ identity 
created solely by the Turkish state has since been challenged by the ramification of different 
identities (Mahçupyan, 2008). I use the term ‗identitarian‘ here to denote the tendency to see 
the identities as negotiated rather than natural, contingent, constructed and imagined rather 
than categorical and pre-given. Here, the identitarian aspects of the notion, ‗minority‘ is more 
at the forefront. Although it is virtually impossible to disassociate identitarian aspect of the 
notion, ‗minority‘ from an emphasis on rights, the discussion articulating the concepts of 
‗sub-identity‘ and ‗upper identity‘ refers to a broader identitarian context. 
 
As already mentioned above, the concept of ‗minority‘ has always been very controversial in 
Turkish politics as the Turkish state has tended to call all its citizens ‗Turkish‘. As explored in 
                                                            
49 Within the literature, the identity acquired by birth is coined as ‗ethnic identity‘ whereas the one granted by 
the state is called as ‗civil identity‘. However, I deem it important to translate them literally from Turkish and 
name them as ‗sub-identity‘ and ‗upper-identity‘ in order to reflect better the pace and gist of the discourse 
within the Turkish context.    
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Chapter 4, according to Lausanne Treaty, only Greeks, Armenians, Jewish and Bulgarians are 
deemed as minorities (Oran, 25 October 2004). Although the Kurds are excluded from this 
designation, Article 66 of the Turkish constitution proclaiming, ‗every individual linked to the 
Republic of Turkey with citizenship is Turkish‘ has increasingly been claimed to ignore other 
identities, such as the Kurdish identity, by different strands starting from 1990s onwards. 
Within this perspective, ‗Europe‘ has increasingly been articulated in relation to the notion of 
‗minority‘. 
 
In the following statement, Baskin Oran, prominent Turkish scholar and one of the lead 
architects of ‗Minority Rights and Cultural Rights Report‘ 50 , focuses on how the EU 
accession emerges as a top-down challenge to the traditional Turkish ‗minority‘ conception 
and brings the understanding of equality. Here, ‗Europe‘ is articulated as a second phase of 
Mustafa Kemal‘s modernisation revolution in the sense that it would accelerate the assertion 
of minority rights. 
 
Turkey‘s perception of ‗minority‘ is completely different from the EU perspective. By 
‗minority‘, the EU wants those who are not in majority and power to be subject to the 
very same treatment as those in power and majority (…) The EU says, ‗If the majority 
is able to learn Turkish, the Kurdish minority should be able to learn Kurdish as well‘. 
Because, according to the EU‘s definition of 'minority‘, all citizens are absolutely 
equal.  Whatever the EU calls a ‗minority right‘ is actually the right to equality. (…) 
The EU has accelerated the whole process. If it were not for Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk] 
and his top-down reforms, Turkey would come to that point in 150 years; but Mustafa 
Kemal made it in 10 years. Now, with the EU Harmonisation Packages, the second 
phase of Mustafa Kemal‘s top-down revolution is being realised  (Oran, 25 October 
2004). 
 
 
                                                            
50 For further details about the significance of the Report, see Chapter 5 
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Here, Oran fixes ‗Europe‘ as a top-down process similar to Mustafa Kemal‘s reforms in the 
1920s and 1930s, which would bring minorities the same rights as majorities. The 
proliferation of multiple identities is achieved by granting rights to minorities. All in all, 
‗Europe‘ is articulated in a rights-based manner (for further examples see Mahçupyan, 1 
December 2006; Oran, 25 October 2004, Nezan, 2 June 2004; Elçi, 14 June 2004, Reisoğlu, 
11 November 2004). 
 
In the following interview, Hasip Kaplan, a very famous lawyer who is well-known for his 
defence of the Kurdish issue in the International Court of Human Rights at various instances, 
and who became a member of the Parliament from the DTP in the aftermath of July 2007 
general elections, states that the resolution of the Kurdish issue is closely related to the EU 
accession in general and Copenhagen Criteria in particular: 
 
Minority rights form the root of the Copenhagen Criteria. All these criteria should be 
fulfilled. It would be fruitful to understand the motto: ‗the way to the EU passes 
through Diyarbakır 51 ‘ in terms of the close link between EU accession and the 
resolution of Kurdish question. Does not Turkey have to pay attention to almost 20 
million Kurdish citizens living in Turkey as it had to some hundred thousand people 
[in Cyprus]? (Kaplan, 27 May 2004). 
 
 
Both in Baskın Oran‘s statement and Hasip Kaplan‘s interview, particular events of the 
Copenhagen Criteria and 2004 Progress Report are constructed as the variants of the multiple 
identities debate on a rights-based manner and ‗Europe‘ is constructed as a gateway to the 
proliferation of Kurdish identity and the granting of rights to the Kurds. 
                                                            
51 Diyarbakır is a city in South-East Turkey in which the largest Kurdish population inhabits. This statement, ‗the 
way to the EU passes through Diyarbakir‘ was first made by the then vice-prime minister Mesut Yilmaz, right 
after the Helsinki Council.  
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Another ramification of this right-based discourse is the proliferation of ‗of-Turkey-ness‘52 as 
an upper-identity (e.g. Uyanık, 4 September 2003; Ünal, 22 October 2004; Ekinci, 2 April 
2006). In the following statement, Baskın Oran points to this change in terms of Turkish 
identity and links it to the EU process, which is the second biggest top-down revolution in 
Turkey after Kemalism in the 1920s
53
: 
 
The transition and globalisation that Turkey is going through is called the EU process. 
During the EU process, our identity is changing. That‘s what we are reacting to. The 
identity of Turkish Muslim is changing into ‗of-Turkey-ness‘. Armenians and 
Suryanis will be a part of this society. If the state is subsidising the mosques, it will 
have to do the same for the cemevis and churches (…) In Turkey, two top-down 
revolutions have been experienced. The first one is the Kemalism during the 1920s. 
The second one is the EU accession process in the 2000s. The EU process is the 
continuation of the first revolution (Oran, 2 October 2006). 
 
 
 
In this statement, Oran claims that the challenge that the EU accession creates with regard to 
identities creates a cementing impact within the society which renders Armenians and 
Süryanis a part this society.  Therefore, in this picture, besides its function of unleashing the 
sub-identities, Europe emerges as an overall ideal that links these sub-identities to each other 
(e.g. Kırıkkanat, 3 December 2004; Ulusoy, 29 October 2003). In this quotation, Ahmet İnsel 
makes an association between the European integration process and the emergence of 
‗Europe‘ as an overarching identity that links the sub-identities under the same rubric: 
 
                                                            
52 Although it is not an accurate translation grammar-wise, I deem it important to use the literal translation as it 
had been coined within the debates in the Turkish context. The notion, ‗of-Turkey-ness‘ in this context has been 
offered as opposed to ‗Turkishness‘ where the former embraces all sub-identities and emerges as an upper-
identity.  
53 For a more detailed discussion on the main tenets of Kemalism, see Chapter 5  
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What is experienced in Turkey today is a religious and ethnic communitarianisation. 
Alevis and Kurds increasingly define themselves in terms of significant and powerful 
Alevi and Kurdish identities. We have to create  an upper social ideal. The EU is the 
bearer of such an ideal. If we aim at another alternative, everybody will be withdrawn 
to his/her own identity and increase the effort to save him-/herself through his/her 
identity (İnsel, 25 March 2002). 
 
 
Therefore, during the ongoing EU accession, it has been denoted by various actors to claim 
that ‗Europe‘ is significant both for unleashing sub-identities and uniting them under the 
rubric of an ‗upper identity‘, i.e. ‗of-Turkey-ness‘ and as an upper identity itself which would 
unite people as an overarching identity. 
 
During this period, an identitarian reading of ‗Europe‘ has also been articulated within the 
framework of this discourse in a way in which it facilitates and promotes the emergence and 
assertion of particular identities (e.g. Keyman, 24 April 2005). When put in a broader 
perspective, this tendency to associate ‗Europe‘ with cultural rights and multiplication of 
identities in general overlaps with what is known in Turkish public space as the ‗second 
republicanism‘. The so-called ‗second republic‘, defended by numerous intellectuals, 
including famous journalists and scholars such as Mehmet Altan, Cengiz Çandar and Hikmet 
Özdemir, sought to articulate a liberal democratic politics. This trend is usually associated 
with Özal‘s neo-liberal economic policies, who was the architecture of replacement of Import 
Substitution Industrialisation with Export-Led Growth as far as the growth strategy usurped by 
the Turkish economy is concerned. This process has co-existed with the concept of ‗structural 
adjustment‘, which meant the adjustment of Turkish economy to the exigencies of neo-liberalism 
and the transformation of Turkish economy into a more market-based economy (for a more 
detailed outline of Özal‘s economic policies, see Öniş, 2004; Kalaycıoğlu, 2002; Ergüder, 1988). 
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‗The second republicanism envisages a liberal state and society based on free market, 
internationally competitive economy, minimal state, individualization, pluralism and human 
rights‘ (Erdoğan and Üstüner, 2004: 511). 
 
Mehmet Altan, one of the vanguards of this strand and a prominent figure in Movement for 
Europe 2002, in the following interview, points to this relation sustained between the EU 
accession process and the realisation of the second republican ideals in Turkey: 
 
When the overall acquis communitaire of the EU will be implemented, society will get 
better. Therefore, an apology is needed for the second republicanists.  Because, when 
you had said in the past what the EU says now, you used to be labelled a traitor. As 
this country does not derive its origins from democracy, a democrat is seen as being 
against the regime. The EU does not have such a mentality. The things we say are 
known by a child at elementary school level in the EU. But here, you are spending 
your life arguing this, being sworn at. Therefore, in terms of its content and spirit, 
Europe is second republicanist. With the Copenhagen Criteria, a period for a second 
republic starts in Turkey. If you demand a liberal democratic state and society, 
democracy, human rights and market economy, this is exactly what the Copenhagen 
Criteria are (Altan, 24 January 2000). 
 
 
All in all, ‗Europe‘, with its transformative impact on minority rights, the proliferation of sub-
identities and the unification of these identities under the rubric of an ‗upper identity‘ refers to 
the broader context of ‗democracy‘ within the context of this discourse.  In the following 
statement, Selahattin Kaya, a prominent political figure in the Kurdish movement who 
worked as an attaché in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 20 years and as a mayor in Bingöl 
(a city predominantly inhabited by the Kurds) in 1989-1994 period, points to the fact that 
democracy brought about by Europe will loom large in terms of ending the problems of 
Kurds. However, it should initiate a broader effort on part of Turkey in terms of democracy: 
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Kurds are the ones who support Turkish EU membership most. Because, the arrival of a 
European-standard democracy at Turkey means the end of their pain (...) Moreover, the 
democracy demand of the region is not a demand only in terms of the individual rights. 
European Union only intervenes to a country within the framework of Copenhagen 
Criteria. That is, it does not intervene in terms of other freedoms than the individual 
rights. It says, ‗resolve it in accordance with your own conditions. (...) The Kurdish 
issue will not terminate even if Turkey joins the EU and all the rights within the 
framework of the Copenhagen Criteria are granted. This will not answer to the society‘s 
needs and the unrest will persist. It is impossible to resolve the Kurdish issue around 
constitutional citizenship. You can deal with the problems of a Kurd from Istanbul with 
individual rights but you cannot do it in Diyarbakır (...) [However], the Kurdish issue at 
Diyarbakır could only be resolved with collective rights. The issue will be resolved 
when you grant self-determination to all the Kurds of Turkey at the regions where they 
are a majority. This has many shapes stretching from autonomy to confederation (Kaya, 
22 August 2005). 
 
 
 
Similarly, in the following interview, Ahmet Türk, the then co-chair of DTP, states that 
‗Europe‘ sparks off a broader process in terms of democratization in Turkey: 
 
EU membership would bring democratisation to Turkey. This would make Kurds 
more comfortable. There are so many problems to be solved and debated. One should 
not think ‗Turkey is joining the EU, all the issue is over‘. At least 15 years is needed 
for Turkish EU membership. It is not right to tell the Kurds, ‗be silent for 15 years‘ 
(…) The EU membership is a big step for the democratisation of Turkey in general, 
and for the democratic solution of the Kurdish issue and guaranteeing some rights of 
the Kurds in particular (Türk, 17 April 2006). 
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2.2. Recap 1: Signification chain forged by Dmultiple identity 
 
To reiterate, within the framework of this discourse, ‗Europe‘ is associated with cultural and 
minority rights. In this respect, ‗minority‘ is a significant articulated signifier. Within the 
framework of a rights-based perspective, the notions of ‗sub-identity‘ and ‗upper identity‘ are 
also included within the signification chain. ‗Europe‘ in this respect is articulated as a notion 
which would not only unleash sub-identities and assert minority rights and cultural diversity, 
but also unify different identities under the umbrella of an upper identity. This overlaps with 
an identitarian reading of ‗Europe‘ within the period which generally sets identities as 
contested, negotiated and problematic. When this is translated to the context of ‗Europe‘, we 
are introduced a representation of ‗Europe‘ as an articulation of particular identities, cultural 
rights, a liberal state with a pluralist society and market economy. Therefore, within the 
signification chain, the signifiers of ‗minority‘, ‗sub-identity‘, ‗upper identity‘ and 
‗democracy‘ as the privileged signifier are associated and rendered equivalent to the notion of 
‗Europe‘. In other words, the discourse on ‗Europe‘ contingently articulates the above 
elements into a more or less stable whole. It is important to note that these elements are only 
some of the components of the above discourse on ‗Europe‘ and are not exhaustive. Within a 
signification chain there are an infinite number of elements, as there are within this one (such 
as ‗second republicanism‘, ‗cultural diversity‘ etc.).  
 
In terms of political identities, another important point to remember is that Dmultiple identity    
draws upon the particularisation of identities (e.g. the Kurdish identity, the Alevi identity, 
etc.), hence operating within the logic of difference. As I have already mentioned in Chapter 
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3, the antagonistic frontier in the logic of difference is weakened and the Other is less 
significant (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 11). However, it is still possible to identify the 
Other within this discourse: the singular identity of ‗Turkishness‘.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
≡                         ≡                  ≡ ≡     ≡ 
 
 
Figure 1: The signification chain constructed for Dmultiple identity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       EUROPE 
democracy   minority sub-identity upper identity  
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2.3. Discourse 2: ‘Europe’ as a guarantee of territorial integrity and the decrease in 
terrorism (D territorial integrity/anti-terrorism) 
 
 
You cannot have PKK in an EU-member country. There will be no raison 
d’être of PKK where basic rights and liberties are under the guarantee of law. 
Ümit Fırat 54 (10 April 2006) 
 
Another significant discourse attached to the notion of ‗Europe‘ in the aforementioned period 
is based on the conviction that if Turkey becomes a part of the EU and harmonises with 
European-type rights and liberties, the terrorist activities and separatist movements within the 
country will not be able to attract any supporters, thus leading to territorial integrity and 
perpetual peace. 
 
During the EU accession period, it has been claimed that if Turkey becomes an EU member, 
the terrorist aims of the PKK will be doomed to failure as the Kurdish citizens of Turkey will 
prefer to live in ‗peace and prosperity‘, rather than under a pan-Kurdist rule. ‗Pan-Kurdist‘ 
within this context means the establishment of a Kurdish state as to entail all the Kurds. 
According to Odabaşı, the Kurdish political tradition has always revolved around a 40-50-
year organisation model ‗aiming to emancipate the Kurds of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey‘ 
(Odabaşı, 19 December 2004). As a follow-up of the previous discourse, although there was 
an ongoing debate in the mentioned period whether individual rights and liberties stipulated 
by the Copenhagen Criteria will satisfy the Kurds who also opt for collective rights and some 
                                                            
54 Ümit Fırat is a prominent Kurdish intellectual and one of the organizers of the Kurdish conference at Bilgi 
University on 12 March 2006. 
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commentators point out that the European citizenship is not enough for the Kurds of Turkey 
(see Kaya, 22 August 2005; Turk, 17 April 2006;  Elçi, 14 February 2005), there was a near 
consensus within the debates that the EU integration would mean the waning of the idea of a 
separation on the part of the Kurds. In this respect, ‗territorial integrity‘ emerged as the 
keyword which would be assured by ‗Europe‘. 
 
In the following statement, Kendal Nezan, head of Paris Kurdish Institute points to a similar 
link between the EU integration and end of terrorism: 
 
Why would the Kurds who acquired their basic rights and liberties crave for a separate 
state, why would they seek a pan-Kurdism dream? Is not it better to live all together in 
welfare, freely and equally under the EU flag? (Nezan, 2 June 2004). 
 
Şerafettin Elçi, one of the most prominent Kurdish intellectuals known for his stance against 
violence, and an ex-minister in Ecevit government in 1978 in the following statement 
highlights the fact that the EU process will render the motive for self-determination 
meaningless especially in the case of the Kurds in Turkey: 
 
A happy citizen would never separate from his/her own state. This is linked to 
Turkey‘s performance. If Turkey is able to make her citizens happy, Northern Iraq 
will never be a centre of attraction for the Kurdish. Turkey on the way to the EU is a 
more viable centre of attraction for the Kurdish. It‘s easier for the Kurds to proclaim 
their rights politically in a Turkey on the way to the EU (…) Until the last quarter of 
the 20
th
 century, self-determination was desired. However, after the developments in 
the EU, this has proved to be meaningless. Different peoples can claim their rights 
easier within wider political alliances (Elçi, 14 June 2004). 
 
 
The message given in Ankara to the mayor of Diyarbakır and the members of DEHAP (the 
precedent party of DTP) by the ambassadors of the EU member countries on 21 Nisan 2005 
215 
 
was quite significant in terms of fortifying this link between the EU integration and the 
futility of PKK terrorism: 
 
Walking on the way paved by Abdullah Öcalan is a cul-de-sac. Similarly, violence is 
not a solution. Violence will bring no benefit to the Kurds. The EU is an integration 
project. We do take the whole Turks into account, not the people at the mountains 
(quoted in Radikal, 22 April 2005). 
 
 
This point has been emphasised extensively in the debates on the impact of the EU on 
diminishing the public support given to PKK and on distancing the Kurdish movement from 
the so-called ‗Ocalan cult‘ (e.g. Akyol, 28 April 2006, Sezgin, and 1 October 2004). One of 
the headings used in the daily newspaper Yeni Şafak in October 2004 could be read in line 
with this claim: ‗Does the EU process distance the Kurds from Ocalan?‘ (quoted in Akyol, 28 
April 2006). 
 
Thus, the emergence of the EU as a peace project, besides its role of functioning as unitive 
rather than separative in Turkey, will lead to ‗decrease in terrorism‘ within the region. In the 
following statement, Mine Kırıkkanat points out to the tribal and feudal social structure of the 
South-East region where Kurds predominantly inhibit and by giving examples from Europe, 
refers to the EU process as a catalyst for the perpetuation of equality, freedom and welfare 
which would ameliorate those problems of the region and make the autonomy and separation 
plans of Kurds unnecessary: 
 
European Union is the biggest peace project of the human history of 5000 years that 
have been full of bloody wars. European Union is an answer to and an alternative to 
the US which increasingly constructs its universal hegemony on the clash of 
civilisations, even on a perspective of religious wars. Not all of the EU members are 
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federations like Spain. None forces the others to be federations. For instance, France is 
a unitary state. And, when Spain gives autonomy to Basque, Catalunia, Andalucia, 
Galicia etc., French basquans, Catalans did not rebel saying ‗we also want autonomy‘. 
Why? Because they have already acquired equality, freedom and welfare. At this 
point, the Kurdish citizens of Turkey have to show maturity and struggle with the 
customs which would render them a tribe rather than citizens, instead of separatist 
demands. As long as the clan order in the region continues, they cannot acquire 
democracy, welfare, freedom or European civilization (Kırıkkanat, 15 December 
2004). 
 
 
All in all, the decrease in terrorism and the territorial integrity brought about by ‗Europe‘ 
means ‗democracy‘. Therefore, ‗Europe‘ brings a broader democracy perspective, which the 
Kurdish movement has to pay attention to. Enver Sezgin, another significant Kurdish 
intellectual, an ex-TKP (Türkiye Komünist Partisi-Turkish Communist Party) member and 
one of the founders of New Democracy Initiative at the 1990s, mentions that the fact that the 
Kurdish movement should not confine itself to the release of Abdullah Ocalan, but should 
rather have a broader democracy perspective: 
 
[as an answer to a question on whether PKK likes the democracy brought by the EU]. 
The latest PKK attacks [July 2005] curbs, intentionally or non-intentionally, Turkey‘s 
catch-up with the EU‘s democracy standards. They need democracy if they want 
general amnesty. To get involved in a legal struggle, they need democracy as well. 
The solution to the Kurdish question and the EU process are closely intertwined. 
Copenhagen Criteria entails all the individual and collective rights they desire. 
However, not only PKK but also some Kurdish intellectuals are not aware of the 
significance of the EU process. Instead of dealing with the issue from a wider 
democracy perspective, they narrow it down to Öcalan‘s isolation or freedom (Sezgin, 
11 July 2005). 
 
 
Hasan Cemal, in the following quote, points to this urge on the part of the Kurdish movement 
to distance itself with the PKK. Moreover, if Turkey does not join the EU process, Northern 
Iraq will be a better centre of attraction for Kurds. The significance of Northern Iraq within 
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the discussions on ‗Europe‘ has been explored thoroughly in the previous chapter but to 
reiterate, in the Turkish domestic debates, the PKK terrorism has been used almost 
synonymously with the region of Northern Iraq and after its recognition as one of the 
constitutionally defined federal regions of Iraq made the region a locus of reference for the 
Kurdish identity. According to Cemal, in the region, Kurds have their own universities, 
newspapers, radio stations, police force and head of the state, which is likely to make it 
attractive for the Kurds (Cemal, 25 April 2005). 
 
If the Kurdish political movement wants to be taken seriously and to be realistic, it has 
to determine its relation to Imrali. If the Kurds care about the EU, democracy, rule of 
law, they have to get rid of Apo‘s shadow and reveal that they genuinely refuse 
violence (...) New obstacles will be encountered on the way to the EU and 
democratisation. You will, on the one hand, be at the mountains with a gun in your 
hand. On the other hand, you will do politics in the city. Nobody would buy this. (...) 
[However], within the premises of democracy, you render Turkey a reasonable place 
to co-exist (Cemal, 25 April 2005). 
 
 
2.4. Recap 2: Signification chain forged by Dterritorial integrity/anti-terrorism 
 
In a nutshell, within the framework of this discourse, ‗Europe‘ is articulated as a catalyst 
which would introduce other collective action options than the PKK in Turkey and thus 
render separation demands and PKK terrorism redundant. This would lead to the decrease in 
terrorism and territorial integrity of Turkey. Putting democracy into a broader perspective as 
such rather than trapping the Kurdish movement into Abdullah Ocalan cult will sustain the 
territorial integrity of Turkey with its happy and affluent citizens from all ethnic origins. 
Therefore, within the signification chain, the elements of ‗territorial integrity‘, ‗decrease in 
terrorism‘ and ‗democracy‘ as the privileged signifier are associated and rendered equivalent 
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to the notion of ‗Europe‘. In other words, the discourse on ‗Europe‘ contingently articulates 
the above elements into a more or less stable whole. It is important to note that these elements 
are only some of the components of the above discourse on‘ Europe‘ and are not exhaustive. 
Within a signification chain there are an infinite number of elements, as there are within this 
one (such as ‗freedom‘, ‗peace‘, ‗autonomy‘ etc.). 
 
Last, but not least, Dterritorial integrity/anti-terrorism, makes possible the emergence of differential 
identities (e.g. ‗Different peoples can claim their rights easier within wider political alliances 
(…) such as the EU‘, Elçi, 14 June 2004), thereby operating within the logic of difference. As 
I have already mentioned in Chapter 3, the antagonistic frontier in the logic of difference is 
weakened and the Other is less significant (Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000: 11). However, it 
is still possible to identify the Other within this discourse: ‗disintegration‘ and ‗terrorism‘.  
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Figure 2: The signification chain constructed for Dterritorial integrity/anti-terrorism 
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2. 5. Discourse 3: ‘Europe’ as a threat to sovereignty (D threat to sovereignty) 
 
There is no difference between today’s pro-EU circles and those who wanted to 
be a British and German-led mandated territory in the early 1920s (…) We will 
not let anybody run down our country which we had inherited. 
 
Youth Federation (11 January 2005) 
 
This line of the discourse culminates in the depiction of ‗Europe‘ as a front that is seeking an 
opportunity to invade the Republic of Turkey culturally and politically. Thus, according to 
this discourse, during the EU process, sine qua nons and the policy priorities of the Turkish 
state such as being a unitary and secular state following the doctrines of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk are violated by the conditions put forward by the EU. As already mentioned in 
Chapter 4, this depiction of ‗Europe‘ as a threat to sovereignty and secularism of Turkey is 
referenced as the ‗Sevres syndrome‘, which argues that the Europeans have always tried to 
sweep the Turks away from the ancestral European- Christian territories and to restore those 
lands back to their rightful owners, the Armenians and the Greeks in the past and now the 
Kurds (Yılmaz, 2006: 38). 
 
Moreover, according to this conceptualisation, ‗Europe‘, mainly meaning the EU, 
instrumentalises Turkey‘s membership bid. Europe tries to obtain ‗unilateral concessions‘ on 
human rights, using the Copenhagen Criteria obligations and Customs Union (Manisalı, 12 
January 2007; Aygün, 17 October 2005). But in reality, ‗Europe‘ shows it is not ready to 
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welcome Turkey at every occasion. The idea that although completing all the requirements, 
Turkey is still not accepted as a member and faces new requirements for membership just 
because it is never considered as part of Europe, is prevalent in Turkey (Güneş-Ayata, 2003; 
Müftüler-Baç, 1999; Avcı, 2003). 
 
The debate on ‗unilateral concessions‘ has mainly culminated around the Customs Union. The 
gist of this debate was that EU integration will render Turkey dependent on the EU even more 
which than had been already the case as a result of the Customs Union. The EU and Turkey 
are linked by a Customs Union agreement, which came in force on 31 December 1995, 
pursuant to the 1963 EU-Turkey Association Agreement, which aims at promoting trade and 
economic relations. The Customs Union is ambitious but does not cover essential economic 
areas, such as agriculture, to which bilateral trade concessions apply, services or public 
procurement (the European Commission, 2009). Based on the idea of minimising trade 
barriers and tariffs, the Customs Union is usually depicted by this discourse under the focus of 
a tool used by the EU to benefit from Turkish economy and to render it dependent on 
European rule. Sinan Aygün, the Chair of ATO (Ankara Ticaret Odası-Ankara Commerce 
Chamber), in the following quotation, points to the Custom Union‘s interference with 
Turkey‘s economic relations with the third countries, which is another way of keeping Turkey 
under control: 
 
Why would I not collaborate with Japan? Iran wants to have a mutual trade 
agreement. We cannot make it because of the Customs Union. I do not have 
independence. I cannot make business. We can develop our trade with Iran just like 
France had. The Customs Union does not allow selling more to Iran. The EU tells us, 
‗you need to obey the trade agreements you had realised with the third countries‘. 
Turkey‘s economy is not independent. The Customs Union Agreement has to be torn 
down. There are 185 countries in the world. 25 of them have signed a Customs 
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Union Agreement. Is Canada, Japan, South Korea destroyed? (Aygün, 17 October 
2005). 
 
 
In the following quotation, Yiğit Bulut likens the Customs Union to Baltalimanı Agreement, 
the agreement signed by the Ottoman Empire and Britain in 1838, which granted various 
economic concessions to Britain and which is seen as the collapse  of economic independence 
of the Empire: 
 
The essence of the Customs Union we apply today is the same as the Baltalimani 
Trade Agreement that had been signed by the Ottomans during the period of 
collapse. You cannot contribute to the administration, you‘re only left with weak 
industries, banking system and SMEs surrendered to crude trade. You cannot even 
do free trade with the third countries. You have to surrender your customs rights in 
accordance with the agreements by the members. While the rights of the member 
states shaping the decision-making mechanisms regarding third countries are still 
valid, you cannot benefit even from those rights (...) [What we see are] a country tied 
to bed and rendered disabled and a policy which does not even bother to change the 
logic of ‗we will not be able to get out of the Customs Union anyway‘ (Bulut, 15 
March 2004). 
 
 
In above quotations, both Yiğit Bulut and Sinan Aygün articulate ‗Europe‘ as a force which is 
keen on acquiring ‗unilateral concessions‘ from Turkey via means of a Customs Union, 
Copenhagen Criteria and like.  This is mainly due to the fact that ‗Europe‘, since the 19th 
century, had a uniform agenda to turn Turkey and the then Ottoman Empire into a colony (e.g. 
Bilget, 15 December 2006; Baykal, 26 September 2006; Sirmen, 9 December 2006; Kılınç, 15 
April 2003). 
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Therefore, another important component of this discourse is the conviction that the continuity 
between the demands of the Europeans of the 19
th
 century from the Ottoman Empire and the 
EU‘s principles is represented by the ‗hidden agenda‘ of the latter. In the following quotation, 
Bülent Yahnici, the then vice president of Nationalist Action Party (MHP) when it was the 
junior partner of the 1999-2002 DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition, links the failure of the EU to list 
PKK and DHKP-C
55
 as terrorist organizations to the ‗secondary‘/ ‗hidden‘ agenda it has. 
 
Are we still going to continue our relationships with the EU if they do not deem PKK 
or DHKP-C as terrorist organisations? (…) The unrealistic attitude perpetuated 
against a terrorist organisation which has caused the death of far more people than 
any other terrorist organisation in the world should be explained to Turkey if it‘s true 
and if it does not have any other explanation, reason, ‗a hidden agenda‘ or a 
‗secondary list‘. If they just don‘t see it as a terrorist organisation without any 
righteous reason, are we going to continue our relationship with the EU by 
disregarding this issue? (quoted in Radikal, 2 January 2002). 
 
 
In the following statement, Erol Manisalı evaluates the ‗Yes to Turkey‘ posters in the 
European Parliament as a manifestation of this ‗hidden agenda‘ of the EU. In a European 
Parliament meeting on 15 December 2004, 2 days before Copenhagen Summit where the EU 
would decide on whether to start negotiations with Turkey or not, some parliamentarians 
supported the report on Turkey prepared by the Christian Democrat Camiel Eurlings and held 
posters saying ‗yes‘ in Turkish to Turkish EU membership (Radikal, 15 December 2004). In 
the following quotation, the well-known Euro-sceptic Erol Manisalı presents ‗Yes‘ of the 
parliament as a part of the ‗hidden agenda‘ of Europe: 
                                                            
55 DHKP-C (Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi Cephesi-Revolutionary People‘s Salvation Party Front) is a terrorist 
organization established in 1994 aiming to replace the existing order in Turkey by armed struggle and to bring 
socialism. It is not as significant as PKK in Turkish political debates and although it caused death of civilians as 
well from time to time, it is never depicted as a substantial threat to the Turkish state:  
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The ‗Yes‘ of the European Parliament is presented as, ‗the EU said yes to Turkey‘ by 
deceiving 70 million people. The EP says, ‗we can only negotiate under the conditions 
which are going to pave the way to Sevres‘. Some media circles are trying to present a 
Yes to Sevres as a yes to a normal membership. I think this should be renamed as a 
covert fascism (Manisalı, 7 January 2005). 
 
Moreover, this depiction of ‗Europe‘ as a front with a ‗hidden agenda‘ which is after 
‗unilateral concessions‘ from Turkey and which will lead to the latter‘s territorial 
disintegration is also coupled with a fear that European demands will foster Islamic 
fundamentalism in Turkey. As already mentioned in Chapter 4, Turkish state tradition has 
always referred to Islamic fundamentalism as an enemy of the secular structure of the state. 
This sensitivity has been even more prevalent after AKP coming to power, which is a party 
which recruited its executive cadres from former political parties with Islamic agenda. All in 
all, within this framework, Turkish people should be aware of the ‗dangers‘ of ethnic 
separatism and Islamic fundamentalism incited by ‗Europe‘. Nahit Şenoğul, the then Chief 
Commander of the Military Academy, makes a reference to the ‗eternal enemies of Turkey‘ in 
the following quotation and draws attention to the disintegration aspect of the ‗danger‘: 
 
When Turkish membership was announced, everybody in the Turkish society became 
very happy. However, more than us, Greeks and Greek Cypriots became happy. The 
separatists and those trying to destroy the Republic became happy. Perhaps, more than 
everybody else, Claudia Roth
56
, who went to Diyarbakır to appoint an ambassador 
became happy. Do all these tell you a story? (Şenoğul, 11 January 2001). 
 
 
                                                            
56 German politician and co-Chair of German Green Party. She was heavily criticized by the Eurosceptic circles 
due to the numerous visits she had paid to Diyarbakir and her speeches on the Kurdish issue and the right of the 
Kurds for self-determination. Within this perspective, Şenoğul, by using the word ‗ambassador‘, is probably 
making a reference to her ‗demand‘ for a free Kurdistan.    
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Similarly, Erol Manisalı in the following quotation draws attention to the compatibility 
between European demands from Turkey which would culminate in mild Islam and AKP‘s 
existence in power: 
 
The EU has an integrative, democratic and social identity internally speaking. 
[However], [i]t is separatist, imperialist, oppressive, Islamist and illegal against 
countries like Turkey (...) There is a Turkey model within the EU accession: an 
Islamist and comprador political party in power, i.e. mild Islam [and] a political party 
of capital in opposition. The latter would function as a safety net for the Islamist 
structure so that it would not follow a fundamentalist and anti-Americanist path. No 
doubt, it is indispensible to add to this picture a Kurdist, separatist and Western 
political party (Manisalı, 21 April 2008). 
 
 
All in all, Europe which poses a ‗danger‘ to Turkey with its hidden agenda and ‗unilateral 
concession‘ demands from Turkey is a ‗security‘ issue. Tuncer Kılınç in the following 
statement makes a good summary of the depiction of all aforementioned points as a ‗threat‘ in 
a speech he made in Brussels on 15 April 2003: 
 
I support EU membership but I don‘t have any hope for that. They would never open 
this door to us. Since the conquest of Istanbul, Europe has always taken us as an 
enemy. The EU is never as warm as to hug you. They would never include the Turks 
who are the continuation of a people who came up to the Viennese gates. The EU has 
never supported Turkey. This is due to cultural or religious factors. Europe has 
mentioned Armenian issue in the 1850s. After the First World War, it paved the way 
to many incidents by rendering us and the Armenians enemies. PKK has been 
functionalized by the EU. The EU is responsible for the death of 33000 people. The 
EU has supported the terrorist organizations in Turkey overtly or covertly. The EU is 
scared that Turkey will burgeon again and be the next Ottoman Empire (quoted in 
Radikal, 26 April 2003). 
 
Similarly, when the Public Prosecutor pressed a charge against AKP for its closure and when 
various European figures condemned this at various instances, Cumhuriyet published a 
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commentary in the name of the newspaper posing a link between Europe‘s ‗intervention‘ to 
the Turkish judiciary‘s independence and War of Independence, rendering Europe a ‗security‘ 
issue: 
 
We have a constitution and a constitutional court; our basic law is not very different 
from those of the member states, although it has aspects to criticize (...) We are a 
state established via the struggle against Europe‘s plan on the partition of Anatolia. 
This is one of our qualities (Cumhuriyet, 2 April 2008). 
 
 
 
2.6. Recap 3: Signification chain forged by D threat to sovereignty 
 
To summarise, within the framework of this discourse, ‗Europe‘ is articulated as a front that 
has a uniform agenda against the then Ottoman Empire and now Turkey. For this aim, it 
pushes its ‗hidden agenda‘ under the guise of Copenhagen criteria or Customs Union to obtain 
‗unilateral concessions‘ from Turkey. These all culminate in the ‗danger‘ of ethnic separatism 
and Islamic fundamentalism‘ which render ‗Europe‘ a ‗danger‘ and a ‗secuirty‘ issue. All in 
all, D threat to sovereignty contingently articulates the above elements into a more or less stable 
whole. It is important to note that these elements are only some of the components of the 
above discourse on‘ Europe‘ and are not exhaustive. Within a signification chain there is an 
infinite number of elements, as there are within this one (such as ‗limited authority of the 
army‘, ‗ethnic separatism‘, ‗rejuvenation of Sevres‘ etc.). Here, in contrast to the previous 
discourses and in line with the logic of equivalence, the depiction of the Other is more 
straightforward (e.g. ‗[the EU] is separatist, imperialist, oppressive, Islamist and illegal 
against countries like Turkey‘, Manisalı, 21 April 2008) and the antagonistic frontier is 
sharper between the Self (‗the Turkish state‘) and the Other (‗Europe‘).  
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Figure 3: The signification chain constructed for D threat to sovereignty 
 
 
 
 
2.7. Discourse 4: ‘Europe’ as a threat to Turkishness 
 
‘Turkey is not an impotent country which is submissive to Europe. We would 
not give up our national pride for the EU membership’ 
 
In the annual opening ceremony of the Parliament by Bülent Arınç, the then 
Chair (quoted in Zaman, 2 October 2005). 
 
 
This discourse draws upon similar security concerns to the issues articulated within the 
framework of D threat to sovereignty from a more identitarian point of view. The ‗lingering‘ twin 
threats of political Islam and Kurdish separatism are again the centre of the debate, this time 
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securitised in a rather identity-based manner. The usual references are the Turkish national 
pride, which had been rendered submissive to the EU and the insult of the Turkishness by the 
legal and political changes stipulated by the EU. Even if ‗Europe‘ is not a threat to different 
aspects of Turkish sovereignty, whatever demand is put forward by the former aims to 
undermine what describes ‗Turkishness‘, ‗Turkish nation‘ or ‗Turkish society‘. This is mainly 
achieved through the insincerity shown to Turkey via double standards and the insensitivity 
on the part of Europe to Turkish priorities and values stemming from history and state 
tradition. This discourse which depicts ‗Europe‘ as a threat to Turkishness dovetails with D 
threat to sovereignty to a considerable extent although the former reads Europe from a more 
identitarian point of view. 
 
In the following speech he made in the opening ceremony of the 2006-2007 academic year, 
Tuzla Navy War School, Yener Karahanoglu, Chief of Navy Forces, points to this 
insensitivity on the part of Europe shown to Turkey and ‗Turkish pride‘ through the EU 
accession process: 
 
Contemporary Turkey is the Turkey of Atatürk. Contemporary Turkey is sensitive in 
terms of national interests, constitutional untouchables and the welfare and security of 
the forthcoming generations at least as much as the EU countries. In terms of shaping 
her own future, Turkey does not need the impositions and suggestions of anyone else. 
It should be noted that Turkish Armed Forces cannot sacrifice and tolerate the erosion 
of constitutionally defined basic values of the Republic of Turkey for the sake of EU 
ideals and the EU accession process. I am leaving to our beloved people‘s discretion 
how much these should be taken seriously especially if those demands are ignoring 
our national pride, constitutional structure, our country‘s land, sea and air security, 
foreign policy interests, our Republic‘s establishment philosophy and our historical 
facts and destroying our national unity (quoted in Radikal, 30 September 2006). 
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This line of thought has also been used to criticize the AKP government in power on the 
grounds that they are not sensitive about the Turkish domestic issues, but are just trying to 
further their Islamic agenda (for further details about depiction of AKP and its ‗hidden 
agenda‘ along these lines see previuos chapter). In the following quotation, Hikmet Bila, a 
prominent journalist from Cumhuriyet, mentions this reluctance on the part of AKP about 
nationally sensitive issues and argues that ‗Europe‘ constantly introduces new criteria adverse 
to Turkish ‗national pride‘. This commentary has just been written after a European 
Parliament document in September 2006 which mentioned the need on the part of Turkey to 
recognise the killing of Greeks and Suryanis during War of Independence as ‗genocide‘ 
(quoted in Cumhuriyet, 16 November 2006): 
This time, they attempt to add three annexes to the Turkish history: Pontiac and Suryani 
genocide, designation of Alevis and Yezidis as minorities and liberalization of turban in 
the universities. Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that,‘ we are concerned about the 
attempts to introduce criteria far from objectivity‘. Similar reactions had been shown 
against the previous impositions. It seems that these attempts did not make any impact 
and were not taken seriously. Those who do not care humiliation of our national pride 
on the way to the EU are stalking. Perhaps they have no idea what ‗national pride‘ is 
(Bila, 29 September 2006). 
 
 
Not surprisingly, coupling of reaction to AKP and depiction of ‗Europe‘ as a front 
underestimating Turkish pride found its most noteworthy resonance within the framework of 
Article 301 debates. General spirit of the era of the debates on Article 301 and Orhan Pamuk 
case revolved around the link between humiliation of Turkishness and Europe as described by 
İlhan Selçuk, prolific Cumhuriyet journalist, ‗who wants to be a Turk when we, assassinator 
of 1 million Armenians and 30000 Kurds, are torn by genocide allegations and constantly 
humiliated by the EU officials?‘ (Selçuk, 3 January 2006).  Especially when the proposal on 
the amendment of the article 301 was debated in the EU Harmonization Commission within 
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the Parliament, CHP and MHP staunchly opposed the amendment of the article, which has 
been summarized by Onur Öymen, CHP deputy Chair, as: ‗the EU asks us the liberty to 
humiliate Turkishness‘ (quoted in Zaman, 17 April 2008). In the following quotation, Osman 
Durmuş, MHP MP, iterates this link between threat to Turkishness and ‗Europe‘ in a speech 
in the same Commission: 
If you substitute the notion of ‗Turkishness‘ with that of ‗Turkish nation‘, noone will 
be able to react if Turks living in Western Thrace, Caucasia or Kirkuk are humiliated. 
They will swear at the Turks at the European Parliament and the Turks will remain 
inactive. Do you think that it is possible? (quoted in Zaman, 17 April 2008). 
 
All in all, with its blind eye to national peculiarities and sensitivities, ‗Europe‘ is clearly a 
security issue which one should be aware of. In the following quotation, ‗Europe‘ is charged 
by Devlet Bahçeli with creating social cleavages in the society which had not existed before 
with its provisions on minorities in the Copenhagen Criteria and Progress Reports: 
 
Legitimising separatism and provocation based on class, community and ethnical 
roots has nothing to do with the burgeoning of a democratic order or with the EU 
membership. The will to relate taking precautions against separatism and provokism 
with EU membership-just as it has been done in terms of the Cyprus issue- does not 
change the fact that the sensitivities in terms of national unity are curbed and 
democracy is weakened. Moreover, this understanding causes the emergence of an 
impression that the EU is indifferent to and even negative about Turkey‘s national 
sensitivities and that our EU target is diluted. That our EU perspective is rendered a 
matter of exploitation does not do anything more than to deepen the hesitancies 
within Turkish public opinion (quoted in Radikal, 6 February 2002). 
 
Similarly, in the following quotation, Erol Ertuğrul, a lawyer who writes regularly at 
Cumhuriyet, mentions a similar concern in terms of European demands on minorities, 
amounting to a breach of Lausanne Treaty, which clearly has to do with our ‗security‘: 
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The EU does not demand any member or candidate state what it demands us. It wants 
things from us which hurt our national pride and lead to disintegation. It wants the 
recognition of ‗Kurdistan‘ and Greek Cypriot Administration. (... ) The cadre running 
our country does not genuinely aim to be a part of Europe, but to realize their own 
agendas under the guise of EU demands. Now we should contemplate once again: is 
the agreement signed on 17 December 2004 a success or a real surrender? Are we 
giving back what we achieved by Lausanne? We should say ‗no‘ to this all together. 
No one can take our independence, national pride and unity from us!!! (Ertugrul, 7 
January 2005). 
 
 
 
 
2.8. Recap 4: Signification chain forged by D threat to Turkishness: 
 
In a nutshell, this discourse draws upon similar security concerns to the issues articulated 
within the framework of D threat to sovereignty from a more identitarian point of view. ‗Europe‘ 
within this framework is pictured as a threat posed against ‗national pride‘ and as an insult of 
Turkishness. At a general level, this insult is realised through legal and political changes 
stipulated by the EU which are insensitive to Turkish priorities and values. This discourse has 
also dovetailed with a staunch criticism of the AKP on the grounds that the former is not 
sensitive about the Turkish domestic issues, but is just trying to further their Islamic agenda. 
All in all, D threat to Turkishness contingently articulates the above elements into a more or less 
stable whole. It is important to note that these elements are only some of the components of 
the above discourse on‘ Europe‘ and are not exhaustive. Within a signification chain there are 
an infinite number of elements, as there are within this one (such as ‗double standards‘, 
‗assault of dignity‘ etc.).  
 
It is also important to note that in D threat to Turkishness, similar to D threat to sovereignty and in line with 
the logic of equivalence, the depiction of the Other is more straightforward (e.g. ‗This time, 
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they attempt to add three annexes to the Turkish history: Pontiac and Suryani genocide, 
designation of Alevis and Yezidis as minorities and liberalization of turban in the universities 
(…) Those who do not care humiliation of our national pride on the way to the EU are 
stalking‘, Bila, 29 September 2006) and the antagonistic frontier is sharper between the Self 
(‗the Turkish state‘) and the Other (‗Europe‘).  
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Figure 4: The signification chain constructed for D threat to Turkishness 
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3. CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this chapter, by using the question list compiled in the Methodology chapter, I highlighted 
the discourses on ‗Europe‘ in the Turkish political debates within the 1999-2008 period as 
they were represented in the newspapers of Cumhuriyet, Zaman and Radikal. I showed how 
the discourses on ‗Europe‘ articulated signification chains  through different elements. 
Although there is an infinite number of elements articulated by those discourses, the 
privileged signifiers of ‗democracy‘ and ‗security‘ were always already included within the 
chains one way or another. It is important to say at this point that the statements included in 
this chapter are not the exhaustive result of my newspaper research. The myriad statements 
(218 statements) have been narrowed down to 30 statements. In order to exemplify the 
statements I used, I included 2 statements for each signifier articulated within the signification 
chain of ‗Europe‘ for each discourse, which I deem to be representative and significant within 
the research (see Annex 1 for the whole list of statements). 
 
The four discourses I illustrated in this chapter are ‗‖Europe‖ as a keyword for minority rights 
and multiple identities, ‗‖Europe‖ as a guarantee of territorial integrity and the decrease in 
terrorism‘, ‗‖Europe‖ as a threat to sovereignty‘ and ‗‖Europe‖ as a threat to Turkishness‘. 
However, this is rather a static approach, focusing on the nature and structure of discourses in 
the 1999-2008 period. I also mentioned how these four discourses relate to political identities 
and what hegemonic strategies they refer to. I argued that whereas Dmultiple identity and Dterritorial 
integrity/anti-terrorism draw upon differential identities such as Kurdish identity and operate within 
the logic of difference where the antagonistic frontier is weakened and the Other is less 
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significant, within the framework of D threat to sovereignty and D threat to Turkishness, the designation of 
the Other is more straightforward and the antagonistic frontier is sharper in line with the logic 
of equivalence. The below table brings together the four discourses, the Others they identify 
and the hegemonic strategies they operate within:  
 
   
     Discourses The Other   Hegemonic Strategy  
Dmultiple identity Singular identity of 
Turkishness 
Logic of difference 
D territorial integrity/anti-terrorism Territorial disintegration Logic of difference 
D threat to sovereignty ‗Europe‘ as a polity Logic of equivalence 
D threat to Turkishness ‗Europe‘ as an identity Logic of equivalence 
 
Table 2: The four discourses on ‘Europe’ and the hegemonic strategies they operate within.  
 
Now, it is crucial to locate these discourses within the flow of events in the aforementioned 
period by temporalising the debates with regard to ‗Europe‘ to understand how ‗Europe-as-
hegemony‘ emerged, which Chapter 7 will try to make. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
DISCOURSES ON ‘EUROPE’ IN ARTICULATING ANTAGONISMS AND 
DEMARCATING POLITICAL FRONTIERS AFTER 1999 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Starting from May 2009, Turkey, as with many other countries, was alarmed by an increasing 
number of swine flu cases. During this period, Minister of Health, Recep Akdağ advocated 
the benefits of swine flu vaccination, whereas Erdoğan, at a speech he made at the Parliament 
on 3 November 2009, declared that he does not agree with the Minister of Health (Radikal, 4 
November 2009).  Interestingly enough, even this slight disagreement on the swine flu 
vaccination was enough to create an antagonism within Turkish public opinion where people 
tended to associate themselves with one of the ‗camps‘ via long discussions and accusations 
aimed at the ‗other‘ camp. Besides its randomness, this small anecdote highlights the 
volatility and fuzziness of struggles to hegemonise certain concepts and political space. 
 
In this dissertation I have aimed to understand the emergence of ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ in the 
aftermath of 1999 in Turkish political debates. Rather than making a pre-given association 
between particular political tendencies and positions vis-à-vis Europe, which is usually done 
in the Turkish context, I attempted to look at the political debates through the hegemony lens. 
For this aim, I called the struggle for the hegemonic positions of political identities ‗bipolar 
hegemony‘ where both poles of the discourses (pro- vs. anti-Europe) are parts of the same 
hegemonic discourse and reify a particular construction of the world. Recognising this, I 
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developed a novel theoretical approach that it is the operation of logics of equivalence or 
difference that depict ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘. In the previous chapter, in order to see how 
logics of equivalence and difference operated in terms of the hegemonic struggle  on 
‗Europe‘, I singled out the discourses on ‗Europe‘ in Turkish political debates in the 1999-
2008 period by using the questions listed in Chapter 4. The resulting discourses have been 
denoted as: 
 
Dmultiple identity-‘Europe’ as a keyword for minority rights and multiple identities:  Within 
the framework of this discourse, ‗Europe‘ is articulated as a reference point for both the 
unleashing of multiple identities and unification of different identities under the umbrella of 
an upper identity. This has either been done in a rights-based manner which materialized in 
the form of notions such as ‗minority‘, ‗sub-identity‘ and ‗upper identity‘ or through a 
broader identitarian reading of ‗Europe‘ where the notion is fixed in a way in which it 
promotes the assertion of particular identities and emergence of ‗of-Turkey-ness‘ as an upper 
identity in Turkish political debates. ‗Europe‘ in this respect also emerges as an overall ideal 
and an overarching identity that links these sub-identities to each other. 
 
D territorial integrity/anti-terrorism-‘Europe’ as a guarantee of territorial integrity and the 
decrease in terrorism: This discourse is based on the conviction that if Turkey becomes a 
part of the EU and harmonises with rights and liberties perceived as ‗European-type‘, the 
terrorist activities and separatist movements within the country will not be able to attract any 
supporters, thereby leading to territorial integrity and perpetual peace. ‗Europe‘ will function 
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as unitive rather than separative in Turkey and it will render terrorism redundant as there will 
be no need for terrorism where ‗democracy‘ brought about by ‗Europe‘ prevails. 
 
D threat to sovereignty-‘Europe’ as a threat to sovereignty: This discourse culminates around the 
depiction of ‗Europe‘ as an imperialist front that is seeking for an opportunity to invade the 
Republic of Turkey culturally, politically and economically. In this respect, ‗Europe‘ is 
articulated as a force which is keen on acquiring ‗unilateral concessions‘ from Turkey via 
means of Customs Union, Copenhagen Criteria and like.  This is mainly due to the fact that 
‗Europe‘ since the 19th century had a uniform agenda to turn Turkey and the then Ottoman 
Empire into a colony currently through the ‗hidden agenda‘ of the EU. All in all, ‗Europe‘ is 
detrimental for the ‗security‘ of Turkey. 
 
D threat to Turkishness -‘Europe’ as a threat to Turkishness:  According to the discourse D threat to 
Turkishness, what is urged by the EU is contrary to the Turkishness. The ‗lingering‘ twin threats 
of political Islam and Kurdish separatism are again the centre of the debate; however, the 
focus is more on the identitarian aspect of the ‗security‘. The usual references of this 
discourse are Turkish national pride, which had been rendered submissive to the EU and the 
insult of the Turkishness by the legal and political changes and Turkish ‗security‘ which is 
challenged by ‗Europe‘. 
 
 
However, this is rather a synchronic approach, focusing on the nature and structure of 
discourses in the 1999-2008 period, removing it from ‗the temporal sequence of events, 
237 
 
relocating it in an abstract theoretical realm outside of the temporal domain‘ (Hay, 2002: 
144). However much this approach is helpful to understand the nature of the discourses, it 
renders the denoted discourses static. As such, it is crucial to locate these discourses within 
the flow of events in the aforementioned period by temporalising the debates and employing a 
rather diachronic approach. 
 
In order to achieve this aim, in this section I will first diachronise the already-sketched 
discourses on ‗Europe‘ by locating them within the timeline of key events scrutinised in 
Chapter 5. This will make it easier to see the possible (dis)continuity and recurrence of the 
discourses. Rather than claiming a causal relationship between the political developments and 
discourses and aiming an actor-based approach, this exercise aims to show what role ‗Europe‘ 
played within the debates during the focused period and what antagonisms it allowed to be 
articulated. 
 
Secondly, after locating the discourses in a chronological perspective, I will state the general 
features of ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ in this period. In this respect, I will focus on the way in 
which discourses on ‗Europe‘ in the mentioned period delineated political frontiers and how 
different political demands and identities within the society were articulated through logics of 
equivalence and difference. After showing how these logics operated, I will argue that, 
although ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ attempted either to split the social (logic of equivalence) or 
to emphasise the non-adversarial differences between political identities (logic of difference), 
it is not easy to claim that these attempts were successful as a hegemonic practice as Laclau 
and Mouffe would intend. First of all, although the analysis of the newspapers and 
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parliamentary debates are helpful in identifying how the logics of equivalence and difference 
attempted to hegemonise the Turkish politics, there is not enough empirical evidence to point 
to the split of the social (logic of equivalence) or to the expansion of the limits of the political 
to the margins of the society (logic of difference). Secondly, the Other in ‗Europe-as-
hegemony‘ is not a singular and a well-defined designation, whereas for a hegemonic struggle 
to turn into hegemony, the ‗Other‘ and the antagonism have to be very-well defined 
(Herschinger, 2008:7). For instance, in case of the Mexican politics, Buenfil argues how the 
Mexican armed movement, teachers, worker and peasant leaders were articulated under the 
discourse of ‗the oppressed’ against a common threat, i.e. ‗the government‘ (Buenfil, 2000). 
On the other hand, in her analysis of the logic of the Apartheid regime, Norval shows how the 
signifier of ‗race‘ is used as a social division between Afrikaans and English-speakers 
(Norval, 1996: 101-173). Similarly, within the framework of Thatcher‘s New Right policies, 
the British society was split into two well-defined poles, ‗one of which -unions, the 
unemployed, the disabled, pensioners and so on- is deprived of the benefits of the Keynesian 
welfare state and subjected to wage cuts, political repression and so forth‘ (Tünay, 1993:16). 
In all these cases, the antagonism and the Other of the discourse is very-well defined (i.e. the 
government, Afrikaans, the middle class). However, as I showed in Chapter 6, and I will 
elaborate on in the forthcoming section, the Others designated by different discourses on 
‗Europe‘ are various. Even in the case of the logic of equivalence where the antagonistic 
frontier is sharp, the Other, ‗Europe‘ designates different features (the Other in D threat to 
sovereignty points to different features than the Other in D threat to Turkishness would have).  
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It is important to remember one of the main claims of the thesis here: whether a discourse is 
pro-European or not does not play role in the demarcation of political frontiers as ‗Europe-as-
hegemony‘ is bipolar entailing both ends of the political spectrum. Because, as Wæver argues, 
the ‗―dominant‖ political line and the opposition usually share a lot (except the question on 
the agenda). Political opponents relate to each other, and therefore almost always deal with 
some of the same issues and use related concepts and images while struggling to reformulate 
and conquer other key terms‘ (Wæver, 2005: 36). Therefore, the question is a part of the 
agreement between opponents and it is rather the answers that differ. However, the limits of 
objectivity and the terms according to which it is asked are the same so that particular 
constructions of the world are reified rather than contested.  Ümit Fırat says, ‗you cannot have 
PKK in an EU-member country. There will be no raison d‘etre of PKK where basic rights and 
liberties are under the guarantee of law‘ (Fırat, 10 April 2006) whereas Tuncer Kılınç says, 
‗PKK has been functionalised by the EU. The EU is responsible for the death of 33000 
people. The EU has supported the terrorist organizations in Turkey overtly or covertly. The 
EU is scared that Turkey will rejuvenate again and will be the next Ottoman Empire‘ (Kılınç, 
26 April 2003). However, they both fix those differences as moments of the same stable 
articulatory structure. In this regard, I argue that the attempt of the discourses on ‗Europe‘ to 
create antagonisms and chains of equivalence and difference emerge through the operation of 
‗bipolar hegemony‘. It is this bipolar hegemony of ‗Europe‘ and its claim for a stable, natural 
and uncontested structure rather than actors or political camps that affect the flow of politics.  
 
In this project, the analysis of the newspapers and parliamentary debates showed that in terms 
of the operation of logics of equivalence and difference, ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ materialised 
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either in a very apolitical and technocratic way where ‗Europe‘ has been presented as 
‗everybody‘s project‘ whereas everybody would retain their different identities (‗logic of 
difference‘) or by equalising all political identities, polarising the society and demonising the 
Other (logic of equivalence‘). Through the operation of logic of difference, ‗Europe‘ 
sometimes emerged as an apolitical, natural ‗Eden‘ neutralising all political differences and 
emerging ‗as everybody‘s project‘ or a malady that could be beaten by a non–political 
involvement of ‗people‘. In both cases, the internal differences between people were 
neutralised under the rubric of ‗Europe‘ or being ‗against Europe‘. Another remarkable 
finding here is that the technocratism stipulated by the logic of difference was accompanied 
by despise of the elite and technocratism in the Turkish context. Alternatively, ‗Europe‘ was 
presented as an ‗either-or‘ situation and ‗meaning was condensed around two poles‘ (Howarth 
and Stavrakakis, 2000:11).  It either emerged within the impossibility of thinking another 
alternative as a political choice but ‗Europe‘ or in the form of articulation of ‗Europe‘ as a 
front that is seeking for an opportunity to invade the Republic of Turkey, dichotomising the 
social space and meaning: you are either with us or a traitor. 
 
All in all, the main argument of this chapter will be that discourses on ‗Europe‘ has been 
unable to create antagonisms and delineate political frontiers as from 2005 to 2006, leading 
‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ to cease. I will argue that the wane of the hegemony of ‗Europe‘ 
within the Turkish context did not necessarily mean that discourses on ‗Europe‘ disappeared 
all together from the political landscape. Rather, elements previously articulated by the 
discourses on ‗Europe‘ started to materialise in different contexts and articulations. For 
example, while the notion of ‗sub-identity‘ was previously explained with reference to 
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‗Europe‘, starting from 2005 it started being contextualised within a nationalism-liberalism 
debate. Similarly, while the notion of ‗minority‘ was a keyword for the discouse which set 
‗Europe‘ as a keyword for multiple identities and minorities, it emerged as a a part of 
secularism-Islamism debate in the second half of the 2000s, as this chapter will show. 
Therefore, antagonisms created by ‗Europe‘ have been substituted by different antagonisms- 
namely the antagonisms of nationalism vs. liberalism and secularism vs. Islamism in 
hegemonising the ‗social‘, where ‗substitution‘ means the emergence of the elements of 
discourse within different antagonisms. Along the same lines, Turkishness‘ which was the 
keyword of the article 301 debates and a significant element in the discourse which articulated 
‗Europe‘ as a threat to Turkishness, has emerged as a connotation used within the debates of 
nationalism that flourished after the rising ultra-nationalist violance incidents and Hrant 
Dink‘s assassination. 
 
Certainly, I do not claim that these ‘new‘ antagonisms are completely novel to Turkish 
politics. All four of the concepts and both dichotomies have predominantly influenced the 
Turkish politics and they are already sedimented within the ‗social‘. Moreover, I vulgarise the 
dichotomies calling them ‗secularism vs. Islamism‘ and ‗nationalism vs. liberalism‘ in the 
sense that these designations are actually coined by the proponents of the other end of the 
dichotomy. For instance, when the events that I will be referring to below unfolded, 
‗nationalism‘ was almost an allegation posed by the so-called ‗liberals‘ whereas Islamism was 
the biggest threat for those who were ‗secular‘. 
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Therefore, rather than making an unproblematised association between particular political 
camps and ‗pro-‘/‘anti-‘ Europe positions, I will argue that in the first period from 1999 to 
2005, the discourses on ‗Europe‘ were able to demarcate the political frontiers hegemonising 
the social via the logic of difference and the logic of equivalence whereas starting from 2005 
and 2006 what we see is that the discourses on ‗Europe‘ are less and less significant to draw 
the political frontiers. 
 
2. TEMPORALISING POST–1999 DOMINANT TURKISH DISCOURSES ON 
‘EUROPE’: RUPTURES AND CONTINUITIES 
 
2.1. Background discourses on ‘Europe’ in Turkish politics 
 
As mentioned above, the concept of ‗Europe‘ has always been significant, although to 
different degrees at different times, within Turkish politics, especially after the 1960s, when 
the EU integration project has increasingly marked the political landscape in Turkey. At a 
very broad level, in Turkish politics, ‗Europe‘ has usually been denoted at three levels: as a 
foreign policy discourse focusing on foreign policy, a civilizational discourse focusing on the 
birthright of Turkey to be a part of ‗Europe‘ and a more policy-based discourse focusing on 
free market and individual rights and liberties guaranteed by the EU acquis communitaire. 
The latter aspect until the 1990s has usually had an economic connotation and has been 
opposed both by the Left and Right during the 1960s and 1970s. The Left‘s motto, ‗they are 
the partner, we are their market
57‘, pointed to the economic asymmetricity between Turkey 
and the then European Economic Community (EEC). The Far Right‘s objection to Europe 
was both on civilizational and economic grounds; the rising pro-Islamic party of the time, 
                                                            
57 In Turkish, the words ‗partner‘ and ‗common‘ are synonymous. Therefore, with this slogan, the detrimental 
and colonizing effects of the Common Market for Turkey and Turkish economic independence are emphasized.     
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MSP (Milli Selamet Partisi-National Salvation Party) characterized the EC as a ‗Christian 
Club‘ (Güneş-Ayata, 2003: 216). ‗Economically, the EU was claimed would weaken the 
indigenous industries and make Turkey pray to Western imperialism‘ (Güneş-Ayata, 2003: 
216). The 1980s has witnessed a similar economic discourse on ‗Europe‘, also in line with the 
content of the then EEC and the policy priorities of the then prime minister Özal, advocating 
market liberalisation and neo-liberalism (for a more detailed discussion on Özal‘s policies and 
their articulation within the discourses on ‗Europe‘ in 1980s and today, see Chapter 6). This 
highly economic connotation attached to the European project has been reinforced by the 
Customs Union Agreement on 31 December 1995, pursuant to the 1963 EU-Turkey 
Association Agreement, which aims at promoting trade and economic relations and 
minimising trade barriers and tariffs. Tansu Ciller, the then prime minister designated the 
Customs Union as the ‗kick-off of the Europeanisation struggle‘ (Ciller, 11 March 1995). On 
the other hand, recent developments in EU-Turkish relations in the late 1990s and 
prioritisation of democracy for entry into the EU made ‗Europe‘ synonymous with 
‗democracy‘ and ‗democratic consolidation‘ especially in the aftermath of Helsinki European 
Council (Aydın and Keyman, 2004). 
 
 
 
2.2. Contextualising the discourses: politics as usual 
 
This section aims to put the outlined discourses in their proper historical context. This 
exercise does not have the aim of sustaining a causal relationship between political 
developments and discourses, which would clash with the general theoretical spirit of the 
244 
 
project at hand. Rather, the aim here is to show what role ‗Europe‘ played within the debates 
during the focused period and what antagonisms it created within the flow of events. 
 
After the Helsinki European Council of December 1999 where Turkey became an EU 
candidate (which signalled, in the then Prime Minister Ecevit‘s words, that, ‗Europe cannot 
exist without Turkey and Turkey cannot exist without Europe‘ (Cumhuriyet, 12 December 
1999), ‗Europe‘ was a significant notion in creating antagonisms and political frontiers. The 
first noticeable antagonisation came with the Accession Partnership, which put forward the 
need for a dialogue with the UN in terms of the settlement of the Cyprus problem as a short-
term priority created a great shock and resentment within the Turkish debates. 
 
At a general level, the Accession Partnership was greeted by the ‗pro-harmonisation front‘ 
(Tarhanlı, 9 November 2000). The general parlance used was the need on the part of Turkey 
to ‗do her homework‘ and work hard to be a full member by the end of 2004 (e.g. Berkan, 9 
November 2000; Aktar, 13 November 2000). Although there were numerous references to the 
amelioration of minority rights in the earlier versions of the document, which were deemed as 
problematic by the Turkish side, ‗the Turkish side was able to change the unnecessary use of 
concept of ―minority‖‘, with Ismail Cem‘s words, Minister of Foreign Affairs in the DSP-
ANAP-MHP coalition government between 1999-2002, who is known for his mild and 
consensual stance vis-à-vis ‗Europe‘ (quoted in Radikal, 5 March 2002).  According to him, 
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[I]n the first drafts of Accession Partnership, there was an idea of creating minorities 
and constructing new categories as ‗minority rights‘. We fought hard against this. We 
said, ‗do not export European diseases to Turkey, and do not look at Turkey through 
the lens you look at Europe. Because they do not exist here. We are not contaminated‘. 
We could explain that. Thus, none of those ridiculous issues were in the Accession 
Partnership (quoted in Radikal, 5 March 2002). 
 
 
On the other hand, in the aftermath of the publication of the document, the then Prime 
Minister Bülent Ecevit sent a letter to the leaders of the EU members pointing to the 
impossibility to set the Cyprus issue as an additional political criterion (Ecevit, 8 November 
2000). He stated that the EU authorities made it clear at the Helsinki Summit that a new 
criterion has not been added to the Copenhagen Criteria and 4
th
 and 9
th
 paragraphs of the 
Document about Cyprus issue ‗have got nothing to do with the accession criteria, but are 
related to the political dialogue‘ (Ecevit, 8 November 2000). Similarly, at a speech he made 
before External Economic Relations Board General Assembly, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer 
argued that, European Parliament‘s decision58, which mentions the allegations on Armenians 
and Kurdish question and demand the retreat of Turkish soldiers from Cyprus, is 
‗unacceptable and ridiculous‘ (Sezer, 15 November 2000). Within the same speech, he offered 
some alternative ‗strategic‘ options other than Europe that Turkey needs to pay attention to, 
such as Middle East, Gulf Region, the African Continent, Latin America and Russian 
Federation (Sezer, 15 November 2000). ‗Europe‘ which has been depicted as a sine-qua-non 
                                                            
58  European Parliament decision mentioned here is the ‗Report on the 1999 Regular Report from the 
Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession‘ dated 19 October 2000. Within the report, European 
Parliament calls on the Turkish Government ‗to withdraw its occupation forces from northern Cyprus‘ and ‗to 
give fresh support to the Armenian minority, as an important part of Turkish society, because of the tragedy that 
befell them before the establishment of the modern state of Turkey‘ (the European Parliament, 19 October 2000: 
8-9) 
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for Turkey at Helsinki was now one of the strategic options among many, which lost its 
charm due to demands on the Kurdish and Cyprus issues. 
 
The sides of the Cyprus debate became even clearer in the course of time. On 13 December 
2001, a group of intellectuals including prominent names from the Left such as Kurthan Fişek 
and Mümtaz Soysal issued a declaration in Cumhuriyet, stating that they were ‗uncomfortable 
with the fact that a very narrow yet powerful circle in Turkey initiate attempts on Cyprus 
issue which are not in line with the Turkish national interests. What the EU and Greece 
demand will result in nothing but the annexation of the island by Greece. We hereby declare 
that we condemn the internal circles which help illegal and inhumane attempts imposed on 
Cyprus issue‘ (quoted in Cumhuriyet, 13 December 2001). MHP, the junior partner of the 
1999-2002 coalition, was also critical of the conditions set out to resolve the Cyprus issue. 
With Devlet Bahçeli‘s words: 
 
Cyprus, besides being a national issue for Turkey is a burning issue in terms of the 
relations with the EU. Greek Cyprus [Administration] is favoured within the EU‘s 
reports. The distortion and arbitrariness of some circles‘ approach to the Cyprus issue 
are reinforcing this kind of one-sided expectations and demands. We wish that the 
sovereignty and security of both communities be linked to concrete guarantees. The 
EU should have an attitude favouring a just and permanent solution (quoted in 
Radikal, 23 January 2002). 
 
 
This first rapprochement between the Left and MHP, according to Firat, signalled a later 
collaboration in terms of ‗Europe‘ in general and Cyprus issue in particular (Firat, 2004: 64).  
The aforementioned grievance also constituted an early reference to Dthreat to sovereignty as 
‗Europe‘ has been articulated with respect to Turkey‘s sovereignty rights on Cyprus. 
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However, Cyprus was not the only point of contention between the parties to the European 
debate. The Copenhagen Criteria‘s emphasis on the need to abolish capital punishment, to 
amend infamous Article 312 and to allow education and broadcasting in mother language was 
heavily opposed mainly by MHP, the junior partner of the 1999-2002 coalition, as Öcalan‘s 
execution was among the priorities of the party during its election campaign before the 1999 
elections. Especially in the aftermath of the 2001 Progress Report where the EU posed 
numerous criticisms in terms of human rights, capital punishment and Cyprus, the exigencies 
of Copenhagen Criteria were increasingly criticised by MHP on the grounds that the EU is 
indirect, dishonest and insincere to Turkey‘ (quoted in Radikal, 15 November 2001). In this 
context, Bülent Yahnici, the then MHP vice-Chair, declared that the problems that Turkey has 
with the EU is not only Cyprus, but the issues of capital punishment, the human rights and 
freedom of thought and the education of minorities and the overall change of Article 312 of 
Turkish Penal Code which pressed charge against those who ‗provoke people to hatred and 
hostility by inciting religious and ethnical differences‘(for a more detailed discussion on 
Article 312 of Turkish Penal Code, see Chapter 5): 
 
We are members of a parliament which made the amendments for Turkey to enjoy 
more human rights. In Turkey, everybody is able to speak his/her own language. But 
for the EU this is not enough. It wants the right to education and broadcasting. Turkey, 
at this point, cannot give those rights (…) They say, ‗you need to abolish Article 312, 
and join the EU‘. We will abolish 312, and the streets will be full of people who 
agitate class, racial and religious differences. People would walk as they want, they 
would wear green cubbe, they would say, ‗we want Sharia‘, right? (quoted in Radikal, 
26 November 2001). 
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During this period, Devlet Bahçeli, MHP leader, made numerous remarks on the necessity of 
the capital punishment: 
 
Many EU officials do not find it sufficient that the capital punishment had already 
been abolished [in Turkey] except for wartime and terror crimes. Those who 
insistently want capital punishment to be outside the scope of terror crimes have to 
give an explanation why the terrorist organisations posing a threat to Turkish people‘s 
right to exist are not taken within the scope of struggle against terror (quoted in 
Radikal, 23 January 2002). 
 
 
Especially in the aftermath of National Security Council meeting of 29 May 2002 where army 
showed its determination to make the necessary arrangements to fulfil Copenhagen Criteria, 
focusing predominantly on Cyprus issue and not thoroughly referring to the issues of death 
penalty and education in mother tongue, MHP was almost the only opponent of the 
abolishment of death penalty (quoted in Radikal, 31 May 2002). 
 
The hesitance about the abolishment of the death penalty on the part of the Army mainly 
stemmed from the fact that, ‗army is a biased party to this discussion‘, as mentioned various 
times by Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, who was the Chief of General Staff between 1998 and 2002. 
Within this context, ‗Europe‘ was always conceptualized as a natural extension of Atatürk‘s 
goal to modernization and Turkey‘s strategic necessity, albeit within the framework of the 
latter‘s unitary and secular structure. A good summary of this position was provided by the 
then Deputy Chief of Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt: ‗Becoming a member of the EU is a requirement 
for the realization of Atatürk‘s goal of modernization. However, it is Turkey‘s most natural 
right to enact necessary measures to protect her unitary and secular structure while pursuing 
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this goal‘ (quoted in Cumhuriyet, 10 October 2000). During the pursuit of this goal, especially 
in terms of Turkey‘s struggle with terrorism, the ignorance of Turkey‘s real problems by 
Europe was another widely used reference by different military figures (quoted in 
Cumhuriyet, 8 March 2002, 29 May 2002). Moreover, there was a near consensus within the 
army that harmonization reforms would considerably weaken Turkey‘s hand in its struggle 
against the ‗lingering‘ twin threats of political Islam and Kurdish separatism (Heper, 2005-for 
a detailed discussion of conception of these ‗threats‘ within the Turkish context see Chapter 
4). 
 
A real earthquake within the public opinion came in March 2002 with the statement by 
General Tuncer Kilinç, who was the then Secretary General of National Security Council, that 
as Europe does not help Turkey in solving her problems, the latter should be involved in new 
arrangements entailing Russia and Iran, ‗without excluding the US‘ (quoted in Radikal, 8 
March 2002).  These concerns have also embodied later in the suggestions on sustaining a 
‗privileged partnership‘ rather than a full membership with the EU, which has usually been 
pronounced by the Christian Democrats in the EU regarding Turkish accession, which will 
not limit Turkey‘s prospective geo-political alliances within the regions of Middle East, 
Middle Asia and Caspian basin and which does not necessitate linking to the EU structures, 
concessions and the delegation of authority (e.g. Eslen, 18 May 2005; Bir, quoted in Radikal, 
26 March 2002). 
 
On the other hand, although the candidacy status granted at the Helsinki Council did not 
provide any rights of membership, the decision has provided considerable impetus for the 
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civil society especially in terms of the reforms necessitated by the EU accession process. 
Important segments within the Turkish state bureaucracy, such as the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the secretariat for EU affairs and the State Planning Organization, have adopted 
liberal approaches to EU-related reforms (Keyman and Öniş, 2003: 15-17). Non-
governmental organizations in particular have served as an important source for pressure for 
reforms. The Turkish Chambers Stock Exchange Union (Türkiye Odalar Borsalar Birliği- 
TOBB), The Turkish Industrialists‘ and Businessmen‘s Association (Türkiye Sanayici 
İşadamları Derneği- TÜSİAD), the Economic Development Foundation (İktisadi Kalkıma 
Vakfı-İKV) and the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (Türkiye Ekonomik 
Sosyal Etüdleri Vakfı-TESEV) are some of the active organizations in this regard. For 
instance, before the Copenhagen Summit of December of December 2002, İKV headed a 
broad-based movement of 175 civil society organizations called ‗Movement for Europe 2002‘ 
to provide collective support for Turkey‘s EU accession and reforms. The digital clock 
located opposite the Turkish parliament counted the days, hours and minutes revealing the 
time left to undertake reforms before the summit, pointing out to the urgency of the reforms 
and little time left for it (Eylemer and Taş, 2007: 564). 
 
The following text of the signature campaign for Europe by Movement for Europe 2002, 
circulated on 9 May 2002 (European Day) explains how very well mainstream civil society 
looked at ‗Europe‘. Movement for Europe 2002 is an ad-hoc movement established in January 
2002 to pressurise the government to ratify the legal changes necessary to ‗get a date‘ from 
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the EU for negotiations at Copenhagen European Council, 12-13 December 2002
59
. Among 
the founding fathers were prominent scholars such as Cengiz Aktar, Cengiz Çandar, Mehmet 
Altan and Erol Katırcıoğlu, who managed to collect approximately 1000 signatures for the 
acceleration of reform process from prominent figures from different sectors of  the Turkish 
elite before the issue of the below declaration (for further details on European Movement see 
Aktar, 2002). 
 
If Turkey is looking for freedom instead of pressure, for affluence instead of poverty, 
and for trust instead of fear, its road passes through the EU. Europe is the direction 
Turkey has moved towards for centuries. ‗Europe‘ is the ‗contemporary civilisation‘- 
it is the investment; it is the employment. It is the profit. It is the interdependence. It is 
the science and technology. It is social security. The EU is not the minimisation of 
Turkey but the latter‘s enlargement as to include Europe. It is Turkish citizens‘ 
ownership of equal opportunities with Europeans in terms of education, work, health 
and retirement. However, unfortunately, Turkey‘s EU membership seems to have been 
left to the mercy of anti-membership forces. The years are passing and the 
constitutional and legal amendments necessary for full membership are being 
implemented reluctantly with much dragging of feet (...) We are calling you, 
irrespective of your political stance, that Turkish people‘s future lies with the EU. 
Let‘s come together and claim this process. Let‘s create the movement for Europe, for 
you, for your children, for all of us together. Turkey‘s place is in the EU. Yes. I 
agree!!!  (Movement for Europe 2002, 2002). 
 
This euphoria within the civil society was accelerated with the AKP coming to power on 3 
November 2002 as it has anchored its political future to the goal of EU accession, especially 
in the specified period. Winning 34.4 per cent of votes and 365 seats in the parliament 
provided the AKP an opportunity to form a majority government for the first time in Turkish 
                                                            
59 The ‗Copenhagen‘ mentioned here denotes the Copenhagen European Council, 12-13 December 2002. This 
European Council set a milestone in terms of the Turkish domestic political debates on ‗Europe‘ as at this 
summit, the Council would give an exact date to Turkey for the start of membership negotiations. At the end of 
the summit, the presidency conclusions stated: ‗If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a 
report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, 
the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay‘ (the EU Presidency, 12-13 
December 2002). This decision was evaluated as ‗a date for a date‘ by the Turkish public opinion (see Radikal, 
13 December 2002).   
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political history since the 1987 parliamentary elections (Keyman and Öniş, 2003). The 
Republican‘s People Party (CHP-Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), with 19.4 of votes and 177 seats, 
became the only opposition party in the Turkish Grand National Assembly while all parties in 
the previous three-party coalition failed to pass the ten per cent national threshold (Higher 
Election Board Official Website, 2002). Right after the elections, AKP leader Tayyip Erdoğan 
made it clear that the AKP‘s substantial goals were to realise and smoothen the EU accession 
period and to apply an intense economic programme: 
 
Our first priority is to watch the EU accession period closely (…) We will leave 
Copenhagen with the best result possible (…) We are a party which is determined to 
accelerate the EU integration process and to execute an economic programme which 
would strengthen integration with the rest of the world (Radikal, 4 November 2002). 
 
 
This initial determination has also been materialized by the intense round of visits paid to the 
European capitals right after the elections. He visited Rome (13 November), Athens (18 
November) and Madrid (19 November) respectively (Radikal, 9 November 2002). During 
Erdoğan‘s visit to Rome, which was his stop after the elections, he was escorted by an army 
of civil society associations including TOBB, TÜSİAD, İKV, TESEV, TÜRK-İŞ (Türkiye 
İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu- The Confederation of Turkish Workers Trade Unions), 
TESK (Türkiye Esnaf ve Sanatkarları Konfederasyonu- Confederation of Tradesmen and 
Artisans of Turkey), TİSK (Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-Confederation of 
Employer Unions of Turkey), HAK-İŞ (Hak İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu- Confederation 
of Turkish Real Trade Unions), TÜRSAB (Türkiye Seyahat Acentaları Birliği-Turkish Travel 
Agencies Association), DEİK (Dış Ekonomik İşler Kurulu-External Economic Affairs Board), 
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UND (Uluslararası Nakliyeciler Derneği- International Hauliers Association), TİM (Türkiye 
İhracatçılar Meclisi- Turkish Exporters Assembly) (Radikal, 14 November 2002). 
 
Those associations continued to scrutinise the acts of the government and the parliament 
during the ratification of the Harmonisation Packages. The members of TOBB, İKV, UND, 
TÜSİAD, Hak-İş ve TÜRSAB warned the government in an advertisement at the newspapers 
‗not to act politically and delay‘ the adoption of the Sixth Harmonisation Package, aiming at 
the normalisation of the DGMs, the right to give a Kurdish name to the new-borns, the right 
to broadcast in mother language and the abolition of the Article 8 of the Fight with Terrorism 
(Radikal, 10 June 2003). 
 
The pro-EU stance of the AKP was carried to the government as well after Abdullah Gül has 
been assigned Prime Minister and given the responsibility to establish the Cabinet by the 
president Ahmet Necdet Sezer on 18 November 2002 as Erdoğan was banned from politics by 
that time
60
: 
 
The most important time frame is the EU. We should look at the membership from a wider 
perspective. Turkey will strengthen the EU and will set an example to the Islamic world. We 
should get aligned with Maastricht and Copenhagen (Gül, 17 November 2002) 
 
                                                            
60 He had been convicted in accordance with Turkish Penal Code‘s Article 312 (―to provoke people to hatred and 
hostility by inciting religious and ethnical differences‘) by the State Security Court of Diyarbakir due to a poem  
he had recited at a rally in Siirt on 12 December 1997, likening mosques to ‗barracks‘, minarets to ‗bayonets‘, 
and believers to ‗soldiers‘. He was able to be elected as a member of the Parliament from Siirt at the 2 February 
2003 by-elections as the ban he had been convicted to had been abolished by the necessary legal arrangements 
beforehand by the Parliament.   
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However, after the AKP came to power, the army‘s sensitivity in terms of Europe has been 
articulated with reference to the fear that Turkey now had a religiously oriented government 
whose ulterior motives were, in their view, in doubt. They thus entertained the idea that the 
AKP government was enthusiastic about liberalizing reforms so that they would have a freer 
hand to promote political Islam in Turkey with the army rendered less powerful (Heper, 
2005). The changes made in Anti-Terrorism Law would no longer have a deterrence effect on 
the perpetrators of those crimes; TV broadcasting in Kurdish would incite ethnic separatism; 
the admitting to Turkey of observers during elections would mean granting capitulations to 
foreigners (quoted in Heper, 2005: 38). Hilmi Özkök, who was the Chief of Staff between 
2002 and 2006, said at a speech he made in August 2005 that, ‗despite the limitations on the 
authority of Turkish Armed Forces, the struggle against PKK will continue‘ (Zaman, 6 
August 2005). The ‗limited authority‘ mainly meant the restructuration and civilisation of 
National Security Council General Secretariat within the framework of Seventh 
Harmonization Package in August 2003 (Radikal, 18 November 2004). Therefore, in line with 
the changes stipulated during the reform process, the Turkish Army would lose its power and 
strength, which has been linked by Erol Manisalı  to the loss of sovereignty at various 
instances: 
 
Like it or not, the EU is a Christian club. The EU is for our benefit; however, if it is 
going to take over the domestic markets, terminate the national industry, govern 
bureaucracy from Brussels, declare conditions on Cyprus, European Army, PKK and 
Armenians which are completely unacceptable to Turkey and say, ‗you cannot join 
otherwise‘, I will continue claiming, ‗it is trying to disintegrate me, it is declaring all the 
conditions not to take me in‘ (…) As long as this continues, even the Turkish Armed 
Forces will not be able to move their finger after 15 years (quoted in Radikal, 8 March 
2002). 
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These concerns about the loss of sovereignty in terms of Cyprus, minimization of the army‘s 
power and the detrimental effects of the harmonization packages on Turkey‘s sensitivities 
culminated in what has been referred to as, ‗Red Apple Coalition‘. The so-called,‘ Red Apple 
Coalition‘ starting from the early stages of the EU accession clearly constituted a Eurosceptic 
haven for those who evaluated ‗Europe‘ as a threat and has been widely used within the 
debates starting from 2003. ‗Red Apple‘ is a frequently used concept in Turkish politics, 
denoting the global leadership by Oğuz Turks, one of the tribes deemed as the racial ancestors 
of the Turks. 
 
It is an imaginary goal that sometimes denotes a location at the west side of the Turks, 
sometimes represented as a golden red ball shining over the throne or a shrine. The 
first red apple of the Turks was Peking. The first red apple of the Ottomans was to 
sustain the Turkish unity in Anatolia by ending the era of beyliks. One of the most 
significant ‗Red Apples‘ afterwards has been Istanbul. After the conquest of Istanbul, 
it has been carried to Rome, to the dome of St. Pietro. After 1960, it has been 
developed by Alparslan Türkeş61 (Radikal, 3 August 2003). 
 
 
As it is clearly seen, the concept of ‗Red Apple‘ has frequently been used by the extreme right 
in Turkish politics in order to denote the goals and ideals of Turks and Turkish nationalism. 
However, during this period, it has been the name of the civil society movement which 
brought together some certain left groups and nationalists; a trend which has first emerged in 
the aforementioned declaration on Cyprus. Sparked by a meeting on 23 February 2003 to 
show support to Denktaş in his hard-liner stance in terms of Cyprus issue, ‗members of BBP 
(Büyük Birlik Partisi-Grand Unity Party), a political party usually known for its extreme 
                                                            
61 The then leader of MHP 
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nationalist and religious tone, MHP and DSP said no to imperialism together‘ (Radikal, 3 
August 2003). ‗This big political leap is interesting to show how superficial the differences 
are between those who claim to have different positions. Unbearable discovery of ‗big 
politics‘ has brought together those who stood at different points in small politics at a 
common denominator‘ (Radikal, 3 August 2003). Therefore, the Red Apple this time 
designated a societal alliance able to overcome the traps and dangers posed by ‗Europe‘. One 
of the prominent figures of the Red Apple coalition, Yekta Güngör Özden, founding father 
and the then leader of Republican Democracy Party and former chair of Constitutional Court, 
declared that Europe‘s appeal to Kurdish nationalists and fundamental Islamists is 
unacceptable for the Turkish Republic: 
 
No sane man could claim that the US is a true friend with its increasing provocation of 
Europe by appealing to the so-called Kurdish nationalists who want separate our 
country and to the fundamental Islamists aiming to drag the country to darkness by 
realising sheria (quoted in Radikal, 3 August 2003). 
 
Another widely used concept within the context of this coalition was Kuva-yi Milliye. Kuva-
yi Milliye is the large societal alliance in Anatolia in the 1920s, usually used to denote the 
popular support behind Mustafa Kemal during the War of Independence. Red Apple coalition 
advocated that a similar societal alliance is needed in order to overcome the threat posed by 
the EU and the United States alike. Erkin Yurdakul, the editor of the journal, ‗Turkish Left‘, 
pointed to the need for such a societal alliance: 
 
We experience serious developments in terms of the disintegration of Turkey. The 
EU‘s Harmonisation Package and the USA have significant plans about this (...) We 
think that everybody should take a role within this struggle in the direction of 
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national struggle. This is a call for Kuva-yi Milliye, not a call for a particular 
political party (quoted in Radikal, 3 August 2003). 
 
As mentioned before, after AKP‘s coming to power, it has been predominantly referred to as 
‗the collaborator of Europe‘. This designation affected the Red Apple coalition as well, which 
justified the urge to establish a societal alliance because of the distrust felt against the political 
parties, especially to AKP in power. Bedri Baykam, one of the most active members of the 
ÇYDD (Çağdaş Yaşamı Destekleme Derneği-Association for the Support of Contemporary 
Life) and ADD (Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği-Atatürkist Thought Association) pointed to this 
association between the emergence of ‗Europe‘ as a threat since Sevres and Lausanne and 
AKP which is the stalking horse of the West: 
 
Those who take our country under blockade externally are collaborating with the 
AKP. The West which cannot digest Lausanne for some 80 years is now attempting 
to realise Sevres by the help of insidious policies and collateral traps (quoted in 
Radikal, 3 August 2003). 
 
Another historical juncture during this period was the proclamation of Kurds and Alevis as 
minorities in the Progress Report by the European Commission. Along those lines, on 9 
December 2004, an advertisement with the title, ‗What do the Kurds want in Turkey?‘ has 
been published at International Herald Tribune, signed by ex-DEP MPs and Kurdish 
intellectuals. Referring to 2004 Progress Report by the European Commission, the declaration 
also made a reference to the Cyprus issue and deemed the necessity of joining the EU, urging 
for a new democratic constitution, a general amnesty which would have a direct impact on 
PKK militants and the implementation of a vast economic development programme within the 
Kurdish region under the auspices of the European support (Abbasoğlu et.al, 2004): 
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Having been victims of great injustice throughout the 20th century, the Kurds now pin 
their hopes for a better future on the process Turkey must undergo to become a 
member of the European Union, which they perceive as being, above all, a 
multicultural area of peace, democracy and pluralism. To join this family of 
democracies, Turkey itself must become a true democracy, with respect for its own 
cultural diversity and political pluralism. In particular, it must guarantee its Kurdish 
citizens the same rights that the Basques, Catalans, Scots, Lapps, South Tyroleans and 
Walloons enjoy in the democratic countries of Europe - and which it is itself 
demanding for the Turkish minority in Cyprus (Abbasoglu et.al, 9 December 2004). 
 
 
On the part of the state elites, another important milestone during this period has been 
Erdoğan‘s first visit to Diyarbakır after inauguration on 12 August 2005. This visit was quite 
crucial as Erdoğan mentioned the existence of a ‗Kurdish issue‘, whereas the Turkish official 
stance has always explained the PKK problem as the ‗South-Eastern issue‘, linking it with the 
region‘s underdevelopment, or a ‗terrorism problem‘. Deniz Baykal warned Erdoğan on the 
ground that he is ‗flirting with terrorism‘, stating, ‗separating people according to their 
ethnical identities will lead to disintegration‘ (quoted in Radikal, 13 August 2005). Along the 
same lines, Erdoğan‘s speech in Hakkari on 23 November 2005 stating that Turkey should 
respect all sub-identities, but everyone has an upper identity, a situation which shouldn‘t 
disturb anyone and offering the use of a rather legal term, Türkiyelilik, (‗of-Turkey-ness‘), 
rather than the mostly used term, Türklük, (‗Turkishness‘) was also an important development 
in this respect (Erdoğan, 23 November 2005a). This was again fiercely opposed by CHP 
leader Deniz Baykal on the grounds that Turkishness was not an ethnic identity and cannot be 
reduced to a sub-identity as ‗it entails Kurds, Albanians, Georgians etc. as well‘ (quoted in 
Radikal, 23 November 2005b). Sinan Aygün, chair of Ankara Commerce Chamber, was also 
amongst the opponents of the designation, arguing, ‗there is only one identity, which is the 
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identity of Turkishness (…) Republic, democracy, secularism, flag and Atatürk should be the 
common denominator of everyone‘ (quoted in Zaman, 4 November 2006). 
 
The start of negotiations on 3 October 2005 provided a further dimension to the debates on 
‗Europe‘. Mainstream civil society, which acted as a watch dog over the governments for the 
ratification of the harmonisation packages, was probably the most enthusiastic part of the 
society, which is reflected well in the words of Fuat Keyman, a Turkish academician working 
on civil society: 
 
An introverted Turkey is an unstable one. Other states do not want an unstable Turkey. 
It is impossible for Turkey to be introvert. Therefore, on 3 October, Turkey will start 
negotiations with the EU. Every step Turkey takes with respect to the EU relations 
will render Turkey more stable within a span of 10 years, the end result be a full 
membership or privileged partnership. In a more stable Turkey, people will expect 
more from politics. They will all political parties to action to find a solution to their 
problems regarding agriculture, energy, environment, woman rights etc. (Keyman, 8 
August 2005). 
 
 
 
Similarly, economist Korkmaz İlkorur argued that the negotiations will create a strong civil 
society and a civic platform in Turkey where the civil society is not historically very strong: 
 
The so-called ‗negotiations‘ are nothing but a process through which the regulations 
covering civil society are re-made in a manner that suits the spirit of the civil society 
undertaken in the name of harmonisation. This process, firstly, necessitates a civic 
platform. During the negotiation process, the hardest job will be to form this platform 
of civil society in a society which [historically] does not have this tradition (İlkorur, 
11 October 2005). 
 
 
On the other hand, the start of negotiations was harshly criticized by Devlet Bahçeli. He 
called Turkey to ‗overrule the negotiations‘ (quoted in Cumhuriyet, 3 October 2005). Critique 
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of AKP was also a substantial part of this stance as, ‗the streets have been surrendered to 
criminals; our roads have been given to terrorists; our squares have been granted to 
separatists; our capital has been granted to compradors and our future has been donated to 
foreigners by AKP‘ (quoted in Cumhuriyet, 3 October 2005). On the day of the start of 
negotiations, the Turkish Communist Party organised a meeting in Istanbul named, ‗Rally for 
Societal Campaign against Imperialism‘. Kemal Okuyan, Secretary General of the party, 
argued that the EU, under the guise of reforms was leading Turkey to destruction, ‗which is 
compromised by the state officials who do not care about the country whatsoever‘ (quoted in 
Cumhuriyet, 3 October 2005). 
 
The launch of negotiations also meant the outmost materialization of the ‗double-standards‘ 
posed by Europe for some. Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, the then Chief of General Staff, points to this 
ambivalent position of the army and the double standards imposed on Turkey, which had 
never been the case with other accession countries in an interview with Fikret Bila on 31 
December 2005: 
 
Turkish Armed Forces has never been against Turkey‘s goal of full EU membership. 
However, what we kept on saying, what really mattered during this process was 
Turkey‘s integrity with its state and peoples (…) The EU should have been sincere in 
this respect. The EU should not have double standards. The EU puts conditions 
before Turkey that it never did to the other countries (…) The double standards of the 
EU has created an impression as if it tried to direct Turkey to a position between 
Sevres and Lausanne. Today, Turkish Armed Forces and all the security forces are 
kind of impotent. They cannot intervene. But, the EU can. Even to the judiciary. It 
becomes a party in the trials, such as in case of Orhan Pamuk (…) There should not 
be an image of Turkey that fulfils anything demanded. Because there will not be an 
end to the demands. The more you take steps, the more demands come. All of this 
means the disintegration of Turkey (quoted in Dağı, 14 January 2006). 
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Moreover, negotiations, coupled with the then European debates on devising an EU 
constitution, meant one step forward towards the delegation of sovereignty to the EU level.  
Emin Şirin, an independent MEP, was one of the significant figures drawing attention to this 
point. He has become a member of the Parliament after 3 November 2002 elections from 
AKP. In 2003, he was the first MEP resigning from AKP after it came to power and 
afterwards joined Liberal Democratic Party, Young Party and Motherland Party respectively: 
 
 
 
 
 
The EU and the US want to control and use their influences on not only the lands of 
Turkey, but also on the Turkish society, the resources of the Anatolian lands and the 
Turkish army. The government today is too passive (…) The foreign trusts like 
Konrad Adenauer [Foundation] remove the cornerstones and change the wind in 
Turkey (…) For instance, Soros wants the EU constitution to be accepted in Turkey 
immediately (…) The army will not be able to continue with its current structure and it 
will be an army of fortune. Every kind of religious symbol will be visible everywhere 
including in the formal ceremonies (…) As that constitution is ratified by two-thirds of 
the member states, you are delegating your full sovereignty for any issue to the 
Brussels bureaucracy. Is it that they can make Turkey do anything that they could not 
get done since Tanzimat in this period that Turkey is so euphoric about?  (quoted in 
Cumhuriyet, 9 January 2005). 
 
Debates on Article 301 stamped 2005 and 2006 during the charges pressed against well-
known novelists and journalists such as Orhan Pamuk, Hrant Dink, Perihan Mağden, Elif 
Şafak , Baskin Oran, Ibrahim Kaboğlu Murat Belge, Ismet Berkan, Haluk Şahin, Erol 
Katırcıoğlu, Hasan Cemal and even Joost Lagendijk, chairman of the EU-Turkey Joint 
Parliamentary Committee. As mentioned before, the cases, which were brought by a group of 
lawyers named Büyük Hukukçular Birliği (Great Union of Jurists), led by Kemal Kerinçsiz 
attracted outmost attention of both domestic and international public opinion and 
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predominantly determined  the debates in Turkey. During the Orhan Pamuk case which 
started on 16 December 2005. The first hearing of the trial was suspended due to the furore 
and turmoil inside and outside of the courtroom, where ‗domestic and European supporters of 
Pamuk has been subject to violence by the protesters‘ (Radikal, 17 December 2005). After the 
trial, a group of 169 intellectuals including Yaşar Kemal, Çetin Altan, Etyen Mahçupyan, 
Adalet Ağaoglu and Alaaddin Dinçer issued a communiqué suggesting the annulment of the 
Article 301 as soon as possible and deemed that, ‗what has been experienced during the 
Pamuk trial as a fatal intervention to the democratisation process‘ (Radikal, 27 December 
2005). On the other hand, not everyone saw this case as a litmus test for Turkish democracy. 
Acute interest shown in the case by European officials has been referred to also as an 
‗intervention to judiciary‘. Mehmet Şandır, the then Deputy Chair of MHP, argued that, ‗The 
Turkish judiciary has been rendered fragile against the EU aggression; this is a disgrace, the 
responsibility for which rests with the AKP‘ (quoted in Cumhuriyet, 17 December 2005). 
Yaşar  Okuyan, the Chair of HP (Hür Parti-Free Party), referred to Verhaugen, who said that 
it is a question of Turkey being tried before the trial, ‗some ignorant EU officials are trying to 
cover up the dirty traces in their pasts‘, referring to Belgium‘s refusal to give back to Turkey 
the DHKP-C militant Fehriye Erdal, who assassinated Özdemir Sabancı, a famous 
businessman, in 1996, and who subsequently fled to Belgium (quoted in Cumhuriyet, 17 
December 2007).  ‗Intervention to Turkish judiciary‘ was also a significant reference point in 
terms of the trial of Murat Belge, Ismet Berkan, Haluk Şahin, Erol Katırcıoğlu and Hasan 
Cemal on 7 February 2006. The first hearing of the trial witnessed numerous protests with 
slogans such as ‗the Brussels vocalists‘ and ‗hands daring to touch Justice shall be broken‘ 
(Radikal, 8 February 2006). Kemal Kerinçsiz, who was again at the compliant chair, said:  
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‗we have foreigners here. They are occupying Turkish courts (...) They settled on the Turkish 
judiciary like a gray cloud‘, pointing to Lagendijk, members of European Commission and 
CPJ (Committee to Protect Journalists), who were among the audience (Radikal, 8 February 
2006). Though not as intensified as the Orhan Pamuk case, the Elif Şafak  case has been 
subject to protests and demonstrations as well. A group including Pakize Akbaba, Chair of 
Şehit Aileleri Dernegi (Martyrs‘ Families Association) and Sevgi Erenerol, the spokesperson 
of Turkish Orthodox Patriarchy, protested Şafak in front of the court building with the EU 
flags with swastikas at the centre (Radikal, 22 September 2006).  The protests were mainly 
directed to the European members of the audience such as Joost Lagendijk, representatives of 
PEN and Amnesty International. Before the Şafak trial, Kerinçsiz called, ‗everyone for the 
national duty to charge the enemies of Turkishness for swearing and humiliating Turkish 
society at Beyoglu Court‘, which has later been brought before the court by two civil society 
initiatives
62
 (quoted in Cumhuriyet, 20 September 2006). 
 
As already mentioned above, starting from 2005 and 2006, ‗Europe‘ has been replaced by 
other antagonisms in terms of sustaining the hegemony. The political actors did not need to 
create their subject positions with regard to ‗Europe‘ because the notion was not the lingua 
franca of politics anymore. ‗Europe‘ did not disappear altogether from the political scene. 
However, starting from 2005 and 2006, ‗Europe‘ is not a performative action anymore. The 
same elements of the debate that have previously been articulated with regard to ‗Europe‘ 
emerged as part and parcels of different debates and antagonisms. One of these antagonisms 
was nationalism, which I will be exploring below. 
                                                            
62 Peace Initiative and Citizens Initiative 
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Starting from 2005, a significant rise of violence committed in the name of ‗nationalism‘ in 
line with the re-launch of PKK terrorism also affected the period, as mentioned above. 
Several  lynch attempts occurred in different parts of Turkey, always based on the rumours 
that the victims were ‗burning flags‘ or ‗chanting pro-PKK slogans‘. 
 
The assassination of Hrant Dink on 19 January 2007 by a 17-year-old was also articulated 
within the nationalism debate. The homicide caused widely felt shame, anger and self-
questioning within the Turkish society, which accompanied the remarkable funeral, attended 
by more than 100000 people.  Many in the crowd wore Hrant Dink masks and carried banners 
proclaiming, ‗Hepimiz Hrant Dink'iz, Hepimiz Ermeniyiz‘ (‗we are all Hrant Dink, we 
are all Armenians‘) (Radikal, 24 January 2007).  This slogan flagging the rapprochement 
between two communities has later been criticized by Devlet Bahçeli, MHP leader, as a 
‗bizarreness developed by those who cannot be seen at the funerals of the martyrs‘ and by 
Tülay Özüerman, CHP Party Assembly member, as: ‗we are now in a position to be ashamed 
of saying ―I‘m a Turk‖‘ and by Tayyip Erdoğan, as: ‗This slogan is annoying. The victim was 
a citizen of the Turkish Republic. His ethnic identity does not matter‘ (quoted in Radikal, 25 
January 2007 and Radikal, 27 January 2007). 
 
Nevertheless, the political environment conducive to the lynch culture, which ‗created a 
criminal from a baby
63‘ has been questioned thoroughly. As a reaction to the above slogan, 
Milli Mucadele Dernegi (National Struggle Association), which has been established by the 
                                                            
63 This was a part of the eulogy delivered by Rakel Dink, Hrant Dink‘s wife at his funeral on 24 January 2007: 
‗My brothers and sisters, one cannot accomplish anything without first questioning the darkness that creates an 
assassin from a baby‘. 
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cadre previously publishing Turksolu (Turkish Left) Journal, has marched with the banners, 
‗we are all Turks, and we are all Mustafa Kemals‘ (Radikal, 17 February 2007). This 
reactionary wave has also found its counterpart in the football pitches. On 28 January 2007, in 
a football match between Trabzonspor- Kayserispor in Trabzon and in another match on the 
same day, placards reading ‗we are all Turkish‘, ‗we will not say we are Armenians even if 
you kill us‘ were displayed. At a match between Malatyaspor and Elazigspor, Malatyaspor, 
football team of Malatya which is Hrant Dink‘s hometown, has been condemned by a placard, 
saying ‗Armenian Malatya‘ (Radikal, 29 January 2007). 
 
The rising ultra-nationalist wave coupled with the assassination of the priest of Santa Maria 
Catholic Church in Trabzon, Andrea Sentore, on 6 February 2006 and of 3 Christians working 
at a publishing house publishing books on Christianity in Malatya in response to their alleged 
missionary activities on 18 April 2007, brought the sub-identity/upper identity debates to the 
forefront (Radikal, 6 February 2006 and Radikal, 19 April 2007 respectively). Erdoğan at a 
speech he made at Bursa Chamber of Industry and Commerce on 21 April 2007 condemned 
the Malatya homicide with reference to sub-identities and referred to the wider nationalism 
debate going on at the political landscape: 
 
We do not endorse ultra-nationalism (…) This is a process which started with the 
assassination of Hrant Dink (…) There are 36 ethnic identities in Turkey. I am clear 
about this. They are all sub-identities (…) whereas upper identity is the citizenship of 
the Turkish Republic. Belief nationalism is malicious (…) we are against belief and 
religious nationalism (…) We are doing whatever necessary for laicism. We are 
equidistant to each and every believer (quoted in Zaman, 22 April 2007). 
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In April 2007, Turkish political landscape was highly predominated by presidency debates as 
the end of tenure of Turkey‘s 11th President Ahmet Necdet Sezer‘s tenure was soon to 
terminate. The main axis of the debate was that the fact that the party in power, Justice and 
Development Party has the parliamentarian majority to vote for a candidate in accordance 
with its ‗own goals‘, thereby posing a threat to the secular regime and the Republican values. 
Chief of General Staff Yaşar  Büyükanıt‘s emphasis on the necessity of having a president 
‗who is genuinely bound by the basic values of republic values, not someone just paying lip 
service to them‘ (Radikal, 13 April 2007) and Ahmet Necdet Sezer‘s last speech at the War 
Academy as the President, which mentions the threat posed against the political regime in 
Turkey (Radikal, 14 April 2007) were two important signs that showed that the AKP‘s bid for 
the Presidency was seen as a controversy to the Republic. In this debate, the presidency of 
Tayyip Erdoğan was particularly on the forefront as his daughter and wife were wearing 
headscarves, he had an imam-preacher certificate and he appointed Islamist hard-liners to the 
bureaucratic points.  The tension has even been more exacerbated when Abdullah Gul as the 
AKP nominee for presidency has not been declared to the public at the very last minute. In 
‗Claim your Republic‘ rallies, demonstrators from different backgrounds chanted slogans 
such as, ‗we do not want imams at Çankaya‘, ‗neither US nor EU, ultimately independent 
Turkey‘ and ‗Çankaya is secular and secular it will remain‘ (Radikal, 15 April 2007). The 
rallies highlighted the anxiety of the masses who felt that the laicist Republic and Republican 
values were under threat by the election of an AKP-nominated president. 
 
Another example of the depiction of a possible Islamist-oriented president as a threat to the 
Republic was two ads by Cumhuriyet, which angered the AKP government and led to a 
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debate in AKP group meetings and the parliament floor about suing the paper. In the first ad, 
a ticking clock with its hands moving backwards was shown, with a slogan in front: ‗On May 
16, the clocks are being set back 100 years. Are you aware of the danger? Defend your 
republic!‘ (Cumhuriyet, 7 March 2007). The second as included the caption ‗1881-200764‘ 
and with the slogan, ‗In May 2007 the presidential election will be held. Are you aware of the 
danger? Defend your republic!‘ (Cumhuriyet, 8 March 2007). As the New York times noted 
in reporting the rallies, ‗there were two Turkeys now‘ (New York Times, 15 April 2007; also 
see Mert, 19 April 2007). 
 
Within this environment, the AKP in general, and Erdoğan in particular, frequently made the 
point that the numbers of demonstrators and impact of the rallies were exaggerated. In two 
related statements, Erdoğan compared the number of Republican rally demonstrators and of 
those who attended the opening ceremony of Karadeniz (Black Sea) Coastal Motorway and 
belittled the former: 
 
More people showed for the opening of Karadeniz (Black Sea) Coastal Motorway. It 
was a march showing the real emotions of that region‘s people, [and the people 
attending were] not pseudo aggregates from 81 cities (quoted in Cumhuriyet, 18 
April 2007). 
 
 
In another speech, he pointed out the same distinction between those people who gather at the 
squares, i.e. Republican rallies, and those whom ‗they‘ would gather if ‗they‘ wanted: 
 
                                                            
64 1881 is the year Ataturk was born and 2007; the year of the presidential election, was depicted as his death and 
extinction of everything he achieved for the Turkish Republic.    
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After all, I am a representative of those silent masses. Look at the squares, some 
certain people gather (...) I am watching with patience. Due to my 
position...However, if I supported tension vis-à-vis  those incidents, we could gather 
10 times [more people] to those very same squares
65
 (quoted in Radikal, 22 June 
2008). 
 
 
Within the same context, another significant debate in Turkish politics has been revolving 
around the concept of so-called ‗neighbourhood pressure‘. In an interview in May 2007, 
seminal Turkish scholar, Şerif Mardin used the concept, ‗neighbourhood pressure‘ to denote 
the communal pressure created and exerted by the bigot Islamists at the very lowest level 
possible, i.e. neighbourhood, on the secular-oriented people to adopt some certain lifestyles. 
According to Mardin, this pressure might occur irrespective of the AKP in power and even 
AKP might have to be abiding by this religious authoritarian environment created by the 
political Islam (Mardin, 20 May 2007). Especially during the presidential elections, this 
designation has long been the main reference point of the secularist circles against the AKP 
policies on the grounds that this neighbourhood pressure is a clear indication of the assault on 
the lives on secular people at the lowest level of the society and finally hidden agenda of the 
AKP to Islamicise Turkey. 
 
This debate has been articulated in another interview given by him where he was asked 
whether Turkey would approximate Malaysia, an illiberal democracy with mild Islamism in 
power where individual autonomy is limited (Mardin, 16 September 2007). Depiction of a 
Turkey where neighbourhood pressure is commonplace, and which will soon be the next 
Malaysia, has long been the main reference point in the delineating of the political frontiers. 
                                                            
65 This speech has also been included within the indictment regarding the closure of AKP devised by the Public 
prosecutor, Abdullah Yalcinkaya on 14 March 2008.   
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This sense of exclusion and pressure on the part of the secular circles has been even more 
exacerbated after AKP‘s landmark electoral victory in the general elections of 22 July 2007. 
In the 22 July elections, AKP got 46.7% whereas CHP got 20.9% and MHP got 14.2% of the 
votes (Radikal, 27 July 2007). Within this context, the following remark by Fazıl Say, one of 
the most prominent Turkish pianists, shaked the public opinion. In an interview in 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, Fazıl Say said: 
 
I am contemplating to leave Turkey, not now though. Our ‗Turkey‘ dreams are 
almost dead. The wives of all ministers wear headscarves in Turkey now. The 
Islamists already won, we could only get 30 % while they got 70%
66
. We are in 
minority now, we are excluded. They have not invited me to the dinner at Çankaya. 
If it continues like this, I have a daughter; I will take her and leave the country 
(quoted in Cumhuriyet, 15 December 2007). 
 
 
The re-launch of PKK terrorism in June 2004 was also noteworthy during the period. In 
particular, the PKK ambushes in Şırnak on 7-8 October 2007, in Dağlıca, Hakkari, on 21 
October 2007 were important developments on the ground during this period. The re-launch 
of terrorist activities of PKK has been coupled with the events in Şemdinli in November 2005 
and the Newroz celebrations in March 2006 which later turned into street riots in Diyarbakır 
organised by PKK. 
 
                                                            
66 It is been debated for a long time to what parties or whom the percentages 70% and 30%  refer by the public 
opinion but it approximately corresponds to the votes of AKP.  
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Against this backdrop, 13 civil society associations with greatest number of members
67
 issued 
a declaration constituting a ‗common stance against terror‘ and stated that whatever has to be 
done to stop terror and its supporters should be done immediately (Radikal, 23 October 2007). 
Especially after the Hakkari attacks, numerous anti-terrorism demonstrations were organized 
in different parts of Turkey. The main target was the DTP, especially through the slogans, ‗we 
do not want PKK in the Parliament‘, and ‗the martyrs will not be dead, and the motherland 
will not be separated‘ (Radikal, 25 October 2007). The general tone of the reactions exhibited 
was very strong, stretching from protests directed to the DTP to individual citizens from 
Kurdish origin being sacked. In big cities, outraged masses protested in front of DTP local 
branches, denouncing terror while urging a military incursion. Besides this increasing rage 
against terrorism, there was also a call for ‗moderation‘ and ‗serenity‘ within society. The 
rally ‗Free, Democratic and Equalitarian Turkey‘ on 3 November 2007 organized by KESK, 
TMMOB and TTB and supported by political parties like DTP and ÖDP (Özgürlük ve 
Demokrasi Partisi- Freedom and Democracy Party) and intellectuals like Adalet Ağaoğlu, 
Oral Çalışlar and Oya Baydar aimed to draw attention to the need for a peaceful and unarmed 
environment against the ‗hysteria for violence rising in the streets‘ (Radikal, 27 October 
2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
67 Among those civil society associations were TOBB, TİSK, TZOB, TESK, TÜRK-İŞ, HAK-İŞ, KAMU-SEN, 
MEMUR-SEN, TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD, ASKON, TUSKON and TBB.   
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3. GENERAL FINDINGS 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In the previous section, I gave a temporal sketch of the period to show how the key events 
outlined in Chapter 5 and the discourses on Europe highlighted in Chapter 6 have interacted.  
In doing this, I aimed to show the possible (dis)continuity and recurrence of the discourses 
and what role ‗Europe‘ played within the debates and what antagonisms it created within the 
political landscape. In this section, after locating the discourses in a chronological perspective, 
I will state the general features of ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ in this period. In this respect, I will 
focus on the way in which discourses on ‗Europe‘ in the mentioned period delineated political 
frontiers and how different political demands and identities within society were articulated 
through the logics of equivalence and difference. . I will argue that, interestingly enough, 
discourses on ‗Europe‘ were attempted to be hegemonic either in a very apolitical and 
technocratic way where ‗Europe‘ has been presented as ‗everybody‘s project‘ or through the 
polarisation of the society and demonisation of ‗the Other‘. 
 
In this respect, this section will aim at showing the main features of ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ 
and highlighting how hegemonic antagonisms changed starting from 2005 and 2006 which 
led ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ to cease. I will argue that wane of hegemony of ‗Europe‘ within 
the Turkish context did not necessarily mean that discourses on ‗Europe‘ disappeared 
altogether from the political landscape. Rather, elements previously articulated through 
discourses on ‗Europe‘ started to materialise in different contexts and articulations. For 
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example, while the notion of ‗sub-identity‘ was previously explained with reference to 
‗Europe‘, starting from 2005 it began to be contextualised within a nationalism-liberalism 
debate. Similarly, while ‗Turkishness‘ was the keyword for D threat to Turkishness within the 
Article 301 debates whereas it has been articulated as an attribute to the liberalism-
nationalism antagonism within the framework of Hrant Dink‘s assassination. Therefore, 
antagonisms created by ‗Europe‘ have been substituted by different antagonisms- namely the 
antagonisms of nationalism vs. liberalism and secularism vs. Islamism in hegemonising the 
‗social‘, where ‗substitution‘ means the emergence of the elements of discourse within 
different antagonisms rather than disappearance of the discourse altogether. 
 
Not surprisingly, Turkey‘s candidacy for the EU, which was granted on 17 December 1999, 
has dovetailed with the eruption of different discourses on Europe. Although those discourses 
designated in the previous chapter are neither mutually exclusive and nor completely 
unconnected from each other, and moreover vary in the extent to which they are articulated 
(for instance the discourse D threat to Turkishness is a more general discourse than the discourse D 
upper identity), they point to different instances of ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘. 
 
As the empirical study with the newspapers Radikal, Cumhuriyet and Zaman showed, the 
discourses also have different resonances throughout the time span. D multiple identities, D threat to 
sovereignty and D threat to sovereignty have been more significant and more recurrent in the specified 
period in the sense that more statements entailed the chains of equivalences articulated by 
those discourses. It is also another significant point that the most general discourses on 
273 
 
‗Europe‘ appeared to be the discourses D threat to sovereignty and D threat to Turkishess as they 
incorporate more diverse elements within the signification chain than the other discourses. 
 
The most noteworthy finding of the project with regard to discourses on ‗Europe‘ is that, 
starting from 1999, they increasingly attempted to demarcate the political frontiers and the 
notion has increasingly been articulated within the existing and respective political 
constellations, attempting to hegemonise the social. However, starting from 2005 and 2006 
what we see is that the discourses on ‗Europe‘ are less and less significant to draw the 
political frontiers. This does not necessarily mean the disappearance of ‗Europe‘ from the 
political landscape altogether. It just means that the discourses on ‗Europe‘ less and less 
demarcate the political frontiers and dichotomise the social. Starting from 2005 and 2006, the 
signification chains of the discourses on ‗Europe‘ have been replaced by different 
antagonisms- namely the antagonisms of nationalism vs. liberalism and secularism vs. 
Islamism in hegemonising the social. The notion of ‗Europe‘ has either been included within 
the signification chains of those antagonisms or just has reappeared as a particular political 
project. As Çelik argues in the case of Kemalist imaginary in Turkish politics, Europe 
‗became less and less able to express a metaphorical fullness, and to absorb social demands 
and dislocations‘ (Çelik, 2000: 201). 
 
In the following section, I will highlight the main features of ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘. I will 
argue that through the logics of equivalence and difference, ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ 
demarcated the political frontiers either in a very apolitical way designating it as a natural 
technocratic project or in a polarizing way where the Other is demonised and prohibited. 
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3.2. Features of ‘Europe-as-hegemony’ 
 
In this section, I will show that the dominant discourses on ‗Europe‘ were predominantly 
articulated through logics of equivalence and difference which created antagonisms in 
different ways in the first period from 1999 to 2005. The discourses on ‗Europe‘ were either 
articulated through the logic of difference, where the differences were marginalised between 
the constitutive components of the discourses through signifying non-adversarial and positive 
differences or through the logic of equivalence, where the political frontiers are constructed 
on a symbolic division in society and perception of a threat from the Other. It is important to 
note that these two different logics are not mutually exclusive and completely distinct from 
each other but are dialectical and two sides of the same coin. For this reason, there is not a 
one-to-one correspondence between logics and two sides of the bipolar hegemony. That is, it 
is not possible to claim that there is one-to-one correspondence between the logic of 
difference and pro-EU positions or between the logic of equivalence and anti-EU positions. 
The logic of difference might entail the cooption of different sections of society in the name of 
the European project or it might articulate a societal alliance against Europe bringing together 
different demands. That is the main reason why I analyse the discourses on ‗Europe‘ in terms 
of a bipolar hegemony rather than an analysis of pro-Europe/anti-Europe positions. 
 
To start with, ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ materialised through the cooption of ‗people‘ under the 
rubric of ‗Europe‘. The discourses on ‗Europe‘ have been inscribed in an inclusive manner, 
which can be seen as a part of an operation to construct differential identities in terms of the 
logic of difference. Starting from DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition and stretching to AKP 
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government, ‗Europe‘ was everybody‘s project in the sense that it almost had an apolitical, 
natural and consensual connotation. 
 
For instance, İsmail Cem, Minister of Foreign Affairs in DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition, 
frequently mentioned how it is ‗wrong to divide people into being pro-Europeans and anti-
Europeans (…) The EU should not be the seismic line dividing us; it is rather a common 
platform bringing us together‘ (quoted in Radikal, 22 December 2001). He often claimed that, 
‗Europe is not an issue of controversy but an issue of compromise‘ (quoted in Radikal, 5 
March 2002) and ‗the EU is an extra-political party issue‘ (quoted in Radikal, 20 August 
2002). Similarly, for Mesut Yılmaz, the vice-Prime Minister of DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition 
and Chair of ANAP, ‗the EU is a national issue for Turkey. It is owned by the people, 
regardless of political parties‘ (quoted in Radikal, 29 May 2002). Here, both Yılmaz and Cem, 
through the invitation of all citizens of Turkey to the ideal of ‗Europe‘, introduce the notion as 
consensual and non- ideological. Here, ‗Europe‘ emerges as a political project which brings 
subjects with differential identities together. However, particularisation of identities does not 
necessarily mean their politicisation as the antagonistic frontier is not sharp and is extended to 
the margins of the society instead. Through the operation of this logic, the ideal of ‗Europe‘ 
brings the Kurds and the Alevis together.     
 
AKP, which came to power in the aftermath of July 2002 elections, also presented itself as the 
genuine and natural translation of the universal will, the representative of various demands 
within the society, almost subscribing to a ‗de-politicised‘ connotation of ‗Europe‘. Tayyip 
Erdoğan, in the first speech he made after the launch of the negotiations with the EU, pointed 
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out to the ‗natural‘ character of the Turkish European project, neutralising the internal 
contradictions of the society: 
 
Turkey managed to turn from a crucial juncture. The EU membership is a natural 
extension of Turkey‘s historical walk. The EU membership is a manifestation of 
Turkey‘s claim to be a democratic, libertarian, just and developed society. Our goal is 
a Turkey which is located among democratic, free and advanced countries. The EU is 
the most appropriate itinerary to do that (Erdoğan, 4 October 2005-emphasis added). 
 
In another speech, he mentioned the necessity to realise the ‘40-year-old European dream of 
70 millions‘68 (quoted in Radikal, 15 December 2004). Erdoğan made this speech just before 
the 17 December 2004 Luxembourg summit, when the European Council decided that EU-
Turkey accession negotiations would start on 3 October 2005, and mentioned that whatever 
had been stipulated by the EU has been fulfilled by Turkey and therefore, if the EU was as 
multicultural and just as it claimed to be, it should say ‗Yes‘ to the Turkish EU membership. 
It is important to iterate that ‗Europe‘ in this context is not a political project or terrain but an 
apolitical notion bereft of any opposition or adversary for which ‗we, as the whole nation, 
struggled arduously‘ (quoted in Radikal, 15 December 2004). 
 
Within this picture, the notion of ‗Europe‘ emerges as an ‗Eden‘ for ‗the people‘, being 
defined as an extra-political party issue. It also emerges as an external power/state-like entity 
realising the demands and interests of the people, solely for ‗the people‘ and for their ‗unfilled 
demands‘. 
 
                                                            
68 Estimated population of Turkey.  
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Alternatively, the notion of ‗people‘ has been the reference point to deal with the threat of 
‗Europe‘. As already mentioned in the previous section, Red Apple was a coalition bringing 
together some certain left groups and nationalists under the umbrella of Euroscepticism 
especially during the early stages of the EU accession. In the words of Erkin Yurdakul, the 
editor of the journal, ‗Turkish Left‘, ‗everybody should take within this national struggle 
against ‗Europe‘, which is a call for Kuva-yi Milliye, not a call for a particular political party 
(quoted in Radikal, 3 August 2003). Although the antagonistic frontier in case of Red Apple 
coalition is stronger than it is for the AKP‘s depiction of ‗Europe‘ as a political project, the 
co-existence of different political tendencies within the coalition and de-politicisation of 
potential areas of conflict between them draw upon the logic of difference.     
 
Similarly, technocratism was an important tool for de-politicising areas of potential conflict 
by constructing differential and non-antagonistic identities and in co-opting different sections 
of the society (Norval, 1990: 146). In the following quotation, Erdal Güven mentions the EU 
as infrastructure and prerequisite for individual freedom and social justice, beyond any 
political affiliation or ideology, by referring to the infamous catch phrase of Kemal Derviş, 
the state minister responsible for the economic affairs in the DSP-MHP-ANAP government. 
He is usually known for the staunch economic programme based on the floating exchange rate 
regime he had devised and the Harmonisation Packages he struggled to get ratified by the 
Parliament. In the aftermath of 2001 economic crisis in Turkey, he was appointed directly by 
the Executive (appointed by the government and approved by the President) as a technocrat: 
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The EU‘s values are the infrastructure for living humanely and fare better than any 
kind of party programme, alliance, plan or ideology. Those values are the most 
optimal and rational combination of economic welfare, social justice, individual 
freedom and coexistence with the neighbours. [Kemal] Derviş has summarised this as 
‗the happiness formula‘. This is what exactly it is (Güven, 18 August 2002) 
 
 
By delinking it with any political tendency or project, ‗Europe‘ in this context is given a 
technocratic and overarching connotation which cross-cuts any possible adversarial clashes 
between different demands within the society. For Norval, within the framework of this 
strategy, the power is concentrated in the executive branch and roles of the cabinet, 
parliament and the caucus are diminished (Norval, 1990: 146). 
 
It is also significant that within the Turkish context, this apolitical and technocratic discourse 
also comprised the critique of the elite, where they are despised and blamed for the problems 
and shortcomings faced during the EU process. It is interesting to infer from the empirical 
study that this discourse on elites stipulated a monolithic and general category of the ‗elite‘, 
which is not necessarily substantiated with regard to groups or people entailed. It is equally 
used by the AKP circles and members of the army, who are allegedly part of the ‗elite‘, as 
well as intellectuals and the critiques of the power-holders. In this picture, the dislike against 
the ‗elites‘ very much dovetailed with the depiction of ‗Europe‘ as a natural, uncontested, 
non-adversarial category, stipulating a discourse of politics without politics, where ‗politics is 
the art of suppressing the political‘ (Ranciere, 1995: 11). In this picture, ‗Europe‘ emerges as 
an external power/state-like entity realising the demands and interests of the people that could 
not be fulfilled by the Turkish state elites. Mehmet Altan, a prominent figure in Movement for 
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Europe 2002, points out to this representation crisis and calls out the Turkish people to 
scrutinise the EU process. According to Altan, the EU replaces the state in Turkey in 
protecting the interests of the people as the sultan-like elite and the politicians are not willing 
to do so: 
 
Our EU process shows that in Turkey the governors never represent the interests of 
the governed (...) [Therefore], the world does not believe in Turkey‘s governors 
either. That‘s why it is scrutinising whether they deceive their own people or not. 
Nevertheless, the EU represents the ideal state that should also exist in Turkey. That 
is, the state has been replaced by the EU in Turkey. The EU is realising the things 
that actually has to be realised by the Turkish state and it advocates the interests of 
the Turkish people (...) That‘s why those governors in Ankara and the spokespersons 
of the Turkish state who consider themselves sultans react to the decision in 
Copenhagen (…) We, as the people claiming our own future, will continue this 
movement in order to prevent the sacrifice of the EU process to the political interest 
and a bureaucratic annuity. We will attempt to be the auditor of the politicians‘ 
sincerity and bureaucracy‘s practices. (Altan, 16 December 2002). 
 
 
Therefore, within this framework, ‗Europe‘ has been articulated in the way that the elite, in 
order to perpetuate their power, compromise with unacceptable demands of the EU. In the 
following statement, Tuncer Kılınç claims that the politicians, not to sacrifice their power, 
sacrifice the policy priorities of Turkey instead. The phrase, ‗ignorance and heresy‘ is widely 
used in Turkish politics, which had originally coined by Atatürk in his ‗Address to the 
Turkish Youth‘ dated 20 October 1927. In the address, he warns the Turkish Youth against 
the fact that ‗those who have power might be in negligence, heresy and even treason‘: 
 
Politicians who lie to the public in order to be voted are ready to sacrifice Cyprus and 
our rights on Aegean in order to get a date from the EU. Those who would deem the EU 
as a Christian club have been pro-EU more than anybody else. The West sees the 
Armed Forces and Kemalism as obstacles for Turkey. Compradors, Second Republicans 
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and those in ‗negligence and heresy‘ with the words of Atatürk applaud these demands 
(quoted in Radikal, 19 May 2004). 
 
By the same token, Ümit Özdağ links the presentation of the EU accession process as an 
external pressure to the fear of the Turkish elite to lose power. He was the then head of 
ASAM (Avrasya Stratejik Arastirmalar Merkezi-Eurasia Strategical Research Centre), who 
has later been a nominee for the Chairmanship of MHP and who is known for his staunch 
nationalist outlook: 
 
We should be realising the EU standards without an external pressure as they are 
genuinely good standards, not because they belong to the EU. However, the Turkish 
elite are corrupted. They could have never been honourable enough to realize this 
[process] through its own dynamics. They could only present those to the Turkish 
people as external sanctions (quoted in Radikal, 10 March 2003). 
 
 
On the other hand, within the same period, another way of sustaining the hegemony of the 
discourses on ‗Europe‘ has been through the logic of equivalence  where the social space is 
split into two antagonistic camps which equalise their inner differences. In case of the logic of 
equivalence, the co-option of different sectors of the society around the discourses on 
‗Europe‘ has been substituted with a more exclusionary, antagonised demarcation of the 
political frontiers. This time, the political frontiers were constructed on a symbolic division in 
society and perception of a threat from the Other. What we see is the condensation of the 
meaning around two poles (Howarth et. al., 2000:11). The Other in this respect has been the 
others of Europe‘-‗the Third-World‘ or ‗the Middle East‘ ‗Europe‘ with its different 
connotations, 
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In this sense, sustaining ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ meant the dichotomisation of the social space 
either in the form of articulation of ‗Europe‘ as a front that is seeking for an opportunity to 
invade the Republic of Turkey culturally and politically. Especially within the framework of 
discourse D threat to sovereignty, perception of a threat from the ‗Other‘ is central and the society is 
symbolically divided between two camps: those who are from ‗us‘ versus those who are not 
from us, i.e. ‗them‘, the Turks versus Europeans, Armenians, Kurds, Greeks, Greek Cypriots 
etc. 
 
In the following statement, Nuh Mete Yüksel, a Prosecutor of State Security Courts, 
mentioned a similar front drawn between the ‗alerted gatekeepers of this country‘ and the 
supporters of ‗the demands of the EU and the separatist movement‘. State Security Courts 
have been designed by 1982 Constitution in order to deal with the cases about ‗Turkish 
Republic‘s internal and external security‘. The courts have been abolished in 2004 and this 
right has been given to Criminal Courts. Yüksel made this statement right after bringing about 
a case against 26 university students who petitioned in favour of university education in 
Kurdish in March 2002. He builds on the ‗peace‘ discourse used by the proponents of Kurdish 
education and argues that these claims are closely related to the separatist movement and its 
‗Byzantine trick‘, the term used for well-organised tricks and conspiracies. It is interesting to 
see that the Byzantine Empire is included within the signification chain of the ‗Other‘: 
 
Claiming ‗we do not want disintegration, we want to live peacefully‘ within the 
framework of Kurdish education demands is a lie and hypocrisy. This is a Byzantine 
trick. The separatist movement is tempering with our people‘s destinies living in 
Eastern and South-Eastern Turkey. You cannot expect good will from separatist 
movements (...) No reasoning, including the EU countries‘ demands coinciding with 
the demands of the separatist movement, cannot render the steps leading to 
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disintegration excusable. The 1000-year-old Turkic land deposited by Atatürk cannot 
be disintegrated for the sake of foreigners‘ caprices. The alerted gatekeepers of this 
country will not let this happen (quoted in Radikal, 16 March 2002). 
 
 
In the following statement, Rahşan Ecevit, the founder and ex-vice president of DSP 
(Demokratik Sol Parti-Democratic Left Party), points out to the missionary practices in 
Turkey and poses ‗them‘ who first imposed fundamentalist Muslim symbols and then 
introduced problem of missionary against ‗us‘ who is losing its religion on the way to 
‗Europe‘. Clearly, the inner differences of ‗them‘ is equalised in a way that the EU that 
induces missionary practices and those who provoke political Islam are components of the 
same Other. 
We‘re losing our religion on the way to the EU. I‘m Muslim. I cannot tolerate that 
Islam regresses here. I want to experience a robust Islam together with both Alevis 
and Sunnis, free from religious exploitation. But, they [first] put the sariks and 
headscarves on Turkey‘s head and made her wear cubbes and burkas. They wanted 
to throw her to the league of uncivilised Muslim countries. Then, the EU fashion 
stepped in. Now, you can even find a church in the apartments. Some of our citizens 
are converted to Christianity either through convincing or providing interest (...) The 
cross comes in right after the takke (...) I want my country back (quoted in 
Cumhuriyet, 3 January 2005).  
 
 
Alternatively, the dichotomisation of the social space has sometimes taken the form of 
iterating the impossibility of thinking another alternative. The ‗Other‘ within this picture was 
either ‗the Middle East‘ or ‗the Third World‘. The meaning is condensed around two poles, 
where you can either choose between ‗Europe‘ or be bereft of democracy, human rights, etc. 
This ‗either/or‘ dichotomy has usually been used within the European integration, within 
Eastern enlargement in particular, where Central and Eastern European countries would either 
‗return to Europe‘ and have all the intrinsic qualities associated with it, or, they would remain 
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‗static, illiberal, submerged into never-ending circles and strives‘ (Bideleux and Jeffries, 
1998:10). 
 
In this statement, as a response to Halil Kalkanli‘s statement that ‗we support full heartedly 
that Turkey join the EU on a honorary, dignified and equal basis‘, the then Chair of PR 
section of General Chief of Staff (Kalkanli, 1 March 2002), Murat Yetkin, a journalist known 
for his liberal stance, argues that staying out of the ideal of ‗Europe‘ is synonymous with 
turning into a Middle Eastern dictatorship: 
 
I don‘t think that staying out of the EU, which is the most successful peace and 
development project throughout the history, would bring honour to Turkey. I believe 
that conversion to a poor Middle Eastern dictatorship will render the people even more 
dishonourable. I would like to raise my child with the EU‘s economic, social and 
political standards, i.e. within a more humane environment (Yetkin, 1 March 2002). 
 
 
This discourse on the impossibility of thinking any other alternative has especially been used 
against the DSP-ANAP-MHP coalition government in the 1999-2002 period in order to 
criticize the delays in adopting Copenhagen Criteria and/or National Programme especially 
due to MHP‘s controversial stance against the abolishment of capital punishment. For Turker 
Alkan, a liberal journalist known for his mild and consensual attitude, delays in the realization 
of National Programme was equivalent to being a Third-World country: 
 
What matters for us is that the EU‘s authorities formally accept us as a candidate. We 
have a National Programme we had devised accordingly and the schedule is in effect. 
It is hard to understand the logic of speculating as ‗they do not want us‘. If you will be 
honest enough to say, ‗I will not be able to fulfil this National Programme; it is too 
democratic for me. The Turkish society and I are not ready for this much of 
democracy and human rights; I am giving up trying to join the EU. It is then worth 
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being a Middle Eastern country where the soldiers commit coup d‘états occasionally 
and the dictators like Saddam wander around‘; I can understand this (Alkan, 9 March 
2002). 
 
Similarly, for Mahfi Eğilmez, another liberal journalist, ‗we should see that there is only one 
alternative to EU membership: being a Third Class Middle Eastern country. If our politicians 
want to keep Turkey as a Middle Eastern country, they should know that power in Turkey 
will sooner or later belong to radical parties‘ (Egilmez, 16 May 2002). 
 
In a nutshell, ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ attempted either to act as a consensual ‗everybody‘s 
project‘ which cancelled the political differences between different sections of the society yet 
retained their differential identities or to split the society into two antagonistic camps in a 
more exclusionary manner where the Other has been demonised, the Other being ‗the Third-
World‘ or ‗the Middle East‘ or ‗Europe‘ itself. 
 
3.3. Reflecting on the findings: merits and limitations  of the analytical framework  
 
 
In the previous section, I aimed at identifying  two  moves of ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ in 
demarcating political frontiers: logic of equivalence and logic of difference. I attempted to 
show that how a politicised struggle of shifting meanings worked in case of notion of 
‗Europe‘ in Turkey after 1999 and how different political identities aligned themselves vis-à-
vis  the concept. I argued that the logics of equivalence and difference are  very helpful in 
showing how the inclusion and exclusion of various political identities worked for ‗Europe-
as-hegemony‘ and thus how the political frontiers have been drawn.  
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I think the analysis above is relevant in broadly  two senses. First, it shows how ‗Europe‘ 
created contestation in Turkish politics thereby demarcating political frontiers and attempting 
at hegemony. Secondly, and more particularly, it points out to how the logics of equivalence 
and difference operated  in establishing ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ in Turkish politics. However, I 
do not claim that ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ was sucessful in being a hegemony per se and this 
has at least two reasons. First of all, I claim that there is not a straightforward relationship 
between understanding how the logics of equivalence and difference operate in Turkish 
politics on the one hand and claiming the emergence of ‗hegemony‘ on the other. This goes 
back to my argument in Chapter 3: the notion of ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ is the hegemonic 
struggle, not the hegemony per se. Therefore, I claim that although logics of equivalence and 
difference are very helpful in understanding ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ as a struggle, it is not 
easy to claim that these attempts were successful as a hegemonic practice as Laclau and 
Mouffe would argue. The analysis of the newspapers and parliamentary debates did not 
provide enough empirical evidence to point to the split of the social (logic of equivalence) or 
the expansion of the limits of the political to the margins of the society (logic of difference) 
by ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘. Moreover, I hereby solely refer to the functioning of logics of 
equivalence and difference whereas various ‗Essex School‘ scholars scrutinised above 
focusing on these logics usually focus on how these logics have been instrumental in 
answering to the social demands attached to those logics. For instance, Buenfil‘s account of 
Mexico shows that the mobilisation of the Mexican armed movement, teachers, workers and 
peasant leaders under the rubric of the oppressed created a ruling bloc out of these groups and 
has been instrumental in unifying their demands (Buenfil, 2000). Similarly, both Howarth‘s 
and Norval‘s various studies show that the rise of the Charterist movement and National Party 
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(NP) in the 1980s coopted the African workers, Indians and Coloureds around the notion of 
‗blackness‘ who had a common demand:  challanging the common enemy of Grand Apartheid 
(Howarth, 1997; 2000; Norval, 1990; 1994; 1996; 1998). Therefore, an analysis of logics of 
difference and equivalence has to incorporate a  focus on the demands of different sections of 
the society to show how these logics  will be instrumental in forming a historical bloc, on 
which further research into these logics should focus.  
 
3. 4. Whatever happened to ‘Europe-as-hegemony’ in the aftermath of 2005 and 2006? 
 
In this section, I will substantiate my initial claim that contrary to the immediate aftermath of 
1999 when the discourses on ‗Europe‘ were increasingly feeding into the existing discourses 
in Turkish political landscape, starting from 2005 to 2006 what we see is that the discourses 
on ‗Europe‘ are less and less significant to draw the political frontiers. In this respect, the 
antagonisms of nationalism vs. liberalism and secularism vs. Islamism replaced the 
signification chains of the discourses on ‗Europe‘ hegemonising the ‗social‘, which are now 
the main instruments for politics as the ‗practice of creation, reproduction and transformation 
of social relations‘ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 153). In the new period, the subjects do not 
position themselves within the discourses on ‗Europe‘ as much as they did before. Starting 
from 2005 and 2006, ‗Europe‘ is not the common language anymore, failing to set the limits 
of objectivity.  Instead, different dichotomies such as secularism vs. Islamism and 
‗nationalism vs. liberalism‘ started shaping politics. Here, I vulgarise the dichotomies calling 
them ‗secularism vs. Islamism‘ and ‗nationalism vs. liberalism‘ in the sense that these 
designations are actually coined in Turkish politics by the proponents of the other side of the 
dichotomy. For instance, when the events that I will be referring to below unfolded, 
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‗nationalism‘ was almost an allegation posed by the so-called ‗liberals‘ whereas Islamism was 
the biggest threat for those who were ‗secular‘. Within this framework, I argue that the fact 
that political space is now organised with regard to different antagonisms does not mean that 
‗Europe‘ completely disappeared from the picture. Rather, elements previously articulated by 
the discourses on ‗Europe‘ such as ‗minority‘ ‗sub-identity‘ and ‗Turkishness‘ started to 
materialise in different contexts and articulations. 
 
As mentioned previously, the notion of ‗Europe‘ was a significant element within the 
framework of  D multiple identity  and it was articulated as equivalent to ‗Europe‘ with respect to 
the latter‘s significance in terms of amelioration of minority rights. It was also articulated by 
D threat to sovereignty in the sense that there was a link between ‗Europe‘s fictitious construction of 
‗minorities‘ in Turkey and ethnic separation instigated by PKK (Baykal, 23 March 2007). 
However, especially within the framework of presidential elections and debates on so-called 
‗neighbourhood pressure‘, ‗minority‘ had a completely different connotation. In Fazil Say‘s 
landmark statement about leaving the country due to the exclusion he felt, ‗the minority‘ was 
the secular circles, ‗whose wives do not wear headscarves‘ and ‗who are not invited to 
Çankaya anymore‘ (quoted in Cumhuriyet, 15 December 2007). ‗Minority‘ is now articulated 
in terms of being secular or not, not with reference to ‗Europe‘. This statement also points to 
the fact that the antagonisms setting the political frontiers are now articulated by other 
antagonisms than ‗Europe‘. On the ‗we‘ side, there is a group which is represented by 30% 
and who feel threatened by the waning ‗Turkey‘ dreams and by the headscarf-wearing wives 
of ministers. ‗Them‘, on the other hand, is the group which is represented by the 70% of the 
votes and which constitutes the majority and exerts pressure on ‗us‘. 
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Similarly, ‗Turkishness‘ which was the keyword of the article 301 debates and a significant 
element in D threat to Turkishness , has emerged as a connotation used within the debates of 
nationalism that flourished after the rising ultra-nationalist violence incidents and Hrant 
Dink‘s assassination.  The main motto of Hrant Dink‘s funeral, ‗Hepimiz Hrant Dink'iz, 
Hepimiz Ermeniyiz‘ (‗we are all Hrant Dink, we are all Armenians‘) and the slogan of Milli 
Mücadele Derneği, ‗we are all Turks, and we are all Mustafa Kemals‘ as a reaction of the 
former show that the debate on ‗Turkishness‘ is now maintained with reference to different 
antagonisms (Radikal, 24 January 2007, Radikal, 17 February 2007 respectively). The 
reflection of this in the football pitches was also noteworthy to point to how the political was 
shaped. On 28 January 2007, in a football match between Trabzonspor- Kayserispor in 
Trabzon and in another match on the same day, placards reading ‗we are all Turkish‘, ‗we will 
not say we are Armenians even if you kill us‘ were displayed. At a match between 
Malatyaspor and Elazığspor, Malatyaspor, football team of Malatya which is Hrant Dink‘s 
hometown, has been condemned by a placard, saying ‗Armenian Malatya‘ (Radikal, 29 
January 2007). These slogans iterate that the political space is now organised with regard to 
the distinction between those who are ‗all Hrant Dink‘ and those who denigrate this and prefer 
to be ‗all Turkish/Mustafa Kemal‘ instead. ‗Turkishness‘ is not articulated by its relation to 
‗Europe‘, but with regard to the so-called nationalists vs. liberals dichotomy. 
 
Along the same lines, the sub-identity vs. upper-identity debates which were precipitated with 
regard to was now a part of a wider nationalism debate, which has been stated in his speech 
condemning the homicides in Malatya. For him there are 36 sub-identities in Turkey whereas 
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upper identity is the citizenship of the Turkish Republic and he was against ‗belief and 
religious nationalism‘ (quoted in Zaman, 21 April 2007). 
 
 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
So far, this thesis aimed at understanding the emergence of ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ in the 
aftermath of 1999 in Turkish political debates. For this aim, rather than making an 
unproblematized association between particular political camps and ‗pro-‘/‘anti-‘ Europe 
positions, I attempted to look at the political debates through the hegemony lens. By calling 
the role Europe plays within the debates as ‗bipolar hegemony‘ where both poles of the 
discourses (pro- vs. anti-Europe) are parts of the same hegemonic discourse and reify a 
particular construction of the world, I argued that hegemony of Europe is sustained via 
‗chains of difference‘ and ‗chains of equivalence‘. After singling out the discourses on 
‗Europe‘ in Turkish political debates in the 1999-2008 period in Chapter 6 (Dmultiple identity, 
Dterritorial integrity/anti-terrorism, D threat to sovereignty and D threat to Turkishness) by using the questions listed 
in Chapter 4, in this chapter, I diachronised the already-sketched discourses on ‗Europe‘ by 
locating them within the timeline of key events scrutinised in Chapter 5. The idea behind this 
was to highlight the possible (dis)continuity and recurrence of the discourses and to outline 
how politics has been precipitated in Turkey via discourses on ‗Europe‘ and what role the 
former played within the debates during the focused period. 
 
Subsequently, I outlined the general features of ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘. For this aim, I 
focused on the way in which discourses on ‗Europe‘ in the mentioned period delineated 
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political frontiers and how different political demands and identities within the society 
operated through the logics of difference and equivalence. I showed that discourses on 
‗Europe‘ attempted to hegemonise the social either in a very apolitical and technocratic way 
where ‗Europe‘ has been presented as ‗everybody‘s project‘ or by polarising the society and 
demonising the Other. However, it is crucial to remember that the concept of ‗Europe-as-
hegemony‘ in this project iterates a hegemonic struggle, rather than the hegemony per se. The 
operation of the logics of equivalence and difference does not necessarily point to the 
emergence of ‗hegemony‘ as such, which I have already argued in Chapter 3. To claim the 
emergence of hegemony, we need more empirical evidence on the hegemonic practices within 
the realms of economy, foreign policy, education and alike.  
Within this framework, the main argument of this chapter has been that discourses on 
‗Europe‘ were unable to create antagonisms and delineate political frontiers starting from 
2005 and 2006, which led ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ to cease, which did not necessarily mean 
that discourses on ‗Europe‘ disappeared altogether from the political landscape. Rather, 
elements previously articulated by the discourses on ‗Europe‘ started to materialize in 
different contexts and articulations. I substantiated this argument by showing how the notions 
of ‗sub-identity‘, ‗Turkishness‘ and ‗minority‘ was previously explained with reference to 
‗Europe‘, starting from 2005, they started being located on wider debates of nationalism-
liberalism and secularism-Islamism. Therefore, antagonisms created by ‗Europe‘ have been 
substituted by different antagonisms. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this thesis, departing from a more general concern with understanding how political 
frontiers are demarcated in Turkish politics, I aimed at scrutinising the emergence of ‗Europe-
as-hegemony‘ in the aftermath of 1999 in Turkish political debates. Rather than approaching 
this puzzle from a Europeanisation literature perspective, which a researcher working on 
Europe in Turkish politics would typically do, I singled out discourses on ‗Europe‘ in the 
Turkish political terrain and I explored how those discourses shaped politics and demarcated 
political frontiers which would sustain the hegemony of ‗Europe‘.  I called this hegemony 
‗bipolar hegemony‘ as, I argued, there is often not that much difference between being anti-
/pro-Europe in terms of reifying a particular conception of ‗Europe‘. After singling out 4 main 
discourses on ‗Europe‘ (i.e. ‗Europe‘ as a keyword for multiple identities, ‗Europe‘ as a 
)Rather than seeing different representations of ‗Europe‘ as uncontested discourses of some 
political inclinations, I focused on how political frontiers were delineated by representing 
‗Europe‘ as an overarching project that would unite different sections of society (logic of 
difference) or by polarising society into two irreconcilable parts (logic of equivalence). This 
thesis showed that ‗Europe‘ has on the one hand been represented as everybody‘s project 
either in terms of healing all problems of the Turkish society or uniting people against loss of 
sovereignty and as an ‗either-or‘ situation where people have to choose between ‗Europe‘ and 
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being a Third world country or between being against ‗Europe‘ and disintegration on the 
other.  
 
 
The thesis 
 
In this respect, the overall thesis has been that ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ after 1999 emerged by 
discourses on ‗Europe‘ delienating political frontiers; this ceased from 2005 to 2006. This did 
not mean that discourses on ‗Europe‘ disappeared altogether from the political landscape in 
2005/06. Rather, elements previously articulated by the discourses on ‗Europe‘ started to 
materialise in different contexts and articulations of ‗Europe‘ have been silenced. This does 
not necessarily mean that the discourses on ‗Europe‘ completely disappeared from the 
political landscape in the aftermath of 2005 and 2006. Rather, they have been silenced so that 
they were not able to create political identities anymore. 
 
Project glossary 
 
To start with, due to the key developments of the period I had selected, ‗Europe‘ more often 
than not meant the EU in this project. In this respect, ‗Europe‘ within the framework of this 
project was taken as a construction and a signifier around which some particular meanings 
were articulated. As Chapter 7 showed, starting from 1999, ‗Europe‘ increasingly penetrated 
the domestic debates and determined the way in which politics was managed. It determined 
the sides of the debates such as Cyprus, minority rights, sub-identity and like. Therefore, 
rather than being a taken-for-granted notion, ‗Europe‘ was a construction articulated 
differently in different contexts. As it determined the sides of the debates, it also had an 
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impact on politics. Therefore, ‗Europe‘ within the context of this project emerged both as a 
construction and an impact. 
 
Similarly, ‗discourse‘ in this project meant the ways in which ‗Europe‘ emerged as a political 
issue. Besides relating itself to the privileged signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘, 
‗Europe‘ also fixed itself to particular meanings such as ‗minority‘, ‗threat to Turkishness‘ 
and ‗decrease in terrorism‘ and emerged as equivalent to those elements. This temporary 
fixation has been taken as ‗discourse‘ by this project. 
 
Another important concept I was interested in has been the ‗political frontier‘, as the core aim 
of this project is to explore the extent to which ‗Europe‘ demarcates the political frontiers in 
Turkish politics after 1999. By ‗political frontier‘, I meant the symbolic dividing line between 
different political identities which is contingently constructed. What distinguished Devlet 
Bahçeli who mentioned the ‗hidden agenda‘ of the EU from Ümit Fırat who took Europe as a 
guarantee for territorial integrity of Turkey? What role did ‗Europe‘ play in the demarcation 
of this difference? I used the notion of ‗political frontiers‘ to define the differential positions 
of those discourses. In this picture, political frontier between Devlet Bahçeli and Ümit Fırat 
has been demarcated by different conceptions of ‗Europe‘, what I called as ‗antagonism‘. 
 
Last, but not least, the concept of ‘Europe-as-hegemony’ is the name of the struggle 
itself for the hegemonic positions of political identities and discourses. Therefore, it 
identifies the hegemonic struggle on the part of discourses on ‘Europe’, not the 
hegemony per se.  
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Broader relevance of the project 
 
 
The main contribution of this project has been the exploration of discourses on ‗Europe‘ in 
Turkish politics through a hegemony lens. This offers an alternative approach to the main 
scholarly tendencies to use the Europeanisation literature to understand ‗Europe‘ at domestic 
level on one hand, and presenting Turkish discourses on ‗Europe‘ through a pro- vs. anti-
Europe bifurcation on the other. Rather than making this unproblematic association between 
political camps and stances vis-à-vis ‗Europe‘, I argued that it does not really matter whether 
a discourse is pro- or anti-European as in both cases it is the ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ iterated. I 
termed this as, ‗bipolar hegemony‘, which offers a fruitful analytical framework for students 
of political science. 
 
I also coined ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ as the privileged signifiers of Turkish politics, which 
is also a novel claim. I argued that for any signifier to be hegemonic in Turkish politics, it has 
to relate itself to the signifiers of ‗security‘ and ‗democracy‘ which have materialised in 
different ways in different periods, yet always significant and ‗privileged‘. As there is not a 
prescribed and free-standing set of rules and techniques that could be taken out from the shelf 
and applied in discourse theory and ‗methodological deficit is one of the most important 
alleged deficits of the discourse theory‘ (Howarth, 2008), conception of privileged signifiers 
as such emerges as a helpful tool to operationalise particular discourses.  
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Finally, I claimed that as helpful as the logics of difference and equivalence are in identifying 
antagonisms and delineation of political frontiers and understanding the emergence of a 
hegemonic struggle, they do not straightforwardly show the emergence of hegemony per se. 
Chapter 7 of this thesis where I operationalise these logics also shows that claiming that the 
the social is split into two antagonistic poles (logic of equivalence) or this split is expanded to 
the margins of society (logic of difference) is not as easy as the Laclau-Mouffean theoretical 
framework would argue. Indeed, the current analysisof newspapers and parliamentary debates 
to trace ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ in Turkish politics after 1999 shows that we need more 
empirical evidence to claim that these particular discourses were hegemonic. The questioning 
of the link between hegemonic logics and hegemony this thesis attempted to make is a novel 
attempt.  
 
All in all, although it cannot give a fully-fledged and empirically-supported account of the 
hegemony of ‗Europe‘ in the aftermath of 1999, this study is an original reading of the post-
1999 Turkish politics in terms of discourses on ‗Europe‘ with its particular focus on the 
hegemonic struggle these discourses emerge within.   
 
 
Avenues for further research 
 
However much it has been an exciting scholarly venture for me to devise the aforementioned 
novel approach, the contribution of this project is largely theoretical. This mainly stems from 
the theoretical framework and analytical toolkit employed. It is difficult to deal with and 
operationalise the concept of hegemony, as has already been pointed out by many scholars 
talking about the concept in its Gramscian sense (Tünay, 1983; Morton, 2007), particularly as 
296 
 
it is understood ‗as a contested, fragile and tenuous process, rather than simply a structure or 
edifice‘ (Morton, 2007: 78). This is complicated further still when one considers how the 
concept is approached from a discourse theory point of view, as discourse theory stresses the 
ultimate contingency of all social identity and the partial fixity of meaning and hegemony 
(Howarth et. al., 2000), thereby adding a contingency dimension to the concept. When 
combined with the methodological deficit of discourse theory, therefore, this resulted in a 
more modest empirical contribution to the literature. Besides, hegemony is a pervasive and 
versatile concept.  
 
There are also some limitations of the current study stemming fom the analytical framework 
employed. As inspirational and groundbreaking as Laclau and Mouffe‘s approach to 
discourses, hegemony and political frontiers is, their theoretical framework entails a number 
of limitations the current attempt also suffers from.  The extension of scope of politics, the 
criticism of the ontological primacy of a particular category like class and the contingency 
aspect brought about in terms of the construction of political identities, without any doubt, is 
path-breaking in terms of explaining social phenomena. In particular, this thesis‘s 
fundemental aim of unveiling how discourses on ‗Europe‘ demarcate political frontiers in 
Turkish politics after 1999 is definitely congruent with Laclau and Mouffe‘s designation of 
the political as a terrain criss-crossed with antagonisms open to articulation and negotiation. 
However, a critical evaluation of the aforementioned theoretical framework is also needed to 
understand and point out to the limitations of this project and to show future research 
trajectories to reflect on these limitations.  
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The main criticism posed against Laclau and Mouffe has been the failure of their theoretical 
framework to take into account material factors and the realm of economy as a whole (e.g. 
Townshend, 2003, 2004; Geras, 1987; Lewis, 2005). According to Townshend, ‗there could 
be some form of explanatory primacy of material factors‘ within the Laclau-Mouffean 
analytical framework (Townshend, 2004: 274). Similarly, in her account of the book, 
Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change, she 
classifies the contributors of the book as ‗thick‘ and ‗thin‘ theorists where the ‗―thick‖ 
explicitly deny the importance of institutional and socio-economic factors in shaping 
discourse and the role of ―interests‖ in explaining political motivation [while] the ―thin‖ 
theorists (…) implicitly invite, or explicitly allow, a greater constitutive role for socio-
economic factors and preconstituted interests, in effect opening up the possibility of greater 
methodological pluralism‘ (Townshend, 2003: 133). This new ‗postmodern politics‘—while it 
‗―repoliticizes‖ a series of domains previously considered ―apolitical‖ or ―private‖; the fact 
remains, [...] that it does not in fact repoliticise capitalism, because the very notion and form 
of the ―political‖ within which it operates is grounded in the ―depoliticisation‖ of the 
economy‘ (Butler, 2000: 98). In line with this, the current attempt which aims to explore the 
emergence and disappearance of ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ does not make any reference to the 
material aspects of this hegemony and how the discourses on ‗Europe‘ are articulated within 
the realm of the economy. Future research on ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ might entail a degree of 
more materialist forms of explanation so as to explore the notion‘s ‗material possibility‘ and 
its relationship to ‗existing market orders‘ in Turkish politics (Townshend, 2003: 136).  
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In line with the non-materiality of Laclau-Mouffean analytical framework, another crucial 
question that needs to be contemplated is whether the notion of ‗hegemony‘ is a dynamic 
concept or not. The thesis so far aimed at exploring how different positions and political 
identities have been formed by the discourses on ‗Europe‘ in Turkish politics after 1999. 
However, in line with this aim, ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ within this study emerges as a struggle 
to maintain the already existing hegemony of the notion. Therefore, the question explored 
here is not how ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ is formed, but how it is maintained. Similarly, the 
Laclau-Mouffean theoretical framework does not interrogate the success conditions of 
discourses. By this token, this thesis did not explore why discourses on ‗Europe‘ succeeded in 
hegemonising the social in Turkey after 1999. A more structurally-informed reading of 
‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ might answer these questions.     
 
Similarly, the explanatory power of the concepts of logic of equivalence and logic of 
difference also has to be rethought, as already mentioned before. In Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, I 
investigated how logics of equivalence and difference worked in forming bipolar hegemony 
of ‗Europe‘. However, as this study confined itself to 3 newspapers, there is not enough 
empirical evidence to claim that the social was really split into two (logic of equivalence) or 
‗Europe‘ emerged as a non-adversarial category (logic of difference).  It would be interesting 
to see in possible future research projects how discourses on ‗Europe‘ shape social demands 
and have an impact on the realms of political economy, mass culture, foreign policy and the 
like. This exercise will also help refer to the question of how we might identify ‗collective 
will‘ in establishing ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘. In sum, further research might fruitfully explore, 
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the impact of ‗Europe-as-hegemony‘ in different domains of social phenomena in Turkey, and 
scrutinise a more historical narrative of ‗Europe‘ 
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